THE PUERTO RICANS:

their history, culture, and society

edited by Adalberto López



THE PUERTO RICANS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2018 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/puertoricanstheiOOOOunse

51475 972.95
Pu

Schenkman Pub. Co. 1980
490p.

Schenkman
11.25

THE PUERTO RICANS: THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY

Sub. ① + ②

Edited by
Adalberto López

Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts

CORRY PUBLIC LIBRARY

Copyright © 1980
Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc.
3 Mount Auburn Place
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

10.12

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The Puerto Ricans: their history, culture, and society.

Bibliography: p.
1. Puerto Rico—History—Addresses, essays, lectures.
2. Puerto Ricans in the United States—~~Addresses~~,
essays, lectures. I. Lopez, Adalberto.
F1972.P83 972.95 79-28298
ISBN 0-87073-844-5
ISBN 0-87073-845-3 pbk.

Printed in the United States of America.

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be
reproduced in any form without written permission of the publisher.

To all the compañeros at the Centro de
Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriqueña (CEREP) and
the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, who are writing the
history of the Puerto Rican people.

Contents

Map of Puerto Rico viii

The Contributors ix

Preface xi

Part I: Puerto Rico to 1898 1

Chiefdom and Encomienda in Puerto Rico: The Development of Tribal Society and the Spanish Colonization to 1530
Francisco Moscoso 3

The Evolution of a Colony: Puerto Rico in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries
Adalberto López 25

The Birth of a Nation: Puerto Rico in the Nineteenth Century
Adalberto López 49

Part II: Puerto Rico Since 1898 95

Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico
Angel G. Quintero Rivera 97

The Politics of Colonialism: Puerto Rico from 1898 to 1972
Diana Christopulos 129

Dependence and Development in Puerto Rico
Morris Morley 171

The Development of Social Classes and Political Conflicts in Puerto Rico
Angel G. Quintero Rivera 213

The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Struggle for Independence in Puerto Rico
Juan Manuel Carrión 233

The Development of Annexationist Politics in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico
Aarón Gamaliel Ramos 257
Women in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico
Edna Acosta-Belén 273
The Unveiling of a Nation: Puerto Rican Literature in the Twentieth Century
Sandra Messinger Cypess 283

Part III: Puerto Ricans in the United States 311

The Puerto Rican Diaspora: A Survey
Adalberto López 313
The Genesis of the Puerto Rican Migration
Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños 345
The Policies of Exploitation and Racism: Puerto Ricans in Hawaii, 1902 351
Vito Marcantonio: Defensor de los Puertorriqueños
Adalberto López 363
Poverty and Discrimination: Puerto Ricans in the United States
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 375
The San Juan Shuttle: Puerto Ricans on Contract
Tom Seidl, Janet Shenk, and Adrian DeWind 417
Voices of Anger and Protest
Pedro Pietri, Iris Morales, and Felipe Luciano 433
Beyond Survival: Por que seguiremos siendo puertorriqueños
Frank Bonilla 453

Selected Bibliography 467

Brief Chronology of Puerto Rican History 475


ATLANTIC OCEAN
SAN JUAN
AGUADILLA
ARECIBO
FAJARDO
Lares
Utuado
Jayuya
CAGUAS
Barranquitas
Cidra
MAYAGUEZ
HUMACAO
San German
PONCE
GUAYAMA
Guanica
CARIBBEAN SEA

The Contributors

EDNA ACOSTA-BELÉN is Assistant Professor of Hispanic and Puerto Rican Studies at the State University of New York at Albany. She is editor of *The Puerto Rican Woman* and author of articles and essays on Caribbean literature.

FRANK BONILLA is Director of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños of the City University of New York (CUNY) and Professor of Sociology in CUNY's doctoral program. He is author of *The Failure of Elites,* co-editor of *Structures of Dependency,* and, as a member of the Centro's History Task Force, participated in writing *Labor Migration under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience.*

JUAN MANUEL CARRIÓN is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is currently working on a book about the Puerto Rican petty bourgeoisie in the twentieth century.

The CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PUERTORRIQUEÑOS was established at the City University of New York (CUNY) in 1973. Through research, publication, dissemination of information and by service to students, faculty and community, the Centro seeks to enlarge the knowledge and capacity for effective action on public issues relevant to Puerto Ricans, especially those living in U.S. communities. The Centro's address is 445 West 59th Street, Room 1205, New York, New York 10019.

DIANA CHRISTOPULOS is a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at the State University of New York at Binghamton and Assistant Professor of History at Hartwick College.

SANDRA MESSINGER CYPESS is Assistant Professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton. She has contributed chapters to several books and is the author of articles and essays on Latin American drama and narrative techniques. She is currently working on a book on Latin American women dramatists.

ADALBERTO LÓPEZ is Associate Professor of History, Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Area Studies Program, and Coordinator of Overseas Academic Programs at the State University of

New York at Binghamton. He is author of *The Revolt of the Comuneros, 1721-1735: A Study in the Colonial History of Paraguay*, co-editor of *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society*, and author of articles and essays on the history of Puerto Rico and colonial South America.

MORRIS MORLEY is currently Adjunct Instructor in History and Political Science at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is co-author of *The United States and Chile* and *The Nationalization of Venezuelan Oil* and is currently working on a book on U.S. imperial policy toward Cuba during 1898-1978.

FRANCISCO MOSCOSO is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton and Instructor in the Department of Puerto Rican Studies at Lehman College where he teaches history.

PEDRO PIETRI, IRIS MORALES, and FELIPE LUCIANO are all young Puerto Rican militants and among the founders of the Young Lords Party (later renamed the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization).

ANGEL G. QUINTERO RIVERA is Research Associate at the Social Science Research Center of the University of Puerto Rico and a member of CEREP (Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriqueña). He is author of *Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico* and *El liderato local de los partidos y el estudio de la política puertorriqueña*, editor of *Lucha Obrera en Puerto Rico* (published in English as *Workers' Struggle in Puerto Rico: A Documentary History*), and author of articles and essays on Puerto Rican history and politics.

AARÓN GAMALIEL RAMOS is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at Rutgers University, and Instructor of Puerto Rican Studies at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

TOM SEIDL, JANET SHENK and ADRIAN DeWIND are researchers and reporters for *NACLA Report on the Americas* published by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). NACLA's address is 151 West 19th Street, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10011.

Preface

This is a book about a people who have never exercised full control over their national destiny. It is a book about a nation hundreds of thousands of whose members have been driven by forces beyond their control to migrate from their homeland and settle in the United States; people who remain today at the bottom of this country's political and socioeconomic structures.

The history, culture, and society of the Puerto Rican people are complex. It is a history that spans over a period of almost half a millennium. It is a culture that has been shaped by Amerindian, Spanish, African and North American influences. It is a society that has been shaped by manifest colonialism. In the past decade much has been written about Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans. Unfortunately, a great deal of that literature is superficial and much of it just plain bad. The history of the Puerto Rican people remains to be written. Too many questions that have been asked about that history continue unanswered; many more questions remain to be asked. This volume does not pretend to ask all the questions or even to touch upon all those that have been asked and still beg answers. It by no means approaches the full story of the Puerto Rican people or touches upon all aspects of that story. It merely explores some of them.

All of the essays in this volume have a common goal: to inform about Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans, to stimulate discussion, and to provide some tentative answers to a few questions. But the essays do vary in substance and approach. A few emphasize narrative history and are designed to provide basic information about Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans for those who know little or nothing about both. Others are more analytical. But both types form a whole which will hopefully prove useful to those interested in the Puerto Rican people.

Adalberto López
State University of New York
at Binghamton

PART I

Puerto Rico to 1898

Chiefdom and Encomienda in Puerto Rico: The Development of Tribal Society and the Spanish Colonization to 1530

Francisco Moscoso

When the Spaniards embarked on the colonization of the Antilles in 1492 and of Puerto Rico in 1508, two different historical worlds clashed. Christopher Columbus and his voyagers, Juan Ponce de León, Sancho de Arango, Luis de Añasco, and the rest of the *conquistadores* of Puerto Rico, came from a Spain that was experiencing, like many other countries of Western Europe in the sixteenth century, the decline of feudalism. It was the historical juncture of the transition to an incipient capitalism. In that initial phase of "original accumulation of capital," in which the gold and silver of the Americas was to play such an important role, the merchant classes played a leading hand in the organization of a new mercantile economy. While a diverse peasantry struggled against the old ties to the feudal landlords, the power of the latter was being wrested at each step by the nascent absolutist states. For the peoples of Spain it was also the epoch of an active participation in the culture of the Renaissance and the beginnings of overseas expansion. In the course of the fifteenth century both Portugal and Spain were involved in the conquest and settlement of non-European territories.

In many ways, the "discovered" aborigines of the Antilles, that is, the Taino peoples, still had the physiognomy of a primitive society. Among them, however, the tribal communal relations had been in a process of disintegration. Chiefs and "principals" came to occupy positions of domination within the tribes. Meanwhile, the masses of laboring tribesmen found themselves subjects of the new polity of the chiefdoms. For the Taino peoples it was the epoch of the incursion of mythology into the culture of nascent class-divided societies. In the fifteenth century the more powerful chiefs of Hispaniola and Puerto Rico were engaged in tribal warfare to expand their chiefdoms.

The history of Spain had witnessed the development of societies from the remote past of human evolution. This is dramatized by the habitation in the Caves of Altamira, bearers of paleolithic art. The area that was to become Spain had been the territorial domain of a diversity of tribes, including invading "barbarians" from the north. During classical antiquity, Phoenicians and Greeks had set up trading posts and colonies there. Later on, the Iberian Peninsula became the western frontier of Roman civilization and the Roman empire. Visigoths conquerors, in turn, established a monarchical enclave in Toledo early in the sixth century and dominated most of the Peninsula until they were defeated by Moslem armies which invaded from North Africa in 711. The Christian feudal nobility resisted the Moslem occupation and, for almost seven centuries, Hispania, the ancient Roman name for the Peninsula, was the arena of a persistent struggle between Christianity and Islam. The final triumph of the Reconquista in Granada coincided with the year Columbus sailed to discover the new route to the Indies.

The history of *Boriquen*, the indigenous name of Puerto Rico, had not witnessed such splendor nor accumulated so much social experience as Spain. Common to both societies was the reality of the exploitation of the labor of the masses; both were forms of class societies.

The main goal of this essay is to outline the process of development of the Taino chiefdoms and to specify their basic characteristics. Such determination will make it easier to understand better the clash between the Spanish colonizers and the Tainos. Hitherto the interrelation between the chiefdoms and the *ecomienda* in the process of colonization of Puerto Rico in the early sixteenth century has been touched only superficially or completely overlooked.

Before dealing with what the chiefdoms of the Tainos were all about, it is important to examine first the background of the formation of the Taino tribes and to attempt to put the question of the development of primitive society in the Antilles, of which Puerto Rico forms an important part, into a proper perspective. The process of historical evolution of tribal society in the Antilles goes back more than seven thousand years. What follows is a sketch of that historical evolution.

Background of Primitive Society in the Antilles

A. c. 15,000-c. 5,500 B.C.

Northern South America is recognized by archeologists as the geographic base from which the most important migrations of tribal groups to enter the Antilles originated. Archeological excavations in Venezuela[1] reveal that there, disperse communities of hunters and wild-food-gatherers equipped with rudimentary paleolithic instruments (13,000 to 15,000 years ago) anteceded the primaeval societies of the Antilles. On the basis of the studies of the anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan,[2] one may assume that the clan community was the original form of tribal social organization in general. Primitive tribal peoples organized production on a communal basis. The clan communities were pressed by the precarious conditions of existence of that time. An egalitarian natural division of labor based on sex and age distinguished their daily struggle for existence.

The communal character of production in primitive societies is also intertwined with the kinship that bonded its members in the spontaneous reciprocity of family relations. The clan community and the primitive stage of historical development demanded spontaneous forms of human cooperation for the survival of society itself.[3] Modern anthropologists estimate the size of clan communities as varying between 25 and 125 people.

After centuries of primitive social experience in the Venezuelan hinterland, important technological improvements were achieved. With the invention of the bow and arrow, for example, the communities acquired a greater mobility and the possibility to hunt medium-sized animals, such as deers. Around 7,000 years before the time of Christ (B.C.), some communities migrated to the coastal zones of the Caribbean Sea. The American archeologist I. Rouse believes that the principal reason for that migration from the interior to the coast was the search for new sources of food. He points out that the great mammals of the late Pleistocene, like the mastodons which had been customarily hunted, were becoming extinct.[4] It should also be pointed out as another possible reason for these migrations the internal pressures brought about by the communities' incapacity to support population increases with the given level of productive forces (i.e., technology). Also, "enemy" tribal communities pressured by the same rigors of the predatory economy may have irrupted into their domains, posing a threat to their own existence. All these reasons, or their combination, might explain the migration of entire communities and of tribal segmentation, that is, the subdivision of the clan communities.

B. c. 5,500-c. 400 B.C.

The Venezuelan archeologists and anthropologists Mario Sanoja and Iraida Vargas note that the migrations to the coast led to parallel patterns of subsistence. Hunting and vegetable-food gathering continued in the interior, while the communities inhabiting the coast emphasized marine-food gathering. The latter pattern of subsistence, based on the gathering of marine shell-foods, was well established in the eastern coast of Venezuela by 2500 B.C. As other archeologists have found, it was to become a principal economic activity in the development of primitive societies in the Antilles. Its importance was probably due to the absence of large- or medium-sized game in the Antilles and the need, therefore, to create alternative sources of protein.

Those coastal communities possessed bone instruments, some of which were used as fishing hooks. They also possessed stone axes and chisels which, as Sanoja and Vargas state, were particularly useful for works in wood:

> It is possible that these had a relation with the construction of the first crafts which would have allowed the inhabitants of the shell-heaps an early occupation of the islands facing the Venezuelan oriental coast.[5]

As the Dominican historian and archeologist Marcio Beloz Maggiolo notes, for the moment the most ancient dates of human occupation in the Antilles oscillate between 5500 and 3500 B.C. for Trinidad.[6] Undoubtedly, the eastern coast of Venezuela, especially the area of the Gulf of Paria to the north of the mouth of the Orinoco River, served as a frame for the first experiences and invention of techniques in sea transportation for those communities moving to the Antilles.

The existensive marine experience, accumulated for thousands of centuries up to the epoch of the Tainos, was registered by Columbus during his first voyage in 1492 as follows:

> They came to the ship in boats, which are made of a tree-trunk like a long boat and all of one piece. They are very wonderfully carved, considering the country, and large, so that in some forty or forty-five men came. Others are smaller, so that in some only a solitary man came. They row them with a paddle, like a baker's peel, and they travel wonderfully fast. If one capsizes, all at once begin to swim and right it, baling it out with gourds which they carry with them.[7]

In the language of the Tainos the boats were called *canoa* (or canoe). Centuries passed before all the islands of the Lesser and Greater Antilles were peopled. Their first peoplings focused on a coastal pattern of settlement, in the main sustained by the richness of the mangroves and by fishing. Archeologists have noted similarities in certain stone instruments used for smashing, utilized by communities in Puerto Rico towards the third century B.C., with the more rudimentary versions used by their ancestors in Trinidad many centuries before.[8]

Primaeval societies were responsible for the first experiments in plant domestication in the Antillean islands. Its record dates more than three millenia. For instance, in the site called El Porvenir, in the Dominican Republic, evidence exists that the *guayiga* (Zamia), a plant of edible fruit, had become a significant component of the diet of the communities there 1250 years B.C.[9]

The remote clan communities left an important legacy to the history of the Antillean peoples as a whole. We may summarize it in general terms: a foundation of communal productive and family relations, certain modes of marine-food gathering and fishing, rudimentary stone, shell and wood instruments and implements, first techniques in sea transportation, and the early experiments in plant domestication.

C. c.400 B.C. -c. 700 A.D.

Successive waves of new migrants, subdivisions of the Arawak tribal stock of South America, invaded the Lesser Antilles three or four centuries B.C. The communities of Arawak origin introduced more advanced techniques of cultivation (e.g., the system of "slash-

and-burn" previously practiced in the tropical jungles of the continent). They brought also the first pottery utensils associated with cooking and the preservation of cultivated foodstuffs. In fact, it is on the basis of the relation between the most ancient ceramic styles of the Antilles and those of the areas called Saladero and Barrancas in northeast Venezuela, a region occupied by Arawak-speaking peoples, that we can establish the point of origin of the first cultivators of the Antilles. Through linguistics it can be determined that the language spoken by the Tainos was a dialect of the Arawak language of South America. Thus, the Tainos as a tribal people descended from the Arawaks.

For a span of seven or eight centuries, communities of the Arawak lineage spread until coming to occupy the Greater Antilles. Perhaps the more primitive communities already inhabiting the islands were assimilated or conquered, or "marginated." In the time of the Tainos, who had a developed agriculture, some very primitive communities of cave-dwellers and food-gatherers survived "marginated" to the southwest of Haiti. Also, others, called the *guanahatabeyes*, as Dr. Manuel Rivero de la Calle writes, survived in the westernmost region of Cuba.[10] Some of the "archaic" communities, archeologists argue, could have had their point of departure in migrations from Florida towards the Bahamas and the Greater Antilles.

Velos Maggiolo indicates that the communities of cultivators seemed to have practiced a system of "slash-and-burn" indiscriminately, depleting soils until the fifth century after the birth of Christ (A.D.). But, as he has pointed out, the agricultural experience in the insular circuit led the communities to an important modification: combining cultivation with longer periods of marine collection and the development of fishing. This balance, which Veloz Maggiolo has termed "the atenuated slash cultivation,"[11] allowed the regeneration of the soils devoted to cultivation and assured the agricultural activity in the tribal economy of that moment.

The archeological excavations in Puerto Rico have uncovered other fundamental changes, especially in what regards the Greater Antillean tribal economy. Toward the fourth century A.D. a new pattern of settlement in savannahs away from the coast emerged. The limitations of slash-and-burn were gradually overcome and cultivation was increased. Slowly but surely the Arawak descendants were conquering the insular environment of the Antilles. The beginning of that movement of tribal peopling into the interior of Puerto Rico, and later Hispaniola, etc., seems to have been related to the successes obtained with a new technique of cultivation in *mounds*:

> The mound is really a rounded and high terreplain over which planting is done, and which is manured. It signifies that this productive system generates a permanent mechanism of sedentarization, which at the same time make possible a greater production and surpluses within this production.[12]

Agricultural economic progress has been studied in relation to the emergence of new, autocthonous ceramic styles of the Greater Antilles. For example, the "ostiones" ceramic style originating in Puerto Rico can be associated with the development of the mounds in a more extensive agriculture and the peopling of the highlands.[13]

Excavations of the representative sites of this phase of tribal development in the Greater Antilles yields a variety of ritual objects. Ceremonial plazas, as well, were already known. Rituals and ceremonialism suppose, at each step, a greater and more complex level of tribal social organization. What probably characterized this phase was the transformation of the clan communities into *tribes*.

D. c. 700-c. 1000 A.D.

The absence of written sources for the study of pre-Taino tribal society makes it impossible to pinpoint the historical time at which the tribes in the Antilles were constituted. Morgan defined the term tribe as "a greater assemblage of gentes," or, in other words, a greater association of clan communities. Generations of Arawak descendants and centuries of historical development passed before the tribes of the Antillean Tainos were formed. The organization into tribes brought dozens and perhaps hundreds of clans together into a new tribal social complex. Taino tribes may have also incorporated pre-Arawak communities. This process probably did not take place before the seventh or eighth centuries A.D. A characteristic of the formation of the Taino tribes was its development and interrelation at an interinsular level; that is, the Tainos did not concentrate in a single island. They came to occupy and make theirs the territories of Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Jamaica, Cuba, and the Bahamas. And they maintained bonds of common historical and cultural development up to the time of the "discovery."

E. c. 1100-c. 1500 A.D.

From the level of the tribe the Tainos moved on to experience yet another, more complex level of tribal social organization: that of the chiefdoms. Paradoxicaly, it was the most advanced level in the development of tribal society and, at the same time, its last one. Henceforth, the communal character of the tribal social order would be dissolved. In its place there arose a new content of social relations of production where some men based their lives on the exploitation of the labor of other men. The seeds of social contradictions that led to its own dissolution were planted in the womb of tribal society as it developed into more complex levels of social interaction. This process was inseparable from the process of development of the productive forces of society.

How did the dissolution of primaeval communal relations materialize? Man himself is the first productive force; society is dependent on his labor for its existence. With the development of the productive forces, that is, with the increase of population and technological progress, tribal society, at each step, was able to diversify the areas of labor. Eventually the separation of manual from mental tasks would be effected. The natural division of labor was transformed into a social division of labor. More advanced levels of tribal production made it possible for some members of the tribe to separate themselves from the process of primary production. From time immemorial the tribal communities may have, and most likely did, give special recognition to some men for their experience, their abilities and their skills, their knowledge, their bravery, etc. Certain clans and their lineages were associated with the performance of specific tasks. A whole complex of tribal kinship relations emerged ascribing different positions to its members in the ordering of the economy. Those who had been enjoying a privileged status within the tribe found themselves in historical circumstances in which their positions could be used to change radically the social relations of production: from communal to class society. Human society in the Antilles was beginning to separate into laborers and the lords of labor.

The archeologist Marcio Veloz Maggiolo stresses the importance of agriclture and surplus production in the plane of an increasing social complexity. To explain this transition he writes:

> The appearance of what the economists call a "surplus" generates, at the same time, *the need for a distribution*, and that need of distribution *creates social echelons* which when elected—in one way or the other—to *administer*, are taking society to a plane where privileges are found, new services arise, there is ritual elevation of the productive process, and in the end, a greater complexity in the idelogy or superstructure of the society. *This is the true motive* by which the so-called "Taino culture" begins to develop a ritual process in accord with its economic needs. The gods are multiplied, they are personalized; each chief or subchief of a village has them; each clan, each tribe has them. . . The representations are linked, basically, to the so-called "cohoba ritual", where the chief, or buhitio or witch doctor, makes contact with the ancestors, to tell the people what should be done, when to expect a hurricane, how to combat the insect plague in the yuca, or to say when the reign of the men of the islands will end to give way to new lords.[14] (Emphasis by F.M.)

We must take exception to some of the premises in the discussion above. The premise that "the need for distribution" created social echelons to "administer" tends to identify that task with social stratification. It runs the risk of seeing the division of society into classes as inevitable. First, it must be pointed out that distribution and administration were not strange practices in the development of tribal society in any phase of historical evolution. No form of society, no matter how primitive it may be, can do without some kind of distribution and administration. The difference is not that this need arose at one point; the need was always present. Rather, the difference is found in the *content* of the relations of production: how production, of which administration and distribution are integral processes, is carried out in the different forms of society historically.

The histories of the so-called Indies and the Spanish documentation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries provide ample evidence regarding the nature of the "social echelons" who ruled in Taino society. The real problem is to uncover the "hidden relations" in the process of production of the chiefdoms. Here are firmer grounds from where to discern the role played by the administration of surplus production, so splendidly inferred from archeology by Veloz Maggiolo but under what is a false premise. In the Taino chiefdoms the mode of production was characterized by the exploitation of the greater part of the members of the tribes by a dominating minority. Surplus production did not create the need for distribution and social echelons to administer it. With the establishment of *class relations* the chiefly class appropriated that right from the rest of the tribe. When one part of society exploits the labor of the other part it can be said it is a society divided into social classes. Exploitation, that is the crux of the matter.

General Characters of the Chiefdoms of the Tainos

A. Social Classes

In the *Apologética Historia* (1550) and in *Historia de las Indias* (1561), Friar Bartolomé de las Casas wrote of the existence of "kings and lords" and "nobles and vassals" in the aboriginal societies of the Greater Antilles. So did other historians and chroniclers of that time, such as Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo and Pedro Mártir de Angleria. This was one way of making "new world" societies intelligible to their own.

Fundamental social distinctions were quickly noticed among *caciques, nitainos* and *naborías*. These were the indigenous terms belonging to the social order of the chiefdoms in Puerto Rico and the other Greater Antilles. By analogy the *caciques* were compared to "kings" and "governors." The *nitainos* were said to be "principals," "nobles," "knights," and even "centurions." And the *naborías* were regarded as "servants" and "vassals" or "subjects." Ultimately this was the way in which the colonizers recognized class difference among the Tainos themselves.

Friar Bartolomé wrote of the preeminent social position of *caciques* (or chiefs) as follows:

> These kings were the overseers of everyone; it was their authority to order the cultivation of the fields, as well as hunting and fishing activities. Everything was brought to him and he distributed to each household what it needed for its sustenance...The same was done in all the things of basic need, directing each person or persons in what they were to occupy themselves.[15]

The overall command of the labor process, as seen above, underlined the chiefs' class rule. Agriculture, fishing and the production of handicrafts was under their control. The concentration of the products of labor in the chiefs' hands and their control over their distribution was a particular form of administration that followed, hand in hand, with the chiefs' lordship over labor.

Las Casas also pointed out that "in this island [meaning those of the Greater Antilles.] and in each of its kingdoms [i.e., chiefdoms] there were many nobles, esteemed for having better blood than the rest, and who had charge over them as in directing and guiding them. In the common language of these islands these were called *nitainos*."[16] The social relation of the *netainos* in the productive process was that of enforcers and supervisors of the labor done by "the rest". Given their lordship over the majority of the laboring clans we think that, instead of "nobles" and the like, the *nitainos* are better defined as *clanlords*. "It is a known fact that those indigenous peoples posess the land in common," wrote Mártir de Angeleria.[17] In the absence of private ownership of land, therefore, there is no basis to distinguish a class of landlords.

On the other side, the term *naboría* was described in the context of servitude to the chiefs in various ways. Friar Ramón Pané, in *Relación acerca de las antiguedades de los indios* (1498), noted the *naborías* as "servants and favorites" in the chief's household. He also referred to the word in terms of servitude to the gods.[18] In the Questionaire of the Heironymite Governors of 1517, Cristóbal Serrano, a lawyer and one of the first colonizers in the Antilles, recalled the times when some of the great chiefs "had thirty and forty and fifty thousand naborías under their command."[19] It should be noted that under the ecomienda system, which will be discussed further on, the chiefs were required to supply hundreds of their *naborías* to work in domestic service as well as in the mines and in agriculture.

Evidently the term *naboría*, whether "service" performed in the "house" or in the "field," referred to a position of laborer affecting the majority of the tribesmen. Labor to the chiefly class, at the same time, was translated in Taino ceremonialism as "service to the gods."

B. Basis of Class Relations

Certainly, that "service to the gods" would not mark its ceremonial presence if a much graver "earthly" labor question were at issue: the alienation of the labor of the Taino village communities. To talk about class relations is to talk about the exploitation of labor.

Before the European discovery, a chiefly class (the *caciques* and the clanlords) explited the majority of the tribesmen (the *naborías*) by commanding their labor and appropriating the fruits of their labor in the form of tribute. This fact is proved in the histories and in the Spanish documentation of the sixteenth century. It was the custom of the chiefs and clanlords to collect tribute that included agricultural and marine foodstuffs, woven cloth, featherworks, gold-inlaid ritual objects and pendants, and a diversity of handicrafts made of polished stone, or wood and bone and shell.

Some examples of the tribal—tributary relations in the chiefdoms were witnessed right at the beginning of the colonization of Puerto Rico. The chiefs agreed to provide the colonial settlers with a food tribute; they also supplied "crews" of *naborías* to help them search for gold and to build the first colonial settlement.[20] Many tributary pacts had been established before with the major chiefs of Hispaniola, in the time of Columbus's colonial administration.[21]

The chiefdoms of the Tainos were still historically far from the tribute Temple-States of the Aztecs or the Incas. From the tenth century, more or less, the tribes of the Tainos were experiencing a transition from a tribal-communal to a tributary society. I use the concept of a *tribal-tributary* mode of production to characterize the social base of the Taino chiefdoms and to underline the incipient condition of class formation therein. Chiefs, clanlords and tribal-tributarians initiated the constant class struggles, sometimes hidden and sometimes open, in the history of the Antilles.

C. Society and Culture

The social and cultural unity of the Tainos of Puerto Rico with those of the rest of the Antilles was recorded by Fernandez de Oviedo in *Historia General y Natural de las Indias* (1535), in the following manner:

> In the idolatries of the *zemi* (spirit gods), and in the *areytos* (chanting ceremonies) and the *batey* (ballgames), and in the navigation in canoes, and in their foods and agriculture and fisheries; and in the houses and beds, and in the matrimonies and the succesion of the cacicados and lordship, and in the inheritance and other many things they are very similar to one another.[22]

The history of the Tainos, particularly that of the past chiefs and their notable achievements, was transmitted orally, from generation to generation, in the ceremonies called *areytos*. Chiefs used symbols of authority such as carved batons and a ceremonial garb made of woven cotton and parrot feathers; the best foods were reserved for their table. They traveled in finely carved canoes and were at special times carried in litters.

At the time of the Spanish conquest, Puerto Rico was said to have been under the rule of Agueybana "The Elder," seated in Guaynía, in the southwest of the island. Among his tributary chiefs were Mabodamoca of Aymaco, in the northwest; Urayoán of Yagüeca, in the west; Guarionex of Otuao, in the highlands; Guacabo of Cebuco, and Aranamá of Toa, both in the north, and many others. Each chiefdom incorporated a number of tributary *yucayeques*, or village communities headed by subchiefs.

In the *yucayeques* there were two kinds of dwellings, the *caney* or house of the chiefs, and the more common *bohios*. Both were built of woods, forest hemp and palm leaves. The *caney* was located at the head of a large open plaza called *batey*. Here the Tainos gathered for their *areytos* and other festivities, as well as for ballgames during which some kind of barter took place.

Religion and mythology played an important role in Taino society. A superstructure of rituals brought the Tainos into contact with the spirit forces of nature. Their world-outlook was very much ordered, at the same time, by tribal magical beliefs. For example, in the *cohoba* ritual the chiefs and clanlords, assisted by the powers of the shamans (called in their language *behiques*), would sit in finely carved ceremonial stools called *duhos* around a ritual object to invoke the spirit forces of nature for guidance. The *cohoba* involved the use of certain hallucinogenic herbs. Before the ritual the participants would induce vomiting with the use of bone spatulaes. This was seen as a means of ridding the body of evil substances in preparation for the communication with the gods.

As with tribal cosmology generally, Taino religion was based on a constellation of spirits that controlled the forces of nature. The *zemi* (gods) represented the forces of the moon and the sun, plants, fertility, and climate, etc. Historians influenced by christianity have mistakenly projected their religious dogma upon the religion of the Tainos. They affirm, for instance, that Yocahú was equivalent to the Christian Supreme Creator, and that Atabeira had much in common with the Virgin Mary. But in fact, as José Juan Arrom has demonstrated in *Mitología y artes prehispánicas de las Antillas*, Yucahú was the god-provider of yuca, the agricultural staple food of the Tainos. Ataharpoons, baskets, and nets among others. Wild fruit gathering and the hunting of rodent species like the *hutia* supplemented these activites.

In the area of handicrafts the Tainos made significant strides. Hammocks, nets, and slips for women were made of cotton. Ceremonial objects were made of polished stone and wood. Gold was worked on a small scale to produce decorative pendants as well as the *guanín*, or a charm worn by the chiefs around their necks. An important area of tribal handicrafts was pottery, which included kitchen utensils and implements, and ritual ceramics. There was regional specialization in the production of some of these handicrafts. Extensive barter and long-distance trade was a common practice of the Taino economy.

The false image of the indolent aborigine of the Greater Antilles does not stand the test of historical research. The view that peace and harmony reigned among the Tainos is equally erroneous. In the epoch of the chiefdoms tribal warfare was frequent. Fernandez de Oviedo noted three causes of war among them: over the terms and jurisdiction of the chiefdoms, over fishing rights, and marriage arrangements among the chiefly clans. Up to now it has been commonly accepted that in the latter part of the fifteenth century the Tainos were constantly harassed and attacked by the "fierce," "warlike," and "cannibalistic" Caribs of the Lesser Antilles. The Caribs, also an agricultural people but less developed than the Tainos, had originated from northern South America, and in the two centuries before Columbus's arrival, had conquered all the islands of the Lesser Antilles. Enthusiasts of the Carib question have debated these points since the last century. On one side, it has been noted that Columbus began to popularize the notion that the Caribs were cannibals, without having first-hand knowledge. Once the colonization of Puerto Rico had begun, the colonial officials saw it to their advantage to exploit this issue as an excuse to enslave them. On the other side, the thesis that the Caribs and the Tainos were enemies is weakened by the military alliances between the two in the resistance against the Spanish colonizers.[25]

It is more likely that the Tainos were engaged in tribal warfare for the reasons given by Fernandez de Oviedo. Certain chiefdoms were in a process of expansion, and some were more powerful than the others. the Spanish colonizers were quick to detect political differbeira or Atabex more likely was a divinity associated with the moon and the tides, and with menstruation and fertility. Mautiatihuel was the god of the sun;[23] Huracán was the god of the storms.

At the time of the harvest the Tainos presented ritual tribute offerings to the *zemi* of the chief's house. If a calamity fell upon a native the *behique* would state to him that he was marked by the god Vaibrama for his failure to provide food to the *zemi* (i.e, to the chiefly class) whose sacred house was kept by him.[24] It is interesting to note that, in the epoch of the chiefdoms, *zemi* objects with human representations abound. In time of war the house of a defeated chief would be burned and the victorious chief would remove its *zemi* objects to his chiefdom. As tribute relations developed in the chiefdoms, so did the chiefly ideology. Each advance made in class relations was sanctioned by a new corpus of tribal magical beliefs. More and more the gods in "heaven" would be personified by the chiefs on earth.

Elaborate ritual burials and mourning were performed in the event of a chief's death. According to Las Casas, when a chief died he was succeeded by his sister's son. It has been noted that the chiefly clans married among themselves. Great chiefs, in turn, practiced poligamy, probably taking one wife from each of the clans on their tributary subchiefs. In the absence of a heir, the clanlords could elect a chief among their ranks.

The aboriginal population of Puerto Rico has remained a subject of speculation. Estimates range from 30,000 to 600,000, the latter figure reported by Las Casas. Whatever the indigenous population might have been, most researchers agree that it was substantial and that it required a great development of the tribal productive forces to support it. In fact, agriculture was the foundation of the economic activities of the Tainos. *Naboŕas,* men and women, were involved in various phases of the preparation of the *conucos,* or cultivated fields. They had developed the technique of planting in *montones* (mounds) and some fields were as large as 30,000 by 10,000 mounds. Rudimentary irrigation canals were made diverting the water from rivers into the *conucos* in the dry regions of Hispaniola, and perhaps also in Puerto Rico and in Cuba. Using a *coa,* or wooden hoe, the Tainos cultivated six species of yuca (manioc), five of yams, three of *adí* (pepper). Also planted were maize, peanuts, beans, medicinal herbs, and cotton.

In the absence of large game the Tainos complemented agriculture with fishing. Their fishing instruments included stick corrals, ences and to find ways to benefit from it in the roar of the incipient chiefly class struggles.

Chiefdom and Encomienda in the First Phase of the Colonization

A. Establishment of the Encomienda

The conquest of Puerto Rico was preceded by fifteen years of Spanish colonial experience in Hispaniola.[26] Juan Ponce de León, an impoverished nobleman, had been one of the officers in charge of the "pacification" of Higüey in southeastern Hispaniola. In 1508 Governor Ovando granted him a *capitulación* (contract for exploration) to begin the colonization of Boriquén. The Spaniards already knew the island as San Juan Bausista, the name given to it by Columbus in his second voyage of 1493. Ponce de León, in turn, gave the name Puerto Rico (literally "Rich Port") to the bay where the capital city of San Juan is located. During the course of the centuries the name Puerto Rico remained for the whole island.

Agueybana, the great chief of Guaynia, had news of the devastation of the Tainos of Hispaniola. The historian Fernandez de Oviedo affirmed that in order to avoid such a fate in Puerto Rico, Agueybana opted to be a *guatiao* or bloodbrother, with Ponce de León. He agreed to make *conucos* to provide cassava bread to the Spaniards and instructed his subchiefs to assist the colonizers. Between 1508 and 1509 the colonizers founded the town of Caparra two miles or so from the bay of Puerto Rico. The town of Aguada (later renamed San Germán) was established in the western chiefdom of Yagueca. A third town called Guánica was established in the chiefdom of Agueybana, but it had a short existence. Through the intercession of five chiefs a *conuco* of about 5,000 mounds was made in the neighborhood of Caparra and another one was made four leagues from the town, in the vicinity of the Toa River. In the latter region the Crown had one of its important plantations of the first two decades of the colonization.

The chiefs had provided crews of *naborías* to help build Caparra; and more importantly, to search for gold in the Bayamón, Cebuco, Cayniabón, and Manatoabón, all rivers in the north. A sample of almost 1,000 gold pesos was sent to Governor Ovando. And in a report to the Governor, Ponce de León wrote:

> Up to now I have not been able to do more than order cultivation of *conucos* in the villages of the chiefs for Your Highness [meaning the king]. There are five chiefs that agreed to cultivate [for us] in their chiefdoms. . .I have not been able *to use the Indians* of this mentioned island *as it should be*.[27]
>
> (italics by F.M.)

Ponce de León was referring to the need for implanting the encomienda system in Puerto Rico. "Through a formal grant of encomienda", the historian Charles Gibson writes, "designated Indian families, usually the inhabitants of a town or a cluster of towns, were entrusted to the charge of a Spanish colonist, who thus became the *encomendero*."[28] In Puerto Rico the *naborías* were entrusted to the *encomenderos* through the intercession of the chiefly class. A chief or a group of subchiefs with the subjects of the *yucayeques* of their residence were entrusted to the more privileged *ecomenderos*. The Tainos worked for the *ecomenderos* in the mines, in agriculture, in cattle ranching, and as domestic servants in exchange for a "just salary" and religious indoctrination.[29] The term *repartimiento* was used when the distribution of the natives was made. As in the rest of the Antilles the chiefdoms of Puerto Rico proved to be an invaluable weapon for colonization purposes. The colonizers used the authority of the chiefs to command the labor of the *naborías*; the clanlords, which were also called "captains" by the colonizers, were used in their capacity of supervisors of the indigenous laborers. Thus, tribal-tributary class relations provided a foundation for the establishment of the colonial encomienda in Puerto Rico.

The accumulation of metal wealth was the prime motive in the organization of the economic activities of the first phase of the colonization of Puerto Rico. In the Antilles gold was customarily mined in the savannahs, in hillside streams, and in rivers. Usually the more wealthy and privileged *encomenderos* (including the colonial officals) would employ miners, for a salary, who would take charge of the mining crews. Fernandez de Oviedo, who was also a *Veedor de minas* (Inspector of Mines) wrote that one crew was doing the digging, while another crew carried the earth in service wooden pans to the rivers; there commonly female crews awaited with wooden wash pans to separate the gold from the dirt.[30] The working conditions were extremely harsh. Repeatedly the Crown gave instructions to put at least one-third of the *encomendados* into the mining activities. Normally they would spend six to eight months in a work season, referred to by the colonizers as the *demora* (which literally means the delay). On the other hand, the rest of the *encomendados* worked in their *conucos* or in the haciendas (plantations) of the *encomenderos*. The Taino *conucos* of yuca, and the cassava bread made thereof, continued to be the base of the agriculture during the times of the encomienda. The Spanish colonizers introduced rice, sugar cane, plantains, ginger, and many other tropical fruits and vegetables to Puerto Rico. They also introduced horses, cows, pigs, sheep, and chickens, etc. But agriculture and cattle ranching, as we pointed out above, were subordinate to the mining economy.

The main gold mine fields of Puerto Rico were located in the vicinity of Caparra, and in a region called *Hoconuco* close to San Germán. An average of two *fundiciones* or gold smeltings per year were done in each town. Between 1510 and 1536, according to the historian Cayetano Coll y Toste, colonial mining in Puerto Rico yielded four million gold pesos.[31] One gold peso was worth 450 *maravedís* in Spain. The gold from the "new world" helped the Spanish Crown subsidize its military adventures. It provided as well, the indispensable capital to the mercantile interests based in Western Europe that were geared to the development of a new world capitalist economy.

By virtue of a royal decree of December 20, 1503, the Tainos, as "free vassals of the Crown," were to be paid for their *encomienda* services; a "just salary" of one gold peso per year was determined by Ovando, governor of the Indies. However, the Tainos were not paid directly in gold. Instead, as happened to many *journaleros* or day-laborers in Spain who received a similar "payment" at that time, payment took the form of clothing items. At the end of the *demora* a distribution of clothes would be made among the Tainos, in accordance with their social status in the chiefdoms. The Tainos referred to this form of payment as *cacona*, which meant in their language the articles given to them by the encomenderos. For example, chiefs and clanlords were paid in cassocks, belts, pants, sandals, colored cotton shirts, etc. Combs, slips, hats, scarfs, and other items were commonly given to female *naborías*. Low-quality shirts and cloths were the typical pay to the male *naborías*.[32] The *jornal de ropa y cacona* (the clothes and *cacona* day wages) was a distinguishing feature of the colonial encomienda in Puerto Rico and probably in the rest of the Greater Antilles. (Excluded from the condition of "free vassals" were the slaves, either war captives from Puerto Rico or Caribs). This precapitalist form of labor-service did not develop fully in Puerto Rico. Although it was instrumental in dissolving the tribal-tribute forms of labor characteristic of the chiefdoms, as its antagonist it met the resistance of the Tainos. As a synthesis of the colonial encomienda it failed to mature because, insofar as the indigenous population of Puerto Rico was concerned, it had practically disappeared after only two decades of colonization. Historically, nevertheless, the "clothes and *cacona* day wages" was the original form of labor service in the transition from tribal-tributarism to capitalism in Puerto Rico.

B. Resistance

The Tainos of Puerto Rico did not revolt until the full weight of the colonial *encomienda* fell upon them. Aside from the intensive mining labor, in each *repartimiento* the Tainos were relocated far from their *yucayeques*. Systematically the colonizers had been waging a campaign to also distrupt the indigenous culture. The social order of the chiefdoms was under siege. In general terms, the Taino people fought a war of resistance to free their land from foreign domination and exploitation. In particular, the chiefly class led that resistance to safeguard its tributary interests, which were being threatened at every step by the colonial *encomienda*.

In early 1511 Agueybana II, who had become "the principal chief of all,"[33] summoned his subchiefs for a general uprising in Puerto Rico. Agueybana "The Brave" led an assault on the settlement of Guánica, in which Cristóbal de Sotomayor, a nobleman, and dozens of others were killed. Meanwhile, the settlement of "Aguada" was attacked and burned to the ground by the warriors of Guarionex. More than 350 Spanish settlers were reported to have been killed in the towns or scattered in the haciendas in the countryside. Upon notice of the Taino offensive, Ponce de León led 400 infantrymen against the chiefdom of Cuaynía. Agueybana retreated to the eastern regions ruled by Daguao and Humacao. Juan González, knowledgeable of the Taino language, led a force that is said to have destroyed those of Agueybana in the east.

The war was carried to the island of Vieques, east of Puerto Rico, where 530 war captives were taken and hundreds of others killed. As a dramatic method of intimidation, 88 Tainos (most of them elders because of their "negative" influence among the youth) were killed and their bodies cut to pieces and scattered along the shore. Thousands of Tainos and Caribs attacked and burned Caparra, and were later confronted in the Aymanio (the region of Loiza in northeastern Puerto Rico). It was reported that 1,000 Tainos and Caribs were killed in battle and 1,200 were made captives. Many clanlords were executed in the presence of the villagers in several *yucayeques*. Still others, among them subchiefs, were exiled and enslaved in Hispaniola.

During 1511 and 1515 Captains Sancho de Arango and Pedro de Salazar, and many others, participated in *cabalgadas*, or entries into the mountain areas to capture natives and sell them as slaves.[34] The Tainos of the valley of Otuao, where the Crown established another royal plantation, submitted after a systematic destruction of their *conucos* and a pursuit into the mountains.[35] There is evidence that some chiefs sided with the *encomenderos* during the resistance. Perhaps it was an indication of previous political antagonisms between the chiefdoms. In the end the superiority of the Spanish weapons proved decisive in battle, an the "pacification" of Puerto Rico was accomplished. Nevertheless, the documents registered Taino resistance in the mountain regions in 1517 and later during the decade of the 1520s.

C. Decline of the Encomienda

No one knows for sure how many thousands of *encomienda* Tainos were killed in the wars of resistance. Extreme hard labor combined with malnutrition took a heavy toll on the indigenous population. The *repartimiento* of late 1514 (not inlcuding the Crown's allotment of 500), did not reach 4,000 *encomendados*.[36] Another development that contributed enormously to the demographic decline of the Tainos of Puerto Rico was measles and smallpox epidemics. One occured in 1518 and another in 1529. The *encomenderos* reported that during each epidemic one third of their *encomenderos* died. The population census of Governor Francisco Manuel de Lando in 1530-1531 shows that there were less than 2,000 natives (many of whom had been brought from other parts of the Caribbean) registered in the last *encomiendas* in Puerto Rico.[37] It was in that context that the Spanish colonizers began to turn to Africa for another source of labor. In the second phase of the colonization of Puerto Rico black slavery replaced the *encomienda*.

The decline of the Taino population was one major factor that brought the colonial *encomienda* to a crisis in Puerto Rico in the 1530s. With the shortage of indigenous labor, the mining activities began to be less productive. Also, many of the first settlers and officials had died or returned to Spain. Ponce de León, for example, died in 1521 after a fruitless effort to conquer Florida. The Spanish population was small and most of the settlers were heavily indebted. With the development of the colonization of Mexico and the discovery of Peru, the Spanish settlers began to focus their colonial designs elsewhere. For those remaining, only slave labor and the development of sugar plantations offered any hope. But this also faced many obstacles.

We have not attempted to cover all the aspects of the colonial *encomienda* in Puerto Rico. Our main purpose was to bring forth the fact that its establishment was the result of the articulation of class exploitation in the chiefdoms (i.e. tribal-tribute) with new forms (i.e. labor-service and slavery) of exploitation. This perspective, of course, does not lose sight of the broader dimension introduced by the Spanish conquest: the colonial relation, and the incorporation of Puerto Rico to the mercantile imperialism of the sixteenth century.

NOTES

1. Mario Sanoja e Iraida Vargas, *Antiguas formaciones y modos de producción venezolanos* (Monte Avila Editores: Caracas, 1974) p. 29
2. *Ancient Society* (Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1877)
3. The thesis that cooperation was the cornerstone of the earliest communities of hunters-gatherers has been most recently argued by Richard E. Leaky and Roger Lewin, *People of the Lake* (Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978)
4. Irving Rouse, "Prehistory of the West Indies", The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, A-335, p.7
5. Sanoja y Vargas, *Op. cit.*, p. 36
6. *Medioambiente y adaptación humana en la prehistoria de Santo Domingo* Tomo I (Ediciones Taller: Santo Domingo, 1976) p. 17
7. *The Journal of Christopher Columbus* translated by Cecil Jane (Anthony Blond: London, 1968) pp. 25-26
8. See Marcio Veloz Maggiolo, Juan González Colón y otros, *Cayo Cofresí: un sitio precerámico de Puerto Rico* (Ediciones Taller: Santo Domingo, 1975)
9. Veloz Maggiolo, Op. Cit., Tomo I p. 257
10. *Las Culturas Aborígenes de Cuba* (Editorial Universitaria:La Habana, 1966) p.69

11. Veloz Maggiolo, *Op. cit.*, Tomo II (1977), pp. 27-28

12. *Ibid.*, p. 203

13. Marcio Veloz Maggiolo, *Indigenous Art and Economy of Santo Domingo* (Ediciones Cohoba-Taller: Santo Domingo, 1977)

14. Veloz Maggiolo, *Op. cit.* Tomo II, pp. 203-204

15. *Apologética Historia* (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles: Madrid, 1958) Vol. III, p. 62

16. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 213

17. *Décadas del Nuevo Mundo* (José Porrúa a Hijos: México, 1964) Tomo I. p. 141.

18. See, nueva versión y notas por José Juan Arrom (Siglo XXi: México, 1974) pp. 48-49

19. In Emilio Rodriguez Demorizi, *Los Dominicos y Encomiendas de Indios de la Isla Española* (Editora del Caribe: Santo Domingo, 1971) p. 229

20. "Relación de Juan Ponce de León del Viaje a la Isla de Sant Xoan, l de mayo de 1509", *Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Indias y América*, Tomo 34, p. 484

21. See for example, "Memorial y relación acerca de cosas de Indias. Por los años 1495", *Archivo General de Indias* (A.G.I.), Patronato, Legajo 170, Ramo 9

22. Oviedo, *Op. cit.* tomo II, p. 107

23. (Siglo XXi: México, 1975)

24. Fray Ramón Pané, *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44

25. The traditional notions regarding the Caribs have been challanged most recently by Jalil Sued Badillo, *Los Caribes:realidad o fabula* (Editorial Antillana:Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, 1978)

26. For a full account of the conquest of Hispaniola see, Carl O. Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (University of California Press, 1966)

27. "Relación de Juan Ponce de León...", *Op. Cit.*

28. *Spain in America* (Harper & Row: New York, 1966) p. 49

29. For the study of the royal decrees of encomienda in Puerto Rico see, Vicente Murga Sanz, *Cedulario Puertorriqueño* Tomo I (1505-1517) (Editorial Universitaria: Puerto Rico, 1961) and Tomo II (1518-1525), published in 1964.

30. Oviedo, *Op. cit.* Cap. VIII "El cual tracta de los metales e minas"

31. *Boletín Histórico de Puerto Rico*, Romo I, p. 241; a study of the Gold Reports of Puerto Rico in the A.G.I. will soon confirm or revise this figure.

32. For a list of the "clothes and cacona day wages" see, *Documentos de la Real Hacienda de Puerto Rico* Vol. I 1510-1519, Aurelio Tanodi, transcriptor y compilador (Editorial Universitaria, U.P.R.: 1971)

33. "Agueybana que era el mayor señor de todos" (p.55); we take our information about the Taino uprising in Puerto Rico from the "Probanza de Juan González, 1532", published in Aurelio Tió, *Nuevas fuentes para la historia de Puerto Rico* (Editorial Universidad Interamericana: San Germán, 1961)

34. "De la dicha guerra postrera siendo capitán Sancho de Arango...", A.G.I., Contaduría, Legajo 1071, No 1, Ramo 1, folios 84-87

35. "Probanza del Contador Sedeño ante el Licenciado Ayllón, 1527 (?)" A.G.I., Justicia, Legajo 985, Ramo 2, No. 10

36. "Carta del Lic. Velazquez, 27 de abril de 1515", A.G.I., Patronato, Legajo 175, Ramo 5

37. A.G.I., Justicia, Legajo 106

The Evolution of a Colony: Puerto Rico in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries

Adalberto López

For the Spaniards in Puerto Rico, the decade of the 1530s was a difficult one. Carib-Taino bands were stepping up their raids against coastal settlements and so were French privateers. The gold deposits were almost exhausted and the Indians who had provided labor in the past had almost disappeared. A critical shortage of labor combined with a rapidly declining output of gold led many Spaniards to seek their fortunes elsewhere in the New World. Many left for Cuba, others went to Mexico, and others left to join the Spaniards in Peru who under the command of Francisco Pizarro were plundering the Inca empire. The exodus of Spaniards from Puerto Rico reached such proportions that Governor Francisco Manuel de Lando concluded that unless it was checked all the Spaniards would eventually leave and the island would be lost to Spain. He issued an order that no one was to leave the island without written permission from him and he brought his point home by publicly cutting off the legs of two Spaniards who tried to disobey him.

Since gold production was no longer a viable activity, the Spaniards who remained in Puerto Rico and the few who migrated to the island later turned to agriculture and stock raising. A variety of crops were grown for internal consumption, and a few for both internal consumption and to pay for the commodities (such as olive oil, wine, dried codfish, wheat and manufactured goods) that the European inhabitants of the island deemed necessary to civilized living. Of these exports, sugar had become the most important by the middle of the sixteenth century. The crop had been introduced into the island soon after the Spanish occupation of

1508 and by the late 1520s there were several small sugar mills (*trapiches*) in operation. Sugar farms were relatively small, usually family-run operations, and were concentrated on the northern coastal plain. Sugar remained one of the most important exports during the almost 400 years of Spanish rule in Puerto Rico. Other exports were cacao and ginger, which briefly surpassed sugar in importance in the first part of the seventeenth century, and tobacco, cotton and coffee, all of which became important only in the eighteenth century. Another export of importance in the second half of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth was cattle hides. Like sugar growing, cattle raising was concentrated on the coastal plains. When the traveler Antonio Vázquez de Espinosa visited Puerto Rico in the first quarter of the seventeenth century he reported that many cattle ranches could be found throughout the coastal plains and that large quantities of leather were being exported to Spain.

Since Indian labor was rapidly disappearing by the 1530s and since there were too few Spaniards available and willing to supply the necessary labor in the sugar farms and cattle ranches, Spanish landowners on the island turned to the importation of black slaves to meet their labor needs. Permission to import black slaves into its American possessions had been granted by the Spanish Crown in 1503, and in the years immediately following the Spanish occupation of Boriquén some slaves were brought to the island. However, it was not till the late 1520s and the 1530s, as a critical shortage of Indian labor developed, that black slaves assumed an economic importance on the island. By 1530 there were in Puerto Rico close to 1,500 black slaves out of a population of slightly over 3,000. As the years passed more blacks were imported into the island, but their number grew slower than that of the non-slave population and, consequently, their proportion of the population declined. In 1765, for example, there were 5,037 slaves out of a total population of 44,883.

For the black slaves, life in Puerto Rico was short, nasty and brutish. True, out of the Spanish metropolis there emerged a code of law that treated the slaves as rational human beings capable of salvation and that was designed to protect them against the rapacity of their masters. Spanish legislation, as many historians have pointed out, was more humane than either Anglo-Saxon or French legislation concerning slaves. But in the Spanish American world there was a wide gap between the letter of the law and the way people actually behaved. In Puerto Rico, as in most societies where slavery has existed, the slaves were seen as chattel by their masters and were brutalized (physically and psychologically) as they were in the plantations of St. Dominque, Brazil and the Anglo-Saxon colonies of North America. As slaves elsewhere in the New World, those in Puerto Rico did not accept their lot in life as meekly as they were encouraged to do by the priests and friars who sought to impose their religion on them. Like the Indians, the slaves resisted the brutalization to which they were subjected. There were individual acts of violence against slave owners. Alone or in groups, slaves often ran away into the forests and mountains of the interior, and once in a while they rebelled. These rebellions ordinarily were local affairs that involved small numbers of slaves and were, therefore, easily put down by the authorities.

In spite of the growing importance of sugar production and cattle raising, Puerto Rico after the 1530s and until the end of the eighteenth century was of little economic value to Spain. The population of the island remained relatively small. Exports grew slowly; and the economy as a whole, though seldom really stagnant, was often described as such. Although a handful of sugar producers and cattle ranchers profited from commercial relations with Spain, Spain itself did not profit (in monetary terms) at all. The revenues generated by the island for the Crown remained insignificant and by the second half of the sixteenth century were not enough to cover the cost of administering and holding on to the island. In spite of this, Spain committed itself to maintaining control of Puerto Rico; for if economically the island was a liability to Spain, strategically it was of tremendous importance.

In 1494, little less than two years after Columbus's momentous first voyage to the Caribbean, the governments of Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, which was blessed by the papacy and which divided the New World into two spheres of influence and control. England, France and other European powers refused that division, and by the 1530s Spain's European enemies were harassing Spanish settlements and commerce in the Caribbean area. As French and English privateers commanded by men such as Francois LeClerc, John Hawkins, and Francis Drake enlarged their operations in the Caribbean, Spain began to take steps to protect its settlements and commerce in the area. By the 1560s Admiral Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, better known for securing Spain's hold on the Florida Peninsula and founding the settlement of St. Augustine there, had organized a fleet system by virtue of which all ships sailing from Spain to the colonies did so in one of two great fleets which, accompanied by warships, departed from the port of Seville in southern Spain every year. After entering the Caribbean one fleet sailed to the Isthmus of Panama, where it unloaded the commodities destined for the markets of the Viceroyalty of Peru and where it took aboard large quantities of silver brought from the mines of Potosi in what today is the Republic of Bolivia. The other fleet sailed to the port of Veracruz on the Gulf Coast of Mexico. There silver from northern Mexico was put aboard and a variety of commodities were unloaded for distribution throughout the Viceroyalty of New Spain, as Mexico was known then. Both fleets sailed to Havana, and from there they sailed together to Spain.

To protect this commercial system, Spain fortified the American terminals of the great fleets as well as the port of Havana. Because the two fleets sailed into the Caribbean in the vicinity of Puerto Rico, the island assumed an already-predicted strategic importance. In the 1530s, decades before the organization of the fleet system, Governor Lando had described the island as "the entrance and the key to all the Indies," a sentiment which was to be expressed many times in the future both by the kings of Spain and their representatives in the Caribbean. It was imperative that Spain hold on to the island, for should it fall into the hands of the enemies of Spain it could serve as a base of operations that could disrupt and even paralyze the entire Spanish-American commercial system.

Spain was not the only power aware of the strategic importance of Puerto Rico. In 1528 and 1538 the French raided San Germán. During those years they even threatened San Juan. It was as a result of growing foreign interest in Puerto Rico that the insular authorities began in 1539 to construct the fortress of San Felipe del Morro at the entrance of San Juan Bay and to establish there a permanent garrison of Spanish troops. The construction of the fortress, whose final form was the result of plans drawn by the Italian architect Bautista Antonelli, was a costly affair. At first funds were provided by Spain and by the more affluent Spanish American colonies. In 1586 Spain decided to formalize the subsidization of its administration and defense establishment in Puerto Rico and created the famous *situado mexicano*, a subsidy which was paid annually to the Spanish authorities on the island by the royal treasury of Mexico City.

By the end of the sixteenth century the defenses of San Juan were strong enough to foil an English attempt (1595) to wrest Puerto Rico from Spain. Commanded by the aging Francis Drake and John Hawkins (two men who in the past had made their reputations in England by raiding Spanish American settlements and ships), a large English fleet tried to sail into San Juan Bay. The artillery of El Morro drove it off. Hawkins died during the attempt; Drake sailed away and died off the coast of Panama after raiding Spanish settlements on that isthmus. Three years later the English tried again to take San Juan. This time they were temporarily successful. Led by Sir George Clifford, the Count of Cumberland, the English fooled the Spanish defenders of the city into thinking that the English fleet would try, as Drake and Hawkins had, to sail directly into San Juan Bay. Instead they landed on the coast east of San Juan and, to the consternation of the Spaniards, attacked the city from the interior. The capital was captured, but the English did not hold it for long. The Spaniards in the interior of the island organized guerrilla bands and made it difficult for the English to get supplies from the interior. This, an epidemic of dysentery that decimated the English troops and news that a powerful Spanish fleet carrrying 3,000 troops was on its way to Puerto Rico led Cumberland to evacuate San Juan. Twenty seven years later (in 1625) when Spain and the Netherlands were at war, the Dutch duplicated Cumberland's feat of capturing San Juan. Like the English, however, the Dutch were not able to hold on to their prize. Once again local resistance and disease forced the invaders to evacuate the city, but not before they burned most of it to the ground. Not till 1898 was the island capital again occupied by foreign troops.

At the time of the English and Dutch attacks, Puerto Rico was little different from what it had been in the 1530s. Sugar and leather were still the main exports. Commercial contacts with the outside world were infrequent and, by law, limited to Spain. Economically, the island was still a liability to the Spanish treasury. Administratively, it was under a governor who was appointed by and reported directly to, the king of Spain. With his official residence in the Fortaleza, the governor was commander-in-chief of all military forces on the island, enforcer of royal laws, legislator and a judicial officer as well. Below him were the two lieutenants who administered the two *partidos* (San Juan and San Germán) into which the island was divided for administrative purposes. The town councils of San Juan and San Germán, the only officially recognized towns on the island at that timme, enjoyed some autonomy over purely municipal affairs but were otherwise under the careful eye and control of the governor and his lieutenants. In Puerto Rico, as in other parts of the Spanish American world, Spain would not tolerate the development of independent town councils as those which evolved in the Anglo-Saxon colonies of North America. Neither would the Crown permit any participation by the local population in the administrative system. Ordinarily, the administration of the island was totally in the hands of Spanish-born bureaucrats whose powers were tremendous because of the lack of any written or unwritten constitutional restraints. The local population was expected, to use Lord Tennyson's phrase, to do and die, never to question why.

Juridically, Puerto Rico fell under the jurisdication of the high court (*audiencia*) of Santo Domingo in Hispaniola. Ordinarily local suits were brought before the head of the town councils (the *alcalde*) or before the governor himself. Rare were the cases that were brought before the *audiencia* of Santo Domingo. Rarer still were the cases that were taken before the Council of the Indies, whose offices were in Madrid and which enjoyed overall supervision over Spanish American affairs.

Parallel to the civil administration, there existed an ecclesiastical administration. From the beginning of the Spanish presence in Puerto Rico, Catholicism was the only religion tolerated in the island. Priests and monks arrived there almost immediately after Ponce de León's occupation and set about destroying the religion of the Indians, converting them to Christianity, and looking after the spiritual needs of the Spaniards. In 1511 the diocese of San Juan was created and in 1513 its first bishop (Alonso Manso) arrived. Nominally, he was under the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Santo Domingo; in fact he was under the control of the civil authorities. By virtue of a series of privileges granted to the Spanish Crown by the papacy—privileges that were collectively known as the *real patronato*—the Church in Puerto Rico, as everywhere else in the Spanish empire, was kept subservient to the crown and its representatives in the colonies. It was the king, for example, who, at the recommendation of the Council of the Indies, decided who was to be bishop of Puerto Rico. Like the governors, the bishops were invariably Spaniards. The only native of the island who held the post of bishop during the almost four centuries of Spanish rule in Puerto Rico was Juan Alejo de Arizmendi, who was born in San Juan in 1757.

Under the supervision of the bishop there worked on the island the monks, nuns and priests who looked after the day-to-day spiritual needs of the island's inhabitants. Concentrated for the most part in San Juan and San Germán and periodically going into the rural areas to baptize the newborn, marry couples and give the last sacraments to the dying, the several dozen members of the clergy also ran the only health facilities (*hospitales*) available on the island. Rather than hospitals in the modern sense of the term, the *hospitales* were places where people went after all home remedies had failed, usually with the belief that death was close at hand. Even then, these primitive health facilities were only available in the towns. In the rural areas people took care of themselves when ill or went to local *curanderos*, rural medicine men whose knowledge of medicinal herbs was often surprisingly advanced.

The clergy also provided the bulk of Puerto Rico's teachers at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Educational facilities were limited and the curriculum backward even by the standards of the time. Still, only the children of the privileged few received the rudamentaries of reading and writing. Fewer still were those who received a higher education. They had to study in Santo Domingo, other Spanish American universities, or in Spain itself, for at no time under Spanish rule did Puerto Rico have a university of its own. In the first decades of the seventeenth century there were very few on the island who could read and write, a situation which did not improve significantly till the nineteenth century.

In Puerto Rico the Catholic Church was culturally and socially of tremendous importance and in the realm of religious dogma it was supreme. But unlike the Church in the more affluent colonies of Spain's American Empire, the Church in Puerto Rico was poor and remained poor throughout Spanish colonial rule on the island. The main sources of revenue for the Church were the ecclesiastical tithe (*diezmo*), which, by virtue of the *real patronato*, was collected by the civil authorities, and voluntary contributions by the faithful. It was this poverty that placed the Church in Puerto Rico far more at the mercy of the state (which often provided badly needed revenues) than of the Church in areas such as Mexico and Peru, where by the end of the eighteenth century it was immensely rich. In Puerto Rico the Catholic Church was in fact another branch of the colonial government, used by it to keep the populace in line and justify its arbitrary rule.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the population of Puerto Rico was still relatively small—no more than 3,000 people. Ethnically it was made up of several hundred whites, close to a thousand black slaves and over a thousand free blacks and mulattoes. Geographically it was still concentrated on the northern coastal plain, especially in or in the vicinity of San Juan, the administrative, ecclesiastical and commercial capital of the island. The capital was a small and unimposing place, culturally, politically and commercially in the periphery of the empire. The city did not have more than a hundred houses, the majority of which were crowded on the western tip of San Juan island, not far from the massive walls of El Morro. Its elite was small and, compared with the elites of cities such as Mexico, Lima, Panama and Potosi, poor. It included the governor, the bishop, the officers of El Morro's garrison, the heads of the few monasteries in the city, the members of the town council, a few local landowners affluent enough to own houses in the city and a handful of merchants—almost all of them born in Spain—who controlled the import-export trade. Below this elite were the artisans who made furniture, hats, shoes, leather goods and other goods in their household shops, and a few retail merchants. At the bottom of the city's social structure were the handful of full-time municipal workers, the common soldiers of the city's garrison and the slaves who served in the households of the well-to-do. Ships carrying royal dispatches to the island's authorities, supplies for the garrison, and a variety of manufactured goods that were exchanged for sugar, hides and a few other agricultural commodities, arrived in the port of San Juan infrequently—sometimes every few years—and must have been the cause of excitement and celebrations.

Besides San Juan, the other municipality on the island at the beginning of the seventeenth century was San Germán on the southern coastal plain. Compared with San Juan, it was a sleepy rural village with a few dozen houses and a small church run by a couple of resident priests. The official residents (*vecinos*) of the municipality numbered only a few hundred and lived in the rural areas within the jurisdiction of the town. Periodically, these rural residents rode into the town to hear mass, exchange gossip, drink and participate in civil and religious celebrations such as the birth of the heir to the throne, the king's birthday, or Holy Week. Most of the time the permanent population of San Germán was small.

Outside San Juan and San Germán, the island's population was either dispersed over the coastal plains in small, subsistence farms or clustered in small groups in the sugar and cattle establishments that dotted the rural areas. These farms and ranches were usually on the banks of rivers that, in the absence of roads, served as the most important means of communication between the interior of the plains and the coast. Contacts between the rural population and the towns were infrequent. Between the towns and the countryside there existed a wide cultural and psychological gap which did not begin to be closed until the last decades of the nineteenth century.

There was a small population and plenty of arable land, so conflicts over land were rare in Puerto Rico at the beginning of the seventeenth century. At the top of the rural social structure were the owners of the sugar farms and cattle ranches and their families. Below them were the workers. Most were black slaves imported through San Juan and brought there by Portuguese slave traders. But already by the beginning of the seventeenth century there were non-slaves working full time on the farms and cattle ranches. Outside these establishments were hundreds of subsistence farmers who lived isolated in the rural areas and who seldom had any contact with the sugar farms and cattle ranches or with the towns. Some of these subsistence farmers were the descendants of runaway slaves (*cimarrones*), deserters from El Morro's garrison, fugitives from the law and sailors who either had been shipwrecked off the coast or had taken advantage of their ships' stops on the coast for water and other supplies and fled from the nightmarish conditions of ship life to seek refuge in the forests of the plains. They concentrated on the production of subsistence crops such as plantains, bananas, yams and *yuca*, and on the raising of a few domestic animals such as chickens and pigs. The subsistence farmers of the interior were the ancestors of the latter-day *jíbaro*, who has gone down in Puerto Rican literature as the true representative of the Puerto Rican nation.

Much of the population of Puerto Rico at the beginning of the seventeenth century was overwhelmingly poor, illiterate and isolated from the urban centers. The people were all nominal Catholics. But priests were few, and the majority of the inhabitants of the rural areas seldom saw them. Also, the beliefs of the black slaves imported into the island had their impact on the religious beliefs of the islanders. Rural Christianity was characterized by superstition and the belief in good and evil natural forces that only the *curanderos* could understand and control. The societies of the towns and of the rural areas were male-dominated societies in which the woman's proper role was that of a good daughter, a good wife and a good mother. As a rule, the degree of control over her own life enjoyed by a woman depended on her social status: The more affluent and "respectable" she was, the greater the limitations on her social and economic activities. Among the poor, the family structure was more amorphous and flexible than among the elite. Prestige and family honor were not as important concerns as they were among the well-to-do. Within the more informal atmosphere of lower class families women enjoyed greater freedom from the restraints placed on their upper class counterparts and often assumed a relatively authoritative position within the family that carried over into the external society.

For Spain the seventeenth century was one of economic, political and military decline brought about primarily by excessive taxation of industry, lack of interest in agriculture, inefficient and free-spending monarchs, internal political dissentions and disastrous involvements in European conflicts. The weaknesses of Spain explain for the most part why in the course of the seventeenth century its enemies (England, France and the Netherlands) were able to establish permanent footholds in the Caribbean and in other parts of the New World claimed by Spain. In the first half of the seventeenth century the French and the English occupied several of the Lesser Antilles, and the Dutch occupied the small islands of Aruba and Curaçao, off the northern coast of South America. In 1655 the English occupied Jamaica. And by the end of the century the eastern half of Hispaniola (St. Domingue) had been lost to the French.

In spite of the major changes that were taking place in the Caribbean area, Puerto Rico did not change much during that century. The population remained small and grew slowly, and although there was a gradual movement of people into the mountains of the interior, the bulk of the population remained concentrated on the northern plain. A few new towns were founded (Ponce, Coamo and Arecibo), but San Juan maintained its political and commercial supremacy and San Germán continued to be the second most important town on the island. Nothing in government administration changed save that by the end of the century five new administrative *partidos* had been created. The governor continued to enjoy tremendous powers, and the local population continued to be kept from any participation in the colonial administration. As in the past, defense remained one of the major concerns of the governor and his lieutenants. In the course of the seventeenth century the defenses of San Juan were strengthened as a result of the growing English, French and Dutch presence in the Caribbean. The fortress of El Morro was expanded, the massive fortress of San Cristóbal was built, and a massive wall was constructed to surround the entire city. In addition, the number of regular Spanish troops was increased and the island's population was organized into militias. By 1700 there were on the island 14 infantry and two cavalry militia companies. Already distrustful of the local population, the Spanish authorities made sure that the militias were under the command of Spanish officers and issued ordinances forbidding militia members to be equipped with fire arms. In spite of the distrust of the Spanish authorities, however, the local population remained loyal to Spain, and the militias proved valuable in keeping the island in Spanish hands. In 1702 the English landed an expedition near Arecibo and were forced to withdraw by the fierce resistance put up by the local populace. The same happened in 1703 when the Dutch landed near Guadianilla.

Throughout the seventeenth century, Puerto Rico's economy remained based on the production of a variety of subsistence crops and the production of sugar and hides for exportation. For a few years ginger and cacao became important exports, but these never supplanted sugar and hides in importance. Because Spain was economically stagnant, it could not supply the island with the manufactured commodities and a few food products that were in demand on the island, nor could it absorb the few commodities that the island had available for export. As a result many of the landowners and cattle ranchers on the island turned to the enemies of Spain for commerce. The local population resisted efforts by England and France to wrest the island from Spain, but it was more than willing to trade with their merchants. Thus, in the course of the century there evolved a very lively contraband trade in which even the very officials charged by the metropolitan authorities with ending it participated. Some of the illegal trade took place in San Juan itself, but the bulk was carried on in isolated spots, especially along the southern coast. There the place that the settlers called Ponce became the center of a lively exchange in commodities between local farmers and cattle ranchers and English, French and Dutch traders. By the end of the century the town of Ponce was rapidly becoming one of the most important on the island.

The contraband trade of the seventeenth century, like the legal trade of the sixteenth, profited only a handful of local producers, merchants and governmental officials who often combined their official duties with illegal involvement in commercial activities. The majority of the population remained totally uninvolved in commercial relations with the outside, poor and devoted to the production of subsistence crops. Royal revenues generated by the island were never sufficient to cover the costs of administration and defense and, therefore, the governmental and military structure remained dependent on the Mexican *situado*. In years when that subsidy did not arrive on the island, a clamor of complaints would arise from civil administrators and regular soldiers whose salaries were not being paid.

In contrast with the seventeenth century, the eighteenth century was for Spain a period of recovery, economic expansion and national prosperity. In 1700 the last Hapsburg king of Spain died and willed Spain and all its possessions to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV of France. In an attempt to prevent Spain and its overseas possessions from becoming a French sphere of influence, England, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands went to war against Philip and France. The resulting War of the Spanish Succession was long and bloody, but Philip held on to his inheritance, and Bourbon kings sat on the Spanish throne until the declaration of the Spanish Republic in 1931.

The main goal which the Bourbons set for themselves in the eighteenth century was to turn Spain once again into the power it had been in the sixteenth century; to reverse the trends that had set in the seventeenth. To achieve this they needed military power; to build their army and navy they needed revenues; and to get these revenues they needed a centralized monarchy and a prosperous economy both in Spain and in the colonies. In pursuit of their goals the Bourbons and the able ministers who served them introduced in the course of the eighteenth century a series of administrative, military and economic reforms which in the long run had their desired results. By the time that the French revolution got under way Spain was enjoying an unprecedented economic expansion, the power of the monarchy was absolute, and abroad Spain commanded a respect that it had not enjoyed since the days of Philip II in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Bourbon policy towards the Spanish American colonies was designed primarily to generate economic growth there, to stimulate commerce between the colonies and the metropolis and to increase the amount of revenues collected in the colonies. To accomplish their ends, the kings of Spain and their ministers in the eighteenth century introduced a series of administrative changes whose goal was to bring the Spanish American world under greater royal control. They made economic reforms designed to increase mining and agricultural output in the colonies and trade between them and Spain, tax reforms to squeeze more revenues out of the colonies and military reforms designed to keep the increasingly prosperous colonies from falling into the hands of England and France. By the end of the reign of Charles III (1759-1788), the Spanish American world was better defended, better administered, and, on the whole, more prosperous than it had ever been in the past.

In the eighteenth century, Puerto Rico, too, drew the attention of the Bourbon monarchs and their ministers. In that century Spanish policy towards the island was based primarily on Spain's determination to hold on to the island and on its desire to have the island pay its own way in the empire. The Spanish government was aware that to realize these goals men of unusual energy and ability were needed to govern the island for Spain. Spaniards of military background who had proven themselves loyal, tireless and efficient servants of the crown were appointed as governors. As a group, the men who governed Puerto Rico in the eighteenth century were of a higher caliber than those who had governed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Like their predecessors, governors in the eighteenth century dedicated much of their efforts to strengthening the defenses of the island. Control of Puerto Rico was important to Spain not only because if it fell into foreign hands the Spanish commercial system in the New World would be endangered, but also because in times of war with England—Spain's major antagonist in the eighteenth century—the island served as an excellent base of operations to harass and disrupt the flourishing English commerce in the West Indies. It was not surprising, then, that in the course of the eighteenth century England tried several times, through war and diplomacy, to wrest the island from Spain.

In addition to defense, another major concern of the representatives of the Bourbon dynasty in Puerto Rico was the economic development of the island. The goal of official efforts was not to increase the material well being of the island's inhabitants (for whom royal officials showed little concern), but to generate sufficient revenues to cover the cost of administration and defense. Aware of the importance of agriculture and of the decline in leather exports in the latter part of the seventeenth century, Spanish governors in Puerto Rico did their best to drive cattle ranchers out of areas that were considered best for agricultural development. In many parts of the northern coastal plain pasture lands were turned into sugar fields. Where cattle ranchers could not be driven out, they were required to fence in their pastures to allow for agricultural development in their vicinity.

Sugar, the island's most important export in the first half of the eighteenth century, received special attention from royal officials. Tax laws were changed to facilitate the importation of machinery needed in the sugar mills, the immigration of sugar experts to the island was encouraged and efforts were made to improve communications and means of transportation between the sugar-producing areas and coastal towns such as San Juan and Ponce. In spite of this emphasis on sugar production, however, the cultivation of other commercial crops was not ignored. Cotton, for which there was a growing demand in the textile mills of Catalonia in northeastern Spain, became an export of some consequence in the eighteenth century. So did tobacco and coffee. Puerto Rican tobacco, however, found it difficult to compete with the cheaper and better quality Cuban product, and as a consequence tobacco production in the island grew slowly. Coffee production underwent a rapid expansion. Introduced into Puerto Rico from the French Antilles in 1726, the coffee tree did well on the island. Puerto Rican coffee found a ready market in Spain and, through Spain, in other European countries. Coffee production took place in relatively small, family-run farms. Because the coffee tree grew particularly well on mountain slopes, the expansion of the coffee economy generated an important migration of people from the coastal plains to the interior. Slowly, the valleys and mountains of the *cordillera central* began to assume an economic importance which they had not enjoyed in the past and which became greater in the future.

To encourage more trade between Puerto Rico and Spain and to try to put an end to the contraband trade between the islander's and English, French and Dutch merchants, the royal authorities in Puerto Rico reduced some export-import taxes and eliminated some of the restrictions which in the past had hindered trade between the island and the rest of the empire. A further step was taken in 1756 when the Crown approved the creation of the Real Compañía de Barcelona, a Catalan charter company that was given a series of special privileges over the commerce of Puerto Rico and Hispaniola. In return for these privileges, the company was to take steps to provide some capital and machinery to encourage greater agricultural output in those two islands.

For all economic activities on the island in the eighteenth century, black slaves continued to constitute a major source of labor. As the economy grew, so did the number of slaves imported into the island. Slaves, however, were not the only laborers in Puerto Rico. By the middle of the eighteenth century non-slave labor had assumed great importance in certain activities, and in some sugar and coffee farms non-slave laborers often outnumbered the slaves. These free laborers, however, constituted an unstable labor force since many of them would work only for part of the year, and others often left their employers and settled as subsistence farmers in the interior. By the end of the eighteenth century some local landowners were already complaining of this and eventually (in the first decades of the nineteenth century) enlisted the support of the royal authorities to insure that free laborers remained attached to the sugar, coffee and tobacco farms.

The results of the efforts made by the Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico in the first half of the eighteenth century to stimulate economic growth on the island were not particularly impressive. Agricultural output grew, but slowly. So did commerce with Spain and other parts of the empire. After a promising beginning, the Catalan company discovered that contraband trade was profitable and established illegal commercial relations with the French and the English in the Caribbean. These activities brought upon the company the wrath of the Spanish government, which eventually withdrew from it the privileges it had previously granted the company and thereby brought about its demise. Commerce was also hindered by Spain's commitment not to allow Puerto Rico to carry on commercial relations with any other countries but Spain and its possessions. As a consequence of this and of the continuing lack of capital and the failure of the authorities to attract immigrants to the island, by the middle of the eighteenth century Puerto Rico was still poor, backward, sparsely populated and unable to generate the revenues necessary to pay for its administration and defense.

When he arrived in Puerto Rico in 1765 to prepare a report for his king on the state of the island, Alejandro O'Reilly was both disappointed and shocked by what he found. O'Reilly was an authoritarian, no-nonsense Irishman who, like a few other Irishmen in the eighteenth century, had entered the service of Spain and had served its monarch loyally and efficiently. At the time of his visit to Puerto Rico he enjoyed the rank of field marshall in the king's army. His mission to the island was to study the military and economic situation there and to make appropriate recommendations for change. Upon his arrival, O'Reilly was dismayed by the state of Puerto Rico's defenses. In spite of the efforts of governors since the beginning of the century, the fortifications of San Juan were in need of repairs, the artillery of the forts was antiquated and the regular Spanish troops were poorly equipped, undisciplined and badly paid. He also was shocked by the overall economic situation of Puerto Rico, whose inhabitants he described as "the poorest in America." After more than 250 years of Spanish rule there still were no roads on the island, few schools and poor sanitation facilities. O'Reilly found agricultural techniques backward and inefficient and commented on the lack of capital and agricultural experts, both of which he deemed necessary to bring the sugar industry up to date. He discovered that contraband still flourished and that in spite of past efforts by the Crown and its representatives on the island trade with Spain and the rest of the empire was still of little significance. He was particularly disturbed by the small population of the island, a situation which he considered one of the major explanations for the economic backwardness of Puerto Rico. After conducting the first island-wide census in the history of the island, O'Reilly reported a total population of 44,883. Of these 5,037 were black slaves. Of the remaining 39,846 only several hundred were Spaniards, several hundred more were creoles (locally born whites), and the remainder free blacks, mulattoes and mixtures of the latter two.

O'Reilly recommended that to strengthen the island's defenses additional funds should be made available to repair and expand the fortifications of San Juan. He also recommended that the size of the Spanish garrison in the capital be enlarged and that the regular troops stationed on the island be better paid, better equipped and more rigorously trained. He recommended that immigration from other parts of the empire and Catholic countries be encouraged to stimulate the island's economy and that state lands be made available to those immigrants who were willing to settle in Puerto Rico. He also recommended that remaining barriers to trade between Puerto Rico and the rest of the empire be abolished, that taxes be lowered and that roads be constructed to facilitate the movement of people and goods between the coast and the interior. In his report, O'Reilly emphasized the importance of sugar production. He recommended that greater steps be taken to curtail cattle raising in areas suitable for agricultural development and that efforts be made to introduce into the island better agricultural methods and technology. The Irishman also indicated the need for more educational facilities. A man of the enlightenment, he believed that a literate and educated population would also be an economically more productive population.

In the years following O'Reilly's visit to Puerto Rico, efforts were undertaken to put into practice many of the recommendations made by him. Most of his recommendations dealing with defense were followed almost to the letter, and by the end of the century the island was better defended than at any other time in the past. The island's defense system was put to the test soon after England and Spain went to war in 1796. Early in the following year an English expedition of some 10,000 men commanded by General Sir Ralph Abercromby landed on the coast a few miles east of San Juan and set out towards the capital. They never took it. The English met fierce opposition both from the regular Spanish troops on the island and from the local militias that had been reorganized in the years following O'Reilly's visit and that were now mobilized for the occasion by Ramón de Castro, the able and energetic Spanish governor. After several weeks of constant fighting the English position became untenable, and in early May the humiliated Abercromby ordered his troops back to their ships to sail away. It was the last time that the English attempted to take Puerto Rico by force.

Not only was Puerto Rico's defense system at the end of the eighteenth century in better shape than it had ever been in the past, but the island's economy was undergoing a slow but unpreceented rate of expansion. Following the recommendations made by O'Reilly, the Spanish authorities after 1765 launched a systematic campaign to attract Catholic immigrants to the island. Several incentives, including free state lands, were offered. Partially as a result of growing immigration, the population of Puerto Rico between 1765 and 1800 grew from 44,883 to 155,000, an increase of almost 300 per cent. Hand in hand with this expansion in population (and primarily as a result of it) went the founding of new towns, both in the interior and the coastal plains. Between 1750 and 1800 alone, 18 new towns were officially founded on the island. Among these was the town of Mayagüez, founded in 1763 and by 1800 one of the most important ports in Puerto Rico.

By creating greater demand for a variety of commodities, a growing population stimulated economic growth on the island. It facilitated that growth by making more labor available to work on the sugar, coffee, tobacco and cotton farms. Royal efforts also were important in bringing about a higher rate of economic growth. Beginning in the 1770s the Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico took a series of steps to stimulate growth. To facilitate internal and external commercial transactions paper money was introduced into the island in 1779. In 1787 a royal company was set up to stimulate the sale of Puerto Rican tobacco in Europe. Several taxes were lowered, a few restrictions on trade abolished (though trade outside the Spanish empire was still forbidden), and new and more efficient agricultural methods and technology introduced. As in the past, governmental efforts were concentrated on stimulating agricultural growth and trade between the island and Spain. Industrial activities, except for the production of cheap rum in the sugar farms, were discouraged by Spain, which like most countries with colonies, tried its best to prevent in the colonies the development of industrial activities (e.g. textile manufacturing) that might compete with metropolitan industries and thus preserve the colonial market for home industries. As a result of this policy, industrial activity in Puerto Rico was almost nonexistent at the end of the eighteenth century. A variety of goods were made within the island by local artisans, but the bulk of the manufactured commodities used on the island was imported from Spain which in turn imported a great deal from England and France.

As a result of population growth and governmental efforts, Puerto Rico entered the decade of the 1790s with an expanding agricultural sector and trade with the outside. Both agriculture and trade received a major boost from developments arising from the international crisis that overwhelmed Europe and the Caribbean in the years following the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. When that revolution began the most important colony in the French Empire was St. Domingue, on the eastern part of Hispaniola. It was a prosperous sugar colony ruled by a small elite of white planters and made productive by a large mass of brutalized black slaves. In 1791, the slaves took advantage of the disruptions created in France and in the colony by the revolution and launched the first successful black rebellion in the New World. It was a violent and bloody affair, and the colony's sugar economy was destroyed. Many whites were killed and many others driven into exile. In spite of Napoleon's efforts to bring the slaves under control again, the blacks maintained their freedom from white rule, and in the first decade of the nineteenth century created the black independent state of Haiti.

The destruction of St. Domingue's sugar industry stimulated the expansion of the sugar industries of Cuba and Puerto Rico, whose sugar producers now sought to supply the European markets previously supplied by the more efficient planters of St. Domingue. In Puerto Rico, new lands were brought under sugar cultivation and more slaves imported to work them. The expansion of sugar production was facilitated by governmental policies and by the presence of French planters who had fled to Puerto Rico from St. Domingue during the black rebellion there. These families—most of whom settled permanently on Puerto Rico with the assistance of the Spanish authorities—not only brought with them badly needed capital but also knowledge about sugar production that was more advanced than that possessed by sugar producers in Puerto Rico.

As the Puerto Rican sugar industry expanded in the 1790s, so did the island's commerce with the outside. In the years following the fall of the Bastille, Spain tried to curb the excesses of the French Revolution, and after the execution of the king of France by the revolutionary government went to war against France in 1792. The war went badly for Spain, and by the mid 1790s the Spanish government pleaded for peace. The price demanded by the victorious French regime was high. By virtue of treaties signed in 1795 and 1796, Spain became a virtual economic and military satellite of France. Since at that time France and England were at war, England declared war against Spain. For Spain, the war with England was disastrous. English sea power not only disrupted Spanish commerce in Europe, but also paralyzed Spain's commerce with its American colonies. In an attempt to cope with the economic crisis that the disruption of trade with Spain created in Puerto Rico and in other Spanish American colonies, the Spanish government issued in 1797 a decree allowing neutral powers to trade with its colonies in the New World. The chief beneficiary of the decree was the United States, whose ships now sailed to Spanish American ports in unprecedented numbers. After 1797 the presence of North American ships in San Juan and other Puerto Rican ports became common, and the island and the U.S. began a lively and profitable commerce. To the United States Puerto Rico exported sugar, molasses, rum and some coffee and tobacco. To Puerto Rico the United States exported wheat, hog products and a variety of manufactured goods. As the trade between Puerto Rico and the United States grew, Spain became increasingly concerned about losing a good share of the island's commerce to the North Americans and in 1799 revoked the decree of 1797. The war with England, however made it impossible for Spain to enforce the new decree and the trade went on, often with the participation of Spanish officials on the island. In the first few years of the nineteenth century the Spanish government concluded that the trade between Puerto Rico and the United States could not be halted and that so long as it remained illegal import-export taxes could not be collected on it. As a result, in 1804 Spain once again opened Puerto Rican ports to legal trade with neutral powers. From then on commercial relations between the United States and the island grew steadily and by the end of the nineteenth century the United States had become one of Puerto Rico's major trading partners.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Puerto Rico was in several ways quite different from what it had been when the Bourbon dynasty came to the throne of Spain in 1700. The population was over 150,000 and a significant proportion of it was now concentrated in the mountain chain of the interior. There were several dozen towns; Ponce and Mayagüez were expanding commercial centers, and San Germán had a population of several thousand. Town life throughout the island was livelier than in the past; contact between the towns and the rural areas was greater. More merchants now traveled through the interior and more people lived year round in the towns. San Juan, which still remained the commercial, administrative and ecclesiastical capital, was a bustling community of over 10,000 people. Some of the capital's more affluent families, including the governor's, now had summer houses among the lovely gardens and orchards of a place known as Rio Piedras, not far from San Juan.

Commercial relations with the outside were expanding, as was agricultural output, both to meet the food demands of a growing population and for exportation abroad. Leather was no longer an export of significance. The main exports were sugar, coffee, tobacco and cotton, in that order of importance. The bulk of these exports left the island through the ports of San Juan, Ponce and Mayagüez, which were also the main centers of distribution for commodities imported into the island. The revenues generated by Puerto Rico's economy and commerce were increasing and realization of the hopes of Spanish monarchs to have the island cover the costs of its own administration and defense seemed close at hand. In 1810 the Mexican *situado* was abolished permanently.

But if the differences between Puerto Rico at the beginning and at the end of the eighteenth century were important, the similarities were perhaps more significant. Impressive population growth had taken place in the second half of the century. Dozens of new towns had been founded, and more people now lived in the interior. But at the end of the century the island was still sparsely populated, and its population remained overwhelmingly rural and concentrated on the coastal plains. In spite of governmental efforts, the island still had no roads at the end of the century. A little progress had been made in education, and more of the sons of the elite now went abroad to study; but at the end of the century the island still had no university of its own, few schools, no printing press, and over 90 per cent of its people could neither read nor write. In the towns health and sanitation facilities were primitive; in the rural areas they were nonexistent. Life expectancy was short, the annual death rate high, and throughout the island *curanderos* continued to take care of most of the sick.

In the second half of the eighteenth century Puerto Rico had witnessed an unprecedented economic expansion that enriched a handful of landowning families and merchants and brought more revenues into the royal treasury. Yet, by the end of the century the vast majority of the island's inhabitants still remained as poor as they had been when O'Reilly had described them as "the poorest in America." The economy as a whole was backward and underdeveloped, and, in spite of growing commercial relations with the outside, relatively isolated from the mainstream of world trade. In general, sugar, coffee and tobacco farms remained relatively small. There still existed a critical shortage of capital in the sugar industry, whose technology, some improvements notwithstanding, remained primitive when compared with the technology in other sugar-producing islands in the Caribbean. In years when Spain was at peace with its European neighbors, the colonial metropolis continued to control the bulk of the island's trade. Spanish policy toward the island at the end of the century was still designed to increase governmental revenues, to prevent the development of industrial activities which might compete with home industries, and to stimulate the production of a few commercial crops that were in demand in Spain or could be channeled through Spain to other European markets.

At the end of the eighteenth century political power was still concentrated in the hands of a small elite of Spanish administrators appointed by the monarchy and responsible only to it. Not only the civil administration, but also the ecclesiastical organization still remained in the hands of Spaniards whose main concern was to maintain Puerto Rico within the Spanish empire and, with royal approval and encouragement, to keep the local population out of both administrative and ecclesiastical positions. Isolated and dispersed throughout the rural areas, the majority of the islanders showed no concern over this policy and therefore voiced no opposition. But among members of the landed elite born and raised on the island—an elite which had become increasingly well-off in the latter part of the century—there were objections to a policy that kept them from playing any role whatever in shaping the destiny of the land of their birth. These objections were not formalized in any sort of program for change. They took the form of a growing antagonism towards Spaniards, an antagonism which the historian Abbad y Lasierra had already described in 1782 when he wrote that among the islanders, Spaniards were known as "men of the other band." At the end of the eighteenth century there were still no Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico; but the foundations for the future emergence of the Puerto Rican nation had been set during the first three centuries of Spanish rule, and the genesis of the development of a national consciousness was already appearing.

Through conquest and military domination Spanish imperialism was able to fix upon Puerto Rico its language and to shape its predominant form of economic activity: agriculture for subsistence and export. A dependent economy and a hierarchical class structure emerged that at its highest levels meshed landowners, and ecclesiastic and military officials with civil administrators. The slow rate of colonization of the island and the larger interests of the empire precluded rapid economic development and social change. The relatively large number of military and civilian officials linked to Spain, along with a lack of a political role on the part of local landowners, commercial groups, subsistence farmers and urban craftsmen, weakened the basis for indigineous political movements for self government. The process of internal migration left the administrative and commercial centers in the hands of those classes and individuals most loyal to Spain and most immune to the currents of nationalism that were to emerge in the rest of the Spanish American world in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Despite poverty and exploitation in the midst of commercial opportunity and a potential bountiful land, the combined forces of Spain and local officialdom early denied the Puerto Rican people the only framework in which these economic possibilities could be realized: a national movement.

NOTES

Most of the data and factual information in this essay was obtained from the following sources:

Abbad y Lasierra, Iñigo, *Noticias de la historia geográfica, civil y política de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico.* (Madrid, 1788).

Alegria, Ricardo, *Descubrimiento, conquista y colonización de Puerto Rico, 1493-1599* (San Juan, 1969).

Brau, Salvador, *Historia de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1956).

Brau, Salvador, *La colonización de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1966).

Córdoba, Pedro Tomás de, *Memorias geográficas, históricas, económicas y estadísticas de la Isla de Puerto Rico,* Vol. I (Madrid, 1831).

Cuesta Mendoza, Antonio, *Historia eclesiastica del Puerto Rico colonial, 1508-1700* (Santo Domingo, 1948).

Díaz Soler, Luis M., *Historia de la esclavitud negra en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1965).

Fernández Méndez, Eugenio (ed.), *Crónicas de Puerto Rico,* Vol. I (San Juan, 1957).

Figueroa, Loida, *Breve historia de Puerto Rico,* Vol. I (Rio Piedras, 1968).

Herr, Richard, *The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton, 1958).

Ledru, Andree Pierre, *Viaje a la Isla de Puerto Rico* (1797), Trans. Julio L. Vizcarrondo (San Juan, 1863).

Miyares González, Fernando, *Noticias particulares de la Isla y Plaza de San Juan de Puerto Rico* (1775) (Rio Piedras, 1954).

Morales Carrión, Arturo, *Historia del pueblo de Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras, 1968).

Morales Carrión, Arturo, "Origenes de las relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Puerto Rico, 1700-1815," *Historia,* II, No. 1 (April 1952).

Morales Carrión, *Arturo, Puerto Rico and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Rio Piedras, 1952).

O'Reilly, Alejandro, "Memoria," in Alejandro Tapia y Rivera (ed.), *Biblioteca Histórica de Puerto Rico,* 2nd. ed. (San Juan, 1945).

Parry, John H., *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (New York, 1966).

Sanz, Vicente M., *Historia documental de Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras, 1961).

Sauer, Carl Ortwin, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley, 1966).

Vázquez de Espinoza, Antonio, *Compendium and Description of the West Indies* (1620s), Trans. Charles Upson Clark (Washington, D.C., 1942).

Birth of a Nation: Puerto Rico in the Nineteenth Century

Adalberto López

For Spain the first decade of the nineteenth century was a period of political chaos and military upheaval that eventually brought an end to its American empire. Since 1796 Spain had been a commercial and military satellite of revolutionary France, a situation that brought the country into conflict with England, then locked in a fierce was with France. Between 1802 and 1804 Napoleon Bonaparte (who was then the power among the French) brought a temporary peace with England, and Spain enjoyed a temporary respite from the burdens of war. In 1804, however, soon after Napoleon crowned himself Emperor of France, the bitter war resumed, as Napoleon sought to impose his will on continental Europe. For Spain the war with England was an unmitigated disaster. At Trafalgar the cream of the Spanish navy went down with the French fleet under the eyes of a joyous and arrogant Lord Nelson. Once again English sea power disrupted communications between Spain and its American colonies and brought commercial relations between the two to a standstill.

The collapse of trade with the Americas and the growing financial burden of the war created in Spain an economic and political crisis that was made worse by some of the steps taken by the Spanish government in an attempt to increase the necessary revenues to finance the war against England. Under the control of Manuel Godoy—a young, intelligent and hard working army officer who had risen to power because he had caught the fancy of Queen Maria Luisa and the friendship of her husband Charles IV (1788-1808)—the Spanish government expropriated some ecclesiastical properties and brought upon itself the wrath of the powerful Catholic Church. In an already inflationary situation caused by a drastic shortage of imported goods, Godoy introduced large quantities of paper money, which fed the inflation and increased popular anger against Godoy and his monarchs. By 1808 a conspiracy of nobles and churchmen took place. Centered on the figure of Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the goal of the conspiracy was to get rid of Godoy and force Charles to abdicate in favor of his son. In March the conspirators came out in the open while the royal family was in the summer palace of Aranjuez, and in the midst of a popular riot Godoy quit and Charles gave up the throne. Ferdinand VII was now the legitimate king of Spain.

Napoleon was concerned about the political squabbles then raging in Spain and angered by what he considered Spain's insignificant war effort against England. He decided to get rid of the Spanish Bourbons and place one of his brothers on the throne of Spain. At about the same time that the enemies of Godoy were acclaiming Ferdinand as their new king, French armies invaded Spain. By the end of the year Charles IV, Maria Luisa and Godoy were in exile in Italy, Ferdinand was in luxurious imprisonment in France, Joseph Bonaparte had been declared by his brother king of Spain, and most important Spanish cities were occupied by French troops.

In spite of Ferdinand's own statements that Joseph was the legitimate king of Spain, the vast majority of the Spanish people refused to recognize Napoleon's brother as their king or to tolerate the French in Spain, and thousands of Spaniards were up in arms against the invaders. Between 1808 and 1814 guerrilla armies, often led by peasants and priests, led an effective fight against the French presence in Spain. England, now the ally of the Spanish people, provided arms and money and eventually sent to the Peninsula a large army commanded by the future Duke of Wellington. By 1814 the French position in Spain had become untenable, and the French armies of occupation were flowing across the Pyrenees back into France. In that year Napoleon freed Ferdinand, and, after getting from him a promise that Spain would declare its neutrality in the war between England and France, allowed him to return to Spain and regain his throne.

In the Spanish American colonies the French occupation of Spain and the imprisonment of Ferdinand VII opened the door to political autonomy for the creole colonial elites who had grown tired of excessive taxation, restrictions on trade with powers other than Spain and the official policy of keeping them out of administrative positions. With Spain in the midst of a bloody war of resistance against the French and with commercial relations between the colonies and the colonial metropolis at a standstill, the colonial elites throughout the Spanish American mainland made a bids for political and economic autonomy that quickly developed into full-fledged wars of independence. By 1810 rebellions had broken out in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and a few other areas of the Spanish American world. These rebellions continued even after the French had been forced out of Spain and Ferdinand, back on his throne, was able to send more troops and supplies to the colonies. By the mid 1820s the colonies in the mainland had won their independence, the Spanish section of Hispaniola had been occupied by black forces from the independent nation of Haiti and all that remained of what had once been an extensive and rich American empire were the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico was deeply affected by events in Spain and the mainland Spanish American colonies after 1808. Unlike the creole elites in the mainland colonies, however, the island's creole elite did not make a bid for independence. True, among the members of the creole elite in Puerto Rico there were a growing awareness of themselves as being different from Spaniards and a growing attachment to the land of their birth. There was also present among them a general discontent with the policies that Spain had followed and was still following towards the island. But there were too many factors that militated against the emergence of an independence movement among the Puerto Rican creole elite as a group. Many of its members still had a strong psychological and sentimental attachment to the mother country, which did not prevent them from desiring changes and reforms but certainly kept them from taking the radical step of desiring independence. Even among those who were psychologically prepared for a complete break with Spain there was the realization that for Puerto Rico to make a successful bid for independence the island's masses would have to be mobilized, something which they saw as difficult to do and which, in any case, most of them were reluctant to try. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Puerto Rican masses (poor, illiterate and exploited) remained apathetic toward the issue of the status of the island within the Spanish empire. At the same time, the island's native elite was afraid of getting the masses involved in any sort of armed political struggle. In the aftermath of the black rebellion in St. Domingue (Haiti) many of the French planters who escaped the anger of the black masses fled with their families to Puerto Rico. In the island these families quickly assumed a certain economic and social importance. Extremely conservative, these families not only instilled fear in Puerto Rico's elite about the dangers involved when the masses (especially the slaves) were mobilized for political ends, but also joined the island's Spanish authorities in doing whatever was necessary to prevent Puerto Rico from following in the footsteps of the mainland colonies. The French royalists and the vigilant authorities in Puerto Rico were joined after 1810 by thousands of Spaniards fleeing from the wars of independence on the mainland colonies. These royalist exiles also brought with them tales of horror about what happened when the masses were involved in political struggles, and once settled in the island, they, too, made every effort to see that Puerto Rico remained a colony of Spain.

Fear of the slaves and of the masses as a whole by the creole elite and the presence of large numbers of French and Spanish loyalist exiles were not the only deterrents to the emergence of an independence movement in Puerto Rico. There were large numbers of Spanish troops, which although concentrated in San Juan, were also stationed throughout the island. Spanish troops had been present in Puerto Rico since the sixteenth century, but the Spanish military presence there became greater after 1810. Hundreds of Spanish troops that had been defeated in the mainland colonies by the patriot armies were reassigned to the garrisons of Puerto Rico. Also, after 1814 Ferdinand VII ordered more troops to the island directly from Spain to forestall any disruptions there. Finally, another factor militating against the emergence of an independence movement on the island was the political situation in Spain, which after 1808 opened before the Puerto Rican creole elite the vision of reforms and of some participation in the politics of the empire and the administration of Puerto Rico.

In the months following the beginning of the Spanish people's resistance against the French, some of those involved in the anti-French struggle demanded of the Junta Central a meeting of the traditional Spanish parliament or Cortes. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century the Cortes had rarely met except to give official recognition to the heir to the throne and to rubber stamp certain important royal decrees. Given that reputation, the conservative Junta Central concluded that no harm could come out of calling for a meeting of the Cortes and gave in to the demands for such a meeting. Among the deputies who met in the port of Cádiz—an easily defensible city still free of French control—there were some, however, who believed that the situation in which Spain found itself was partially the result of an irresponsible monarchy and who concluded that in the future the actions of the monarchy should be restrained by a written constitution. In spite of bitter opposition from conservative elements who argued that the Cortes should direct itself solely to the issue of fighting the French, the radical deputies (later known as *liberales*) carried the day and managed to turn the Cortes into a sort of constituent assembly. The radical deputies believed that in the formulation of a constitution for Spain the Spanish American colonies should have a voice, and they invited the colonies (most of which were at the time in the midst of wars of independence) to send delegates to Cádiz.

The Puerto Rican creole elite welcomed the invitation from the Cortes of Cádiz with joy and optimism. In June of 1809 the municipalities of the island voted to elect the representative the island had been asked to send to Spain. It was an election in which the masses did not play any role whatever, but it was the island's first election nevertheless. The man chosen to represent Puerto Rico's interests (or more accurately, the interests of the Puerto Rican colonial elite) was Ramón Power y Giralt, a native of San Juan who had been educated in Spain, visited France and had been a navy officer in the service of Spain in the Caribbean. A close friend of Power y Giralt was Juan Alejo de Arizmendi, also a native of San Juan and the first and last native of Puerto Rico to hold the post of bishop of the island during Spanish colonial rule. Bishop Arizmendi was overjoyed by the turn of events in Spain and counseled his friend Power y Giralt "to protect and uphold the rights of our Puerto Rican compatriots, as I will do until I die." Like most members of the creole elite, Arizmendi was socially and politically conservative, sharing the elite's fear of and contempt for the masses. But his counsel to Power y Giralt is indicative of a growing national consciousness that was already having its impact on the island's elite.

Upon his arrival in Cádiz, Power y Giralt was elected vice president of the Cortes. To the deputies of the Cortes he presented 22 propositions that delineated the economic aspirations of his merchant and landed countrymen. In addition to making demands for more schools, a university and more roads, he also made demands for the distribution of royal lands to those who were willing to develop them, more freedom of trade with nations other than Spain, the abolition of certain insular taxes and greater participation for the island's elite in the administration of the island. He requested, for example, that natives of the island be given preference for appointments to the insular administration, that the heads of the *partidos* be popularly elected by the municipalities, and that Puerto Rico be given effective and permanent representation in the Spanish Cortes.

The demands made by Power y Giralt and by other deputies from Spanish America were given a sympathetic hearing by those who met in Cádiz. The group, however, was more interested in providing Spain with a written constitution. By 1812 a constitution that provided for a powerful monarchy but placed some important restrictions on the monarchy had been drafted and promulgated. The new constitution declared Puerto Rico and the rebellious Spanish American colonies provinces of Spain and gave them the right to elect representatives to the Spanish Cortes. The constitution also provided for restraints on the powers of the provincial governors and included certain provisions that gave the Puerto Rican elite the hope of eventually having some sort of island assembly through which they could exercise some control over insular affairs. The constitution of 1812, however, was short lived. The war against the French was still the primary concern of the Spanish people who either did not understand what the constitution was all about or who rejected it as too radical for the country. Ferdinand had learned of the new constitution while still in prison in France and did not approve of it. Once he was back on his throne in 1814, he immediately set out to destroy that constitution. Assured of the support of the bulk of the army, Ferdinand declared the constitution null and void and issued orders to arrest and imprison or exile those who had met in Cádiz and who had dared to dream of a constitutional monarchy. Dozens of liberals were exiled or imprisoned; a few others were executed. Power y Giralt did not experience the anger of the arch-conservative Ferdinand. He had died in 1813, still arguing on behalf of greater power in Puerto Rico for the island's creole elite.

Ferdinand was too conservative to tolerate a written constitution or any sort of representation for the colonies in the Spanish government or electoral system in the colonies themselves. But he was intelligent enough to realize what was going on in the Spanish American world and to take steps to prevent Puerto Rico from following in the footsteps of the rebellious mainland colonies. After 1814 he not only enlarged the

Spanish military presence in Puerto Rico and provided the island with governors of whose loyalty he seemed assured, but he also took steps to meet some of the demands of the island's creole elite. In 1815 he issued the famous *Cédula de Gracias* designed to meet some of the economic demands of the Puerto Rican elite and to stimulate internal economic growth. The *Cédula* abolished many of the existing restrictions on trade between the island and countries other than Spain, permitted the importation of sugar-processing machinery tax free, and invited Catholics from all nations to settle in Puerto Rico. To stimulate Catholic immigration several incentives were offered. Royal lands were to be given free to these immigrants, six acres for each member of the family and three acres for each slave the family brought to the island. In addition, the *Cédula* exempted immigrants from taxation for a period of ten years after they arrived in the island and offered them Spanish citizenship after residing in Puerto Rico for five years. To make easier the implementation of the provisions of the *Cédula*, the island was divided into six *partidos* (San Juan, San Germán, Humacao, Coamo, Arecibo, and Aguada), each under a trained Spanish bureaucrat appointed by the governor.

The Ferdinandian reaction that set in in 1814 was welcomed in Puerto Rico by army commanders, civil administrators, the church and the majority of the French and Spanish merchants and landowners who resided there. To the members of the creole elite, the end of constitutional procedures in Spain and the return of Puerto Rico to a blatant colonial status run by and primarily for the benefit of the colonial masters was a source of disappointment and bitterness. A few were placated by the provisions of the *Cédula de Gracias*. The majority of them, however, continued to argue on behalf of reforms and some sort of official representation for the island in Spain in spite of fierce local conservative opposition to these demands. To those who dreamed of reforms, the opportunity once again appeared in 1820 when Spanish troops in southern Spain mutinied against the reactionary government of Ferdinand VII and against duty in the rebellious Spanish American colonies, and forced the king to recognize the constitution of 1812 as the law of the land. The Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico were concerned about developmentsin Spain and feared that the king had become a prisoner of radical reformers. Nevertheless, they reluctantly decided to obey the liberal government that was organized in Spain in the aftermath of the military mutiny and called for elections of representatives to the Cortes as provided in the constitution of 1812. Once again the members of the Puerto Rican elite got together and chose as their representative José Maria Quiñones, a former colleague of Power y Giralt. Upon his arrival in Spain, Quiñones established contacts with the representatives from Cuba and together launched a campaign on behalf of reforms for the two islands. Many of the demands made by Quiñones before the Cortes in Madrid were identical to those made previously by Power y Giralt in Cádiz. Quiñones, however, went one step further and demanded a degree of political participation by the island's elite which Power y Giralt had not dared mention eight years earlier. Quiñones not only asked for greater autonomy from the governor for the Puerto Rican municipalities, but also demanded greater restrictions on the powers of the insular governor and the creation of an insular assembly whose members were to be elected by the Puerto Rican creole elite.

The Overseas Commission of the Liberal government in Spain considered and accepted many of the proposals that had been submitted by Quiñones and his Cuban colleagues. Yet the degree of political autonomy and participation that Quiñones and other Puerto Rican creoles expected did not materialize. By 1822 the Liberal government in Spain was weakened by factions, personal quarrels and intrigues, and was faced by a growing Catholic-conservative rebellion whose goal was to "liberate" Ferdinand from the liberals. Secretly, Ferdinand had appealed to the Holy Alliance to come to his aid and destroy the constitutional government to which he had paid lip service. The Holy Alliance listened and encouraged France, one of its members, to intervene. In 1823 a French army of 100,000 (*Los cien mil hijos de San Luis*) invaded Spain and with the assistance of Spanish conservatives destroyed the liberal regime. Once again, Ferdinand was absolutist king of Spain. And once again, he set out to persecute those who had dared to impose a constitutional government on Spain. The constitution of 1812 was for the second time in its history declared null and void, all laws issued by the liberal governments of 1820-1823 were similarly annulled, and both Puerto Rico and Cuba were returned to their previous status. In Spain thousands of liberals were forced into exile; hundreds were jailed; dozens were executed. And while Ferdinand busied himself persecuting reformers in Spain, his representatives in Puerto Rico clamped down on the activities of the more liberal-minded among the members of the insular creole elite.

In spite of the events and crises which had shaken Spain and the

Spanish American world during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico in the mid 1820s remained a colony of Spain still governed by a powerful Spanish governor who answered to the king and no one else, and with an administrative, ecclesiastical, and economic organization still dominated by Spaniards. Yet, during that quarter century the island had experienced many changes. Thousands of Spanish loyalists migrated from the rebellious Spanish American colonies and settled in Puerto Rico. Hundreds of French families from St. Domingue did the same. And later, Spanish families migrated to the island from Louisiana and Florida as these territories were lost by Spain to the French and the United States respectively. Partly as a consequence of this migration, partly as the consequence of the migration of European Catholics who were attracted to the island by the provisions of the *Cédula de Gracias*, and partly due to natural internal population growth, between 1800 and the mid 1820s the population of Puerto Rico grew by over 100,000 and San Juan became a thriving community of close to 15,000 residents. The vast majority of those who migrated to the island went into agricultural activities—primarily coffee and sugar production. Output of both commodities increased and so did output of tobacco, cotton and cheap rum.

Although by the mid 1820s Spain continued to be Puerto Rico's main commercial partner, trade with the United States was becoming increasingly important. In 1797 and again in 1804 Spain had allowed neutral powers to carry on commercial relations with the island. The United States took advantage of this and by the 1820s dozens of North American ships sailed every year to San Juan and other Puerto Rican ports carrying a variety of agricultural and manufactured commodities in demand in the island. In spite of the demands of certain Spanish merchants that trade with powers other than Spain be prohibited, the Spanish government concluded that such trade was bringing revenues into the royal treasury and that it was not harmful as long as it was restricted to commodities that did not hurt Spanish industries or Spanish consumers. To protect Spanish industries, tariffs were used to make certain non-Spanish commodities noncompetitive in Puerto Rico. In 1824 the expanding trade between the island and the United States was once again sanctioned by the Spanish government. Five years later Spain issued another law that allowed friendly powers to establish consular officers in Puerto Rico. Among the first countries to take advantage of the new law was the United States.

A growing population and more freedom of trade stimulated economic growth in Puerto Rico, a growth that was encouraged by the Spanish authorities in the island. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico was governed by men who in spite of their political conservatism were concerned about the economic conditions in the island and eager to promote growth. Of these administrators probably the most effective was Alejandro Ramírez who had been named to his post in 1813 by the constitutional government of Cádiz and who remained in that post when Ferdinand returned to Spain in 1814. During the previous administration of Governor Toribio Montes, a printing press had been introduced into the island. Montes had used that press to print the first publication to appear in Puerto Rico, *La Gaceta Oficial.* During his administration Ramírez used it to put out the *Diario Economico de Puerto Rico,* which was designed primarily to disseminate information on market potentials, new agricultural methods, technology and fertilizers. It was also during the administration of Ramírez that the Puerto Rican *Sociedad económica de amigos del pais* was created. Like the *sociedades económicas* in Spain, it was made up of affluent and "enlightened" Spaniards and Puerto Ricans dedicated to the promotion of "useful" knowledge and educational facilities. Ramírez did his best to improve the educational system on the island, to improve methods of transportation and to bring into the island more capital and technology for the sugar industry. To raise additional revenues he established the first lottery in Puerto Rico's history. During the last years of his administration he devoted a great deal of his efforts to the enforcement of the provisions of the *Cédula de Gracias* of 1815.

Much of the progress that was made in the island during the second decade of the nineteenth century must be attributed in part to the efforts of Alejandro Ramírez. He was without question one of the most efficient and progressive administrators ever sent to Puerto Rico by Spain. Spain benefited from his administration, since during that period governmental revenues increased from 70,000 to 200,000 pesos. Spanish and Puerto Rican merchants and landowners also benefitted from his efforts. Yet, those efforts had their negative effect since Ramírez's emphasis on the development of the sugar industry strengthened the trend towards a single-crop economy increasingly dependent on imports of manufactures and certain foodstuffs.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, then, Puerto Rico experienced an impressive population growth, an expansion of commercial relations with the United States and a modest expansion in commercial agriculture. But probably the most significant change experienced by the island during that period was political. In 1809-1814 and in 1820-1823, Spain had enjoyed constitutional governments, and those governments had invited Puerto Rico to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes. Those two brief periods of constitutional rule had whetted the appetite of the Puerto Rican creole elite, which, in spite of its fear and contempt of the masses and its refusal to follow the rebellious path of the mainland Spanish American colonies, was becoming more conscious of its separate identity and interests. The elite chafed under the arbitrary rule of Spanish governors and resented its exclusion from the civil administration and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the taxes to which it was subjected and the limitations that still existed on trade with countries other than Spain. The first quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed the birth of Puerto Rican liberalism. Elitist in character, it was essentially a reformist movement that initially kept the issue of political autonomy low key but that eventually came to emphasize it. In the decades that followed, the Puerto Rican liberal elite split into groups, each committed to a different solution to the problem of Puerto Rico's status under Spanish colonial rule. At no time, however, did these groups develop a program of socio-economic reform beneficial to the masses to go along with their political demands.

In the decades following the overthrow of the Spanish Liberal regime in 1823, the Spanish administration in Puerto Rico changed, but not significantly. In 1828 the island was divided into seven judicial districts, each with a *justicia mayor*, and in 1832 the Real Audiencia de Puerto Rico was created. For many years the Real Audiencia, with its seat in San Juan, enjoyed jurisdiction over both criminal and civil cases. Later on, however, two audiencias were set up—one in Ponce, the other in Mayagüez—to deal with criminal cases within their jurisdictions. Aside from these changes, the administrative arrangements remained more or less as they had been at the end of the eighteenth century. The municipalities enjoyed some autonomy over purely local affairs, but were otherwise under the careful eye and control of the governor and his representatives throughout the island. The powers of the governors remained great, and ordinarily they behaved with unpredictable arbitrariness. Most were military men dedicated to preserving the colonial status of the island and keeping the populace in line. Among the most notorious governors of the nineteenth century was Miguel de la Torre, who decided to indulge the populace in "bread and circuses." He encouraged the islanders to enjoy themselves to the point where they would not possibly want to rebel. His administration became known as the regime of the three B's (*baile, botella, baraja*—dance, drinking, and gambling.) Another abusive governor was Juan Prim, who once declared that "to govern this island all that is needed is a whip and a violin." In the nineteenth century each governor usually brought his own ideas as to how best to govern the island. Some were intelligent and brutal; others were brutal and stupid. What one governor did during his administration, his successor often undid during his. But on one thing they all agreed: Any demands for political participation or autonomy for the island on the part of the Puerto Rican creole elite were treasonous and, unless the authorities in Spain ordered otherwise, to be destroyed by any means.

To back up the arbitrary rule of the generals and marshals who governed the island in the course of the nineteenth century, the Spanish government strengthened the Spanish military presence in Puerto Rico. The large garrison of Spanish regulars in San Juan was strengthened and other garrisons set up throughout the island. In 1869 the notorious *Guardia Civil* was introduced into Puerto Rico. The *Guardia* had been founded in Spain during the archconservative regime of General Narvaéz and was designed primarily to maintain law and order in the rural areas of Spain. In Spain the *Guardia Civil* quickly earned a reputation for discipline, efficiency and brutality, and was primarily used to protect the great landowners of southern Spain against periodic violence on the part of the land hungry and exploited peasantry of that region. In Puerto Rico the *Guardia Civil* was also used by the Spanish authorities to maintain law and order in the rural areas, a law and order designed to protect the economic interests of the landed elite, both Spanish and Puerto Rican.

To facilitate the movement of troops from one part of the island to another the Spanish authorities on the island began in 1852 the construction of a *carretera militar* (military road) that eventually connected San Juan to Ponce and that by the end of the nineteenth century was the only surfaced highway on the island. Other roads were mere dirt trails that often became impassible during the rainy season. In addition to the construction of the *carretera militar*, the Spanish authorities opened in 1880 a short railway line connecting San Juan to Rio Piedras a few miles away.

In health, sanitation and education, little progress was made in the course of the nineteenth century. The overall state of medical facilities improved a little and the number of doctors in the island increased. There were also efforts to introduce vaccination programs against such diseases as smallpox. But in spite of these improvements, health and sanitation facilities remained inadequately financed and backward. The cities were dirty; doctors and hospitals were usually found only in the main urban centers and with a few exceptions catered primarily to the needs of the members of the elite. Even after the cholera epidemic that swept the island in 1855 and killed over 30,000 people, private and governmental efforts to improve health and sanitation facilities were not substantial. By the end of the century the average life span was 35 years and the death rate approximately 31 per 1,000. In the rural areas the vast majority of people usually turned to home remedies or local *curanderos* when ill.

In education some improvements were achieved. Because of both governmental and private efforts, the number of elementary schools on the island increased after the 1830s and by the end of the century schools were to be found in many of the towns of the interior. In 1832 a theological seminary (which in 1858 was transformed into the College of Secondary Education under Jesuit control) was established. In the decades that followed a few technical schools to train students in agricultural science, navigation and commerce were founded. A few secondary schools that offered courses in biology, chemistry and a few other sciences also were created in the second half of the century. Foreign languages, especially French, began to receive some attention from those in charge of shaping educational policies. On the whole, however, the Puerto Rican masses benefitted little from these improvements. Although an occasional lower class boy was lucky enough to receive some sort of education, the majority of those attending schools were the sons and daughters of the Spanish and Puerto Rican elite of the island. Furthermore, Puerto Rico remained without a university in spite of the persistent demands of the insular elite. Ordinarily the sons of those who could afford it went for university degrees to Europe, to South American countries and, by the latter part of the century, occasionally to the United States. By the end of the nineteenth century the Puerto Rican educational system remained backward and poor. In the late 1890s only 4.5 per cent of the insular tax income was devoted to education. By the end of that decade only 8 per cent of school-age children were attending school and the illiteracy rate was almost 85 per cent.

Although the main reason for the lack of progress in communication and transportation facilities, health, sanitation and education was the reluctance of the Spanish government to spend on the island more than was necessary to hold on to it, part of the blame must be attributed to the local governors and their subordinates who often put into their own pockets funds provided by the Spanish government for the construction of roads, hospitals and schools. In nineteenth-century Puerto Rico the Spanish administration was not only arbitrary and often brutal but also exceedingly corrupt.

There were a few sensitive churchmen who sympathized with the plight of the Puerto Rican masses and who periodically complained about the arbitrariness and corruption of the local administration and petitioned for more hospitals and schools. However, the Church as a whole remained throughout the nineteenth century a conservative institution run by Spanish bishops who invariably supported the civil authorities in their efforts to maintain Spanish control of the island. Through the priests who worked under them, the Church authorities sought to convince the masses that it was God's will to accept passively Spanish rule. Temporal life, they said, was brief and unimportant. Men's business was to prepare themselves for the afterlife. In the schools run by the Church, children were taught to read and write, but they were also infused with the dogma of the Church and with an unquestionable respect for the established authorities and for imperial "law and order." Economically impoverished, the Catholic Church in Puerto Rico (like the Catholic Church in Spain) remained in the nineteenth century simply another branch of the government, loyal to, controlled by and dependent on it for a good proportion of its income. Catholicism was the religion of the state and the only religion officially tolerated on the island.

In spite of a high death rate and short life expectancy, the population of Puerto Rico grew impressively in the course of the nineteenth century because of a high birth rate. In 1800, the total population was 155,000. By 1860 it had grown to 583,000. When U.S. troops occupied Puerto Rico in 1898, the population was close to 950,000. The major cause of this population growth was natural increase among the island's inhabitants. Also, in the course of the century the island continued to attract immigrants from several parts of the world. Between 1822 and 1844, for example, when the Haitian Republic ruled what later became the Dominican Republic, thousands of Spanish-speaking families migrated to Puerto Rico. Immigrants also came from Spain and its possessions, such as the Canary Islands. Immigration was encouraged and facilitated by Spain and its representatives on the island who, following the policies originally included in the *Cédula de Gracias* of 1815, continued to do their best to offer all types of incentives (including state lands and tax exemptions) to those who were interested in immigrating to Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century also experienced important economic changes that had a substantial impact on the island's society and politics. Probably the most important development was the expansion of commercial agriculture in the course of the century. Natural population growth, the immigration of families who often brought with them capital and agricultural know how, the abolition of many limitations on external trade (which got under way in the 1790s and was embodied in the *Cédula de Gracias* and governmental efforts to make the island more productive are all part of the explanation for the gradual expansion of commercial agriculture. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, Puerto Rico's most important commercial crop and export was sugar, the production of which began in the first part of the sixteenth century and which was given an important boost by the destruction of the flourishing sugar economy of St. Domingue in the 1790s. Between 1830 and 1896, the amount of land devoted to sugar production grew by almost 300 per cent and sugar production rose from 17,000 to 62,000 tons. Accompanying this expansion in sugar output there were some important technological changes. Earlier the bulk of the sugar was produced in primitive *trapiches*. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, large and more modern mills (*centrales*) had made their appearance. Some of these *centrales* were established by French capitalists, others by local businessmen who were organizing on a corporate basis. Although these *centrales* were not as technologically advanced as those established in Cuba around the same period, they did represent a major change in the Puerto Rican sugar industry and were producing by the end of the century a sizeable proportion of total sugar output. To be economically profitable, these *centrales* required increasing amounts of sugar cane land to be cultivated in order to keep the mills busy. Thus, concurrently with the appearance of the *centrales* there was a growing concentration of sugar cane land in the hands of fewer people. In 1882 the Puerto Rican observer José Ramón Abad wrote:

> There have been established in the island factories known as *centrales* . . . which have become centers for the absorption of lands and have thus reduced the number

> of landowners. . . . Property, before distributed in small holdings, is being accumulated in fewer hands.

This process of concentration of sugar cane land in fewer and fewer hands gained momentum after the U.S. occupation of 1898.

Sugar remained Puerto Rico's most important export during most of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, however, it lost its preeminence to coffee, whose cultivation began in the eighteenth century and expanded rapidly in the course of the nineteenth. Part of the reason for this was the introduction of hulling machinery and the flow of capital, mostly Spanish, into the coffee sector of the economy. Between 1830 and 1896 the acreage devoted to coffee cultivation increased by almost 600 per cent, and by the 1890s coffee had become Puerto Rico's main export. The nature and growth of the coffee economy in nineteenth century Puerto Rico still remains to be studied. It can be said, however, that as in the sugar sector of the economy there was in the coffee sector a growing concentration of land in fewer hands as the more capitalized coffee plantations absorbed more and more of the smaller coffee farms.

In addition to the expansion of sugar and coffee production, Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century also experienced growth in the production of tobacco. Tobacco exports, however, never reached the importance of sugar and coffee during that century. Unlike sugar and coffee, however, tobacco production stimulated (as shall be described below) the development of some important manufacturing activities in the urban centers.

Throughout the first three centuries of Spanish colonial rule in Puerto Rico the bulk of the acreage under cultivation was devoted to the production of subsistence crops (plantains, bananas, rice, peas and yams). In spite of the growth of sugar, coffee and tobacco production in the course of the eighteenth century and first decades of the nineteenth, the subsistence nature of agriculture did not change radically in many areas. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the rapid expansion of commercial agriculture brought about a decline in the proportion of cultivated land devoted to subsistence crops. By the 1890s the acreage devoted to commercial crops exceeded the acreage devoted to subsistence crops (41 per cent devoted to coffee production, 15 per cent to sugar, 1 per cent to tobacco, and 32 per cent to subsistence crops). So during the latter part of the Spanish regime, the Puerto Rican economy increasingly developed away from subsistence farming, while the importance of commercial agriculture grew and the island became more dependent on overseas trade. This development and an increasing population explain why by the 1890s the island was importing a considerable proportion of the foodstuffs it consumed. By the time the U.S. army moved into the island in 1898, the Puerto Rican economy had already taken the classical mold of a dependent colonial economy.

The Spanish government made efforts to restrict in the colonies the development of manufacturing activities that might compete with metropolitan industries and the displacement of capital abroad and in speculation and consumption. Because of this the "industrial" sector of the Puerto Rican economy in the course of the nineteenth century grew very slowly and by the 1890s remained insignificantly small. One of the major manufacturing activities in Puerto Rico at the end of the century was rum distilling, which was tied to the sugar sector of the economy. In the cities the only major industrial activity was the production of cigars, which grew as a consequence of an expanding tobacco output and which took place in large factories and was based on wage labor. Aside from the cigar industry, there were in the cities other small shops producing a variety of commodities (mostly for internal consumption) which were also based on wage labor. But these were relatively unimportant, and the urban proletariat (though restless and already making organizational efforts) constituted at the end of the century a very small proportion of the island's population. At the end of the century, as in the past, the bulk of the manufactured commodities in Puerto Rico were imported from Europe and the United States.

Until the end of the eighteenth century, Spain monopolized the legal foreign trade of Puerto Rico. It was as a consequence of the military and political crisis that overwhelmed Spain in the late 1790s and the first decade of the nineteenth century that the colonial metropolis allowed other nations to trade with the island, a policy not reversed during the rest of the nineteenth century. But although Spain permitted other nations to trade directly with Puerto Rico, she retained preferential trade advantages for herself. Puerto Rican tariffs were generally highest on articles which originated in countries other than Spain. This policy placed some limitations on trade between Puerto Rico and countries other than Spain, but did not prevent it. On the contrary, in the course of the nineteenth century Puerto Rico became increasingly incorporated into the world capitalist economy, and commercial relations between the island and the United States, England and a few other countries expanded. This trade was stimulated by internal demand for a variety of goods (an internal demand that increased as the population increased) and in turn stimulated and was stimulated by the growth of commercial agriculture in the island. By the end of the century Spain supplied less than one-third of the total value of Puerto Rico's imports, the United States about one-fourth, and England and its possessions over one-fourth. These three countries alone accounted for close to 85 per cent of the island's total import trade. Germany, Cuba, and France were the remaining suppliers of importance.

At the end of the nineteenth century about 60 per cent of the goods imported into the island were manufactured commodities such as cotton fabrics, furniture, leather products, iron and steel goods, fabrics of hemp and jute, machinery and soap. The remaining 40 per cent were agricultural imports among which the most important were rice, wheat, flour and hog products. Most of the wheat came from the United States, as did the hog products. Cotton fabrics came primarily from the textiles factories of Catalonia in Spain.

To pay for these imports Puerto Rico at the end of the 19th century exported primarily coffee, sugar and tobacco (which together accounted for close to 90 per cent of the value of the island's exports). Puerto Rico's major markets at that time were Spain, which absorbed about 25 per cent of the island's exports; Cuba, which absorbed about 23 per cent—mostly coffee; and the U.S., France and Germany, each of which took about 10 per cent of Puerto Rico's exports. From Puerto Rico the United States imported primarily sugar. There is evidence that suggests that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Puerto Rican sugar industry was becoming increasingly dependent on the U.S. market. In the 1880s, for example, the United States was purchasing close to 80 per cent of the island's sugar exports. This growing dependency on the United States disturbed a few Puerto Ricans such as José Ramón Abad who, like José Martí in Cuba, was not only concerned about the growing economic dependency on the United States but also about the growing dependency of the island's economy on the production of the so-called after dinner crops: coffee, sugar, and tobacco.

The expansion of commercial agriculture in the course of the nineteenth century created a greater demand for labor to work on the sugar, coffee and tobacco establishments. As in the past, slaves continued to play a role in the economic life of Puerto Rico until the abolition of slavery in 1873. The demand for labor created by the agricultural expansion that got underway in the latter part of the eighteenth century brought about an increase in the number of slaves imported into the island. Between 1775 and 1865 the number of black slaves in Puerto Rico increased from 6,467 to slightly over 41,000.

In spite of official legislation (much of it dating back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) designed to protect the slaves against excessive brutality from their masters, the slaves in the nineteenth century remained more or less at the mercy of their owners. This legislation was ordinarily ignored by Puerto Rican and Spanish slaveowners on the island and ordinarily by the Spanish authorities themselves. In fact, often Spanish governors issued laws that blatantly contradicted the spirit and the letter of previous legislation. In 1848, for example, as a consequence of a black slave rebellion in the neighboring island of Martinique and slave revolts near Vega Baja and Ponce in Puerto Rico, Governor Juan Prim issued the notorious *Bando Negro* designed to keep black slaves in Puerto Rico in line. By virtue of the new code, any act of resistance or insubordination on the part of a slave was punishable by death, any act of resistance against a white on the part of a free black was to be punished by cutting off the right hand of the black, a free black who insulted a white man was to be sent to jail for five years, and no blacks from Haiti, the United States, or the French Caribbean colonies (where slave resistance was on the increase) were to be allowed into Puerto Rico. In 1782, Abbad y Lasierra had written that in Puerto Rico the black slaves, "deprived of everything, are condemned to constant hard work, always exposed to the rigors of a brutal or greedy master." Almost 100 years later, Alejandro Tapia y Rivera wrote that "the slave is outside the law and subject to the self interest and arbitrariness of a man who calls himself his owner." Neither was being emotional; both were reflecting a social reality.

As in the past, black slaves in Puerto Rico did not accept their status passively. Individual acts of violence against slave owners were frequent; whenever possible, slaves ran away into the forests of the interior, and small slave rebellions and conspiracies were endemic during most of the nineteenth century. It was partially as an attempt to curb or put an end to slave resistance that Governor Prim issued his *Bando Negro*. Slave resistance continued, but it was a resistance with which the authorities easily coped. In Puerto Rico slave rebellions were quickly and easily repressed, not only because they often lacked effective organization and tended to be local in character, but also because the slave population of the island constituted a relatively small minority. As in Cuba and the sugar islands of the Lesser Antilles, slavery in Puerto Rico was linked to the sugar industry. Unlike in the other islands, however, the slave population in Puerto Rico during the nineteenth century constituted a relatively small proportion of the total population of the island. As Eric Williams has emphasized, the following table has no counterpart in Caribbean history:

Population	1827	1834	1860	1872
Total	323,838	357,086	583,181	618,150
Whites	162,311	188,869	300,430	328,806
Free non-whites	127,287	126,399	241,015	257,709
Slaves	32,240	41,818	41,736	31,635
Slaves as % of total	10%	12%	14%	5%

Source: Eric William, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969* (New York, 1970), p. 290.

There are several factors that might explain why the proportion of slaves in the total population did not increase significantly in the course of the nineteenth century and eventually declined in the 1860s. Possibly, the slaves were not reproducing as fast as the non-slaves. It is also possible, but doubtful, that slaves were being manumitted in large numbers. Probably, however, the main explanation for the decline in the proportion of slaves in Puerto Rico is that there were several factors limiting the importation of slaves into the island. Slaves were expensive, and there were not many in Puerto Rico who had the capital necessary to import large numbers of them. Furthermore, in the first half of the nineteenth century Spain first limited and then abolished the slave trade in Puerto Rico. For reasons other than humanitarian, England abolished the slave trade in its colonies in 1807, then set out to pressure Spain into doing the same in hers. In 1817 Spain and England signed a treaty whereby Spain pledged itself to end the slave trade in Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1820. Under pressure from Cuban and Puerto Rican slave owners, however, Spain sought to avoid compliance with the treaty. But England continued to exert pressure on the Spanish government, and in 1835 another treaty was signed between the two governments. Not till 1845, however, did the Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico launch an effective campaign against the slave traffic. After that year the number of black slaves imported illegally into the island was insignificantly small.

Since slavery did not meet the labor needs of the expanding commercial agriculture of Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century, the landed elite turned to the free population of the island for labor. A large number of free blacks and mulattoes—who during the nineteenth century outnumbered the slaves—and a sizeable population of "poor whites" lived in the rural areas as subsistence farmers on lands to which they held no legal title. This impoverished population, which grew in the course of the nineteenth century, constituted at the beginning of the century a potential source of labor for both Spanish and Puerto Rican landowners in the island. The problem faced by these landowners was that the free poor population could not be readily persuaded to work as wage earners on the commercial establishments. Land was plentiful and it was easy for the free poor to eke out a simple existence by growing a variety of subsistence crops and raising a few domestic animals such as chickens and pigs. In 1830, for example, the total area under cultivation in Puerto Rico was about 6 per cent. In 1897, in spite of the expansion of commercial agriculture, the figure had risen only to about 14 per cent.

Since most of the free subsistence farmers could not be persuaded to work for wages in the commercial sector of agriculture, in the course of the nineteenth century a campaign was launched to force them to do so. Already in the late eighteenth century there had been complaints about the shortage of labor in the island and demands that something be done to make the independent subsistence farmers seek "useful" employment in the sugar, coffee and tobacco farms. By the end of that century there existed on the island *agregados*—"free" workers who lived as squatters on privately-owned lands and who worked periodically for the landowners in lieu of paying rent. It was in the nineteenth century, however, that significant efforts were made to turn subsistence farmers into workers in the commercial sector of agriculture. When he presented himself before the Cortes of Cádiz in 1809, Power y Giralt demanded the exclusion of squatters from Crown lands and control of these "landless" citizens. Because of the political turmoil in Spain between 1809 and 1823, little was done to meet the demands of the landowners. But once Ferdinand VII was once again secured on the throne of Spain after the chaotic liberal interlude of 1820-1823, these efforts were undertaken. After 1824 laws were promulgated that evicted those who lived as squatters on Crown lands or those who could not show legal title to the lands they cultivated. Island landowners also began to seize lands (actions which were "legalized" by sympathetic courts) worked by independent subsistence farmers. The goal of these acts was not primarily to bring new lands under commercial cultivation. In fact, by the second half of the century a lot of landowners owned large tracts of idle land. The goal was to create a landless peasantry who would be forced to seek employment or sharecropping agreements in the sugar, coffee and tobacco establishments in order to survive. In the 1820s the governmental and private campaign of evictions and land seizures began to pay off. Between 1824 and 1827 alone, the number of *agregados* increased from 14,327 to 38,906.

But the need for labor was such that greater measures were taken by the local authorities. In 1837, Governor Miguel López Baños issued a decree known as *Bando de Policía y Buen Gobierno*, which compelled all of the unemployed landless peasants to work on local plantations and farms. By virtue of this decree, workers were forced to register their names on municipal roles under penalty of fines. Several years later, in 1849, Governor Juan de la Pezuela extended the law so that workers were compelled to carry work books (*libretas reglamentarias*) similar to those still in use in South Africa today. These books recorded the workers' services and were maintained by the landowners who employed them. Workers could not change their places of employment if they had contracted debts with their employers. Loss of the work book was punished by forced labor without pay; repeated loss was punished by six months' imprisonment.

As a result of these laws, which were applauded by the majority of Puerto Rican and Spanish landowners in the island, the number of "free" workers in Puerto Rico increased rapidly in the course of the nineteenth century. According to David Turnbull, who visited Puerto Rico in 1840, there were in 1835 about 41,000 "free" workers, exceeding the slave population by several thousand. In subsequent decades the proportion of the population made up by "free" workers in the rural areas increased, while that of the slaves decreased. And whereas the slave population remained overwhelmingly black, the "free" workers included free blacks, mulattoes and whites. Turnbull wrote that in Puerto Rico "free" whites worked alongside slaves on the plantations.

The majority of the landless workers usually remained attached to a particular sugar plantation or coffee or tobacco farm. Usually they received a small plot of land to grow subsistence crops and raise a few animals. In the coffee and tobacco areas, the *agregados* usually entered into sharecropping agreements with the landowners on whose lands they lived. In the sugar plantations, they were usually required to work during the harvest season and at other times of the year in lieu of paying rent. The *agregados*, however, were not the only "free" workers in the island. Thousands of small farmers who managed to retain part of their land in spite of governmental and private efforts to evict them came to depend on the neighboring sugar, coffee and tobacco establishments for occasional employment. Since official currency was hard to come by (especially in the rural areas) the wages of these parttime workers usually took the form of vouchers (*vales*) that could be used to purchase commodities only in the stores set up by the employers for whom they worked.

There is evidence that suggests that like the black slaves, many of the subsistence farmers who were evicted from their small farms and forced (by law and necessity) to work in the commercial sector of agriculture resented and resisted the encroachment of agro-capitalism. It was this resistance, as well as the periodic slave rebellions and conspiracies, that in the early 1860s led local authorities in several parts of the island, especially in the sugar producing areas, to organize the *Guardia Rural*. The *Guardia Rural* was a rural police force that a few years later was joined by the Spanish *Guardia Civil* to enforce the labor codes and to protect the interests of Spanish and Puerto Rican landowners.

The laws regulating the activities of "free" workers in Puerto Rico were repealed in 1873—the same year that slavery was abolished in the island. Repeal of these laws, however, did not destroy their results. By 1873 there existed in Puerto Rico a large number of rural workers, harshly exploited and living an impoverished existence. The numbers of these rural laborers increased after 1873 and became even greater after the American occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898.

At the end of the nineteenth century about 85 per cent of the total population of Puerto Rico lived in the rural areas. Although there still existed throughout the island thousands of small independent subsistence farmers, rural society was essentially divided into two classes. At the top there was a relatively small elite of Puerto Rican and Spanish landowners who owned a large proportion of the land (almost all of the land devoted to sugar, coffee and tobacco production) and who enjoyed great power and social prestige. This elite could always count on the local Spanish authorities when faced with workers' resistance and insubordination. Below the landed elite, there were the *agregados* and the thousands of subsistence farmers who periodically worked on the sugar, coffee and tobacco establishments to supplement their incomes. Between the workers and their employers there often existed ties of *compadrazgo* (godparenthood) that allowed the landowners to camouflage the exploitative relationships under the guise of protecting "their" workers; in exchange for this protection, workers were expected to obey and respect their employers.

On the whole, the rural population remained poor, illiterate, isolated from the main urban centers, exploited and abused and often brutalized by the *Guardia Rural* and the *Guardia Civil*. But in spite of the harshness of life, the rural poor found time to amuse themselves. In the rural areas the most popular pastimes were dancing, horse raising and cockfighting—the latter being almost an addiction among many rural inhabitants. Periodically, the people of the rural areas would go to nearby towns to participate in religious festivals, to have their children baptized, to be married or just to gossip. Most of the towns of the interior were small and lacked many facilities, especially when compared with the coastal centers. The municipal governments of these towns were controlled by the landed elite and operated under the careful eye of the Spanish authorities. The permanent population of these towns was small, usually consisting of a few shopkeepers, local officials, artisans, household servants, a priest or two and, in the case of the larger towns, a few teachers and the families of some of the members of the landed elite. By the end of the nineteenth century these families ordinarily had properties and houses in the towns and resided there for part of the year while their lands were supervised by foremen usually related to them by kinship ties.

As a result of a growing population, expanding agriculture and growing commercial relations with the external world, the main urban centers in Puerto Rico in the course of the nineteenth century grew both in size and social complexity. In the nineteenth century the most important cities in Puerto Rico were coastal cities: San Juan, the political, ecclesiastical and commercial capital of the island; and Ponce and Mayagüez, both thriving commercial centers. In these cities the elite was composed of royal bureaucrats, military officers, higher clergy, merchants, some members of the landed elite and a relatively small group of professionals (lawyers, doctors and teachers). Below the elite were artisans, shop keepers and soldiers. And below these was an impoverished mass of household slaves, workers, street hawkers, beggars and the perennial thieves and prostitutes. Members of this lower social stratum ordinarily lived in shacks on the periphery of the cities. By the end of the nineteenth century the walled area of San Juan had a total population of nearly 32,000 and perhaps 15,000 more lived between the city and Rio Piedras.

The majority of the members of the urban elite were Spaniards. Almost all of the members of the bureaucracy (from the governor down), the military establishment and the higher clergy were Spaniards, born in Spain and loyal to the colonial metropolis. Although by the end of the nineteenth century there resided in the coastal ports an increasingly important community of Puerto Rican merchants, most of the members of the merchant community in these cities were Spaniards who, together with the few Puerto Rican merchants, controlled the import-export trade of the island. Between these merchants and the landed elite there were close economic relations. It was on these merchants that the sugar, coffee and many of the tobacco producers depended for the credit necessary to keep their operations going.

The growing affluence of the landed elite and the merchant communities and some improvements in the educational system made possible the growth in nineteenth century Puerto Rico of a group of Puerto Rican professionals and intellectuals who were usually related to members of the landed and urban elites. Occasionally an individual of lower class origins was able to get an education and (in a few cases) obtain a university degree; however, the majority of professionals and intellectuals in Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century were the sons of local merchants and landowners who had the status and money to provide them with an education. Since the island did not have a university, those who desired a university education had to go abroad. Most went to Europe, others to the United States and Latin American universities. It was out of this small group of Puerto Rican professionals and intellectuals—some of whom had studied in European universities and been deeply influenced by the nationalism that was rampant in Europe at the time—that the leadership for pro-independence and reformist movements came.

In attempting to explain the development of pro-independence and reformist activities in Puerto Rico in the course of the nineteenth century, it is important to take account of the growing sense of national identification that emerged during that century. Already in the latter part of the eighteenth century the historian Abbad y Lasierra had commented on the growing dislike toward Spaniards on the part of those born in

Puerto Rico, a dislike that manifested itself in a tendency among members of the creole elite on the island to think of themselves as different from Spaniards. This tendency became more marked and widespread (primarily among the professionals, intellectuals and members of the landed elite) in the nineteenth century. And it was the professionals and intellectuals who gave voice to this growing sense of national pride. In 1843, for example, a small group of young Puerto Rican writers in San Juan began the publication of the *Aguinaldo Puertorriqueño,* which included prose and poetry and which reflected the growing pride of young Puerto Rican writers in their land. The following year, another group of Puerto Ricans published in Barcelona, Spain, the *Album Puertorriqueño,* which was so nationalistic in sentiment that the Bishop of San Juan ordered the confiscation of copies of the book circulating in Puerto Rico. Among those involved in the publication of the *Album* was Manuel A. Alonso (1822-1889), a young Puerto Rican medical student who in 1849 published (in Barcelona) *El Gíbaro,* considered by many the first important piece of Puerto Rican literature. Using the language of Puerto Rican peasants to present vividly their mores and way of life, Alonso described faithfully and with pride the traditions and customs of his country.

National pride also was reflected in the growing interest of Puerto Rican intellectuals in the history of their island. By the middle of the nineteenth century there existed in Puerto Rico the *Sociedad Recolectora de Documentos Históricos de la Isla de San Juan Bautista,* and in the second half of the century a small group of Puerto Rican historians emerged on the island whose work reflected the growing interest among intellectuals in their past. There were, for example, Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, who published in 1854 the *Biblioteca Histórica y Geográfica de Puerto Rico,* and Salvador Brau, probably the most important Puerto Rican historian of the nineteenth century.

Pride in the land of their birth was so strong among Puerto Rican professionas and intellectuals that it brought with it an increasing bitterness towards the Spanish presence on Puerto Rico and the colonial status of the island. They resented the economic and "moral" backwardness of their land and identified Spanish rule as the source. They resented the arbitrariness of the Spanish colonial administration and the official policy of excluding those born on the island from administrative positions. Gradually some of the Puerto Rican professionals and intellectuals became more vocal in their demands for reforms, and as the years passed a few concluded that the only solution to the colonial problem and the humiliations that the colonial system imposed on them was total separation from Spain.

But a growing national pride alone does not explain the growing demands for reforms and eventually for independence that made themselves felt in the island in the nineteenth century. Economic factors must also be taken into accunt if one is to make sense of the way Puerto Rican politics developed in that century. There is an important and direct correlation between the various political movements that appeared in Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century and the emerging social classes on the island—a correlation that still needs to be studied in detail but whose outlines can be roughly described. As is to be expected, those whose jobs depended on the continuation of the colonial status quo vocally opposed any changes in the status of the island or reforms of a political nature. The Spanish officialdom and the Spanish military on the island were among these. So were the members of the higher clergy. In addition, those whose economic activities depended on the continuation of a close association with Spain were either totally against political reforms of any kind or opposed to reforms that might endanger that association. Spanish merchants (and a few Puerto Rican ones) involved in the trade between the island and Spain, generally supported the colonial authorities against those who demanded political changes. Many of the coffee growers (Puerto Rican and Spanish) who depended heavily on the Spanish and Cuban markets and whose product was protected in those markets against foreign competition (e.g. Brazil) tended to support either the colonial status quo or those groups who demanded some political reforms that would give them a greater voice in insular affairs but would keep Puerto Rico within the Spanish economic system. On the other hand, the handful of merchants who carried on the import-export trade between the island and the United States resented existing policies (tariffs, etc.) that hindered the further development of that trade and therefore tended to support changes that might bring freer commercial relations with the United States. Similarly, many sugar producers, whose main market was the United States, tended to support the demands for economic and political reforms voiced by the professionals and intellectuals. Economic interests, then, were a determinant factor in shaping Puerto Rican politics in the nineteenth century. However, national origins did play a role: Spaniards were more likely to favor closer relations with Spain than were Puerto Ricans.

Those who supported the colonial status quo and fought against any type of political reforms became known by the second half of the nineteenth century as *incondicionales* and later (when they organized themselves in a formal political party) as *conservadores* (conservatives). Perhaps the most important spokesman for this group was José Pérez-Moris editor of the *Boletín Mercantil,* the most important conservative newspaper in Puerto Rico. To Pérez-Moris, as to most conservatives, all demands for political reforms were treasonous and to be treated as such by the authorities. He was particularly infuriated by talk of "democracy" so often heard among reformist groups. Christ, after all, he once declared, had been executed by democratic acclamation.

Actively supported by the colonial administration, the Spanish military and the higher clergy, the conservatives enjoyed a powerful position in the island and did their best to use it against those who desired political reforms. Despite strong opposition, the reformist movement that emerged on the island during the first two decades of the nineteenth century not only survived but gained momentum in the course of the century.

The reformist movement in Puerto Rico not only faced formidable opposition within the island and among the metropolitan authorities, but also had to cope with important internal divisions. In the course of the nineteenth century the movement split into three groups, two of which sought reforms while keeping the island within the Spanish imperial system, and one of which concluded that the necessary reforms could only be achieved through independence. Of these groups the least important were the *asimilistas*, who enjoyed some support among Puerto Rican merchants and coffee planters tied to the Spanish metropolis, but who, nevertheless, remained a small and relatively impotent force throughout the nineteenth century. The goal of the assimilists was to end the colonial status of Puerto Rico and to have the island declared an integral part of Spain. Its inhabitants would then enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by Spanish citizens. The assimilists, then, were in fact denying the separate identity of Puerto Rico.

Far more important than the assimilists were the *autonomistas* who were by the latter part of the nineteenth century the most important reformist movement on the island and who, as shall be shown below, accomplished some of their goals by the time of the U. S. occupation in 1898. Arguing that political authority is not legitimate unless it represents the members of the community over which that authority exercises power, the dream of the autonomists was to establish between Puerto Rico and Spain a relationship similar to that established between Canada and England. The autonomists, then, did not desire a complete break between Puerto Rico and Spain. Their major goal was to have Spain grant Puerto Rico (or grant the Puerto Rican elite) the right to play a central role in the administration of the island and in the shaping of economic policy for Puerto Rico. The autonomists not only desired full representation in the Spanish Cortes, but also municipal autonomy in the island and a greater role in the central administration of Puerto Rico. The autonomist movement drew its support primarily from the landed elite (especially the sugar producers) and merchants who were involved in the import-export trade with countries other than Spain. The leaders and chief spokesmen, however, were professionals and intellectuals. By the end of the nineteenth century the most important autonomist leaders on the island were Luis Muñoz Rivera (1859-1916), the son of an affluent merchant in the town of Barranquitas, a self-educated man, and founder of the newspaper *La Democracia* (1890); and José Celso Barboas, a black man born in Bayamón in 1857. The son of a bricklayer, Barbosa's intelligence caught the attention of his father's employer, who made it possible for him to study medicine at the University of Michigan. Of these two men, Muñoz Rivera became the more important and the more successful in realizing the goals he set for himself. And he was successful because he was the opportunistic politician par excellence. He once described himself as "eminently practical," and declared:

> We are not bent on fighting useless battles or pursuing the impossible. For those who cherish beautiful ideals, let us imagine whether the idea is possible and then make haste to follow its luminous path. If it cannot become a reality, let us limit our desire to the dictates of reason, rather than waste our energies in fruitless combat.

Within the autonomist movement in the latter part of the nineteenth century there were some men who went along with the opportunistic guidelines expounded by Muñoz Rivera and who became involved in the autonomist movement, not because they felt that autonomy was the real solution to the colonial problem but because they saw autonomy as one step (as a gateway) to full independence. Among these the most important were Román Baldorioty de Castro (1822-1889), a native of Guaynabo and a graduate of the University of Madrid; Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón (1855-1913), a native of Luquillo and also a graduate of the University of Madrid; and José de Diego (1866-1918), a native of

Aguadilla, educated in Spain and one of Puerto Rico's most important poets. After the U. S. occupation of 1989 both Matienzo Cintrón and José de Diego broke with the opportunistic politics of Muñoz Rivera and became outspoken advocates of complete independence for the island.

The intransigency of the Spanish colonial authorities and the conservatives, the attitudes of the colonial metropolis towards Puerto Rico and the failure of the reformist groups to obtain any meaningful political reforms for the island led some of the more radical reformists to the conclusion that the only solution to the problems that afflicted Puerto Rico was independence from Spain. As was pointed out in the first part of this essay, pro-independence sentiment in Puerto Rico during the first two decades of the nineteenth century was almost nonexistent. That, however, is not to be interpreted as meaning that there were none in the island who advocated independence at that time. In fact, as early as 1809, when Power y Giralt was chosen as the Puerto Rican representative to the Spanish Cortes meeting in Cádiz, some members of the municipal council of San Germán urged that he petition the Cortes for independence, something that was anathema to him and that he totally ignored. Two years later, in 1811, a small pro-independence conspiracy was discovered and crushed by the Spanish authorities in San Germán. But these were small and isolated affairs that had no impact on island politics save to place the local Spanish authorities on their guard.

In spite of the repressive apparatus of the Spanish colonial administration in Puerto Rico, laws declaring treasonous pro-independence activities and the refusal of the Puerto Rican landed elite to back such activities, the pro-independence sentiment became more marked among the members of the professional and intellectual elite in the course of the nineteenth century. As already has been suggested, however, many of these saw independence as an impossible dream and decided to concentrate their efforts on the struggle for autonomy, which they saw as a step towards independence. A few, on the other hand, refused to follow this opportunistic path. In 1838 the Spanish authorities discovered in the island a conspiracy to declare Puerto Rico's independence. Of those involved in the conspiracy a few were exiled to Spain, others fled to Venezuela and a few were imprisoned in San Juan or executed. One of the nationalists, Buenaventura Quiñones, was found dead a few days after he was thrown into one of the cells of El Morro.

By the 1850s the chief spokesman of Puerto Rican independence on the island was Ramón Emeterio Betances. Born in Cabo Rojo in 1827 of an affluent family, he was educated in France, where he studied both in Paris and in Tolouse. He still was in Europe during the revolutions of 1848, events which influenced him deeply. After receiving a degree in medicine he returned to Puerto Rico in the 1850s and dedicated himself first to the abolition of slavery and then to the independence of his native land from Spain. While he carried on his medical practice in Mayagüez, he founded there a secret society. His activities were discovered by the authorities and he was forced to leave the island. After living in Paris for a few years, he once again returned to Puerto Rico and continued his struggle for independence. Early in 1867 the Spanish authorities once again discovered Betances' pro-independence activities and ordered him to report to the authorities in Madrid. Rather than do that, he secretly left Puerto Rico and went to New York City, where he established close contacts with Cuban revolutionary exiles. In a letter which was published in the *New York Herald*, Betances declared, "It is a waste of time, money, and energy to expect reforms from the Spanish government."

From New York and later from Santo Domingo, Betances set out to organize a rebellion in Puerto Rico. He tried to gain the support of autonomist spokesmen in Puerto Rico, such as Baldorioty de Castro, but these men refused his overtures. They remembered the failure of the conspiracy of 1838 and believed that because of the powerful military presence of Spain on the island a bid for independence was almost suicidal. Betances, however, refused to give up. In Santo Domingo he established the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Committee and continued his preparations for a revolt in Puerto Rico. Arms were gathered and men recruited. In the meantime, he established contacts with pro-independence elements in Puerto Rico. There his main contacts were Manuel Rojas, a native of Venezuela who owned a farm near the town of Lares; Mariana Bracetti, a native of Mayagüez and sister-in-law of Rojas; and Mathias Bruckman, a native of the United States who had lived in Puerto Rico for many years and who had become a close friend of Betances during the years Betances practiced medicine in Mayagüez.

By the beginning of 1868, Betances had moved to St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. By this time a flag for the forthcoming republic had been designed and Betances had issued his famous Ten Commandments of Free Men. In these commandments he called for the abolition of slavery, the right to decide on taxes, religious freedom, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of commerce, freedom of assembly and the right to bear arms—a democratic political program that on the whole was unconcerned with socio-economic issues (there was no mention in the commandments, for example, of ending the expropriation of lands used by "squatters" or of ending the *agregado* system).

The revolt that Betances organized was scheduled for September 29, 1868. The Spanish officials in Puerto Rico were informed of the plans and pressured the authorities of St. Thomas into forbidding Betances and the troops he had gathered from leaving the island. His ship *El Telégrafo* was detained in St. Thomas and Betances was personally prevented from going to Puerto Rico. In spite of this setback, however, his collaborators in Puerto Rico decided to go ahead with the plan. On September 23, they marched from Rojas' farm and occupied the town of Lares. There they declared the independence of Puerto Rico, raised the flag of the new republic, and forced the parish priest to celebrate a *Te Deum* mass to honor the event.

How many men were involved in the Lares revolt still remains a subject of debate. The estimates run from a few hundred to several thousand. One thing is certain: The Lares revolt was a failure. It failed because the Spanish authorities had been informed of what was coming and had taken precautions. It failed because the rebels had acted in haste; it failed because the revolt received no support from the Puerto Rican elite, and, most important, it failed because the masses did not rally to it. Although Betances and some of his close collaborators had a genuine concern about some of the problems afflicting the Puerto Rican masses (they were, for example, outspoken advocates of abolition), his movement, like that of the autonomists, remained elitist in nature. There was no attempt to develop a socio-economic program that might have helped to mobilize the masses on behalf of the rebellion. Even the slaves, whose freedom was declared by the abortive republic did not rally to its support. But even if the rebels had gone to the masses, it is doubtful that they could have mobilized the masses in force. For one thing, the main concern of Betances and his followers was to establish independence. To the Puerto Rican peasantry that was an unimportant issue. They were concerned with socio-economic questions like land, not with forms of government. Years after the Lares revolt the Puerto Rican observer Francisco del Valle Atiles wrote that "as far as forms of government are concerned, the Puerto Rican peasant shows little concern." But even if the Puerto Rican peasantry had seen in independence the possibility of better lives for themselves, their mobilization would have been difficult. The presence of the *Guardia Civil*, the *Guardia Rural*, and regular Spanish troops in the rural areas, and the control exercised by the landed elite (which as a group opposed independence) over a large proportion of the peasantry would have made the mobilization of the rural masses on behalf of the revolt difficult.

The Lares revolt lasted for a few days. Within 24 hours the Spanish military had broken the backbone of the revolt, and although small bands of rebels continued to operate in the mountains for a few weeks thereafter, that resistance was easily crushed. Of those involved in the revolt several went into exile, a few were executed and hundreds of Puerto Ricans, many of whom were advocates of autonomy and had nothing to do with the revolt, were kept in the dungeons of El Morro for several weeks. Betances spent most of the rest of his life in Europe, and never again returned to Puerto Rico. But although it failed, the Lares revolt had its symbolic importance. It established a history of struggle and became a point of reference for all subsequent liberation fighters.

A few days after the Lares revolt, the military in Spain overthrew the monarchy of Queen Isabella II and political disorders spread throughout the country. Between 1868 and 1873, the new regime in Spain experimented with an imported monarch (Amadeo of Savoy) and prepared a new constitution for the country (1869) which provided for representation from the colonies. The monarchy of Amadeo did not last long. Those who supported the son of Isabella (the future Alfonso XII) and those who supported the Carlist pretender to the throne refused to back the new monarchy. Also, the new government had to cope with a destructive and violent revolt that broke out in Cuba in 1868 and lasted till 1878. Republican elements in Spain took advantage of the chaos and in 1873 took over the government and declared their country a republic. But the republican camp was divided between those who favored a centralized republic and those who favored a federal republic, and it had to face the opposition of monarchical groups, a Carlist revolt, a deteriorating economic situation and the spreading war in Cuba. In 1874 the Spanish military destroyed the republican government and restored the monarchy. In 1875, the son of Isabella II was crowned king of Spain.

If the failure of the Lares revolt strengthened the belief of many members of the professional and intellectual elite in Puerto Rico that independence was an impossible dream, the situation in Spain between 1868 and 1874 opened for them the vision of political reforms and greater participation on their part in the administration of Puerto Rico. Between 1868 and 1874 the Spanish government authorized the election of 15 deputies to represent Puerto Rico in the Cortes. It also permitted the election of municipal councils and of a Provincial Deputation, a sort of administrative council. Freedom of the press and freedom of petition were established, and political groups were allowed to organize on the island. Although the explanation for these concessions lies in part in the inherent "progressiveness" of the men who ruled Spain between 1868 and 1874, they are best explained in terms of an attempt by the new Spanish government to end the revolt in Cuba (concessions similar to those granted to Puerto Rico were also granted to Cuba) and keep the Puerto Rican elite from following the footsteps of its Cuban counterpart.

It was in the aftermath of the Spanish "revolution" of 1868 that the first formal political parties emerged in Puerto Rico. First to organize were the Puerto Rican reformists (most of them autonomists) who founded the Liberal Reformist Party in 1870. A few months later, the defenders of the colonial status quo established the Conservative Party. According to the rules set up by the Spanish metropolis, only adult males who could read and write were allowed to vote. Thus, in the early 1870s the two parties competed for an electorate of 20,000. Between 1869 (when the first elections for the Cortes were held) and 1874 (when the republican government was overthrown in Spain) the Liberal Reformist Party had the upper hand. It drew its support primarily from Puerto Rican professionals and intellectuals and from members of the landed elite. During that period Liberal Reformist deputies participated in parliamentary debates in Spain and voted. They also controlled most of the municipalities in Puerto Rico and the Provincial Deputation. But during this period they accomplished little in the way of bringing genuine political and economic reforms to the island. The only success, which can be attributed to a smaller sector of the Liberal Reformist Party, was the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico.

In the first half of the nineteenth century some of those in the reformist movement became outspoken advocates of abolition. The abolitionist crusade—which developed in Puerto Rico parallel to the abolitionist crusade in Cuba—faced the opposition of both Spanish and Puerto Rican slave owners. In spite of this opposition, however, it grew and gained momentum after the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies in 1833 and in the French Antilles in 1848. Among those most active in the movement by mid century were Betances, José Julián Acosta, Baldorioty de Castro, Julio de Vizcarrondo and Eugenio María de Hostos (without question the intellectual giant of Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century). Some of these men not only freed their own slaves but also organized fund-raising activities to purchase the freedom of others. Within Puerto Rico, however, the abolitionist movement made little headway. Concluding that it was futile to carry on the struggle for abolition on the island itself, by the 1860s the most important leaders of the movement had settled in Spain to carry on their struggle there. Using the Spanish press to voice their arguments, they continuously attacked the institution of slavery as barbaric and behind the times. In Madrid, Puerto Rican and Cuban abolitionists joined and in 1865 founded the Sociedad Abolicionista Española. Among the founders of the Society were José Acosta and Julio Vizcarrondo. It was Vizcarrondo who founded in Madrid the paper *El Abolicionista Español.*

In spite of the efforts of Cuban and Puerto Rican abolitionists, the trend within the Spanish government was against abolition. The reason for this was not the belief of the heads of government in Spain that there was nothing evil or exploitative about slavery, but the argument of Cuban slaveowners that the abolition of slavery would wreck the Cuban economy. This view carried a lot of weight in Madrid since Cuba was Spain's most valuable colony. Although in Puerto Rico (unlike in Cuba) the slaves constituted by the 1860s a small proportion of the population and were not crucial to the economy of the island, there were some Puerto Rican slaveholders who made the same argument. But because of the relative unimportance of slavery in Puerto Rico, the opposition of Spanish and Puerto Rican slaveholders was not as formidable as that of the Cubans. Also, as the years went by the argument of the abolitionists that slave labor was more inefficient and expensive than "free" labor began to strike a sympathetic chord among some of the slave owners themselves. "No really acceptable reason," said Puerto Rican abolitionists in a memorandum to the Spanish government in 1866, "can be given for the continuation of slavery in Puerto Rico. The general wealth of the island does not need it; its disappearance will not affect any productive element, and the self-interest of the owners must demand the overthrow of that institution." By the 1860s the main concern of Puerto Rican slave owners was not abolition per se, but that abolition be accompanied by compensation for the slaves they owned.

It was the situation in Spain after 1868 and the revolt that spread throughout Cuba in that year that gave the abolitionists the best opportunity to get their message across and to have slavery abolished in Puerto Rico. In the parliamentary debates the Liberal Reformist deputies from the island not only emphasized the inhumanity of slavery but also pointed out that Puerto Rico offered a suitable atmosphere for emancipation: The number of slaves was relatively small in proportion to the total population and the commercial sector of agriculture depended overwhelmingly on "free" labor. They were also careful to point out that by abolishing slavery in Puerto Rico and Cuba, Spain might be able to end the bloody rebellion that was going on in Cuba and that, they argued, had been precipitated by the intolerable situation in which Cuban slaves found themselves. They continually emphasized that almost all civilized nations had abolished slavery and that it was a blot on the Spanish nation to allow the institution to survive in its Caribbean possessions. Of the Puerto Rican deputies in the Spanish parliament, probably the most effective and eloquent speaker on behalf of abolition was Baldorioty de Castro. "I leave it to this Assembly," he once declared to the members of the Cortes, "to decide whether a Spanish province of 650,000 people should keep a handful of Negroes in bondage. . . . I leave it to them to decide whether a Spanish province can endure the enslavement of man by man, subjected to political servitude as well, with a tyrannical rule felt at home and in the public square."

The war in Cuba, the constant pressures brought upon the Spanish government by Puerto Rican abolitionists and sympathetic Spaniards in Madrid and the establishment of the Republic in Spain in 1873 finally brought the desired results. Among the leaders of the new republican government there were some who believed that slavery should be abolished immediately both in Cuba and in Puerto Rico. The opposition of Cuban slaveholders, however, and the possibility that such slaveholders might join the revolt then raging in Cuba made even the new republican government reluctant to abolish slavery on that island. Puerto Rico, on the other hand, presented a very different situation. Consequently, on March 22, 1873, slavery was abolished there. But it was an abolition with strings attached (strings designed to appease Puerto Rican slaveholders). By virtue of the law of 1873, the 31,635 slaves in the island at that time were required to enter into contracts with their owners for a period of not less than three years. If their owners refused to enter into such contracts, they were to enter into contracts with other persons or with the government. After five years the freedmen were to receive "political rights."

The abolition of slavery was about the only major success enjoyed by the Puerto Rican Liberal Reformist Party between 1870 and 1874. Aside from that, little changed in the island save the elite enjoyed greater control of municipal governments during that period and that formal political parties had been organized. After the overthrow of the republic in 1874, a reaction took hold in Spain that gave support to conservative and reactionary elements in Puerto Rico. The constitution of 1869 was abolished and a more conservative one drawn up. However, in an attempt to bring about some sort of conciliation between conservatives and liberals in Spain and to quiet down the increasingly vocal reformist minority in Puerto Rico, the conservative leadership of the restoration period in Spain (1874-1898) not only gave in to the demands of Spanish liberals for a role in the political system of the restoration, but also gave some concessions to reformists on the island. Political parties continued to be tolerated in Puerto Rico and so were municipal elections and the election of a few representatives to the Cortes. Electoral laws, however, were rewritten to limit the size of the electorate. By virtue of the electoral law of 1878, the vote was limited to males over 25 years of age who paid at least 125 pesetas a year in taxes or came within certain specified groups such as priests, retired officers, holders of academic or professional diplomas and public employees earning an annual salary of at least 2,000 pesetas. These categories enfranchised a large proportion of the Spaniards on the island, the small group of Puerto Rican professionals and intellectuals, and certain members of the Puerto Rican landed elite. In 1880, when the new electoral law was put into operation, only 2,004 out of an adult male population of 374,640 were eligible to vote.

Persecuted and discriminated against, the Liberal Reformist Party continued to exist but followed a policy of abstaining from elections after 1874. Furthermore, the Liberal Reformist Party became divided over the issue of the colonial status of the island. Originally, the party had included both assimilists and autonomists, and for a while the assimilists enjoyed great influence within the party. After the restoration of 1874 and the reaction that acompanied it, disappointed assimilists concluded that the autonomist solution was the best. In 1881 disgruntled assimilists left the Liberal Reformist Party and founded the Assimilist Party, whose aim was the complete assimilation of Puerto Rico with Spain. "Our position is not a mystery," one of the leaders of the new party wrote. "We desire that the future of Puerto Rico be forever united with that of Spain. We seek equality among all the members who form the great Spanish nation."

With the desertion of the assimilists, the Liberal reformist Party fell into the hands of outspoken autonomists. There were some, however, who questioned some party leaders' desire to openly espouse a formal platform for autonomy along Canadian lines. They were afraid that such an open espousal would invite reprisals on the part of the Spanish authorities. Under the able leadership of Baldorioty de Castro, who urged the members of the party to make a formal declaration on behalf of autonomy, the party changed its name to the Puerto Rican Autonomist Party in 1887.

The creation of the Autonomist Party brought the reprisals that some of the Liberal Reformers had feared. Urged and actively supported by the Conservative Party—which equated demands for autonomy with treason—Governor Romualdo Palacios launched a reign of terror against the members of the Autonomist Party, against those suspected of sympathizing with the goals of the party, and even against some of the assimilists as well. Assimilist and autonomist newspapers were closed down, and hundreds of suspects rounded up, thrown into jail, tortured and in some instances executed. The governor controlled communications to such a degree that for months no word could be sent to Spain about events on the island. Antonio S. Pedreira in his book *El Año Terrible del '87* wrote,

> In the jails innocent men and suspects were submitted to brutal tortures, tied with handcuffs, and tortured with little sticks in order to make them confess infamous lies. . . . There were mutilations, broken bones, stabbings, twisted testicles and assassinations, like that of the baker Juan Diaz, that of the director of the newspaper *EL Gato Flaco de Humacao* who was drowned in the excreta of a latrine and that of Corporal Ambrosio of Yauco, who was hung by his testicles.

It was not until the end of the year, when the authorities in Spain learned of what was happening in Puerto Rico and ordered Governor Palacios to end the campaign of persecution he had launched, that the terror subsided. Among those who suffered through the experience was Baldorioty de Castro. He emerged from prison emanciated and ill. Two years later he died in Ponce.

The terror of 1887 convinced many former autonomists that Betances had been right when he wrote in 1867 that "it is a waste of time, money and energy to expect reforms from the Spanish government." During the months the terror lasted, and in subsequent years many autonomists sought exile in neighboring Spanish-speaking islands and in New York City, where they established close relations with Cuban revolutionary groups, as Betances had done in the 1860s. By the early 1890s there existed in New York City a Puerto Rican Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, which had been organized by José Martí. In New York, in the Dominican Republic and in secret societies in Puerto Rico itself these men now prepared to struggle for independence.

In the meantime, the Autonomist Party continued to operate in Puerto Rico under the careful eye of the Spanish authorities. After the death of Baldorioty de Castro, the party fell under the control of Luis Muñoz Rivera and José Celso Barbosa. Between the two men there were quarrels. One source of the quarrel was personal in nature. Barbosa, for example, resented the elitist arrogance of Muñoz Rivera. More important, however, in explaining the conflict between the two men and the subsequent split within the party was the different tactics proposed by the two leaders to achieve autonomy for Puerto Rico. Both men realized that if autonomy was to be granted, the struggle on its behalf had to be carried to the Spanish political arena. It was agreed that the Autonomist Party should establish a working relationship with one of the Spanish political parties that might be sympathetic to the autonomists' goals. Barbosa, however, argued that the Autonomist Party should ally itself with the Spanish Republican Party. Muñoz Rivera, on the other hand, rejected an association with the Spanish republicans as foolish and unrealistic. With a clear conception of what Spanish politics were all about, Muñoz Rivera knew very well that the republicans in Spain were a small and impotent political force that had no chance of ever coming to power. Since he knew that the Spanish Conservative Party was adamant about refusing to give Puerto Rico any sort of autonomy, Muñoz Rivera concluded that the only option available to the Autonomist Party was to ally itself with the Spanish Liberal Party, then led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. Sagasta's party had been in power in the late 1880's and the chances were good that the party would enjoy power again. In spite of the outspoken opposition of Barbosa, the opportunistic tactics argued by Muñoz Rivera carried the day.

While Barbosa and Muñoz Rivera were arguing over tactics and pro-independence groups were organizing support within and outside Puerto Rico, the Cubans launched their second war for independence in 1895. The war (among whose first casualties was the poet and patriot José Martí) was bloody and destructive. Tens of thousands of Spanish troops were sent to the island to strengthen the already powerful garrisons there. The rebels, however, fought on. On the island, the Spanish commanders applied every savage technique in their effort to repress the liberation movement. Thousands of captives and suspects were tortured or executed. Tens of thousands of Cuban families were removed from rural areas and placed in camps that were described in the U. S. press at the time as concentration camps (decades later, during the Vietnam war, such camps were described as "strategic hamlets").

The war of independence in Cuba stimulated expansionist aspirations among U. S. policy makers, aspirations that dated back to the early part of the nineteenth century. In the United States business groups with interests in Cuba urged the government in Washington to intervene in the Cuban war to "protect American property and American lives." The "yellow press" emphasized day after day the brutal behavior of Spanish troops on the island and also urged intervention. With little reluctance, Washington decided to intervene. At first it tried to persuade Spain through diplomatic channels to give up Cuba. When those efforts failed, the United States used the sinking of the battleship *The Maine*—which had been sent to Havana harbor to protect American lives—as an excuse to declare war on Spain in early 1898.

In Puerto Rico, the outbreak of the war of independence in Cuba opened opportunities that Muñoz Rivera was quick to exploit. In 1896 he traveled to Spain and met with Sagasta. In his discussions with the Spanish Liberal leader, Muñoz Rivera emphasized that the Puerto Rican people were loyal to Spain but that they would no longer tolerate the blatant colonial status in which they found themselves. Sagasta was interested, but refused to make any commitments. Muñoz Rivera then returned to Puerto Rico. While on the island he learned of a pro-independence plot centered in the town of Yauco and through one of his subordinates in his newspaper *La Democracia* denounced the leaders of the conspiracy to Governor Savas Marín. Immediately thereafter the governor ordered the arrest of those involved in the plot while Muñoz Rivera hurried back to Spain to emphasize to Sagasta that the Yauco affair was but an indication of things to come should Spain continue to refuse to grant Puerto Rico some sort of autonomy. Sagasta was convinced, and in the spring of 1897 he and Muñoz Rivera signed a pact in which the former pledged himself to autonomy for Puerto Rico should he come to power in Spain. Soon thereafter, in August, the conservative head of the Spanish government was killed by an anarchist, and Sagasta was chosen to replace him and organize a new government. In November Sagasta kept the pact he had made with Muñoz Rivera and tried to end the war in Cuba by granting both Cuba and Puerto Rico autonomy. The Cuban rebels rejected anything short of independence. The Puerto Rican autonomists, however, received the offer with almost delirious delight. For decades they had opposed independence because many of them thought it was an unrealistic dream but primarily because they knew that in order for the island to get independence it would have to undertake as popular a war as that raging in Cuba. Eager to protect their economic interests and afraid and contemptuous of the masses, the majority of the autonomists were not about to follow a path that would have involved the mobilization of the masses for political struggle. The autonomy now granted to them by Spain would bring a minimum of social and economic dislocation to the island, would place them in a position of political power the Puerto Rican elite had never enjoyed before and would open avenues for further trade with countries such as the United States.

The Autonomous Charter that was granted by Spain to Puerto Rico in November 1897 conceded the island more autonomy (in matters of self government) than the government set up under U. S. domination after 1898. The Charter gave Puerto Rico the right to full representation in the Spanish Cortes, the right to participate in negotiations between Spain and other countries affecting the commerce of the island, the right to ratify or reject commercial treaties affecting Puerto Rico, and it specifically authorized the insular government to frame tariffs and fix customs duties on imports and exports. The Charter vested the power to legislate on internal affairs in a Parliament consisting of two houses: a partially elected Council of Administration of 15 members (7 of whom were to be named by the Governor-General), and an elected Chamber of Deputies of 32 members. To be a member of the Council or the Chamber, a man had to be a native of Puerto Rico or a citizen of Spain who had resided on the island for four consecutive years. The new Parliament could "pass upon all matters not specially and expressively reserved to the Cortes of the Kingdom or to the Central Government." The Charter itself could not be amended except on petition of the insular Parliament.

By virtue of the government created by the Charter, the official head of the government and the representative of the Spanish Crown in Puerto Rico was the Governor-General. He was appointed by the authorities in Spain and he exercised broad powers in matters relating to the Church (which still maintained its position as the only officially tolerated religious institution on the island), the armed forces, the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of royal laws, decrees, treaties and other acts or measures of the home government that were applicable to Puerto Rico. In other affairs, however, the Governor-General exercised executive authority on behalf of the cabinet (provisions for which were included in the Charter), which was responsible not to him but to the insular Parliament.

As a result of the first elections under the provisions of the new Charter, Luiz Muñoz Rivera and his followers won an impressive victory and he became the presiding officer of the insular cabinet. On July 17, 1898—the very day that Puerto Rico's first Parliament held its inaugural session—Spanish troops surrendered in Santiago de Cuba which signaled the end of Spanish resistance on that island. Eight days later, U.S. troops commanded by General Nelson A. Miles landed near Guánica in Puerto Rico and quickly proceeded to crush the little resistance they faced from Spanish troops on the island. On July 28, the insular Parliament disbanded, never to reconvene.

The U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico was not a mere side-effect, a peripheral military act, of the war between the United States and Spain. Nor was it the result of efforts by pro-independence Puerto Ricans in the United States who urged Washington to include the island in its plan of operations in order to "liberate" it from the Spanish yoke, as it had promised to "liberate" Cuba once the war with Spain got under way. The U.S. invasion was a deliberate, well-planned act, whose genesis antecedes the official declaration of war against Spain in 1898. By the end of the nineteenth century the United States had become a naval power of importance and was searching eagerly for coaling stations, provision centers and naval bases that would enable its ships to cross the seas with as few stops as possible. In 1891, for example, Secretary of State James Blaine wrote to President Harrison, "I believe that there are only three places of sufficient value to be taken: One is Hawaii and the others are Puerto Rico and Cuba."

But strategic considerations were not the sole (or primary) reason for the growing interest of the United States in Puerto Rico before 1898. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the United States became an expansionist capitalist country in search of overseas markets for its products and of areas that would supply U.S. industries with raw materials and U.S. consumers with certain commodities that had to be imported. Puerto Rico was seen as an important potential market for U.S. goods (by 1898 the island's population was close to one million) and also as a place which could provide part of the sugar needs of the U.S. home market.

The beginning of the war between Spain and the United States and the realization among a few Puerto Ricans that the island would be occupied by the United States led some to urge the Puerto Ricans to take advantage of the war and declare their independence before the arrival of U.S. troops. That was the position taken by Eugenio María de Hostos and by Bentances. Bentances, who at the time of the war between Spain and the United States was dying in Paris, wrote:

> What are the Puerto Ricans doing? Why don't they take advantage of the blockade to rise up in a mass? It is essential that when the vanguards of the American army land they be received by Puerto Rican forces waving the flag of independence, and that it be the latter who give them their welcome.

But Betances' advice went unheard. Unconcerned about the issue of the political status of the island, the Puerto Rican masses either remained passive or welcomed the U.S. troops who were seen by many of the rural poor as liberators from the brutality of the *Guardia Civil*. Muñoz Rivera and other autonomist leaders refused to heed Betances' advice. They did not want a popular revolt. They were upset by the turn of events, but they did nothing to oppose the U.S. invasion, because they foolishly believed that the United States would give Puerto Rico outright independence or, at the very least, a system of autonomy like the one granted to the island by Spain in 1897. The North American troops invaded Puerto Rico, defeated the few Spanish troops who resisted, and established a colonial government. Under the peace treaty signed between Spain and the United States on December 1, 1898, Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States, providing that "the civil rights and political conditions of the territories ceded to the United States shall be determined by [the U.S.] Congress."

On September 13, 1898, a couple of months before the Treaty of Paris was signed, María de Hostos wrote in his diary while looking at Puerto Rico from the deck of the steamship *Philadelphia:*

> Yesterday I spent the whole day with my binoculars in my hands; from El Desecheo to El Ataud and from Borinquen Point to Point Ponce, I saw everything; I looked and looked again; I admired it, blessed it, and felt it. I felt it: I mean what the literary dialect expresses in that phrase, not what it says in itself. I felt for her and with her her beauty and her misfortune. I thought how noble it would have been to see her free by her own effort, and how sad and overwhelming and shameful it is to see her go from owner to owner without ever being her own master, and to see her pass from sovereignty to sovereignty without ever ruling herself.

NOTES

Most of the data and factual information in this essay was obtained from the following sources:

Abbad y Lasierra, Iñigo, *Historia geográfica, civil y natural de las Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico* [1782] (San Juan, 1866).

Alonso, Manuel A., *El Gîbaro* [1849] (San Juan, 1949).

Atiles, Francisco del Valle, *El campesino puertorriqueño, sus condiciones físicas, intelectuales y morales* (San Juan, 1887).

Babín, María Teresa, *Panorama de la cultura puertorriqueña* (San Juan, 1958).

Babín, María Teresa, *The Puerto Ricans' Spirit: Their History, Life and Culture* (New York, 1971).

Berbusse, Edward J., *The United States in Puerto Rico, 1898-1900* (Chapel Hill, 1966).

Brau, Salvador, *Las clases jornaleras de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1882).

Carr, Raymond, *Spain, 1808-1939* (London, 1966).

Carroll, Henry K., *Report on the Island of Porto Rico* (Washington, D.C., 1899).

Cifre de Loubriel, Estela, "Los inmigrantes del siglo XIX—Su contribución a la formación del pueblo puertorriqueño," *Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña*, No. 7 (April-June, 1960).

Córdoba, Pedro Tomás de, *Memorias geográficas, económicas, y estadîsticas de la Isla de Puerto Rico*, 6 vols. (San Juan, 1831-33).

Córdoba, Pedro Tomás de, *Memorias sobre todos los ramos de la administración de la Isla de Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1838).

Cruz Monclova, Lidio, *Historia del año 1887* (Rio Piedras, 1958).

Cruz Monclova, Lidio, *Historia de Puerto Rico* (Siglo XIX), 3 vols. (Rio Piedras, 1952, 1957, 1962).

Cruz Monclova, Lidio, *Román Baldorioty de Castro, su vida y sus ideas* (San Juan, 1966).

De Diego, José, *Obras comvletas*, 2 vols. (San Juan, 1967).

Díaz Soler, Luis M., "The Abolition of Slavery in Puerto Rico, 1868-1873," *Caribbean Historical Review*, No. 1 (December, 1950).

Documents on the Constitutional History of Puerto Rico, 2nd. ed. (Washington, D.C., 1964).

Crónicas de Puerto Rico, 2 vols., edited by Eugenio Fernandez Menden (San Juan, 1957).

Flinter, George, *An Account of the Present State of the Island of Porto Rico* (London, 1834).

Foner, Philip S., *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism*, 2 vols. (New York, 1972).

Fraga Iribarne, Manuel, *Las constituciones de Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1953).

"Puerto Rico Through New England Eyes," 1831-1834, edited by Frank Otto Gatell, *Journal of Inter-American Studies.*

Gomez Acevedo, Labor, *Organización y reglamentación del trabajo en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX* (San Juan, 1970).

Jimeno Angius, D.J., *Población y comercio de la Isla de Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1885).

Maldonado-Denis, Manuel, *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation* (New York, 1972).

Meléndez Muñoz, Miguel, "El Agrego: Patriarcalismo y feudalismo económicos," *Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriquena,* No. 2 (January-March, 1959).

Memoria de los trabajos realizados por la Sección Puerto Rico del Partido Revolucionario Cubano, 1895-1898 (New York, 1898).

Mintz, Sidney W., "The Role of Forced Labor in Nineteenth Century Puerto Rico," *Caribbean Historical Review,* No. 2 (December, 1951).

Muñoz Rivera, Luis, *Obras completas,* 3 vols. (Madrid, 1920).

Osuna, Juan José, *A History of Education in Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras, 1949).

Pagán, Bolivar, *Historia de los partidos puertorriqueños, 1898-1956,* 2 vols. (San Juan, 1959).

Pedreira, Antonio S., *El año terrible del 87* (San Juan, 1948).

Perloff, Harvey S., *Puerto Rico's Economic Future: A Study in Planned Development* (Chicago, 1950).

Ramírez de Arellano, R.W., *Instrucciones al Diputado don Ramón Power y Giralt* (Rio Piedras, 1936).

Rivero, Angel, *Crónica de la Guerra Hispanoamericana en Puerto Rico* (Rio Piedras, 1972).

Rosario, Pilar Barbosa de, *De Baldorioty a Barbosa: Historia del autonomismo puertorriqueño, 1887-1896* (San Juan, 1957).

Sendras y Burin, Antonio, *Como se gobierna en Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1886).

Suarez Díaz, Ada, *El doctor Ramón Emeterio Betances, su vida y su obra* (San Juan, 1968).

Tapia y Rivera, Alejandro, *Mis memorias, 1826-1882* (New York, 1928).

Turnbull, David, *Cuba, with Notices on Porto Rico and the Slave Trade* (London, 1840).

Wells, Henry, *The Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study in Changing Values and Institutions* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

Williams, Eric, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean,* 1492-1969 (New York, 1970).

Williams, Eric, "The Negro Slave Trade in Anglo-Spanish Relations," *Caribbean Historical Review,* No. 1 (December 1950).

PART II

Puerto Rico Since 1898

Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico

Angel G. Quintero Rivera

Fallacy of the Thesis of Colonial Capitalism in Spanish America

This article is the first chapter of a broad study on the class history of Puerto Rico. The analysis of the development of contemporary social classes and their conflicts requires an examination of the capitalist economy, on which these class relationships are based. The purpose of this article is to examine the background to the emergence of this type of economy in Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rican historical literature still includes no comprehensive analytical presentation of the pre-twentieth century Puerto Rican economy. All that exists is an extremely limited selection of studies on specific subjects. Interpretations of pre-twentieth century Puerto Rican economic history are to be found in works of a general nature and are, therefore, superficial and inadequate.[1] In these interpretations, the Puerto Rican economy in the nineteenth century is presented as a "rudimentary type of agrarian capitalism"—rudimentary in the technological sense. The great economic change at the beginning of the twentieth century is seen as basically one of degrees of technological

---

A. G. Quintero Rivera, "Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico", *Caribbean Studies* 13, No. 3 (October 1973): Reprinted by permission of the Author and the Institute of Caribbean Studies. Copyright 1973 by the Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico.

development—the change from small to large sugar mills, from the *trapiche* to the *central*. In these analyses, capitalism emerges in Puerto Rico alongside Spanish colonialism, or at least as a result of the *Cédula de Gracias of 1815*, which did away with a number of institutional impediments to the expansion of commercial agriculture, and opened the way for commerce, which in turn opened a number of pathways for the development of this type of agriculture.

These interpretations fall within the same tradition as the theory popularized by Andre Gunder Frank[2] (though expounded earlier by Sergio Bagú[3]) in which the colonial economy of Hispanic-America is presented as a capitalist economy. The core of Gunder Frank's theory is that the colonial economy consists of a series of "links of exploitation" stretching from the worker on the land to the power of the metropolis. In each link (agricultural worker-farm owner, farm owner-city merchant, etc.) a ruling minority expropriates the fruits of the labor of a lower stratum (or part of what that lower stratum has in turn expropriated) for its own benefit. In this theory, capitalism is equated with exploitation, with the appropriation of the surplus through the expropriation of productive labor.

This equation is misleading since exploitation can be found in economies with very different systems of production: for example, in the slave economy, in the feudal economy and in the economy based on what Marx called "the Asiatic mode of production."[4] In fact, Sergio Bagú, following a similar line of argument, finds himself obliged to classify slavery as a capitalist institution.[5] But this could lead to the absurdity of speaking of capitalism in the economy of the pharaohs. Capitalism cannot be defined simply as a system of exploitation, but rather by the way in which this exploitation is structured and based. Capitalism is conformed by some relations of production structured in terms of, and resulting in, a specific mode of appropriation of the surplus, and only when this appropriation becomes the axis of the economy.

Another argument put forward in the theory of Gunder Frank and Bagú (an argument present also in many interpretations of nineteenth century Puerto Rican history) is that the Hispanic-American colonial economy was capitalistic because it resulted from capitalism, i.e., it was structured to complement international capitalism. But if our primary concern is the examination of certain social relationships that are structured on the basis of, and relative to, certain types of economy, then the latter must be classified not in terms of causes, but in terms of their nature or of what constitutes them. The Gunder Frank-Bagú thesis tends to emphasize the external relations of the economy, ignoring its internal relations. An analysis of the external relations is important (especially when one is dealing with a colonial economy where these relations are implicit in its very nature). Nevertheless, the significance of the external relations lies not in whether or not they are caused, but in how they influence or are fit into the dialectics of the internal relations.

The emphasis on external relations is linked to another important aspect of the thesis of ''colonial capitalism'': the identification of capitalism with commerce. This is the central point of the arguments presented in the interpretations of the Puerto Rican economy of the nineteenth century referred to above. According to these interpretations, proof that it was a capitalist economy lies in the considerable increase in commercial activity in Puerto Rico during that century. The equation of capitalism with commerce is also one of the pillars of the Gunder Frank-Bagú thesis. The root of this equation lies in some of the classics of the history of capitalism, and it still is the focal point of some of the most important academic debates on this economic system.

The equation of capitalism with commercial activity emerges primarily from the European experience, where the birth of capitalism was accompanied by an increase in commercial relations; even more so in contrast with the economic system which preceeded it (feudalism) whose nature tended to limit commercial activity (which is not to say that commerce did not exist under feudalism, as Gunder Frank erroneously supposes).[6]

The historical identification of capitalism with commerce is not accidental. Commercial activity is structurally implicit in capitalism. The relations of production that shape the system are oriented toward the production of commodities, not so much for their use value, as for their exchange value. This does not imply, however, an identification between production of commodities and capitalist relations of production. In other words, although a certain type of productive relations would imply the production of comodities, the production of commodities does not necessarily imply a specific set of relations of production.[7] Those who adhere to the thesis that equates capitalism with commerce commit this fallacy. Although commercial activity is implicit in capitalism, it does not necessarily imply the existence of capitalism. There are an abundance of historical examples to testify to this.[8]

The thesis of ''colonial capitalism,'' then, is based to a great extent on the fallacy of identifying capitalism with commerce. Both Manfred Kossok and Sergio Villalobos address themselves to this fallacy when they write that "the progressive integration of Latin America into the system of commercial relationships of the world market in the eighteenth century helped to reinforce and consolidate internal feudalism, since these commercial relationships were defined in terms of ownership of land . . ., of the exploitation of natural wealth by means of the exercise of rights over persons,"[9] that is to say, in terms of productive relations based on serfdom (the core of the feudal regime of production), and not on wage labor as capitalism would imply.

The identification of capitalism with commerce makes difficult an analysis of class relations, not only because of the confusion of terms it creates, but also because the only relationships taken into account by this thesis are those concerned with the distribution aspects of the economy, the relations among merchants, or, at the most, between the owners of the means of production and the merchants. If the production process is ignored, there is no basis for class analysis, which is directed basically at the conglomerate of relations arising from the structure of the productive process: the relations between producer and his product, the relationships between direct producers in a situation of social division of labor, the relations between them and the owners of the means of production and between both and the small independent producer.

The increase of commercial activity in Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century, then, cannot be used as evidence of a capitalist development in island or of the predominance of this type of economy.

Within class analysis the fundamental factor in the classification of economic systems is the organization or structuring of the relations of production (what Maurice Dobb has referred to as the regime of production, or the mode of production in the broad Marxist sense).[10] In capitalism these relations of production are encompassed by the concept of *wage labor*. This means that the direct producer has sold his labor power; that is, his productive capacity has become a commodity. The producer, as a man, then finds himself alienated from himself, because he is separated from one of his basic constituents: the capacity to produce. He is also separated from his product, as it does not belong to him, and separated also because his labor activity is not carried in terms of his product but by the wages he receives by selling this activity.[11]

The concept of wage labor implies the existence of people who are able to buy this labor power and convert it into productive capacity, supplying the worker with raw materials and instruments to work with.[12] The raw materials and the means of working them also are subject to the market. Thus, ownership of money is the source of a possible total control of the productive process. The process, as embodied in the social division of labor, will, moreover, tend toward the production of commodities that can be exchanged for money again, perpetuating control.[13] Through control of the productive process, the products can be valued higher than the cost of production, and by means of this surplus value the cycle of the accumulation of capital is initiated. In fact, wage labor already implies surplus value because if the worker has nothing to sell except his labor, the capitalist buying his labor power with wages buys the whole capacity of that labor power for reproducing itself in productive labor.[14]

The concept of wage labor implies a money economy. The direct producer sells his labor power to whoever controls the means of production. Nothing belongs to him except his wages. His life in society revolves around and through his wages, especially those aspects of his life directed towards the satisfaction of his material needs. He sells his labor power and buys what he needs with his wages. The expansion of an economy based on wage labor means that society will be organized around these money-relationships.

The existence of a money economy implies the development of a home market, an organization for the exchange of commodities and the buying and selling of labor. It is important to emphasize that it is not simply a question of the mere existence of trade or money in an economy, but of a *money economy* and a *home market;* a system in which money is the basis of economic relationships and in which the factors of production, as well as the products, are encompassed within a framework of exchange (also based on money).

The rise of the capitalist economy in Puerto Rico must be examined in terms of these elements. The basic questions are obvious: How was the economy progressively getting to be organized around wage labor? When can it be said that this is the center point of the structuring of the relations of production? It is also necessary to deal with matters implicitly linked to wage labor. For example, when can one speak of a money economy and a home market in Puerto Rico? In this article, I will try to trace the background of this process; the background of the rise of the capitalist economy in Puerto Rico, not only because it is necessary for understanding the emergence of this economic system, but because it helps us understand the particular nature of the capitalism that emerged on the island, and the political and social aspects of its subsequent development.

The Seignorial Hacienda

The economy of Puerto Rico developed very slowly during the first three centuries of Spanish colonization. Compared with the wealth of areas like Mexico and Peru, Puerto Rico—whose metal deposits were exhausted by the middle of the sixteenth century—was poor and consequently not a very attractive place for colonizers. The island was used mainly as a military bastion for the defense of Spanish vessels en route between Spain and its mainland American colonies, or as place where some of these ships could stock up with fresh water and supplies.

Apart from soldiers and Spanish officials in San Juan, the island was mainly settled by absconders, deserters, runaway slaves who had managed to escape from the plantations on neighboring islands and some soldiers who, having finished their military service on the island, decided to settle there.[15] Given a low rate of immigration and the rapid decline of the Indian population of the island in the course of the sixteenth century, the total population of Puerto Rico declined from about 50,000 Indians at the time of the Spanish occupation in 1508 to about 5,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Puerto Rico thrived basically on a natural economy. Apart from a very insignificant and sporadic exportation of hides and a few other agricultural commodities, official trade was practically nil, though there is ample evidence of illicit trading or smuggling.[16] This, however, was more superfluous than fundamental to the economy. It took place mainly at the level of barter: ginger or hides for apparel (e.g. shoes, handkerchiefs, lace, jewelry) or for a good *machete* (Manchester blade).

Since local production was fundamentally for subsistence, the Spanish officialdom in San Juan had to depend on financial support from the rich colonial territories in other parts of the Spanish American empire (a system that became institutionalized in the *situado mexicano).* It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that Spain began serious efforts to turn Puerto Rico into a productive colony rather than a dependent one. This concern became a vital necessity when the Empire began to vanish at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

In the first two decades of the nineteenth century a large number of

Spanish families from the emancipated colonies on the Spanish American mainland arrived in Puerto Rico. So did French families from Louisiana and Haiti. Many of them brought their slaves and working tools (or some agricultural machinery) with them. The Spanish government gave them land and facilities to start cultivation. It did away with a whole set of impediments to trade that had been imposed on the island in favor of traders from Seville and, later, Cádiz. As a result, agricultural production for export increased rapidly. This was the situation that the interpreters of the economic history of Puerto Rico who are mentioned at the beginning of this article have erroneously seen as the origins or development of capitalism on the island.

As argued above, an increased activity in commerce is not a sufficient criterion for the classification of an economy. An analysis of the productive process, of the way production is organized socially, is needed. In this respect, the change accompanying the increase in agricultural production for export during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is essentially one from a subsistence agriculture of family production to what I have called a seignorial hacienda economy—both pre-capitalist systems of production.

Given the sparse population of Puerto Rico in the eighteenth century and first part of the nineteenth, the scarcest factor of the economy was labor, and the most readily available was land. There are no earlier figures available, but as late as 1830 only 5.8 per cent of the land was under cultivation. This proportion, although it increased, remained small throughout the nineteenth century. In 1897 it was only 14.3 per cent (see Graph 1). This low proportion of cultivated land was not the result of an unequal development of regions, as is common in Latin America, where the population is concentrated in certain areas while large areas remain completely outside the mainstream of the economic life of the country. The population of Puerto Rico in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was distributed fairly evenly throughout the island,[17] which meant that there was indeed a large amount of land available for cultivation.[18] In the eighteenth century, therefore, practically all the peasants (except the slaves) were independent producers. Given the choice, peasants prefer to work their own land rather than to work for others.

GRAPH 1. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND UNDER CULTIVATION (1830-1920)



GRAPH 2. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND DEVOTED TO MAIN CROPS (1827-1920)



For the embryonic haciendas at the beginning of the nineteenth century, land was also a more readily available factor than liquid capital, which was indispensible for the importation of slaves (the slave trade, in any case, was then in its last years).[19] The labor problem facing the developing commercial sector of agriculture was, then, how to get the peasants—who were producing independently for their family subsistence—to work on the haciendas. This was progressively achieved in the nineteenth century, not by the hire and sale of labor (as the development of capitalism would imply) but through dominion of the land and of rights over persons—elements associated with the feudal regime of production.[22]

With the distribution of land to immigrants at the beginning of the nineteenth century (grants made to them by the Spanish government), many peasants found themselves in a situation where the land they had worked for years and had considered theirs was suddenly part of the dominion of some señor, and where the abundant land to which they usually shifted their crops or to which they could possibly move was now also privately owned. This development was accompanied by a series of "anti-vagrancy" laws promulgated by the colonial authoritiesand known as the *régimen de la libreta* (work-book regime) or white slavery. Anyone without trade or property had to carry a workbook signed by the proprietor under whom he was working. Nonpossession of such a book constituted a punishable offense.[23] In order to move from one part of the island to another, the workbook carrier needed the approval of the proprietor under whom he was working. It is impossible to conceive the development of a labor market under these conditions.[24]

Since land was the most abundant factor in the economy, this situation fostered a system where landowners 'graciously' allowed peasants the use of land under their dominion in exchange for work by the peasants in the hacienda or in the owner's demesne. The peasant was given the opportunity to cultivate land for his immediate subsistence needs while contributing to the commercial production of the hacendado. Since the urban population of Puerto Rico was small,[25] the commercial production of the hacienda was almost exclusively for export. Consequently, no home market of any consequence was generated and payment of labor with money made no sense.[26] Even at the end of the nineteenth century, the amount of money circulating on the island was very low and the monetary integration of the economy very weak.[27]

In a period of eight years (1824-1832) for which data is available, the proportion of *agregados* (as the resident farm laborers were called) rose by almost 300 per cent, while the total population of the island rose by 75 per cent.[28] By 1832 there were already clear tendencies of change from an agrarian structure based on small independent peasant producers to an hacienda economy. The estimate obtained for the social structure in that year is as follows:[29]

TABLE 1. PROPORTION OF PEOPLE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION BELONGING TO FAMILIES OF:

Landowners	46.4%
hacienda owners	1.7%
small producers	44.7%
Agregados	32.5%
Slaves	10.5%
In trade	4.0%
(Not more than 1.8% in what is now generally referred to as merchants or businessmen)	
Artisans	2.4%
Soldiers	0.6%
Others	1.0%
Margin of error	2.6%
	100.0%

Towards the end of the century, the proportion of landowners had declined to 24.6 per cent. (7 per cent hacendados, 2.3 per cent small farmers and 21.6 per cent small independent producers on farms worked exclusively with family labor).[30] The haciendas came to cover almost half of the total land under cultivation (42.3 per cent), thus reducing the proportion of land worked by small farmers and independent family producers to 32.4 per cent. Jointly with the increase of commercial production the haciendas and the expansion of the *agregado* system, another type of tenancy developed: small farmers who worked the land with family labor (like the small producers) but whose holdings were such that they required some seasonal additional labor and whose production exceeded family subsistence needs. This type of farmer owned 25.3 per cent of the land under cultivation toward the end of the century.[31]

The hacienda, as a structure of production, progressively came to dominate the agrarian social structure. It did not attain, however, a position of control (though clearly a position of dominance). This hampered the emergence of situations of conflict among the various strata of proprietors. Moreover, the considerable proportion of medium-sized and small farmers, imprinted a character of continuum to the social stratification, thus hindering a situation of antagonism between the hacienda and the independent producer. In fact, the independent producer came to be linked with the hacienda structure through share-cropping agreements (*medianeros*), working part of the time on the hacienda in return for services or supplementary income, or through kinship ties with the *agregados*. Nor were these types of tenancy separated by different modes of production (in the limited sense): They shared what Marx described as the "petty mode of production." Apart from a few specific phases in the cultivation of coffee (the major commercial crop by the latter part of the nineteenth century) such as harvesting, where a primitive division of labor is found, productive labor in the haciendas was as individualized as on the farms of the small independent producers.

Life around the hacienda was communal. First, it went on almost entirely within the hacienda itself (it must not be forgotten that it was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the acreage devoted to commercial crops exceeded the acreage devoted to subsistence production—see Graph 2); and, second, it was shared by the various social strata. In contrast to the large estates in many areas of Latin America, the hacienda in Puerto Rico was generally administered by its owner, who also lived on it. He was an ever present element, as a person, in the life of the laborers and the small producers, just as they were, in turn, present in the life of the hacendado. To a large extent, they shared a common life, although with different roles and from a different social position. The position of the hacendado, whose basis was his control over the means of production, had developed precisely through the productive relations into a whole way of life, which in its dialectical relationship to his position of dominion came to form part of his class interests. Exploitation (expropriation of surplus) was necessary to satisfy the needs of consumption of his position of power and prestige. But just as important for his position—for his way of life—was that he should be respected, admired and even loved by the hacienda laborers and the small producers, with whom he shared his life. In this situation, to try to maximize profits—that is, to organize production in terms of exploitation—could have been harmful to his class interests. These class interests were more intimately linked to his position in his shared life than to profit maximization. The laborers, on the other hand, were tied to the hacienda work by factors other than purely economic rewards: by mutual services[32] and ritual ceremonies.[33] This agrarian structure, with its center or main spring in the hacienda, thus engendered a culture based on deference and paternalism, where the hacendado was (as Bloch says of the European feudal lord) "le premier habitant."

Gateways to Capitalism

The Puerto Rican economy in the nineteenth century was in the process of structuring itself around the hacienda. We cannot speak, therefore, of capitalism in the island, nor of a bourgeoisie or a proletariat. The socio-economic configuration and structural developments of that economy, however, opened some gateways to capitalism. Some of these arose internally within the hacienda economy itself; others from process related (though somewhat marginal) to it.

In the first place, the change from an economy of independent subsistence producers to an hacienda economy represented a structural step towards capitalism (in the sense of what Marx described as the "primitive accumulation of capital") that not only placed one class in a position of being able to purchase labor power, but which also separated the direct producer from the means of production. In this way the foundations for the development of a class needing to sell its labor power were laid.

Second, from the hacienda there emerged a superstructural gateway of some importance. The "outside" world of the Puerto Rican hacienda owners—the United States and Western Europe—was not by this time a feudal world, but one of developing capitalism. The *señores de hacienda* were beginning to identify with the bourgeoisie of these countries; they were reading its literature and philosophy and learning about its trade and wars. Many sons of hacienda owners were sent to study in these countries and the whole process affected them more directly. It is important to point out, nevertheless, that this influence was not simply the result of an intellectual fashion. It had its basis in the concrete life situation of the hacendados, in their situation as creoles faced with Spanish absolutism. "Bourgeois" liberalism provided the ideological tools for the self affirmation of a way of life that, considering a whole range of different circumstances, was becoming progressively differentiated from Spanish life and culture. Absolutism was faced with the principle of reason, and the freedom that rises from it. Faced with an authority of "government by privilege" which was oriented towards the defense of Spanish interests ,the creoles posed the principle of equality before the law.[34]

Thus, a class situated in the productive process in a position similar to that of lords in the feudal regime came to tinge its ideology with bourgeois values. This in turn had repercussions on productive relations. For example, by the last decades of the nineteenth century, when the population had increased considerably and the amount of land available had decreased, some hacendados, influenced by "the capitalist rationality of maximum exploitation of the factors of production," sought new ways of retaining the labor that would permit the maximum possible use of their land in commercial production. For this, the hacienda owner had to provide the workers with the prime necessities of life that previously had been grown by *agregados* on the individual subsistence plots made available to them by hacienda owners. Credit in what was called the hacienda shop (the counterpart of what was known in the United States as "the company store") gradually became a substitute for the plots. (The available documentation suggests that this was not a generalized phenomenon, but one to be found primarily in some large haciendas.) These shops sold on credit basic consumer goods to the laborers, who then had to pay back with labor on the hacienda for whatever they consumed. Some hacendados went a step further and instituted the system of vouchers (*vales*). They paid the workers with vouchers that could only be used in the hacienda shop. With this closed system of exchange, whether by vouchers or credit, the hacienda was assured a fixed minimum labor force in a situation of labor scarcity. At the same time, it ensured maximum profit from the land. Under these circumstances, one cannot speak of buying and selling of labor, nor of the integration of these workers into a money economy. The establishment of hacienda shops, however, was certainly a step in this direction. Nonetheless, social relations continued to be based on deference and paternalism. The hacendado increased or reduced credit arbitrarily for each laborer on the basis of personal relationships with him and according to what he paternalistically estimated the needs of each worker to be.

The superstructural "enbourgeoisement" of the hacendados was linked to a structural problem that was more far reaching: the marketing of the commercial production. The usual mechanics of trade were as follows: A class of merchants, mainly Spaniards, provided credit to the hacendados for their commercial production and were also in charge of marketing the produce.[35] In most cases this involved few monetary transactions. Under credit were included such items as seeds, agricultural machinery and fertilizers. In some cases the hacienda owner paid with part of the production that the merchant himself was in charge of exporting. As is to be expected, the merchants tried to make the most out of this situation of dependency in which the hacendados found themselves.[36] This structural situation was in itself a source of conflict.[37] The ideological opening of the hacendados to the bourgeois world reinforced their struggle to control the commercial aspects of their agricultural production. Puerto Rican politics was born, in fact, with this conflict between merchants (Unconditional Spanish Party or Conservative Party) and hacendados (Liberal Reformist Party, later Autonomist Party) in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. The hacendados fought for institutional credit facilities and access to international trade (trade with Spain and Cuba was controlled by the established merchants).[38]

This internal political struggle and the aspirations it carried were gradually separating the hacendados as a class from the hacienda laborers. The comprehensive common life described above, began to break down, and the shared ideological configuration gradually took two different roads. This became evident, for example, in the different conceptions of work of hacendados and laborers. While for the hacendado, who was turning progressively more towards commercial production in a situation of labor shortage (i.e. more work would have meant more production), work acquired the moral category of virtue; for the small producer or the *agregado,* whose concern was subsistence production, more work than was necessary made no sense. This situation slowly generated two distinct types of morality, which in turn meant a rupture in the "harmony" of hacienda life.[39] Its contradictions as a pre-capitalist mode of production turning towards the production of commodities emerged more clearly.

The credit relations between hacienda owners and merchants not only led the hacendados to get involved in trading activities, but also involved merchants in production.[40] If the hacendado had a bad harvest, he would have to pay off his credit in land. Thus, a considerable number of merchants were becoming landowners as well.[41] Apart from the different relations of production that arose on these farms (administered apparently by overseers—*mayordomos*), such incursions of the merchants into productivity brought about expositions, discussions and plans for the organization of agriculture exclusively on commercial lines, with relationships structured around the production of commodities. This is a process that during the nineteenth century begins to appear primarily in the sugar cane industry.[42]

It was precisely in the sugar industry (which was losing importance in the second half of the nineteenth century when compared to the growing coffee sector of the economy) where the emergence of gateways to capitalism was most evident. In contrast with the traditional patriarchal form of proprietorship, types close to corporative ownership were appearing in the sugar industry.[43] Technological specialization was becoming more marked at the manufacturing stage of sugar production,[44] and in both this stage and the agricultural one division of labor became more generalized. In addition, it was this industry that was most affected by slavery which in the Antilles moved more rapidly towards capitalism than the hacienda economy.[45]

It should be made clear that contrary to the experience of other Caribbean islands, the Puerto Rican economy was never predominantly a slave economy. The slave population never exceeded 11.5 per cent of the total population (1846). Furthermore, many of the slaves (the so-called domestic slaves, for example) were not directly involved in productive activities.[46] As on the other islands, however, in Puerto Rico slavery was intimately linked to the sugar industry (see Graph 3).[47] The sharp division in civil status implied by slavery, combined with a growing division in the productive process in the sugar industry,[48] resulted in a marked division between the life of the slaves and the life of the proprietors.[49] In contrast to the communal life shared by *agregados*, small producers, small farmers and hacienda owners, the sugar *ingenios* (mills) presented two distinct life styles,[50] that obviously were interlaced and affected by the paternalism and deference of the hegemonic structure of relations of society at large.[51] Thus, it is not strange that with the abolition of slavery in 1873 many sugar cane haciendas began to organize production on a wage basis (though because of the general organization of the economy and its hegemonic ideology, others tended to maintain the hacienda-*agregado* structure).



GRAPH 3. SLAVE POPULATION COMPARED TO SUGAR PRODUCTION (1775-1875)

With the abolition of slavery and the decline of the sugar industry,[52] some of the slaves who had been employed in skilled jobs or crafts in the *ingenios* migrated to the large towns. The increase in the labor force of these towns provided by 1896 the basis for the creation and development of large-scale cigar factories based on wage labor.

It was precisely with the growth of the tobacco industry in the urban centers and the rebirth of the sugar industry in the countryside at the turn of the century that the Puerto Rican economy began a rapid transformation towards a capitalist economy. This transformation, rooted in the indigeneous developments of the Puerto Rican economy in the nineteenth century, cannot be understood, however, without analysing the impact on the economy of the North American invasion of 1898, which gave capitalism in Puerto Rico a particular imperialist nature.

The Impact of the North American Invasion on the Structure of the Agrarian Economy

In 1898 Puerto Rico became a possession of the United States. The analysis of the impact of this change of sovereignty on the Puerto Rican economy is important since it meant, on the one hand, an acceleration (or precipitation) of processes toward capitalism already present in the latter part of the nineteenth century and, on the other, jointly with these processes a radical change in the nature of economic power.

Although in 1895 the sugar industry produced $4,400,000 in exports (29 per cent of the total value of the exports of the island), by 1920 it produced $74,000,000 and represented 66 per cent of the total value of exports.[53] In 1895 North American investment in the sugar industry was practically nonexistent, while toward the end of the decade of the 1920s almost half of the total production was in the hands of four companies from the metropolis.[54] Although of secondary importance, it is also interesting to note that in 1895 the value of tobacco exports was 4.4 per cent of the island's total and that 25 years later it had reached 19.3 per cent of the total. And while in 1895 there is no evidence of North American involvement in the Puerto Rican tobacco industry, by 1920 North American interests controlled practically all the manufacturing and marketing aspects of that industry.[55]

These changes have been interpreted by many analysts of Puerto Rican economic history as being basically the result of North American technical superiority.[56] Puerto Rico, according to these interpretations, came under North American rule by mere coincidence—as the result of a war between the United States and Spain, whose focal point was Cuba and with which Puerto Rico had nothing to do. Once under the United States, the modern technology of North American companies gained over a backward rudimentary economy. The process is thus conceived as inevitable and nonpolitical. This type of interpretation is erroneous, and its clarification is of fundamental importance for the analysis of the political conflicts in the decades following the North American takeover.

It is a mistake, in the first place, to argue that Puerto Rico and the Philippines became North American possessions simply as spoils of war, as a result of a military adventure. Though the center of the conflict was undoubtedly Cuba, both the Philippines and Puerto Rico were clearly within the North American expansionist interests at the end of the 19th century. There is ample documentary evidence attesting to the strategic-military interest of the U.S. in Puerto Rico before the war of 1898.[57] But economic reasons of a more profound character were also present. Regarding this point, J.A. Herrero has presented the following argument:

> Except in very specific products, the North American nation was conceived since its beginning as bound to purvey itself with the basic necessities of life (that is, within the mythology of self-sufficiency). Sugar was evidently one of the few products which the United States did not produce abundantly. It was necessary, then, to secure territories where sugar was produced or which could be turned into sugar producing areas.[58]

Thus, while towards the end of the nineteenth century 86 per cent of the sugar consumption of the United States was satisfied through imports, by 1932 only 0.4 per cent was imported. The territories acquired directly or indirectly—i.e. Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba—contributed to 76 per cent of the sugar consumed in the United States (see Table 2).[59] It was no coincidence either, that these territories became fundamentally monoproducers of sugar.

TABLE 2. SUGAR CONTRIBUTED TO THE AMERICAN MARKET

SOURCES OF SUPPLY

	Average 1898-1901 Per Cent	1932 Per Cent
1) Louisiana (cane)	11.1	2.6
2) Western U.S. (beet)	3.2	21.1
3) Hawaii (cane)	12.0	16.4
4) Puerto Rico (cane)	2.1	14.7
5) The Philippines	.7	16.6
6) Cuba (cane)	16.6	28.2
7) Others	54.3	.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
(3 + 4 + 5 + 6)	31.4	75.9

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Spanish American War took place at a time of global imperialist territorial expansion. Describing that period, Paul Sweezy points out, for example, that "Africa, which had been less than 10 per cent under outside domination in 1875, was almost completely partitioned by the European nations during the next 25 years."[60] This was the period when the United States, France and

Germany emerged as competitors to England in industrial production. In these countries, manufacturing (originally oriented towards their own internal protected market) was reaching a level whereby it was being limited precisely by their own market. The expansion of these industrial economies not only created a need for new markets but also necessitated a broader influx of raw materials to be processed. Furthermore, given the capitalist nature of these economies, with a tremendous increase in manufacturing there followed accumulation of capital seeking investment. As the surplus of capital increased, interest rates declined and financiers were forced to seek low-wage labor markets for profitable investment.[61] That this process was taking place simultaneously in several formerly protected economies, and that these economics rivalled England in a relatively short time span generated a situation of competition for control of the nonindustrial countries of the world, preferably (given the protective pattern of the time) by the inclusion of these areas within the tariff and custom barriers of the industrial powers. This would insure a steady supply of raw materials, control of markets for manufactured products, and would provide a framework of security for their investments (i.e. capital exportation).[62]

The economic history of Puerto Rico in the years following the North American invasion fits perfectly into this pattern of imperialist development. Regarding the flow of capital from the U.S., it is of great significance that just after the war of 1898 ended, the Washington Bureau of Statistics reported large numbers of enquiries, "chiefly from the great producing and business centers," as to "the opportunities for American capital and skill to develop the resources of the island."[63] North American literature of Puerto Rico of the year 1899 also testifies to this interest in investment.[64] It is also of great significance that the first North American civil governor of Puerto Rico published an essay specifically on this matter as soon as he stepped down from office in 1901.[65] There are no total figures for investment during these years, but there are documents that indicate that during the four years following the North American occupation of the island, the Porto Rico American Tobacco Company purchased the main centers of tobacco processing and gained an early control of that industry.[66] There is also ample evidence showing that the sugar mills (*centrales*) that eventually controlled raw sugar production were established by North American companies during the first decade following the invasion of the island by North American troops.[67] These companies quickly displaced the French companies that had begun to invest in the sugar industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Besides being oriented to supplying sugar for U.S. consumers, the development of the sugar industry after 1898 also was designed to serve as a source of raw material to be processed in the new colonial metropolis. No sugar refineries were permitted to be established in Puerto Rico (except for a few serving exclusively the Puerto Rican internal market, and established at a later date). Puerto Rico became, therefore, an exporter of raw sugar to be processed in the metropolitan economy.[68]

The emphasis on raw sugar production is intimately linked to an additional imperialist aspect of the North American takeover of Puerto Rico: the development of the island as a market for U.S. products. Interests from the metropolis eventually pushed Puerto Rico into a situation of a one-crop economy, of sugar mono-production and, by definition, an import-export economy. Mono-production developed jointly with metropolitan control of customs and tariffs and turned into the purest form of commercial imperialism. The North American military invasion paved the way for U.S. commercial interests. A North American eye-witness account noted, for example: "American commerce followed sharply upon the heels of the American Army."[69] And the development of that commerce was such that four decades later, during the climax of sugar mono-production, Puerto Rico was the greatest per capita purchaser of U.S. goods. With a population of two million, Puerto Rico was then the U.S.'s second largest customer in Latin America and the ninth largest in the world.[70]

It was not by mere coincidence, then, that Puerto Rico came to be under U.S. domination; the United States was indeed interested in Puerto Rico as a potential market for U.S. products and as a potential major source of sugar before the war of 1898. It is also erroneous to argue that the hegemony of U.S. companies in Puerto Rico was the result of technical superiority. There are two other factors of greater importance: first, a series of economic measures taken by the first North American governors, or directly by the metropolis, aimed at displacing insular producers and assuming control of the means of production; and second, a particular state in the development of the social classes and its conflicts that permitted this to happen.

The first of these economic measures that must be considered is the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the protective market of the United States, which formally took place in 1901 (though it had been envisioned at the time of the North American occupation of the island in 1898). This inclusion placed the cultivation of products required within this market in a favorable position. For Puerto Rico this meant sugar and tobacco. The coffee market in the United States was supplied by Brazil; Brazil produced the most inexpensive type of coffee and it was preferred by North American consumers. At the time of the U.S. occupation, the main markets for Puerto Rican coffee were in Europe.[71] The inclusion of Puerto Rico within the U.S. protective tariff system reduced the number of European ships that arrived in San Juan with European goods to be sold in the island (goods that under the new market structure being created by the United States would be imported from the North American metropolis) and that returned to Europe with Puerto Rican coffee to be sold in European markets. (Sending ships solely to transport coffee from the island to Europe would have been extremely expensive and would have made the price of Puerto Rican coffee in European markets forbiddingly high.) In addition, Puerto Rican coffee as a U.S. product faced after 1898 higher tariffs in its former European markets, especially in Spain.[72] These developments were immediately reflected in a rapid decline in the amount of coffee exported by Puerto Rico.[73]

In contrast to coffee production, sugar production had been decreasing during the last decades of the 19th century (see Graph 2) and had generated a situation by the time of the North American invasion whereby a large proportion of coastal land previously used for sugar production lay idle. The inclusion of Puerto Rico in the U.S. market created among many hacendados a desire to shift from coffee to sugar production[74] and among many landowners of idle sugar cane land a desire to put their lands under cultivation. (Tobacco was a crop requiring considerable attention and special care and was not adopted, as a general rule, by the big proprietors. In fact, tobacco in Puerto Rico became identified as "the small farmer's cash crop.")[75]

The second economic policy measure that must be considered is the change in currency decreed by President McKinley in January 1899. The Puerto Rican monetary unit, whose real value at the time of the invasion was estimated at .90 of a U.S. dollar,[76] was changed to dollars at a rate of exchange of .60, which in real terms constituted a forced devaluation. The main economic groups in Puerto Rico did not oppose the new law. The hacendados, whose commercial production was based on credit, had more debts than cash money, and even proposed a greater devaluation—a rate of exchange of .50 to the dollar. The merchants lost on the credit to the hacendados, but they had large stocks of merchandise purchased under the previous monetary system that they could now sell with higher profit levels.[77] They, in fact, proposed the .60 rate of exchange that was finally adopted. With opposition from only a few meagre and incipient banking interests, it was very easy for the metropolis to establish the new monetary system favorable to the dollar. The change, although apparently harmless, implied a reduction of approximately 33 per cent in the already scant liquid capital in the island.[78]

The two measures described above begin to make more sense when a third one is considered: the freezing of credit, also decreed in 1899 with the pretext that Puerto Rico was undergoing a period of monetary instability.[79] It already has been pointed out how the usual mechanics of commercial production functioned before 1898. The hacendados, through credit, grew commercial crops with which they would repay the loans, but withheld a surplus, which, given the pre-capitalist nature of the economy, was used for their own consumption needs.[80] The restraint on credit decreed in 1899 represented for the hacendados the elimination of the basis of their commerical production. In order to obtain necessary capital to continue production, they found themselves forced to sell some of their lands. The owners of idle sugar cane land also found themselves in a similar situation. The inclusion of Puerto Rico within the protected market of the United States had awakened their interest in cultivating idle lands, but the credit facilities that would have enabled them to do so had been frozen. In order to invest in production they were forced to sell part of their land holdings, or to sell it all to someone with capital to put it into production and move to the city with the cash thus obtained and enjoy a leisured and "refined" life.

This leads to a reconsideration of the two previously discussed economic measures. The inclusion of Puerto Rico in the U.S. market created among many coffee producers a desire to shift part of their lands to sugar growing. This required more capital than the continuation of coffee cultivation. Since a restraint had been placed on credit, these hacendados had only two alternatives: either sell even more land to start sugar cane production or stick to coffee production and open themselves to all the vicissitudes to which that crop would be subject within the new customs and tariff scheme.[81] But then who would be able to purchase the land that the coffee growers and the owners of idle sugar cane land needed to sell when the already scarce liquid capital in the island had been reduced by approximately 33 per cent with the introduction of the new currency system? These measures, therefore, encouraged the transfer of agricultural land to North American interests, who not only had dollars to invest but who were also willing to do so.

The situation of insular landowners was made worse by a fourth measure: the establishment of fixed prices for land, prices much below the estimated value in a free market. The rationale for this measure was control of land speculation, but its results were that those in need of selling part of their land holdings were forced to sell more than would have been necessary had the price of land not been fixed by the new colonial authorities.

The tax laws (approved in 1901) also aggravated the situation of Puerto Rican landowners. Taxes were imposed on the value of property, not on the earnings derived from it. The landowners who on account of the freezing of credit had no capital for commercial cultivation found themselves forced to pay proportionally the same taxes as the absentee companies that were expanding their sugar production. Having no capital for cultivation, many landowners were not able to pay such taxes and their properties were seized by the government and put up for sale at auctions.[82] Between 1901 and 1903 more than 600 cases of embargo were authorized by the colonial authorities.

A fifth, but somewhat different sort of measure, needs consideration: the so-called 500-Acre Law approved by the U.S. Congress in May of 1900, which limited to 500 acres the amount of land corporations could own in the island. It has been mentioned before that French interests had begun to invest in the sugar industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Also, groups of businessmen on the island had begun to organize on a corporate basis and were doing the same. These interests, which had been favored by the Spanish government, feared the new situation and tried to abide by the law at all times. The 500-Acre Law had the effect of limiting the opportunities of competitors to North American capital who sought to acquire land available for purchase as a result of the measures discussed above. Moreover, it has been argued that many of the non-U.S. corporations did sell part of their properties when they exceeded 500 acres. The North American companies, on the other hand, disregarded the new law and, in fact, the law remained a dead letter for over three decades. It served only as a Damocle's sword against the non-U.S. sugar interests in the crucial years immediately after the North American occupation of Puerto Rico. By 1910 North American companies controlled the most valuable sugar cane lands on the island.

The process of progressive control over the means of production by North American companies was reinforced by a combination of dominion of the new market, on one side, and the inherent weakness (or nonexistence) or a local bourgeoisie, on the other. The gateways to capitalism that had appeared in the nineteenth century generated certain processes through which a fistful of men came to be situated in the productive process in a position similar to that attributed to an industrial bourgeoisie: owners of means of production, oriented towards profit maximization, who organized the production of commodities on wage terms (for example, the owners of the large centers of tobacco processing, several owners of sugar mills or incipient sugar plantations). These "bourgeois" elements, however, had not yet matured as a bourgeoisie when the U.S. invasion of the island took place. In 1898 the numbers of this type of producer, or entrepreneur, were very small and the process of their formation very recent. It is not to be expected, therefore, that these producers would have configurated a conglomerate of shared and distinct interests, a "weltanschaunng" of their own, and a distinct common struggle. Many still responded ideologically to their class of origin: merchants or hacendados, which were classes in conflict. More frequently, each visualized its interests as a purely individual matter.

These "bourgeois" producers were unable to present a common front against the North American capitalist companies and they were inferior to these companies both in understanding and dominion of the new market situation that resulted from the U.S. takeover. Because of this, the "bourgeois" elements abdicated , and the North American companies soon reached an agreement with them. They purchased their establishments, and incorporated them as inferior co-owners (by giving them shares in the company) and as administrators and managers in the companies, which absorbed their holdings.[83] The North American companies allowed and took advantage of the desire of these "bourgeois" elements to preserve their position of local power. The Puerto Rican industrial bourgeoisie, then, died in its infancy. At the time it was beginning to emerge its members fell into intermediary or managerial positions.

To summarize, the acquisition of agricultural lands by North American corporations, the process of absorption of industrial establishments and the destruction of the small and incipient Puerto Rican bourgeoisie during the years immediately following the U.S. invasion of 1898 transformed Puerto Rico into an open field for the development of North American imperialist capitalism.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Julian Steward, et al., *The People of Puerto Rico* (Urbana, 1956), especially chapters 3 and 4; *Disquisiciones sociólogicas* [collection of essays by Salvador Brau].Edited by Eugenio Fernández Méndez, (San Juan, 1956), Introduction; Eugenio Fernández Méndez, *Historia de la cultura en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1964), chapter 3; and Andrés Sánchez Tarniella, *La economia de Puerto Rico, etapas de su desarrollo* (Madrid, 1971), chapters 1 and 2.

2. Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review, 1967).

3. Sergio Bagú, *Economía de la sociedad colonial, ensayo de historia contemporanea de America Latina* (Buenos Aires, 1949).

4. Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, 1967), examines the kind of society that formed around this "Asiatic mode of production" and presents in detail the differences between it and capitalist society.

5. Bagú, *Economía*, pp. 130-143. Eugene Genovese in *Political Economy of Slavery* and in *The World the Slaveholders Made* (New York, 1969) shows quite convincingly how an eonomy based on slavery produces a kind of society different from capitalist society, with different social classes and a different culture and social life.

6. Witold Kula, *Theorie economique du systeme feodal* (Paris, 1970). In this work, translated from the Polish, Kula examines broadly the nature and intensity of commerce under feudalism, breaking down the myth of feudalism as representing a completely closed system. On the other hand, he examines how the structure of production did tend to limit commerce.

7. This is in the short run, for although the production of commodities does not necessarily imply capitalist relations of production, it does tend to generate them. The relationship between commodity and capitalism is, therefore, historico-dialectical; it is not a relation of logical identity. (For example, "The market is a category of commodity economy, *which in the course of its development* is transformed into capitalist economy and only under the latter gains complete sway and universal prevalence." Opening words of V.I. Lenin's, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (Moscow, 1967).

8. ". . . merchant's capital belongs to the ante-diluvian forms of capital, which long precedes the capitalist mode of production and are to be found in the most diverse economic formations of society." Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Ch. XXXVI.

9. "Comercio y economía colonial de Hispano-América," in F. Braudel and E. Pereira Salas, eds., *Temas de historia económica hispanoamericana* (Paris, 1965).

10. "By mode of production Marx did not refer merely to the state of technique—to what he termed the state of the productive forces—but to the way in which the means of production were owned and to the social relations among men which resulted from their connections with the process of production." Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London, 1946), p. 7. Therefore, *mode of production* is the basis of class relationships.

11. On these points see Karl Marx, "Alienated Labor," the first manuscript in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.*

12. This implies in turn a previous accumulation of capital (which Marx called "primitive") that gradually separates the direct producer from his means of production, thus making way for the control of these through accumulated surplus.

13. "... the division of labor manifests itself directly in the diversity of use-values which confront one another as particular commodities." Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* [1859] (London, 1971), p. 51.

14. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter XLVIII, Part 3.

15. Alejandro O'Reilly, "Memoria sobre la isla de Puerto Rico," in Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, ed., *Biblioteca histórica de Puerto Rico,*" [1854] (San Juan, 1945).

16. Among several documents that testify to this state of affairs in commerce is the classic *Historia geográfica, civil y natural de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico* by Fray Iñigo Abbad y Lassierra [1782] edited by José Julián Acosta y Calvo (San Juan, 1866), pp. 334-335. On the nature of illicit commerce see the work of Arturo Morales-Carrión, *Puerto Rico and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (San Juan, 1950).

17. See population figures by municipalities presented by O'Reilly, "Memoria"; Pedro Tomás de Córdoba, *Memorias geográficas, económicas y estadisticas de la Isla de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1831-1833), 6 Vols.; and *U.S. Census for the Island of Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C., 1899), p. 43.

18. "Means of extending cultivation are within the reach of all persons, even the lowest class." George D. Flinter, *An Account of the Present State of the Island of Puerto Rico* (London, 1834), p. 17.

19. In 1817 Spain and England agreed to end the slave traffic within three years. Eric Williams, "The Negro Slave Trade in Anglo-Spanish Relations," *Caribbean Historical Review*, No. 1, Dec. 1950.

20. Graph 1 has been composed from figures presented by H.S. Perloff, *Puerto Rico's Economic Future* (Chicago, 1950), p. 14; Acosta, *Historia; Report of Governor Davis on the Industrial and Economic Conditions of Porto Rico* (Washington, 1899), pp. 18-19; and Arthur D. Gayer, et al., *The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico* (New York, 1938), p. 21. (Perloff provides the figures for 1830, Acosta for 1862, Governor Davis for 1897, and Gayer, et. al., for 1910 and 1919).

21. Graph 2 has been composed from figures presented by Córdoba; *Memórias geográficas;* Acosta, *Historia; Report of Governor Davis;* and U.S. Governors' *Reports* (San Juan, 1910 and 1920). (Córdoba presents figures for 1827, Acosta for 1862, Davis for 1897, and the governors' *Reports* for 1909 and 1919.)

22. The economy of nineteenth century Puerto Rico corresponds perfectly to Dobb's description of feudalism: "a socio-economic system under economic status and authority were associated with land-tenure, and the direct producer was under obligation under law or customary right to devote certain quota of his labour or his produce to the benefit of his feudal superior." Maurice Dobb, *Papers on Capitalism*, p. 2.

23. Labor Gomez, *Organización y reglamentación del trabajo en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX* (San Juan, 1970).

24. Sidney W. Mintz in "The Role of Forced Labor in Nineteenth Century Puerto Rico," *Caribbean Historical Review*, No. 2, Dec. 1951, presents these regulations as a road to capitalism in terms of the labor force that they created from previously independent producers. He overlooks the state of serfdom that these regulatons generated. Maurice Dobb has examined how in European history, situations of shortage of labor have made difficult the development of a free labor market. He argues that the emergence of capitalism was preceded by an abundance of labor, a product of the exodus of population to the cities in the later Middle Ages. Dobb, *Studies*, Chapters 2 and 6.

25. See Córdoba, *Memorias Geográficas,* (for 1832); Acosta, *Historia* (for 1866); Fernando López Tuero, *La reforma agrîcola,* (San Juan, 1891); and Adolfo de Hostos, *Ciudad murada* (La Habana, 1948), p. 30.

26. Fernando López Tuero (in his *Estado moral de los factores de producción en Cuba y Puerto Rico* published in Madrid in 1896), describes the worker on a cash basis as follows: "when he has earned enought to satisfy his fancy, he quites the project and leaves." (Note that he uses the word fancy [*capricho*] and not necessities.) The Archivo General de Puerto Rico stocks an account book of the Hacienda Pietri *(Libro de cuentas de la Hacienda Pietri,* 1898) where most labor payment were in nonmonetary forms. Sidney Mintz also points to the scarce use of cash payments in the hacienda he analyses ("The Culture History of a Puerto Rican Sugar Cane Planation: 1876-1949," *Hispanic American Historical Review, 1953).*

27. Enrique Vijande, *La custión monetaria en Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1889). The lack of national monetary integration is evidenced also by the amount of different currencies in circulation, including money coined in haciendas. This lack of integration is also reflected in the disparity of tax collections by municipalities. See, Abelardo de la Haba y Trujillo, *El impuesto de consumos en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1897).

28. Córdoba, *Memorias geográficas,* Vol. 6, Ch. IV.

29. Table I has been prepared from data presented in Córdoba, *Memorias geográficas,* and in his *Memoria sobre todas las ramas de las administración de la Isla de Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1838).

30. Estimated from data presented in the 1899 Census.

31. Ibid.

32. Eric Wolf, in "San Jose: Subcultures of a Traditional Ciffee Municipality" (Steward, et al., *People)* presents various examples.

33. A good example of this type of ritual is co-parenthood. See Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-parenthood," *South Western Journal of Anthropology,* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1956).

34. On the liberalism of the Spanish American "criollo" (creole) see the illuminating work of Francisco López Cámara, *La génesis de la conciencia liberal en México* (México, 1954). The most important exponent of liberalism in Puerto Rico in the nineteenth century was Ramón E. Betances, author of "Los diez mandamientos del hombre libre", in Ada Suárez de Díaz, *El Doctor Ramón Emeterio Betances, su vida y su obra* (San Juan, 1968). Probably more representative of Puerto Rican liberalism in the nineteenth century was the thought of Román Baldorioty de Castro (one of the most important leaders of the Autonomist Party).

35. López Tuero, *Estado moral,* Ch. 2.

36. Adolfo Vendrell, *La caña de azúcar* (San Juan, 1892), p. 4. Vendrell uses terms such as usurers when referring to the merchants.

37. See, for example, Francisco Maymi Cruells, *¿Canje tenemos? Crisis segura* (San Juan, 1895).

38. See, Francisco Mariano Quiñnones, *Historia de los partidos Reformista y Conservador de Puerto Rico* (Mayagüez, 1889); Angel Acosta Quintero, *José Julián Acosta y su tiempo* (San Juan, 1965); and Pilar Barbosa Vda. de Rosario, *De Baldorioty a Barbosa* (San Juan, 1937), among others.

39. On the different conceptions of work, see, Salvador Brau, *Las clases journaleras de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1882); Francisco del Valle Atiles, *El campesino puertorriqueño*

(San Juan, 1887); Federico Asenjo Arteaga, *Páginas para los jornaleros* (San Juan, 1879); and López Tuero, *Estado moral,* Ch. 2. On the effects of this on generating conflicts see the last two works.

40. These are in fact the two main roads to capitalism presented by Marx in the third volume of *Capital,* in his discussion of the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Chapter 20).

41. Lidio Cruz Monclova, *Historia de Puerto Rico (Siglo XIX)* (San Juan, 1952), Vol. I, p. 696; and J.R. Abad, *Exposición agrícola e industrial de Tabaco* (Ponce, 1884), p. 92.

42. For example, Enrique Delgado, *Proyecto para la creación de una empresa de Factorías Centrales para la Isla de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1881). Among the nine persons said to be backing the project, eight are mentioned as "merchants and capitalists" and one is an engineer. Two of them are also said to be proprietors. No hacendado is mentioned.

43. For example, Central San Vicente, *Devolución de la central a su legítimo poseedor* (San Juan, 1889).

44. Central San Vicente is a good example. See, Santiago Mc Cormick, *Informe dado a la Excelentísima Diputación Provincial sobre el sistema de las Factorías Centrales para la elaboración del azúcar* (San Juan, 1880). More details are found in J. Ferreras Pagán, *Biografía de las riquezas de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1902), Vols. 1 and 2.

45. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, 1944); and Remy Bastien, "Plantation and Creole Culture," in OAS, *Plantation Systems in the New World* (Washington, D.C., 1959).

46. Luis M. Díaz Soler, *Historia de la esclavitud negra en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1965), Ch. VII.

47. Model of the graph suggested by Steward, et al., *People,* p. 46. Additional information was taken from D.J. Jimeno Angius, *Población y comercio de la islad de Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1885), and the works cited in notes 17 and 21 above.

48. The slaves were not involved in a "petty mode of production" as the *agregados* and small producers were. They carried out collective tasks required by the sugar industry.

49. See, for example, the description of a former Cuban slave in Miguel Barnet, *Biografía de un Cimarrón* (Havana, 1966). (An English version of this work is available).

50. Fernández Méndez, *Historia,* pp. 14-26.

51. See description of social life in Díaz Soler, *Historia.*

52. A process that has not been considered essential to discuss and an analysis of which would imply the examination of several aspects of international trade and of internal production irrelevant to the arguments of this article.

53. Perloff, *Puerto Rico's Economic,* p. 136.

54. Brookings Institution, *Puerto Rico and its Problems* (Washington, D.C., 1930), p. 643.

55. Bailey and Justine Diffie, *Puerto Rico: A Broken Pledge* (New York, 1931), Ch. V.

56. Sánchez Tarniella, *La economia,* p. 69; Fernández Méndez, *Historia,* Ch. IV; and Steward, et al, *People,* Ch. V.

57. Correspondence of the Spanish-American War as cited by Charles Beard, "Territorial Expansion Connected with Commerce," in T.P. Green ed., *American Imperialism in 1898,* edited by T.P. Green (Boston, 1955), p. 25.

58. J.H. Herrero, *La mitología del azúcar,* p. 8. It is important to point out that many of the arguments in this section of this article have been developed from the work of Professor Herrero of the University of Puerto Rico and from the many discussions we have had on this matter.

59. U.S. Tariff Commission, *Report No. 73* (Washington, D.C., 1934), p. 159. as quoted by Herrero, *La mitologia*, p. 9.

60. Pual Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalis Development* (London, 1962), p. 302. See also, Peter Gang and Reimut Reiche, *Modelos de la revolución colonial* (México, 1970), p. 20.

61. H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History*, 8th ed. (New York, 1959), pp. 554-555.

62. On U.S. imperialism see, Gareth Stedman Jones, "The History of U.S. Imperialism," in *Ideology in Social Science* edited by R. Blackburn,(London, 1972). In this article Stedman presents evidence that before the Spanish-American War the general consensus in the U.S. about the economic crises of the early years of the decade was that they were a consequence of "over production and lack of markets." (p. 225). See also, Chester Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States* (New York, 1916), pp. 23 and 28.

63. As quoted by Julius W. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish American War," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May 1934.

64. For example, A. G. Robinson, *The Porto Rico of Today* (New York, 1899), Ch. XI; W. Dinwiddie, *Puerto Rico: Its Conditions and Possibilities* (New York, 1899); and C. Morris, *Our Island Empire* (Philadelphia, 1899), p. 225.

65. Charles H. Allen, "Opportunities in Porto Rico" in Leonard Wood, et al., *Opportunities in the Colonies and Cuba* (New York, 1902).

66. Blanco Fernández, *España y Puerto Rico, 1826-1930* (San Juan, 1930), pp. 310-311. Robinson, *Porto Rico of Today*, is a witness to the fact that American capital was investing in tobacco processing just two weeks after the landing of the U.S. troops in the island.

67. Herrero, *La mitlologia*, adds that by 1910 North American companies controlled 62 per cent of total sugar cane land.

68. The North American interest in raw sugar for processing is confirmed by data presented in the U.S. Senate, 59th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. 250, *Production and Commercial Movement of Sugar, 1895-1905* (Washington, D. C., 1906). Figures for refined sugar imported by Puerto Rico from the United States are also found there (p. 95). The 1914 *Census of Manufactures* (U.S. Bureau of the Census), Washington, D.C., Vol. II, P. 428, mentions that the United States by this date was only buying raw sugar, and processing it not only for internal consumption but for export as well.

69. Robinson, *Porto Rico of Today*, p. 166. See also, William R. Corwine's *Report on Porto Rico*, which he prepared for the Merchants Association of New York in 1899.

70. Judd Polk, "Plight of Puerto Rico," *Political Science Quarterly*, Dec. 1942, p. 485.

71. An examination of data on exports from the island in the five years before the invasion by U.S. troops in 1898 is very illuminating. In 1895, for example, coffee exports were 62.9 per cent of the total value of exports, and the United States imported only 0.01 per cent of the total. At that time the U.S. was purchasing 35 per cent of the sugar exported by the island. (In other years before the invasion, sugar exports to the U.S. were even greater. In 1884, the U.S. purchased 88.3 per cent of all the sugar exported by Puerto Rico.) This data has been estimated on the basis of the figures presented in "Trade of Puerto Rico," by F.H. Hitchcock, chief, Section of Foreign Markets, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1898, which appears as Appendix 1 in Dinwiddie, *Puerto Rico*.

72. U.S. Department of Commerce, *The West Indies as an Export Field* (Washington, D.C., 1917), p. 226; Porto Rico Official Economic Commission, *Porto Rico's Case and the Tariff Bill* (Washington, D.C., 1913), p. 7; Corwine, *Report*, p. 5; Jones, *Porto Rico*, p. 102.

73. U.S. War Department, Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, *Monthly Summary of Commerce of the Island of Porto Rico: July 1899-April 1900* (Washington, D.C., 1900). Raymond Crist in "Sugar Cane and Coffee in Puerto Rico. Part I, The Role of Privilege

and Monopoly in the Expropriation of the Jibaro" (*The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Jan. 1948) presents another argument that is very convincing but that I have not been able to corroborate. He says that since in the U.S. there were sugar and tobacco interests (and, one can add, North American interests engaged in production in Puerto Rico since the turn of the century) these pressured Congress to protect a fixed minimum price for their products. That coffee had no such interests, Crist says, resulted in a tremendous instability in prices. This, according to him, made the planning of production extremely difficult and led many hacendados out of production.

74. Within the ecological possibilities, since the best suited land for sugar cane cultivation—the coastal plains—is not the best for coffee production, which thrives best at the foot of the hills.

75. This identification runs from Abad, *Exposición* (p. 93) to the study of Steward, et al. in 1956 (chapter on Tabara).

76. Dinwiddie, *Puerto Rico*: p. 222.

77. As in fact occurred. See, U.S. War Department, *First Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C., 1901). pp. 65-66.

78. More details can be found in R.P. Porter, *The Currency Question of Porto Rico*, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Washington, D.C., 1899); and, again, in the illuminating analysis of Herrero, *La mitologia*, pp. 1-7.

79. U.S. War Department, *Report of the Porto Rican Military Governor* (Washington, D.C., 1900) as quoted by Herrero, *La mitologia*, p. 11.

80. I emphasize this usually, but not exclusively, since jointly with the gateways to capitalism that were opened in the nineteenth century the investment in production machinery increased. Moreover, in the hacienda economy the surplus was frequently used to acquire more land—the basis of power and status then—specially land where many *agregados* lived. Given the feudal nature of the production regime and the labor scarcity, this was the most valuable land and the one that represented the most prestige and power. This does not weaken in any way the point I want to stress: that the surplus of production did not generate an accumulation of liquid capital among the hacendados.

81. The situation of the hacendados became even more critical when the island was devastated by the San Ciriaco hurricane in 1899. The coffee crop of that year was practically lost. The ideology of the "establishment" has presented this hurricane as being *the* cause of the ruin and decline of the coffee hacendados (see, for example, Tarniella, *La economía*, p. 69). Puerto Rico had survived many hurricanes before; it was primarily the situation at the time of this hurricane—restraints on credit, lost of markets, currency devaluation—which made it such a disastrous event. Nevertheless, even without the hurricane the economic measures brought about by the "change of sovereignty" were dreary enough for a radical transformation of economic power in the island. More illuminating accounts of the situation of the coffee sector of the economy than these "natural disaster interpretations" are the annual reports of the first North American governors. See, for example, the report of 1905, p. 7.

82. Jose G. del Valle presents this situation in articles written for the publics press in 1901 and reprinted in *A través de 10 años* (Barcelona, 1907), pp. 116, 198. He points out that during the year "notices of auctions of farms seized by embargo overwhelmed the press every day." On the whole process see, José de Jesús Tizol, *El malestar económico de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1922), pp. 86-88.

83. Luis Toro, for example, owner of one of the two main centers of tobacco processing, sold his property to the Porto Rico American Tobacco Co. and was named manager of the enterprise. See, Blanco Fernández, *España y Puerto Rico,* pp. 310-311. This, and many other cases, are presented in detail in Andrés Ramos Mattei's doctoral dissertation now in preparation.

84. In view of what I have presented in the first pages of this article the reader must be asking himself how and why the American companies established their production on a wage system basis, core of the capitalist mode of production. The analysis of this would take us from the backgrounds of the emergence of capitalism to the process of the emergence itself. I refer the interested reader to chapter 2 of my forthcoming book on the history of the Puerto Rican working class.

The Politics of Colonialism: Puerto Rico From 1898 to 1972

Diana Christopulos

The United States entered Puerto Rico as an invading army on July 25, 1898. Puerto Rican civilians gave little aid to Spanish forces on the island, and a modern historian has described the 19-day invasion as "something of a triumphant procession."[1] Although American officials expressed shock at the extensive poverty and illiteracy on the island, they believed Puerto Ricans would quickly and willingly benefit from the North American presence. General Nelson A. Miles, the U.S. military commander, stressed the political advantages of his arrival when he announced, "The primary effect of this occupation will be the immediate transition from your former system of government, desiring [sic] that you accept with joy the system of the Government of the United States." Puerto Rican political leaders assumed the commander was pledging, at the very least, a continuation of the autonomy gained under Spain. In fact, General Miles was initiating a new colonial era in Puerto Rico.

Miles was only the first of four generals who governed Puerto Rico between July 25, 1898 and May 1, 1900 (see Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., *The United States in Puerto Rico, 1898-1900,* The University of North Carolina Press, 1966). Under their direction the U.S. army built roads, distributed food during emergencies, vaccinated the population against smallpox and practically eliminated yellow fever. However, the military governors made it clear that insular improvements did not require the direction, aid or consent of insular political representatives. They abolished both the provincial assembly and the insular cabinet set up under the Autonomous Charter of 1897 as "not compatible with American methods and progress."[2] Freedom of the press was sharply curtailed to forestall criticism of the martial order. During its tenure, the military government established a pattern of disregard for the Hispanic origins of Puerto Rican culture and institutions. The island's name was arbitrarily changed to "Porto Rico" to suit North American pronunciation and usage. The Roman Catholic Church's ancient ties with the Spanish state were broken, which left hundreds of clerics without salaries and ended Catholic domination of insular education. A peaceful invasion by Protestant missionaries and American school-teachers began filling the void left by the separation of church and state. In a private letter, one of the U.S. commanders revealed the tactless paternalism that frequently characterized the military government: "I am getting in touch with the people and trying to educate them to the idea that they must help themselves, giving them kindergarten instruction in controlling themselves without allowing them too much liberty."[3]

Puerto Rico's political elites found American dominance particularly galling. Forming a tiny portion of the population, insular political leaders were aristocratic, relatively wealthy and accustomed to sharing power in the local government. By 1900 these politicians were lashing out at the United States, protesting Puerto Rico's lack of political autonomy, uncertain trade conditions and continued subordination to the American military.

Although the U.S. Congress had little concern for Puerto Rican complaints, it did seek to clarify the political status of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippine Islands, colonies seized by the United States during the Spanish-American War. Congressional debates over Puerto Rico reflected partisan and economic divisions. The Republicans, represented by Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio, argued that Puerto Rico was a "nonincorporated" territory, belonging to the United States but not really part of it. According to Foraker, the island's people could be taxed and subjected to a tariff while being denied representation and other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Foraker's description was a lengthy and euphemistic definition of a colony. Senators in the Democratic party, sickened by the U.S. military's bloody repression of a Philippine independence movement, introduced two resolutions opposing formal American colonies. The first stated that the United States had no constitutional power to acquire and govern territories permanently as colonies. The second stated that the United States would not govern any people without that people's consent. The resolutions had little effect. Many Democrats supported free trade between Puerto Rico and the United States, a position favored by certain American exporters. A Louisiana rice grower, for instance, happily noted that he could supply Puerto Rico with 10 million tons of rice if Congress would protect him from competition by bringing the island inside U.S. tariff walls.[4]

Republican expansionists wrote most of the Foraker Act of 1900, which Congress called "an act temporarily to provide revenues and civil government for Porto Rico." The law, also known as an organic act, defined the political and economic relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. It differed significantly from the Autonomous Charter granted by Spain in 1897 and used by Puerto Rican elites as a model for *minimal* self government under the United States. A comparison of the two documents shows why politically vocal Puerto Ricans preferred the Autonomous Charter (see *Documents on the Constitutional History of Puerto Rico*, Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2d. ed., June 1964). First, Puerto Ricans had little voice in shaping the Foraker Act. Unlike the Autonomous Charter, the organic act owed almost nothing to the initiative of insular political leaders. Congressional committees heard testimony from Puerto Ricans, but the final bill neither reflected the desires of island politicians nor required the approval of the insular population. Second, the Foraker Act placed almost all political power in the hands of appointed rather than elected officials. Under both the Autonomous Charter and the Foraker Act, the colonial power appointed the governor and the local population elected the lower house of the legislature. However, the composition and powers of the upper house changed drastically with the passage of the Foraker Act. All 11 members of the new Executive Council were appointed by the U.S. President, and the act only required that five be Puerto Ricans. The Autonomous Charter's Council of Administration, with eight of its 15 members elected, had acted as both a law-making body and as the insular executive power except in times of emergency. The Executive Council, although serving as both a legislative house and a cabinet, was clearly subordinate to the presidentially-appointed governor. Third, the United States allowed Puerto Rico only token representation in Washington. At the time of the American invasion, the Spanish had apportioned the island 16 representatives and three senators in the Cortes, the Spanish equivalent of the U.S. Congress. The Foraker Act provided nothing more than a figurehead "resident commissioner," elected in Puerto Rico and allowed to speak but not vote in the House of Representatives. Fourth, the Foraker Act significantly reduced Puerto Rican control over local affairs. Although the insular legislature retained the power to draw up its own budget and approve certain appointments, it could no longer set its own tariffs or participate in the negotiation of commercial treaties with foreign countries. The Spanish governor-general had been able to recommend that the Cortes overrule insular legislation, but the American governor could veto bills directly. Two-thirds of both legislative houses could overrule the governor's veto, but the U.S. Congress expressly reserved the right to annul any bill passed in the Puerto Rican legislature.

In addition to its political sections, the new organic act included special provision for American businessmen interested in Puerto Rico. Goods from outside the United States would be subject to the same tariffs in Puerto Rico as on the mainland, but American products could enter the island duty-free after 1904. Insular products could also be shipped duty-free to the United States. Further, the Foraker Act extended the Coastwise Shipping Act to Puerto Rico, requiring the use of American ships for all insular-mainland trade. Congressional reformers scored a minor victory by including a provision that no corporation could own more than 500 acres of land in Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, the 500-Acre Act provided no penalties, and almost everyone ignored it for nearly 40 years.

With the passage of the Foraker Act, most insular political leaders became disillusioned with the U.S. government. The military government and the Foraker Act arrogantly disregarded the fact that Puerto Rico had ever approached governing itself and ignored the claims of some Puerto Ricans that Spain could not cede an autonomous state. With racist asides about childlike peoples, the United States presumed to teach Puerto Ricans the fundamentals of democracy. However, the United States did not permit an insular plebescite on political status until 1951.

One year after the passage of the Foraker Act, the Supreme Court dealt another humiliating blow to island politicians. In *Downes v. Bidwell*, the court upheld Senator Foraker's contention that Puerto Rico was a "nonincorporated" territory. Its citizens could be taxed, but they could not claim Constitutional rights such as trial by jury. To avoid simply calling the island a colony, the court cited numerous and ambiguous historical precedents. Finley Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley" offered his own summary of the court's findings:

> First, that th' Disthrict iv Columbya is a state; second, that it is not; third, that New York is a state; fourth, that that it is a crown colony; fifth, that all tates ar-re states an all territories ar-re territories in th' eves iv other powers, but Gawd knows what they ar-re at home.

Puerto Rican political leaders had no doubts about the meaning of the court's decision. Insular politicians of all persuasions angrily rejected both *Downes v. Bidwell* and the Foraker Act as permanent definitions of the island's civil order. Luis Muñoz Rivera, for example, had expected the U.S. to improve on the Autonomous Charter of 1897. He complained that instead, "we had the military government first and afterwards . . . the Foraker Act, within which we see its autonomous and petty kings arising."[5] Embittered by the loss of autonomy, he took to his study and wrote a poem titled "Sisyphus" about the Greek king eternally condemned to push a huge rock up a mountain, only to have it roll back down just before reaching the top. In his opposition to the Foraker Act, Muñoz Rivera manifested the elitism as well as the bitterness of his generation. He argued for a voting age of 25 rather than 21 because, "the Latin race "(i.e., the masses)" is excitable and undeliberative, and at the age of 21 years a man . . . has not formed character."[6]

Unwilling to accept the colonialism of the Foraker Act, Puerto Rican leaders organized new political parties based on alternative solutions to the problem of colonial political status. The Republican Party campaigned for eventual statehood, while the Federalist Party proposed greater autonomy and eventual independence. Although the Federalists probably had a numerical majority among voters, the Republicans won the 1900 elections. Federalists boycotted the polling places, charging that American officials had gerrymandered insular election districts to assure a Republican victory.

Strongly pro-American, the Puerto Rican Republican Party openly identified itself with the United States party in power. Its strongest supporters were urban business interests that had long dealt with trading houses in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Within a few years, the party added the support of the powerful American sugar corporations that rapidy entered the island after 1898. American tariff protection allowed Puerto Rican sugar to compete for the mainland market against the less expensive Cuban product, and sugar dominated the insular economy by 1920. Although economic self-interest motivated most Republicans, the party included a small group of American-educated intellectuals whose commitment to statehood sprang from a genuine admiration for American political institutions. The party's leader, Dr. José Celso Barbosa, was one of these intellectuals. Celso Barbosa, a black man, expected both justice and economic progress from the party of Abraham Lincoln and William McKinley.

Unlike insular Republicans, Federalists were highly skeptical of the United States government. Groups that had supported autonomy during the latter half of the nineteenth century formed the backbone of the Federalist Party. Luis Muñoz Rivera, ex-president of the Autonomist Party, became the Federalist leader. His party gained additional and unexpected support from the island's coffee growers, who blamed their economic decline on United States trade policies. Their plight is discussed below.

In 1904, the Federalists merged with a small group of dissident Republicans and formed the Union Party. The Republican splinter group had concluded that the United States would never grant Puerto Rico statehood. As Unionists, they abandoned statehood and endorsed both independence and autonomy as acceptable alternatives. Unionists swept the 1904 elections and remained the majority party for 20 years. Despite its majority, the Union Party was seriously divided over the status issue. Muñoz Rivera emphasized independence until 1912, when he prompted and won a party fight to make autonomy the preferred status. Convinced that United States economic and military requirements would prevent a voluntary American departure, Muñoz Rivera shifted his efforts to obtaining greater self government under United States rule. A large, independence-minded minority (*independentistas*) led by José de Diego, remained in the party to challenge Muñoz Rivera. A smaller group existed with Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón and formed the Independence Party (*Partido Independentista*) in 1912. The new party died with its leader in 1913.

Although every Puerto Rican political party wanted major changes in the Foraker Act, the "temporary" law remained in effect for 17 years. In 1909 the insular legislature used one of its few powers, control of the budget, to force Congressional discussion of its complaints. The legislature refused to pass a new budget for 1910. Congress did discuss the matter, and it agreed with President Taft that Puerto Ricans were ungrateful to the United States government. It quickly amended the Foraker Act with the Olmsted Act, providing that the previous year's budget would remain in effect any time the insular legislature failed to pass a new one. In 1912, Congress reacted to continued pressure from Puerto Rican politicians and began hearings on a new organic act. The final bill, known as the Jones Act, did not pass until February 1917.

The Jones Act made several formal changes without decisively altering arrangements provided for in the Foraker Act. A 19-member elected senate replaced the Executive Council as the legislature's upper house. However, the council continued as a cabinet appointed by United States officials, and almost all power remained in the executive branch. In addition to the governor's veto and the Congress's annulment power, the Jones Act gave the American president an unconditional veto over insular legislation. Finally, the second organic act granted Puerto Ricans American citizenship and a special version of the Bill of Rights. Islanders ruefully noted that the honors of citizenship included eligibility for the military draft just three months before war was declared on Germany. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1922 (*Balzac v. the People of Puerto Rico*) that the Jones Act did not make Puerto Rico an "incorporated" part of the United States and did not extend the full protection of the Constitution to Puerto Ricans.

Although Puerto Rican political status remained unsettled and largely unchanged in the first 30 years of American hegemony, insular social and economic conditions changed rapidly. The government built new roads, cut the death rate by almost one third,and strung telephone and telegraph lines across the island. Heavy educational expenditures brought the percentage of school-age children in classrooms from an abysmal eight per cent in 1898 to about 50 per cent in 1930 and lowered the illiteracy rate from 82 per cent to just over 50 per cent.[7] Of course, these publicly-funded material improvements also facilitated penetration of the island by American capital. Better transportation and communication opened new areas for massive sugar plantations. Healthy workers who had been educated to be on time and perhaps speak a little English were much more useful than undisciplined laborers.

In taking over the island economy, the Americans accelerated several trends initiated during the last decades of Spanish rule. Like the Spanish, they increased the amount of land under cultiation. Similarly, they devoted a larger share of the land to cash crops, with a proportionate decrease in the area used for subsistence crops. In 1898 food crops accounted for 32 per cent of the cultivated acreage. By 1930 they representd only 14 per cent. As a result of these changes, Puerto Rico became increasingly dependent on the export of a few agricultural goods.

The Americans also initiated several new developments in the insular export economy. Tobacco and a variety of tropical fruits that were almost never exported during the Spanish period became important cash crops. Manufacturing remained a minor category, never accounting for more than a quarter of all exports, but both the textile and cigar industries grew rapidly after the American takeover.[8] Most importantly, sugar replaced coffee as Puerto Rico's leading export. Between 1898 and 1930, sugar acreage climbed from 15 percent to 44 per cent of all cultivated land. Coffee dropped from 41 per cent to 33 per cent in the same period. The value of exports rose quickly from $8.5 million in 1901 to $103.5 million in 1928, and sugar consistently accounted for about half the total.

A series of policy measures and natural events combined to destroy the insular coffee industry after 1898. The United States failed to duplicate Spain's protective tariff on coffee. Sugar, tobacco, and textiles received protection from foreign competition, but coffee did not. The high-quality Puerto Rican bean cost nearly twice as much as its Brazilian and Colombian rivals, and Congress would not consider doubling the price of coffee merely to insure that Americans would wake up to a better taste in the morning. In 1899, the hurricane San Ciriaco compounded the problem by destroying 80 per cent of the coffee crop. World War I blockades took a heavy toll of European continental markets. Coffee growers who survived the war had lost almost all their trees in 1929 to San Felipe, the most powerful hurricane ever recorded in Puerto Rico. Those who continued to grow coffee found few buyers during the Great Depression. Between 1900 and 1930, coffee production plummeted from over 20 million pounds to less than 5 million pounds. Not surprisingly, the coffee growing regions of the interior became strongholds of independence sentiment. By 1930, thousands of coffee workers had become migrants to the cane-fields and the urban slums.

American tariffs did more than close the mainland market to insular coffee producers. They also forced Puerto Ricans to pay the same prices as American consumers for "foreign" goods. If American beef producers persuaded Congress to pass a high tariff against Argentine beef, Puerto Ricans had to pay the same high meat prices as American consumers. Of course, Puerto Ricans ate more rice than beef. Since Louisiana rice growers had some influence in Congress, islanders had to pay two to three dollars more for 100 pounds of rice than the Japanese price on the international market. Under the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, the highest in American history, Puerto Ricans had to pay mainland prices for virtually all their products at a time when their per capita income was less than one-tenth of the American level.

Puerto Rican consumers suffered further from the Coastwise Shipping Act, which stipulated that the island must use the American merchant marine for all trade with the mainland. The law effectively limited 80 per cent of Puerto Rico's imports and over 90 per cent of its exports to four American steamship lines. Islanders actually subsidized the American shippers, who would not have been competitive in a free market, to bring them expensive food and consumer goods.

Although some Puerto Ricans benefited from the American presence, mainlanders controlled most of the new agricultural wealth. Four American companies, the South Porto Rico Sugar Company, the Fajardo Sugar Company of Porto Rico, Central Aguirre Associates and the United Porto Rico Sugar Company, controlled 50 per cent of the 1930 sugar crop. Similar conditions prevailed in tobacco and fruit growing. Mainlanders often did not own the land, but they exported 80 per cent of the tobacco and 60 per cent of the fruit crop.[9]

As the export figures suggest, some Puerto Rican planters prospered under United States domination. A few local managers of American corporations echoed their approval of the political and economic status quo. Along with most insular professionals, the planters and managers formed a Puerto Rican middle class that was dependent on American markets, commercial treaties, and good will for its continued existence and comfort.

Owners of small and medium-sized plantations became reliant on larger producers. In sugar, for instance, the smaller planters *(colonos)* no longer ground their own cane. In 1910, there had been 500 sugar mills, many of them very small. In 1930 only 46 large corporate mills *(centrales)* remained. *Colonos* complained that the centrales undervalued their cane and took a disproportionate share of the profits, but they had no alternative grinding facilities. Tobacco farmers had to deal with American buyers, who controlled both the credit market and the local price of tobacco.

Puerto Rico's class of landless workers, both urban and rural, grew in size and in economic vulnerability after the American arrival. Between 1898 and 1930, the island's population grew by almost 60 per cent. At the same time, adult male unemployment rose from 17 per cent to over 30 per cent. The cane worker of the 1930s exemplified the problems of landless labor. During most of the year *(el tiempo muerto),* he had little or no work. Puerto Rican wages had improved, but they still averaged less than one-half the average for other tropical countries producing the same goods.[10] The sugar worker could buy more rice with one hour's labor in 1930 than in 1897, but he bought rather than grew much more of his food by 1930. According to one study, he had to work 104 days to pay for his family's food in 1930, a task that had required only 70 days of work in 1897. At the end of the 1920s, the Puerto Rican sugar worker spent *94 per cent* of his income for food, a proportion matched only in Asia.[11]

Thirty years of United States domination of the insular economy even nullified important American medical contributions to the island. The cause and cure for hookworm, a debilitating and often fatal parasite, were discovered in Puerto Rico in 1901. A U.S. military doctor found that the parasites enter the body through cracks and scratches on the soles of the feet. Until adequate sewage lines could be provided for the island, the wearing of shoes offered the best protection against hookworm. However, neither the U.S. corporations nor the federal government had any interest in providing the people with shoes. In addition, the American tariff raised the price of shoes so that only one fourth of the 1930 population had ever worn a pair. Ninety per cent of the rural population continued to be infected to some degree with hookworm. Diseases such as hookworm, enteritis and malaria made the Puerto Rican death rate the western hemisphere's highest.

The high prices of shoes and staple foods, the predominance of sugar and large corporations and the growing numbers of landless workers could all be related to Puerto Rico's political and economic ties with the U.S. The tariff and the Coastwise Shipping Act were the most obvious bonds, and their benefits corresponded neatly with the requirements of mainland economic interests. Yet the Puerto Rican legislature could do nothing about high prices or the sugar economy. Only the U.S. Congress could change the tariff.

In addition to political and economic domination, the U.S. presented a new menace to Puerto Rico. The island's Hispanic language, religion, and social heritage were constantly challenged by the well-heeled North American culture. Intellectuals and professionals were most attuned to the new threat, and they feared that economic dependency would mean the end of Puerto Rican culture. Muñoz Rivera spoke for the intellectuals and the professionals when he predicted:

> In the future there will be abundance, physical well-being, a richness of fruits and metals; but there will be no country. And if there is, it will belong to Americans and

> their sons and grandsons. In half a century it will be a stain to wear a name of Spanish culture.[12]

Cultural battle lines were drawn over the insular education system and the impractical U.S. policy of teaching all classes in English. Elitist Puerto Ricans opposed both the education of the masses and the introduction of English in the schools. They argued that the United States was trying to destroy essential social distinctions and obliterate Hispanic culture while creating a better investment climate for American corporations.

American officials did little to dispell the image of cultural imperialism. They clearly considered education and Americanization synonymous cures for all of Puerto Rico's ills. Within a few years, the island was flooded with American teachers drilling students in the English language, assigning them work from American textbooks, and instructing them in the values of American business society. The educators undoubtedly believed schools were a panacea for the island's social problems, but the United States also expected to reap commercial benefits. As the U.S. commissioner of education on the island wrote to a friend,

> Technical and industrial education here will give us a corps of young Puerto Ricans, trained in both the English and Spanish language and in our industrial and commercial methods who will be valuable pioneers in extending our trade in South America . . . they ought to accomplish much in extending our commerce and in creating new markets for our manufacturers.[13]

While the Puerto Rican elites argued over education and status, the masses continued in their poverty. They remained relatively indifferent to politics because they saw no connection between their own problems and abstract discussions of their political relationship with the United States. Many of the poor who had expected better conditions when the U.S. army replaced the brutal Spanish Guardia Civil were acutely disappointed by the actual result. In many cases, working conditions probably deteriorated. Cane workers lost the local *hacendado,* who was occasionally benevolent, and gained the American sugar corporation, which was run for profit only. As the cane workers became disillusioned with the Americans, they took the initiative and tried to unionize the cane fields. Their strikes were quickly repressed. Using the muscle of the insular police, management simply locked the tenants (*agregados*) inside the plantation, locked the day laborers out, and continued to work the cane fields.

In the first four decades of U.S. rule, only one insular political party dealt seriously with the problems of the workers. The Socialist Party, which concentrated on material improvements for the laboring classes, was the only political organization that attracted genuine mass support. Republicans and Unionists often bought votes to provide a facade of popular legitimacy, but they scorned and feared the lower classes. Even a radical *independentista* such as José de Diego contended that the Puerto Rican laborer needed more education before exposure to the "subversive" ideas of labor unionism.[14]

The Socialist leader, Santiago Iglesias, introduced unionism in Puerto Rico. Born in Spain, he arrived in the island as an exiled trade unionist in 1896. Three years later he formed a political party (*Partido Obrero Socialista*) and required its members to join his labor union (*Federación Libre de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico*). Iglesias did not advocate revolutionary socialism, nor did he recognize the role of U.S. imperialism in perpetuating insular poverty. He favored eventual statehood and an American standard of living for the Puerto Rican worker. He became a good friend of Samuel Gompers, conservative leader of the American Federation of Labor. His party discussed the problems of labor—wages, prices, working conditions, hours—and ignored the status issue.

After reorganizing as the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*) in 1915, the party quickly gained support. It elected a senator and a representative in 1917 and garnered 60,000 votes in 1920. In 1924, Iglesias unwittingly began a process of political suicide when he led the Socialists into the *Coalición* with the Republicans. The party of the workers joined the party of the property-owners and exporters to pursue statehood and the spoils of political victory. Although Iglesias may have felt he acted in the laborers' best interests, he effectively moved his party into junior partnership with the Republicans. Socialist voting strength peaked in 1928, when the party won almost half of the seats in both houses of the legislature. By 1932, workers realized that the party was failing to keep its promises of more jobs and better working conditions. Socialist totals declined steadily, and no party had broad mass support again until 1940.

The Republican-Socialist *Coalición* typified the willingness of Puerto Rican politicians to ignore insular problems during the 1920s and concentrate on the profitable aspects of U.S. domination. By 1922, the deaths of Muñoz Rivera, De Diego, and Celso Barbosa had muted even the status issue. Antonio Barceló, who succeeded Muñoz Rivera as the Unionist leader, engineered the removal of independence as a status alternative in the party platform. Unionists joined dissident Republicans under José Tous Soto in a pro-statehood Alliance (*Alianza*) in 1924. Alianza leaders offered a solid political base for the corporate sugar economy. Barceló's brother-in-law managed the Fajardo Sugar Company, and Tous Soto doubled as Speaker of the House and attorney for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.[15] Superior organization, almost the only important difference between the *Alianza* and the *Coalición*, brought *Alianza* majorities until 1932.

Insular politicians often benefited financially from their relationship with the United States, but they also resented the arrogance of its domination. American officials proved to be paternalistic racists, proudly ignorant of the island's political history and naively sure of their own civilization. Uninterested in any Puerto Rican responses except gratitude and subservience, the U.S. government displayed a classical imperial attitude towards the island. It usually ignored Puerto Rican demands, but it insisted on controlling everything on the island. Representative forms of government existed, but they were emptied of political content. American officials used the democratic facade to indict Puerto Ricans for their own political and economic failures. Whatever their problems, islanders were supposed to be grateful for American rule, as presidents Taft and Coolidge pointed out when Puerto Ricans talked too loudly about substantive democracy.

American indifference towards the Puerto Ricans may well have been related to the American attitude towards formal colonies. The U.S. Constitution makes no provision for colonies—nor, in a sense, for Puerto Ricans. Informal expressions of colonialism such as economic and cultural penetration were perfectly acceptable and required no reference to the Constitution. However, the U.S. had developed no governmental patterns in the early twentieth century for possessions not destined for statehood. The result was to deny Puerto Ricans both the paternalism sometimes available from openly colonialist powers and the freedom to govern themselves.

Conditions did not improve in the 1930s. The 1929 Wall Street stock market crash resounded in economically-dependent Puerto Rico, and added to the island's burden of impoverishment. By 1933 only 35 per cent of the working population was gainfully employed.[16] The 1932 hurricane, San Cipriano, compounded the misery with 225 deaths, over 100,000 left homeless, more than $30 million in property damage, and devastation of small fruit farmers' orchards.

Finally reversing its laissez faire attitude towards Puerto Rico, the Roosevelt Administration tried to extend the New Deal to the island (see Thomas G. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal,* University of Florida Press, 1960). Two successive agencies, the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) and the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), made superficial attempts to deal with the island's massive problems. PRRA spent almost $60 million on resettlement programs. Over a million people were on PRRA relief in 1938, but tens of thousands remained unemployed and unaided.

Puerto Rican planners knew that the island's problems went deeper than the American stock market. They devised an extensive program, known as the Chardón Plan, to curtail insular dependence on sugar cane, absentee owners and imported foods. Despite initial approval from President Franklin Roosevelt, the Chardón Plan was not enacted. Bickering American administrators and obstructive economic interests reduced it to nothing more than a useful model for future island governments.

While the governments in San Juan and Washington debated, the island population began actively demonstrating its frustration. To protest high prices, residents of San Juan boycotted gasoline retailers and demonstrated against bread and flour dealers. University students and longshoremen staged strikes and counterstrikes against the U.S. governor's plan for greater Americanization of island schools. In the upland coffee regions, popular insurgents drove out agents of the Land Bank of Baltimore because the bank threatened to foreclose mortgages on bankrupt middle class coffee growers.[17]

The most dramatic examples of popular militancy occurred in the sugar industry, which controlled half of the cultivated land and over one-third of the agricultural work force. Cane workers at the South Porto Rico Sugar Company went on strike late in 1933. In early 1934, they were joined by employees of the Fajardo Sugar Company and Central Aguirre Associates, so that the entire eastern section of the industry came to a standstill. The continuing prosperity of the sugar corporations made them a natural target for hungry workers. Fajardo's parent corporation, the American Sugar Company, actually tripled its profits between 1931 and 1932, at a time when only seven corporations on the New York Stock Exchange could declare comfortable profits.[18] The sugar corporations, fearing the growing radicalization of the workers' demands, granted moderate wage increases.

Small sugar planters (*colonos*) also found reason to protest. To help American corporations in Cuba, the U.S. government had increased the massive Cuban sugar quota at the expense of the Puerto Rican quota. The unexpected cut left Puerto Rico with a 200,000 pound sugar surplus in 1933. The major *centrales* protected themselves by grinding only their own cane and refusing that of the colonos. In response, small growers formed the *Asociación de Colonos,* with Jesús T. Piñero as president. Piñero appealed to the Roosevelt Administration for relief, and *colonos* eventually received sole rights to a fixed proportion of the sugar quota.

Intellectuals voiced their dissatisfaction through renewed endorsement of cultural nationalism, which reached its twentieth century peak during the 1930s. Its most articulate expression, Antonio S. Pedreira's *Insularismo,* appeared in 1934. *Insularismo* was the major effort to define and defend Puerto Rican national identity, and the work influenced a whole generation of insular leaders. Pedreira concluded that the United States had increased economic output at the expense of intellectual, political and social excellence. He argued that only a vigorous reaffirmation of insular character and traditions could overcome the greed and mediocrity that typified the new order. Anti-American in nature, *Insularismo* was also perhaps more aristocratic than nationalistic:

> The customary values Pedreira wanted to preserve are those—dancing, horse riding, acting, witty conversation—of a leisure-class stamp and not obviously identifying a Puerto Rican "national character."[19]

A mild racism also flawed Pedreira's work, as when he attributed insular confusion over identity to the mixing of races. However, certain radical politicians of the 1970s have echoed his emphasis on the cultural effects of domination by the United States, placing it within a more democratic view of social development.

Among political parties, the nationalist renewal was signaled by polarization over the status issue. By 1928, both the Union-Republican Alianza and the Republican-Socialist *Coalición* had endorsed statehood as the preferable alternative. Sensing the underlyng discontent of urban and rural workers, the *Alianza* reorganized in 1932 as the Puerto Rican Liberal Party. Its aging and wily leader, Antonio Barceló, dramatically inserted a call for independence in the party platform.

Barceló's supporters included a vigorous new generation of intellectuals, one of whom was Luis Muñoz Marín. Muñoz Marín was the son of autonomist leader Luis Muñoz Rivera, and he represented a new type of insular politician. Born in Puerto Rico in 1898, familiar with island politics and politicians, he also was fluent in English and had spent half of his youth on the mainland. While in the United States, he cultivated political friendships and published poetry and political essays in two languages. His work appeared in the *American Mercury*, the *Nation* and other periodicals. In 1926 he became the editor of *La Democracia*, a Unionist newspaper founded by Muñoz Rivera. Muñoz Marín's early political writings expressed concern for the welfare of the people, blamed the United States for their plight and insisted on eventual independence. He lashed out at the United States, charging, "The American flag found Puerto Rico penniless and content. It now flies over a prosperous factory worked by slaves who have lost their land and may soon lose their guitars and their songs."[20] In Muñoz Marín's view, the root of insular problems could be easily expressed:

> One cannot observe Puerto Rican life close up without reaching the conclusion that every form of tutelage is morally degrading . . . This is the political illness of Puerto Rico and its only cure is a dose of unadulterated sovereignty.[21]

However, he modified his criticism of the United States after Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932. Muñoz Marín explained his goals as a Puerto Rican Liberal in a letter to a friend:

> We are for independence, but we don't bait the United States unless driven to it. We have a special tenderness for the Democratic party . . . because of its traditional liberal attitude towards Puerto Rico and the Philippines. We are opposed to begging money from the American taxpayers and instead claim the right to have our own tariff, to get rid of the coastwise shipping laws, and to be empowered to regulate absentee ownership.[22]

The Liberals were not the only party supporting independence in 1932. They had a vocal competitor in the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. Founded by José Coll Cuchi in 1922, the Nationalist Party finally acquired enough signatures for the island-wide ballot in 1932. By then it had a new leader, one of the most controversial figures in Puerto Rican history. Pedro Albizu Campos, like Muñoz Marín, had an American education. While earning a law degree at Harvard University, he developed friendships with Irish and Indian students who were radically committed to overthrowing the British Empire. His wife, a Radcliffe student, was a Peruvian leftist. After Harvard and World War I service in the American army, Albizu Campos had no ambiguous feelings about the United States as a colonial and racist power. He attacked the United States for Puerto Rico's spiritual enslavement and condemned its influence throughout Latin America. As the Nationalist leader, he exhibited great pride in Hispanic culture, unwillingness to compromise with existing powers and readiness to sacrifice himself for Puerto Rican independence. He greatly admired the Cuban martyr, José Martí, and he established contacts with radical Latin Americans of his own time. A two-year trip in the 1920s acquainted him with hopeful revolutionaries in Haiti, Cuba, Peru and the Dominican Republic and with successful revolutionaries in Mexico.

Although Albizu Campos cared about his people's material welfare, he made their cultural heritage and political independence his primary concerns. On an island where thousands suffered extreme poverty, he concentrated on political ideals. Manuel Maldonado-Denis has pointed out that Albizu Campos was most successful in raising the national consciousness of Puerto Ricans (see *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historical Interpretation*, Random House, 4th ed., 1972). However his active support was drawn primarily from intellectuals, students, and coffee planters. The masses, while perhaps sympathetic, did not join Albizu Campos' movement, because he failed to demonstrate the link between independence and economic improvement.

In 1932 the Nationalists formed a loose coalition with the Liberals. For the first time since 1924, voters had a clear choice on the status issue, Liberals and Nationalists representing independence and Republicans and Socialists promoting statehood. Although the Liberals received more votes than any single party, the Republican-Socialist *Coalición* won its first majority. Albizu Campos drew less than three per cent of the votes in his race for resident commissioner, and he ran far ahead of other Nationalist candidates.

After the 1932 elections the Nationalist party turned to extra-electoral tactics. Albizu Campos correctly noted that the elections were dishonest, but he grossly overestimated his own mass support. The insular police reacted by suppressing the Nationalists, and many of them retaliated violently against both insular and federal governments. As early as 1932, a Nationalist leader was killed—and avenged—in the coffee-growing region around Utuado.[23] In October 1935 Albizu Campos spoke out against student apathy at the University of Puerto Rico. His suggestion that the men were effiminate and the women drunkards provoked a student demonstration, and brought together an explosive mixture of anti-Nationalist students, Nationalists and insular police. The police killed three Nationalists, and an additional Nationalist and policeman were wounded. At the Nationalist funeral, Albizu Campos vowed that a mainland American would die for every Nationalist killed.

Four months later, in February 1936, two young Nationalists killed Insular Police Chief Francis Riggs, an American. The Nationalists were not allowed to make their trial a public forum. Puerto Rico had no death penalty, so police killed the youths as they "tried to escape." The death of Riggs shook the island's entire political system. The immediate results were Albizu Campos' political martydom and Senator Millard Tydings' introduction of a bill for Puerto Rican independence. Within two years, the events following from Riggs' murder would initiate a new era in insular political history.

The federal government used the pretext of Riggs' death to suppress the whole Nationalist party. As one Liberal congressman explained, "The regime wishes to guarantee vengeance for the death of the American."[24] The government blamed Albizu Campos, and he was soon indicted along with seven of his followers. The prosecution was a mockery of justice. The federal government decided that a Puerto Rican court could not be trusted to return a guilty verdict. For Albizu Campos to be tried in a federal court, he had to be indicted for the political crimes of sedition and conspiring to overthrow the government rather than for the criminal charges of incitement to violence and complicity in murder. For the most part, his "sedition" and "conspiracy" consisted of advocating independence in public places. A federal requirement that jurors speak English meant that few Puerto Ricans were empaneled, but the first trial resulted in a hung jury. Undeterred, the government selected a more pliable jury within two weeks and won a guilty verdict. Albizu Campos was sentenced to nine years in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.

The prosecution of Albizu Campos for advocating independence was especially absurd in light of the fact that a U.S. senator had introduced a bill for Puerto Rican independence shortly before the Nationalists came to trial. Ironically, Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland had been a close friend of Francis Riggs and had nominated him for the position of insular police chief. As chairman of the Senate Territorial and Insular Affairs

Committee, Tydings was more familiar than most Americans with Puerto Rico. During a 1933 visit he had written President Roosevelt, "It would certainly be better for us if we were out of this place, and conversely, much worse for Puerto Rico."[25] Like many observers, both mainlanders and Puerto Ricans, he believed that independence would mean economic disaster. The Tydings Bill, introduced in April 1936, was a vindictive move on the senator's part. He undoubtedly thought he was punishing the island for his friends' death or at least forcing Puerto Ricans to face th implications of independence. Tydings had the covert support of President Roosevelt and his cabinet. In a political miscalculation unmatched in Puerto Rican history, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes urged the bill's introduction "because of the quieting effect that [I] anticipated it might have on Puerto Rican public opinion."[26]

The Tydings Bill scrambled all existing political alignments in Puerto Rico. At one point in the hectic spring of 1936, Liberals, pro-independence Republicans and Nationalists formed a United Front in favor of the bill. Liberal leader Antonio Barceló vowed to support independence "even though we die from hunger." Albizu Campos argued that President Roosevelt's support of the Tydings Bill made further legal formalities unnecessary and proposed immediate independence. However, the front soon crumbled. Prison walls silenced Albizu Campos. Most insular Republicans, actively backed by American corporations, vocally rejected the bill. The most puzzling opposition came from Muñoz Marín, a major figure in the Liberal Party's independence faction.

In rejecting the Tydings Bill Muñoz Marín joined the distinct minority of insular politicians who treated political status as something more than an easily-changed slogan. He understood that independence was a real possibility and that the highly dependent insular economy would be dangerously strained by a sudden American withdrawal. Puerto Rican agronomist Pedro Chardón reported that independence under the Tydings provisions would "double and treble the island's prevailing starvation and could result in nothing short of chaos."[27] Muñoz Marín insisted that the United States owed Puerto Rico more than a fond farewell after dominating insular development for forty years. Instead of accepting the Tydings Bill, he urged the Liberal Party to lobby for better terms and a new independence bill.

With Muñoz Marín counseling against immediate independence and Barceló in favor, the Liberal Party became hopelessly divided. The party's support came from two major groups. The urban middle class faction of lawyers, writers, professors, teachers and shopkeepers favored independence. The professionals of this group felt a strong commitment to Hispanic culture and saw little danger in an independent economy. Urban shopkeepers thought independence would allow them to regain the customers they were rapidly losing to North American chain stores. The smaller sugar growers (*colonos*) formed the party's second major faction. They were benefiting from New Deal provisions which protected their American markets, and they opposed immediate independence. Neither Barceló nor Muñoz Marín could unite the party. Barceló alienated the *colonos* with his lack of concern for the economic consequences of independence. Muñoz Marín confused urbanites by opposing immediate independence. He tried to get party support for a more generous independence bill, but he lost an executive committee power struggle and was ousted from the party.

In the end, the controversy surrounding the Tydings Bill demonstrated the irony and impotence of Puerto Rico's political dependence on the United States. A senator's anger and a cabinet officer's ignorance thoroughly rearranged the insular political system. The bill itself died innocuously in committee, smothered by American corporations that had business in Puerto Rico. The Liberal Party was the major casualty. Because of the split in their ranks, the Liberals lost the 1936 elections. They registered 48 per cent of the popular vote, but lost the vast majority of individual election districts. The Republican-Socialist *Coalición* remained in power.

While the Liberals and the *Coalición* fought for voters, the remnants of the Nationalist Party continued demonstrating in the streets. The American governor, ex-admiral Blanton Winship, saw the Nationalist marches as a test of his own will, and he began denying permission for the parades. In early 1937 he relented and said he would allow a Nationalist march on Palm Sunday in Ponce, the island's second-largest city. Winship reversed himself and withdrew permission only 24 hours before the scheduled parade. His arbitrary action encouraged Nationalist defiance. On Sunday morning, 80 young Nationalist cadets and 12 girls walked into a police force of 150 well-armed men. When the shooting ended, 17 marchers and 2 policemen were dead, and over 100 people were wounded. Photographs and testimony of attending doctors confirmed that the event deserved its popular name, "The Ponce Massacre." The vast majority were shot from behind, and not one civilian could be shown to have had a gun. An American Civil Liberties Union investigation called this police riot a "gross violation of civil rights and incredible police brutality."[28] The United States government decided not to investigate the event.

Although the Ponce Massacre outraged Puerto Ricans, most of them continued to be more concerned about hunger, jobs and material welfare than about the political issue of independence. Luis Muñoz Marín used his understanding of popular desires to restructure his crumbling political base. In 1938 he organized the Popular Democratic Party (*Partido Popular Democratico*, PPD) with the pledge that "status is not an issue." Many insular intellectuals and professionals believed Muñoz Marín was only dropping that status issue temporarily. They felt sure he would seek independence after the Popular Party won an election, and many of them followed him into the new party.

Between 1938 and 1940 Muñoz and his *Populares* took their campaign to the countryside. They adopted the broad-brimmed hat (*la pava*) of the solitary mountain peasant (*jíbaro*) as their symbol on the ballot. Their slogan was "Bread, Land and Liberty" (*Pan, Tierra, y Libertad*). In their platform, they made no mention of independence and stressed enforcement of the 500-acre law. The *populares* made a host of specific promises, including agricultural cooperatives, minimum wage legislation and homes for sharecroppers. Traveling from town to town in an old car, Muñoz Marín talked to people about their problems and tried to break down the well-established tradition of vote-selling. He compared the vote to a weapon for the protection of one's family. Rather than selling it for a pair of shoes, the people should *lend* it to Muñoz Marín so that he could fight for their economic betterment. He urged them to pit virtue against money (*verguenza contra dinero*). If they felt short-changed after four years, the people could throw him out of office. For the first time since the early days of the Socialists, a Puerto Rican political party won popular support without paying for it. A cane worker described his reaction to the new party:

> Before, at political meetings the leaders would hold forth, and it was truly eloquent oratory, truly lovely. But what we heard we did not understand—orations about the mists, the seas, the fishes, and great things. Then, when Muñoz Marín came, he didn't come speaking that way. He came speaking of the rural workers, of the cane, and of things that were easier to understand. And the people could go along with him . . . And so they learned to trade the mists and the sea for the plantain trees and for the land they were going to get if they gave the Popular party their votes.[29]

In November of 1940, the Popular Party won its first victory. The Populares were not in a clear majority, but the votes of three splinter party members gave them control of the insular legislature. Muñoz Marín became president of the Puerto Rican Senate. The PPD consolidated its position in 1944 by winning undisputed control of the legislature.

The results of the 1940 elections reflected major changes in island politics. The most obvious was mass support for the Popular Democratic Party, with strength concentrated in rural areas. The Popular victory also demonstrated the disarray of all the other parties. The Republican-Socialist Coalición was torn by internal divisions and demoralized by the death of Santiago Iglesias in 1939. Liberal chief Antonio Barceló died in 1938. When his sucessor adopted a pro-statehood position, Liberal *independentistas* flocked to the Popular Party. They had no other choice, since Nationalist leader Albizu Campos remained in federal prison.

Finally, the 1940 elections marked a turning point in Puerto Rican history. The next 30 years would bring a moderate increase in political autonomy and dramatic changes in the local economy. The great sugar corporations would be replaced in importance by textile corporations, Hilton hotels, Union Carbide, Phillips Petroleum, Kennecott Copper and other mainland giants. In 1940 Puerto Rico was predominantly agricultural and had virtually no industry. By 1970 it was among the world's 20 most industrialized areas.

When the Popular Party took power in 1941, it had promised a specific list of social and economic reforms. However, such reforms required a sympathetic American governor, one who would aid rather than obstruct new programs. Luis Muñoz Marín appealed to President Roosevelt to appoint a governor who was more than a disciplinarian or an unemployed political retainer. Roosevelt responded by naming Guy Rexford Tugwell in the fall of 1941. Tugwell had moved easily between the Columbia University faculty and various government positions. A leading theorist of the New Deal, he had considerable experience with the problems of both farmers in general and Puerto Ricans in particular. Beween 1935 and 1937 he had directed the controversial Resettlement Administration, a bureau that distributed land and arranged low-interest loans for impoverished tenants in the United States. Many farm interests considered his activities socialistic. Tugwell had visited Puerto Rico twice before becoming governor. In 1940, he headed a group researching means for enforcement of the island's 500-Acre Act. As governor, Tugwell sought to forge a partnership between government and business, with government the senior partner. Although he distrusted bankers and corporate leaders, he never suggested an end to private enterprise. His goal was to create an efficient, powerful and reasonably honest bureaucracy to spread the benefits of capitalist society.

Like Tugwell, Muñoz Marín was interested in working with private enterprise rather than dismantling it. His party initiated expropriation of the great sugar estates, but the 500-Acre Act was never fully enforced, and large cane fields remained in private hands. Muñoz Marín's Popular Democratic Party strongly resembled Roosevelt's Democratic Party in its celebration of "pragmatism" and a "middle way" between fascism on the right and socialism on the left.

Although its final achievements were limited, the PPD originally pleased its rural supporters by quickly moving to enforce the 500-Acre Act and improve the lives of agricultural workers. The Land Act of 1941 served as the main reform vehicle. Its most innovative feature was the creation of proportional profit farms that were owned by the government, run as large-scale plantations, and worked by landless laborers *(agregados)*. At the end of each year, the *agregados* divided the farm's profits among themselves. The government mandated a Land Authority to buy land, establish farms, hire qualified managers, and supervise profit distribution. By 1950 the government had acquired nearly half the holdings in excess of 500 acres and was operating 48 proportional-profit farms. Another feature of the Land Act, provided for in Title V, was the establishment of new rural communities for *agregados*. The Land Authority bought acreage unfit for large-scale agriculture and gave *agregados* plots of three acres or less to use as they pleased. To prevent loss of the lands because of indebtedness, the Land Authority retained the titles. Over 13,000 tiny plots had been distributed by 1945. In addition to implementing the Land Act, the government regulated agricultural wages and broke the sugar corporations' control over AGREGADO labor. Many cane workers felt that the PPD had improved their lives (see Sidney W. Mintz, *Worker in the Cane: a Puerto Rican Life Story*, Yale University Press, 1960).

However, the shortcomings of the Popular Party's agricultural program became obvious within a decade. By 1950 the party had lost interest in total enforcement of the 500-Acre Act. The government continued to distribute land and placed 400,000 people in Title V communities by 1964, but it concentrated on extremely marginal acreage and ignored remaining larger holdings. Many of the tiny farms were isolated and infertile, and all of them were too small for subsistence farming. Several of the 48 proportional-profit farms were losing money because of poor management and worker discontent. Private sugar corporations no longer controlled the insular economy, but the government had failed to provide sufficient jobs and land for the rapidly growing rural population.[30]

Rather than diversify agriculture, the PPD decided to undertake the industrialization of Puerto Rico. Tugwell and Muñoz Marín agreed that agriculture had reached the saturation point, since all arable land was in use. They thought that industry alone could provide new employment opportunities and a solid base for economic development. Tugwell wanted to postpone creation of new industries until World War II supply shortages ended, but Muñoz Marín insisted on an early start. Excise receipts from insular rum helped Muñoz Marín win the argument. A wartime liquor shortage greatly whetted mainland thirst for the Caribbean beverage, and the excise revenues financed new island industries.

Between 1942 and 1947 the government emphasized public ownership of new industries. The Industrial Development Company, popularly known as *Fomento*, organized companies to produce rum bottles, cardboard boxes, structured tile, bricks, sewer pipes and other goods. It took over the Puerto Rican Cement Corporation from the PRRA. In an effort to promote tourism, Fomento built the island's first large hotel, the present Caribe Hilton. After five years, the government decided its program had been a failure. *Fomento* had opened 2,000 new jobs, but 200,000 were needed. Its investments generated $4 million annually, but the island needed another billion dollars.[31]

In 1947 the PPD government began opening Puerto Rico to mainland investors, offering them a cheap labor supply, well-controlled labor unions and liberal tax incentives. Muñoz Marín announced that the program would promote private investment without subjecting Puerto Rico to uncontrolled exploitation by American corporations, but the only serious controls were those on wage levels and worker organizations. Minimum wages were controlled by the government and maintained well below mainland levels. The closed shop was banned except in local commerce and selected interstate industries. The *Confederación General de Trabajadores* (CGT), which received PPD support for its militant organization of the sugar workers during the early 1940s, had become an arm of the Popular Party by 1950. It expelled *independentistas* and affiliated itself with the mainland CIO. During the 1950s competing AFL-CIO internationals eroded CGT organization in urban areas. AFL-CIO successes led to the complete removal of some wage disputes from the island, because absentee owners and mainland union representatives arranged the settlements. Only one-third of the island's workers were organized by 1969, and they went on strike only one-third as often as their mainland counterparts. At that time, Puerto Rican workers averaged an hourly wage of $1.82 compared with $3.10 for the same groups in the United States. Yet the island's high unemployment rate, which never sank below ten per cent even in official figures, prompted most Puerto Ricans to accept low wages.[32]

The Industrial Incentives Act of 1947 outlined the benefits available to private investors in Puerto Rico. The most important provision was a 10-year exemption from insular taxes for any corporation that built a plant in a new industry, expanded in an approved existing industry, or constructed a new hotel. Since the Jones Act already exempted Puerto Rico from federal income taxes, corporations could virtually escape taxation for 10 years. The government later extended the period to 17 years in some industries. U.S. investors, who estimated they could quadruple their mainland profit levels, poured into the island during the 1950s.[33] By suspending corporate taxation, the government deprived itself of income necessary to finance badly needed social reforms and an independent economic base. It excercised minimal control over the use of capital after a plant was constructed. Investors from the United States could freely remove their profits from the island instead of funneling them back into the Puerto Rican economy.

To provide further encouragement to investors, *Fomento* sold its own industries to private businessmen and became the major agency of a development program known as Operation Bootstrap. Bootstrap's extensive mainland advertising campaign alerted Americans to the advantages of doing business in Puerto Rico, vacationing in San Juan's Condado district and drinking Puerto Rican rum. In addition, Bootstrap administered the program of Aid to Industrial Development, which helped mainland investors by recruiting and training workers, building factories to rent and sell on liberal terms and providing free technical advice.

A recent publication for American investors abroad summarized

Puerto Rico's advantages for the foreign capitalist. It explained the incentives program, noted the ease with which profits may be repatriated, and concluded:

> "Relatively little can be said about government regulation, as the Puerto Rican economy is rapidly becoming a showpiece of free enterprise . . . the Puerto Rican economy is largely integrated into that of the U.S. . . .
>
> Consequently, the government's role is . . . largely indirect. The government does not subject management to any special requirements, and labor need not be given a voice on the board of directors or in the management of the corporation. Non-Puerto Rican investment or ownership is allowed in all areas. Puerto Rico does not enforce any special code covering investment in oil or mining, local-content requirements . . or controls on new investment or expansion of existing investment.[34]

As the government changed its economic policies, it also reorganized the bureacracy that administered them. *Fomento* gathered most of its complex and wide-ranging activities under a single office, the Economic Development Administration (EDA), in 1950. The EDA gained jurisdiction over numerous semi-independent boards and commissions that had appeared during Tugwell's administration. These included the Government Development Bank, which provided economic aid to investors, and the Land Authority, which supervised agrarian reforms. Overall responsibility for developmental planning lay with the newly-created Economic Division of the Planning Board.[35]

An experienced group of local administrators, Tugwell-Muñoz Marín appointees, headed the new insular bureaucracy. Born in Puerto Rico and educated in the United States, they remained major political figures for over 20 years. Teodoro Moscoso, first director of *Fomento*, eventually presided over President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Rafael Picó began as chairman of the Planning Board and went on to serve as Treasurer of Puerto Rico and president of the Government Development Bank. A former *independentista*, Sol Luis Descartes, had a 20-year career as director of the Land Authority's Planning Division, head of the Office of Statistics, Treasurer of Puerto Rico and director of the insular power authority. Jaime Benítez, another former *independentista*, was rector of the University of Puerto Rico for 25 years. Roberto Sánchez Vilella, an unobtrusive but efficient worker, was both a legislative aid and a high-ranking administrator for Muñoz Marín.[36]

By the time Muñoz Marín retired in 1964, the PPD could cite an impressive list of material improvements. The island's standard of living appeared to be luxurious compared with other parts of Latin America. However, Puerto Rico was part of the United States economy, and Puerto Ricans paid American prices for their goods. Insular incomes never approached those of the poorest states, and many statistics merely reflected the success of mainland corporations in the island.

Insular social reform programs offered improvements, but failed to meet the population's needs. The government built miles of new roads and 34,000 units of low-cost urban housing. Water and sewage systems were extended to every urban center on the island. After the PPD instituted free medical care, life expectancy reached 70 years and the death rate was lower than in the United States. For the first time, Puerto Ricans could apply for welfare benefits. However, 40 per cent of all dwellings were still inadequate in 1960. Urban renewal efforts stopped the growth of San Juan's slums without reducing their area or population. Urban slums and many rural areas lacked adequate water and sewage facilities. Jobless Puerto Ricans could expect *less than $12 a month* from the Welfare Department, a pathetic sum at American price levels.

The government continued to expand educational facilities, but the school system still exhibited serious shortcomings. Despite rapid population growth, insular schools accommodated 90 per cent of the children aged six to 12 years. Literacy improved from 69 per cent in 1940 to 83 per cent in 1960. High school classes grew more rapidly than any other group, and enrollment at the University of Puerto Rico nearly tripled between 1950 and 1964. University teaching standards were substantially revised and improved. Nevertheless, problems remained at every level of the school system. Dropout rates were high, and the average adult had only four and a half years of education. Those who stayed in school suffered from overcrowding, half-day sessions, and a continued overemphasis on the English language. At the University of Puerto Rico, Rector Jaime Benítez confined young scholars to a "*casa de estudios*"—roughly, "ivory tower"—form of education. Pro-independence student strikes in 1948 provoked repressive action by the administration. Benítez engineered the passage of regulations banning "partisan" political activities and speakers on the campus, giving the PPD a monopoly over student forums. As one scholar has noted, "to assume the emergence of 'political activities' that are not 'partisan' is rather like requesting a system of marriage without sex."[37]

Operation Bootstrap attracted hundreds of new industrial plants, but

American corporations enjoyed most of the financial benefits while Puerto Ricans had to cope with new problems created by industralization. One billion dollars in new investments entered Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1960, and dramatically shifted the island's economic emphasis from sugar to industry. In 1940 sugar accounted for almost 40 per cent of all income and almost 70 per cent of all exports. By 1964, industry earned four times as much as agriculture. Heavy industry, such as petrochemicals and copper, had begun replacing the light, consumer-goods industries of the 1950s. The move to heavy industry created two new problems. First, factories tended to become capital-intensive, using very expensive, sophisticated machinery and only a few, highly-sklled workers. Heavy industry thus threatened to produce higher unemployment rates. Second, the new petrochemical and mineral industries multiplied insular problems with air and water pollution.

Unemployment remained a chronic Puerto Rican dilemma. World War II and the end of the Depression helped drop official levels from 18 per cent in 1940 to 13 per cent in 1950, but the government was unable to make significant improvements under Operation Bootstrap. The actual numbers of unemployed and underemployed probably averaged over one-third of the working population. Although the number of jobs grew by 28 per cent between 1940 and 1964, the population increased more than 34 per cent. As agricultural jobs disappeared, workers left to fill new positions in the cities, refill the urban slums, or try their luck in the United States.

Figures on average income grossly distorted actual conditions, because income was very unevenly distributed. Per capita income rose from about $100 annually in 1940 to over $1,000 annually in 1964. However, the poorest 20 per cent of the people lived on only five per cent of Puerto Rico's personal income while the richest 20 per cent monopolized over half of that total. Eighty per cent of all families earned less than $3,000 dollars a year, placing them below the official United States poverty level. The average family income of $3,818 compared very poorly with the mainland average of $7,430. In 1962, 300,000 of the island's 2.6 million people were on relief, and 650,000 were receiving surplus food from the United States.[38]

As a result of *Fomento's* activities and World War II, mainland contacts with Puerto Rico multiplied geometrically. The hegemony of American sugar interests was broken, but its replacement was a much greater military, industrial and cultural mainland presence. During

World War II, the United States established military bases throughout the island. They covered over 10 per cent of the total land area by 1964. The Strategic Air Command's Ramey Air Force Base and extensive naval gunnery ranges on offshore islands made Puerto Rico a key element in United States Caribbean defenses. A recent publication of the Council on Foreign Relations has concluded:

> denial or curtailment of American national interest in the Caribbean would in practice be difficult to reconcile with the maintainance of an American world role and with any attempt to use American influence, even in a restrained manner, in support of a world order consistent with American institutions and aspirations.[39]

New American industries made Puerto Rico dependent on the United States in two ways, both of them long familiar to the island. First, the firms were usually subsidiaries of absentee corporations. Their directors extracted huge salaries and profit remittances, distorting Puerto Rican development. Second, the American corporations themselves were subject to national business cycles and federal tariffs and trade laws. Like any American state, Puerto Rico could be harmed by a recession or a change in external trade policies. In the early 1960's, for example, the United States renegotiated textile agreements with the European Common Market to the detriment of Puerto Rican mills and workers. The island eventually suffered from Spanish and Italian competition. Unlike the states, it had no voting representatives to oppose the changes.

Finally, their higher incomes and improved transportation-communication system exposed Puerto Ricans to a widening flood of American consumer goods and services. The cars, telephones, and televisions came from the United States, as did most of the television programs. Increasing numbers of Puerto Ricans sent their sons and daughters to American colleges and universities. As one insular scholar remarked, "If Puerto Rico is a bridge between two cultures it is a bridge with three lanes going in one direction and only one in the other."[40]

Through the efforts of the Popular Party, the material well-being of the masses joined political status as a major insular political issue. Muñoz Marín and his followers linked the two issues by arguing that special political ties with the United States were essential to insular economic development. By rejecting the statehood alternative, they maintained an image of cultural nationalism and avoided an embarrassing failure in the U.S. Congress. Their insistence on ties with the United States had a self-fulfilling character, since Operation Bootstrap made Puerto Rico increasingly dependent on the United States and multiplied American interests on the island. The PPD development strategy effectively closed off alternative solutions to the problems of low wages and high unemployment. Political subordination to the United States prevented the island from changing its external trade policies to allow the importation of cheaper goods or the protection of local industries. Economic reliance on mainland corporations made cheap labor an integral part of the industrial incentives program.

Puerto Rico's labor surplus spilled over into the mainland after World War II, when large numbers of Puerto Ricans began migrating to the continent. About 70 per cent of the migrants were between the ages of 15 and 39, peak years of economic productivity. Many of them left San Juan slums such as *"El Fanguito"* ("Little Mud Hole)" and *"La Perla"* ("The Pearl") to live in New York's *"El Barrio"* (East Harlem) or "Little Korea," a section of the South Bronx famous for its gang wars during the 1950s. Before 1940, migration to the United States averaged fewer than 2,000 persons annually. The number reached 46,000 in 1946, averaged 41,200 during the 1950s, and peaked at 69,000 in 1953. The Puerto Rican population on the mainland rose from 70,000 in 1940 to 900,00 in 1960. By 1970, there were more Puerto Ricans in New York City than in San Juan.

Several factors explain the migration. American corporations in Puerto Rico easily filled their needs for inexpensive, unskilled labor, but mainland factories, restaurants and farms faced a shortage of immigrants and rural Americans willing to accept low wages after World War II. The colonial relations between Puerto Rico and the United States greatly facilitated migration. Puerto Ricans needed no passports or special papers to work on the mainland. Furthermore, the Federal Aviation Administration allowed very low air fares between San Juan and the United States. The most important factor may have been the formal policies of the insular government. Unable to provide jobs for its population, the government shifted the responsibility for employment to the poor by urging them to leave the island. It treated American cities as a frontier, a population "safety valve." Through the migration division of its Department of Labor, the Puerto Rican government encouraged immigration and aided immigrants in the United States. The head of the migration division served as an unofficial ambassador in New York City.[41]

Whatever, the failures of the Popular Party, its political successes continued. The PPD consistently won over 60 per cent of the popular vote after 1944 and rarely lost an election district. The familiar bossism and pre-election voter intimidations of its predecessors soon replaced the party's early idealism. Its strong organization and reliable support among rural workers allowed it to survive challenges on both sides of the status issue, first from *independentistas,* then from the Statehood Republican Party *(Partido Estadista Republicano,* PER.)

Although Muñoz Marín had declared "status is not an issue," many of his liberal-*Independentista* followers doubted that he would abandon independence after supporting it for two decades. They were wrong. When they realized their mistake, many of them joined Concepción de Gracia in leaving the PPD and forming the Puerto Rican Independence Party *(Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño,* PIP). Founded in 1945, the PIP was the major opposition party until the 1956 elections. The Nationalist Party also revived after Pedro Albizu Campos returned from the Atlanta penitentiary in December 1947. When Rector Jaime Benítez refused to allow an Albizu Campos speech at the university in 1949, students responded with a nearly-unanimous strike. However, the rule against "political" speakers remained in effect.

Under pressure from independence supporters both inside and outside his party, Muñoz Marín lobbied in Washignton for greater political autonomy. Both Tugwell and President Harry S. Truman favored an elected governorship by the end of World War II. When Tugwell left in 1947, Truman made Jesús T. Piñero the island's first Puerto Rican governor. A year later, Muñoz Marín became the first beneficiary of the Elective Governor Act of 1947. Recognizing status as the major issue of the 1948 campaign, he revived a 1920s proposal for a Commonwealth or *Estado Libre Asociado* (Associated Free State). Puerto Rico would have its own constitution but continue in a special relationship with the United States. Muñoz Marín called his 1948 gubernatorial victory a mandate for commonwealth status, but it was really a vote of confidence in his leadership. Under his leadership, unemployment had dipped, the poor received a slightly larger share of the national income, and labor unions could count on government support against the sugar planters. Rural workers in particular, did not object if he wanted a commonwealth.

However, the commonwealth proposal roused fears of permanent subordination to the United States within the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. The insular government was harrassing Nationalists with Law 53, an anti-free speech bill passed in 1947. A Puerto Rican version of the anti-subversive Smith Act, the "Law of the Muzzle" made it a felony to:

> Promote, advocate, advise, or preach voluntarily and knowingly the *necessity, desireability*, or *suitability* of overthrowing, paralyzing, or subverting the insular government or any of its political divisions, by means of force or violence.[42]

During and after the 1948 student strikes, scores of Nationalists and PIP members were detained for vaguely defined "seditious" activities. Embittered Nationalists took violent action in 1950 when the U.S. Congress passed Pubic Law 600, authorizing a special referendum on the drawing of a commonwealth constitution by insular delegates. Puerto Ricans could vote only "yes" or "no" since neither statehood nor independence appeared on the ballot. The Nationalists responded with a series of attacks on insular and federal authorities. On October 28, 1950, a Nationalist-led mutiny at the Rio Piedras prison resulted in 100 escapes and the death of two guards. Two days later four Nationalists attacked the governor's mansion in San Juan, killed a policeman and lost their lives. During October Nationalist uprisings also occurred in Jayuya, Utuado, Arecibo, Ponce and Mayagüez. Clashes with the police and National Guardsmen produced 29 dead and 51 wounded.[43]

On November 1 two Nationalists attacked the Blair House in Washington, temporary home of President Truman. One Nationalist and one Secret Serviceman were killed. The other Nationalist received a death sentence, which Truman commuted to life imprisonment. The attempt on Truman's life also brought swift repression in Puerto Rico. On November 2 the insular government arrested the entire Nationalist leadership and many members of the PIP. Albizu Campos was given a 79-year sentence under Law 53, but Muñoz Marín pardoned him in 1953. The Nationalists struck again in March 1954. Three men and a woman entered the U.S. House of Representatives, opened fire, and wounded five congressmen. As a result, 13 Puerto Ricans were convicted of conspiracy, and Albizu Campos' pardon was revoked.

The United States had designed the United Nations as, in part, a tool for dismembering the formal British and French colonial systems. Prodded by Puerto Rican *independentistas*, the U.N. soon turned to the issue of *American* colonies. According to U.N. rules, the United States had to supply details of social, economic and educational conditions in all territories that were not self-governing. The United States considered Puerto Rico an internal affair and did not welcome international scrutiny except on guided tours. The paradoxical status issue provided a solution. The United States could keep Puerto Rico to itself by making it appear to be self-governing. Congress joined Muñoz Marín in supporting commonwealth status.

On June 4, 1951, almost 70 per cent of those voting endorsed the commonweath in the first status plebescite under United States rule. Less than a year later the people voted to accept the constitution drafted by PPD representatives and approved by the U.S. Congress. As a young man, Muñoz Marîn had scoffed at autonomy as "freedom with a long chain." On June 25, 1952, he inaugurated the Commonwealth Constitution by raising the Puerto Rican flag beside the American flag. This was the anniversary of the American invasion in 1898.

Compared to the earlier Autonomous Charter and the Jones Act, the Commonwealth Constitution does provide for broader individual liberties and a more completely Puerto Rican executive branch. However, the constitution avoids a clear definition of the political relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, merely noting that the insular government exercises its powers "within the terms of a compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America." Public Law 600, which authorized the plebescite and constitutional convention, introduced the idea of "compact" as follows:

> fully recognizing the principle of government by consent, this act is now adopted *in the nature of a compact* so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption. (emphasis added)

The legal idea of a compact stems from the times of the *Mayflower* in the United States and has tended to imply an equality of rights and obligations among those who agree to it. However, not even the Popular Party has consistently advanced one definition of the term as it applies to Puerto Rico and the United States. Before the passage of Public Law 600, Resident Commissioner Fernós Isern told a House committee that the bill "would not change the status of . . . Puerto Rico . . . It would not alter the powers of sovereignty acquired by the United States . . .under the the terms of the Treaty of Paris."[44] By 1952, Muñoz Marín was arguing that the compact worked a major change in Puerto Rican status, that the island was no longer an American colony, and that any future changes could only occur with the consent of the Puerto Rican people.

Unfortunately for Puerto Rico and the PPD, the United States government has rarely agreed with Popular Party rhetoric on the commonwealth. The Senate committee that reported Public Law 600 stated, "The measure would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic relationship to the United States."[45] Public Law 600 provided that the Commonwealth Constitution had to be approved by the U.S. Congress, a requirement that forced Puerto Rico to strike several particularly liberal welfare measures from its constitutional draft. Many sections of the Jones Act remained in force through the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, passed in 1950. Tax and tariff rules, borrowing restrictions on the insular government and other portions of the old act were copied verbatim.

Perhaps the clearest explanation of the compact is found in Resolution 22 of the Puerto Rican constitutional convention, which defined the commonwealth as:

> . . . a state which is free of superior authority in the management of its own local affairs but which is linked to the United States of America and hence is part of its political system *in a manner compatible with its federal structure.* (emphasis added)

The major shortcoming of the commonwealth lies in the fact that virtually no aspect of local life is free of the superior federal authority. Federal control of foreign policy does not necessarily interfere with local autonomy. However, the United States also decides who may enter Puerto Rico, where Puerto Ricans may go, and whether Puerto Ricans will fight in foreign wars. Banking, currency and the mails are under federal jurisdiction, as are all laws concerning bankruptcy, naturalization and citizenship. The United States controls the media by licensing radio and television stations and by censoring books and works of art through the customs system. Puerto Ricans still have no voice in their tariffs and trade arrangements, and they must still transport their goods in American ships. The United States retains unlimited power to expropriate Puerto Rican lands and property. The drastic limits on insular autonomy have led many Puerto Ricans to ridicule the "compact" as nothing more than a cosmetic device to hide American sovereignty on the island.

In foreign relations the United States has capitalized on the ambiguity of commonwealth status. The United States notified the United Nations in 1952 that Puerto Rico had become a "territory with self-government" and therefore did not require annual reports on its social, economic and educational conditions. In 1966, however, the United States officially proclaimed its control over the island for military reasons and refused to join 14 Latin American nations in signing a treaty to ban the testing, use, production and storage of nuclear weapons in Latin America. The United States objected to the Treaty of Tlaltelolco because it specifically included Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the nuclear-free zone.[46]

Although the PPD insisted that the Commonwealth Constitution settled the status question, neither the voters nor the other political parties agreed. Four months after the formal ratification of the commonwealth, in November 1952, the Puerto Rican Independence Party made the strongest showing in its history, and won almost 20 per cent of the popular vote. Police repression, public apathy towards independence and continued econommic growth under Muñoz Marín seem to have demoralized the PIP after 1952. Its popular support shrank to 22,000 votes, less than two per cent of the total, by 1964. As the PIP declined, the Statehood Republican Party (PER) steadily crept up on Muñoz Marín in the gubernatorial elections. The PER won over 13 per cent of the vote in 1952, about 25 per cent in 1956, and over 30 per cent in 1960. The PPD totals barely changed from 1952 to 1960, growing from 429,000 to 457,800. In the same period, the PER's vote rose from 88,100 to 252,300.

Statehood found support among the middle and lower classes of Puerto Rico's rapidly growing urban areas. Many urbanites felt that the rurally-based PPD was insensitive to housing shortages, welfare needs, public service inadequacies and utter misery in some of the slums. The newly-arrived middle class that bought General Electric appliances, drove Chevrolets and watched *Bonanza* embraced a rabid, 100 per cent Americanism. To the middle class, statehood would mean full citizenship and a final break with the traditions of rural poverty. As one PER legislator put it:

> . . . we're tired of having our leaders go up to Washington with tin cups, asking for handouts. If the United States won't give us statehood, why the hell did they give us U.S. citizenship in 1917? We want *complete* equality, not just some halfway measure.[47]

Even though it claimed that the commonwealth was an ideal solution, the PPD made a series of attempts at further improving Puerto Rican status. In 1957, an American congressman joined the insular resident commissioner in sponsoring the Fernós-Murray Bill, an abortive attempt to win greater autonomy in the fixing of tariffs. Five years later the insular assembly passed Joint Resolution No. 1, which asked that the United States resolve the status question by recognizing the island's local autonomy. Muñoz Marín and President John F. Kennedy exchanged several letters on the same topic. Finally, in 1963 Congress established the Joint Commission of the United States and Puerto Rico for the Study of Status (STACOM) to investigate the status question and make recommendations. Congress appointed seven Americans and six Puerto Ricans to the commission. After months of testimony and the withdrawal of the insular representative for independence, STACOM reached the anticlimactic conclusion that statehood, commonwealth and independence were all honorable and possible alternatives. STACOM also recommended a second plebescite on the status issue.

In July 1967 Puerto Ricans dutifully went to the polls. They could vote for independence, statehood or continued commonwealth status, but the results were not binding on the U.S. Congress. Both the PIP and the PER labelled the arrangement a phony plebescite. The PIP boycotted the election, but the PER could not keep its members in line. Most of them followed Luis A. Ferré into a second statehood party, the New Progressive Party (*Partido Nuevo Progresista*, PNP). With the motto "Statehood is Security," they won 38.9 per cent of the vote. Commonwealth remained a heavy favorite, winning 60.5 per cent. Less than one per cent of those voting chose independence. However, the status issue remained lively and unresolved.

In addition to the Progressives, several new political parties appeared in the 1960's. In 1960, the bishops of the Catholic church misinterpreted a PPD platform statement on criminal legislation that "only those acts which the general concensus of Puerto Ricans consider immoral . . . can be prohibited with punishment." They organized the Christian Action Party (Partido Acción Cristiana, PAC) to counteract what they called "the modern heresy that the popular will decides what is moral and immoral." The PAC also opposed government birth control clinics and supported religious instruction in public schools. Its two American-born bishops issued pastoral letters declaring a vote for a PPD a mortal sin, a position Cardinal Cushing and other high Catholic officials quickly attacked. The party won only 6.6 per cent of the gubernatorial vote in 1960 and 3.3 per cent in 1964.[48] On the left, the most prominent new group was the Pro-Independence Movement (*Movimiento Pro-Independencia*, MPI). Founded in 1961, the extra-electoral MPI led draft resistance and anti-election activities throughout the decade. Finally, the

People's Party (*Partido del Pueblo*) became the island's third statehood party in 1967.

By 1964 Muñoz Marín was 66 years old. He wanted the Popular Democratic Party to outlive him, and he decided to challenge the rules of Puerto Rican politics by retiring before dying. At an emotional nominating convention,he named longtime aide, Roberto Sánchez Vilella, to succeed him as candidate for governor. PPD politicians accepted Muñoz Marín's choice, mustered the usual 60 per cent majority, and prepared to go on as before. However, Sánchez Vilella soon alienated old *politicos* by appointing members of the New Progressive Party to executive positions. His influence plummeted because he did not have an independent base within the party, and he lacked charismatic appeal among the voters. By 1968 even Muñoz Marín had abandoned him. The party rejected Sánchez Vilella's bid for renomination and settled on an unattractive, little-known candidate. However, the governor convinced the one-year-old People's Party to jettison its statehood platform and make him its standard bearer. Sánchez Vilella's divorce and remarriage to a young secretary brought the voters out to hear him—and to see his new wife. He ran a poor third in the election, but he effectively split the PPD vote.

The beneficiary of the PPD infighting was Luis A. Ferré, candidate of the New Progressive Party, who won the 1968 election with 45 per cent of the popular vote. The Popular Party had suffered its first defeat after 28 years of political hegemony. Many Puerto Ricans assumed that the PPD's day had ended and that the island would be approaching statehood by 1980. Under Ferré, Puerto Rico appeared to continue developing at an impressive rate. The gross national product increased over ten per cent annually, and the government planned rapid expansion in tourism and heavy industry. As an heir to the Puerto Rican Republican Party, Governor Ferré hoped to forge special bonds with the Nixon Administration as Muñoz Marín had done with the Democrats. When opponents identified him with "Americanization", Ferré tried to downplay cultural issues and status by simply aligning himself with progress in Puerto Rico. Polls predicted an overwhelming victory for Ferré in November 1972. Instead, he suffered a defeat by the Popular Party. Ferré garnered 561,000 votes to his opponent's 603,000. The PDP also won both houses of the legislature, capturing 72 of the island's 78 election districts. The PIP earned four per cent of the vote, a slight improvement over its 1968 totals.

Puzzled journalists and politicians interpreted the election as a new mandate for the commonwealth and a rejection of independence, but the issue was far more complicated. The PPD victory resulted from two major elements. First, the electorate responded to economic hardships and international tensions by moving to the left. Second, the PPD found that it, too, could move rhetorically left and reconstitute its majority around a young, charismatic leader.

Figures on economic growth hid serious problems in Puerto Rico's economy. Heavy investments by copper and petrochemical firms raised the gross national product but provided few jobs and masked declines in other parts of the economy. A mainland recession eliminated job opportunities for young Puerto Ricans and contributed to a general decline of tourism in the Caribbean. The Ferré government, which favored private enterprise, was forced to buy luxury hotels to prevent them from closing. Low tariff walls and improving wages rendered the island's large textile industry incapable of competing with Italian and Spanish imports. About 62,000 textile workers lost their jobs in 1970 alone. To attract new mainland firms, Fomento advertised an official unemployment-underemployment rate of 34.4 per cent.[49]

The local effects of United States hot and cold wars encouraged negative feelings towards statehood among the populace. Puerto Ricans watched their sons being drafted to fight in Vietnam while well-educated Cuban refugees moved in to compete for the few highly-paid jobs with American corporations. When residents of the off-shore island of Culebra insisted that the U.S. Navy stop using their beach as a gunnery range, Ferré sided with the Navy. The Navy made the political mistake of supporting Ferré's reelection, a move which alienated many Puerto Ricans.

Finally, certain elements in Ferré's style of government eroded his electoral base. The Federation of Pro-Independence Students (*Federación de Universitarios Pro-Independentista,* FUPI), a university affiliate of the MPI, had been actively protesting the Vietnam war for several years. In 1970 antiwar students insisted that ROTC programs be ended on campus. The Ferré government replied that "only a strident minority of radicals oppose the ROTC" and sent police to end the agitation. Police fired into a group of rock-throwing students and killed a girl who was watching from a nearby balcony. The girl's death prompted a university referendum which disproved the government's "strident minority" theory. About 80 per cent of the students voted, and over half favored the abolition of ROTC. Ferré did not confine his government's repressive activities to the university campus. When the PIP helped organize squatter takeovers of public lands, Ferré authorized island police to raze the communities. On 14 different occasions, police and bulldozers moved in at 5 a.m. to destroy squatter shacks. The expulsions drew fire from the Puerto Rican Bar Association, which criticized Ferré for failing to secure warrants. The Bar Association also pointed out that Ferré was ignoring middle class "squatters" including a high-ranking member of his government, who had built beachfront homes on public lands owned by the Navy.

Anti-Ferré groups found an alternative in the reinvigorated Popular Democratic Party. The PPD had always maintained control of the insular senate. Its president, Rafael Hernández Colón, managed to reunite both the voters and the PPD politicians. At first, 36-year-old Hernández Colón seemed to offer nothing more than a handsome face and a strong commitment to commonwealth status. However, he quickly capitalized on Ferré's weaknesses. He stressed economics and sounded a note of cultural renewal, if not cultural nationalism. On election day, the PPD offered a candidate for those opposed to statehood in general and Ferré in particular. Colón lost San Juan and Ponce, but carried Bayamón, a large suburb of the capital. The suburban middle classes offered a strong replacement for the PPD's shrinking rural base.

After 81 years of rule by the United States, Puerto Rico has become an economic, political and cultural colony of the mainland. The Popular Democratic Party ended the abuses of the sugar economy during the 1940s, but Operation Bootstrap increased insular economic dependence on the United States. American investments in Puerto Rico now total $14 billion. The island is the United States' largest per capita export partner and fourth largest customer overall. Lobbyists for the major corporations would undoubtedly oppose radical changes in Operation Bootstrap. With their huge investments, American interests have a decisive influence on insular economic policy. Private industry finds high unemployment rates attractive rather than reprehensible, so the government promotes migration instead of economic reorganization. Corporations can finance a limited middle class, but most of the population remains expendible. The insular government cannot fund effective aid programs for the unemployed and unemployable because it allows corporations to escape taxation. Federal aid is limited, because American congressmen have little interest in promoting unpopular welfare measures for a voteless population.

Any move towards greater political independence would threaten United States military and diplomatic interests in Puerto Rico. The island is a key position in the Caribbean defense system and a jumping off point for enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, which has largely been a Caribbean affair. Furthermore, the United States has a strong prestige commitment to Puerto Rico as a Third World showcase. Rejection of commonwealth status could easily be seen as an American failure.

In the past, Puerto Rico's economic weakness has been used as the major argument against both statehood and independence. Federal taxes, the PPD constantly warned, would make statehood expensive, while lack of free trade with the United States would make independence an economic disaster. Insular nationalists have frequently avoided economic discussions and have insisted that independence was necessary for reasons of dignity and cultural affirmation, regardless of the financial consequences. However, the continuing poverty of Puerto Rico's masses has made it clear that only an independent government would be free to end the island's lopsided development. Independence would be a very difficult proposition, but many of Puerto Rico's people already are living very difficult lives.

NOTES

1. Edward J. Berbusse, *The United States in Puerto Rico, 1898-1900* (University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Ibid., pp. 82, 88.
4. Ibid., p. 155.
5. Ibid., p.230.
6. Ibid., p. 119.
7. *Politics and Education in Puerto Rico: A Documentary Survey of the Language Issue,* edited by Erwin H. Epstein, (Scarecrow Press, 1970), p. 52.
8. Victor S. Clark, et al., *Porto Rico and Its Problems* (The Brookings Institution, 1930), p. 404.
9. Bailey W. and Justine W. Diffie, *Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge* (Vanguard Press, 1931).
10. Ibid.
11. Clark, *Puerto Rico*, pp. 31-31.
12. Adalberto López, *Puerto Rican Nationalism: A Survey* (mimeographed, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1971), p.23.
13. Berbusse, *United States*, p. 214.
14. Gordon K. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean* (Harper and Row, 1963), p. 61.
15. Henry Wells, *The Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of Changing Values and Institutions* (Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 101.

16. Thomas G. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 130.

17. Juan Antonio Corretjer, *Albizu Campos y las huelgas en los años '30* (Liga Socialista Puertorriqueña, 1969).

18. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics*, pp. 131-132.

19. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom*, p. 239.

20. Luis Muñoz Marín, "The Sad Case of Puerto Rico," *American Mercury*, Vol. 16, No. 52 (February 1929), p. 136.

21. Quoted in Manuel Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historical Interpretation* (Random House, 4th ed., 1972), p. 83.

22. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics*, p.30.

23. Corretjer, *Albizu Campos*, passim.

24. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics*, p. 251.

25. Ibid., p. 107.

26. *The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes. Volume 1. The First Thousand Days* (Simon and Schuster, 1953), pp. 547-48.

27. Mathews, *op. cit.*, *Puerto Rican Politics*, p. 258.

28. Ibid., p. 313.

29. Sidney W. Mintz, *Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History* (Yale Univeristy Press, 1960), p. 187.

30. Wells, *Modernization*, pp. 137, 148.

31. Ibid., p. 149.

32. Karl Wagenheim, *Puerto Rico: A Profile* (Praeger, 1970) pp. 128-131; "Puerto Rico: A National Profile," *International Business Series Publications*, Ernst and Ernst, 1971, p. 13

33. Charles T. Goodsell, *Administration of a Revolution: Executive Reform in Puerto Rico Under Governor Tugwell, 1941-1946* (New American Library, 1964), p. 179.

34. Wagenheim, "Puerto Rico: A National Profile," pp. 15-27.

35. William H. Stead, *Fomento: The Economic Development of Puerto Rico* (National Planning Association, 1958), p. 11.

36. Goodsell, *Administration*, passim.

37. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom*, p. 395.

38. Oscar Lewis, *La Vida* (Random House, 1965) ,p. xi.

39. Robert D. Crassweller, *The Caribbean Community: Changing Societies and U.S. Policy* (Praeger, 1972), p. 59.

40. Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico*, p. 214.

41. For a brief survey of the Puerto Rican migration to the U.S. mainland see, Adalberto López, "The Literature of the Puerto Rican Diaspora," *Caribbean Review*, Vol. V, No. 2 (Spring, 1973), pp. 5-11.

42. Quoted in Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico*, p. 197 (emphasis added).

43. Byron Williams, *Puerto Rico: Commonwealth, State or Nation?* (Parents Magazine Press, 1972), pp. 170-71.

44. Wells, *Modernization*, pp. 230-231.

45. Ibid., P. 391.

46. *New York Times*, February 13, 1967.

47. Salvatore Adonio, "What Happened in Puerto Rico?", *Hispanic American Report;* Wells, *Modernization*, pp. 272-273.

49. Stan Steiner, "The Poor in Puerto Rico," *New Republic*, 165 (December 11, 1971), pp. 8-9.

Dependence and Development in Puerto Rico

Morris Morley

Initial assertions of an identity of interest between the United States and Latin America developed in the 1820s with the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and the more mystical doctrine of manifest destiny—both of which operated to justify United States interventionary activity in terms of its advantages to the intervened country. The United States used the Monroe Doctrine, with its non (European) colonization principle and its notion of a uniquely American system, to lay the foundations for its eventual hegemony in Latin America. It unilaterally intervened in various countries throughout most of the nineteenth century in order to establish or maintain acceptable political elites, policies and institutions, to develop and expand favorable trade and business relationships, and occasionally to annex territory. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the problems associated with a new industrialization functioned to encourage a concerted United States policy of economic expansion on a global scale. In respect of this policy, Latin America—especially Central America and the Caribbean area—was of primary importance.

The changeover from a basically agrarian, commercial, nonindustrial society to a world industrial power was manifested in the development of the large corporation, which in turn became a crucial factor in the evolution of United States expansionist ambitions in the 1890's. Possessing an "overwhelming economic power which made it possible to bypass traditional imperialism,"[1] the large corporation also possessed a particular view of the world that it effectively propagated among the highest echelons of government. This view argued that economic expansion overseas was a way of solving the pressing domestic economic problems of the time and of simultaneously defusing the possibilities of internal social revolution. The need for external markets to absorb the industrial surplus, for raw materials and for miltiary bases to support the development of a global economic empire was to characterize United States industrial-capitalist expansion.

The decision to intervene militarily in Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898 initiated this new foreign policy designed to protect and expand existing United States economic interests in Latin America. What John Quincy Adams in 1823 had called "natural appendages to the North American continent,"[2] became, in 1898, formal colonies under U.S. military rule.

Roots of Economic Dependence 1898-1940

United States economic penetration of Puerto Rico necessitated a political environment conducive to the flow of capital into the island and to the subsequent activities of U.S. investor interests. Consequently, U.S. policy during the early period was primarily directed toward creation of a political and administrative infrastructure that facilitated such penetration.

The military and strategic aspects of this policy, rooted in the Monroe Doctrine and manifest destiny, were based on the notion of the Caribbean area as a closed U.S. domain. Strategic and commercial imperatives were closely linked throughout the nineteenth century, and the United States continued to underwrite Spanish rule in the Caribbean as long as the area remained politically stable and economically accessible to U.S. commercial interests. By the 1890s, Spanish control was being seriously threatened by indigenous nationalist movements that U.S. policy makers perceived as detrimental to stability and order, and to existing and future U.S. economic interests. The result was a series of U.S. military interventions, and the replacement of Spain by the United States as the hegemonic power in the Caribbean. U.S. military control of Puerto Rico, observed an historian of the period, brought with it "the establishment of order and, most important, the willingness of capital to enter the country. . . ."[3]

Any ideas that Puerto Ricans may have harbored about the institution of a democratic political process were promptly rejected by U.S. policy makers. The notion of mass political participation would result, if at all, from a sustained period of elite rule and tutelary government.

"The people generally," declared General George W. Davis, U.S. military governor from 1898 to 1900, "have no conception of political rights combined with political responsibilities. Privileges they all desire, but they seem to have very little conception of political responsibility and the obligation of all to bow to the will of the majority."[4]

The withdrawal of U.S. military forces in 1900 was accompanied by the imposition of the First Organic (Foraker) Act which outlined the structure of the new civilian government. The island governor would be a U.S. presidential appointee, and the U.S. Congress retained the power of veto over any laws passed by the island's Legislative assembly. The Puerto Rican government also was denied any role in the negotiation of U.S. trade treaties that might adversely affect the Puerto Rican economy. This dependency underwent little change as a result of the Second Organic (Jones) Act of 1917. United States citizenship was extended to the island population, but the power of the appointed U.S. governor and the U.S. Congress (in which Puerto Rico had no vote) remained unchanged. Both Acts encouraged the formation of an 'Americanized' political structure based on strong executive control and the separation of power principle. The goal of U.S. policy makers was to develop politically elite clients who were responsive, not to the indigenous population, but to U.S. economic elites penetrating the country.

Independence for Puerto Rico never was seriously considered by the U.S. government during the pre-1940 period. Congressional rejection of the Tydings Bill (1936) supporting independence for the island was one of the more visible examples of this attitude. Puerto Rico continued to be "an unincorporated territory of the United States,"[5] and the potential for extensive local political and social organization was severely limited by the actions of the U.S. government.

The educational system was a major target of those "Americans in the insular bureaucracy who had been sent to Puerto Rico for the specific purpose of implementing a federal policy of Americanization."[6] Religious education was banned, public education for girls and coeducational classrooms were instituted, and the study of 'the American way of life' and U.S. history was given a prominent place in the educational syllabus. But more important, the study of English was made compulsory, and between 1904 and 1915 was substituted for Spanish as the language of instruction in public schools. These factors contributed to the emergence of an educational system that, in part, identified the belief system of the Puerto Ricans with the values and goals of the U.S. capitalist-entrepreneur. They encouraged psychological dependence on the United States through indigenous groups who came to support cultural and political assimilation with the U.S.

Cultural imperialism was viewed by U.S. policy makers as an important determinant in the development of an internal class structure that would support external economic penetration and dependency. Between 1898 and 1930, the movement of United States capital into the Puerto Rican economy destroyed the traditional pattern of individual land ownership and consolidated the dominance of the large external corporation. Of 107 foreign corporations operating in Puerto Rico in 1922, 103 were U.S.-owned.[7] Prior to 1898, coffee and sugar accounted for 41 per cent and 15 per cent respectively of the total cultivated land. By 1930,as a result of large-scale American investment ($10 million alone between 1900 and 1910), sugar had assumed a dominant position in the economy. It accounted for 44 per cent of all the land under cultivation. Four U.S. corporations produced 50 per cent of the total sugar crop in 1930 and together controlled almost 40 per cent of the agricultural wealth of the island.[8] In 1936, Puerto Rico was a sugar monoculture economy in which 2 per cent of sugar farms owned or controlled 65 per cent of all land growing sugar cane.[9]

U.S. penetration and control of the sugar industry gave impetus to the entry of U.S. capital into other areas of the Puerto Rican economy. U.S. corporations played a prominent role in the tobacco and fruit industries, were the major source of investments in public utilities (telephone, gas, light and power) and, together with Canadian interests, owned over half of all Puerto Rican bank resources in 1929. Increased U.S. demand for Puerto Rican needlework products encouraged U.S. entrepreneurs to import the necessary raw materials and establish a low quality, low cost operation carried on mainly in private homes. By the late 1920s, this industry was employing approximately 50,000 women and children under the most exploitative 'sweatshop' conditions. The great majority of these workers received wages of from 15 to 25 cents a day.[10] In the process, a long tradition of high quality needlework was practically destroyed.

A major effect of U.S. investor policies was a change in the pattern of land tenure. Whereas the coffee industry was labor-intensive, small scale, easy to market and required a minimal capital outlay, the cultivation of sugar normally required large tracts of land and substantial capital investment. The transformation of the Puerto Rican economy wrought by U.S. investors resulted in the virtual proletarianization of the agricultural labor force. Landless, they sought employment in a sugar industry where the vast majority of workers held jobs only during the months of the sugar harvest and earned wages as low as 62 cents a day.[11]

U.S. corporate interests, supported by the political power of the appointed governor, established and maintained links with indigenous political elites to protect their economic activities in Puerto Rico. Political parties, dependent on financial contributions from the sugar industry and allied interests, refused to enforce the 500 acre provision of the First Organic Act. Furthermore, the repatriation of corporate profits to the U.S. and the resultant decapitalization of the economy were not subject to any local control.

The policies of the U.S. government also facilitated the entry of the American investor into the Puerto Rican economy and the economic dependence of Puerto Rico on the United States. The increasing transfer of U.S. government funds, in particular, complimented the actions of the capitalist—entrepreneur and helped finance economic penetration.

The application of the U.S. tariff laws to Puerto Rico after 1898 meant that in return for the duty free entry of local products into the U.S. market, all Puerto Rican purchases from other countries would be subject to the exceedingly high U.S. tariff duties. Thus, the development of substantial trading relationships outside of the U.S. market was difficult, if not impossible. In 1930-1931, the United States accounted for over 95 per cent of Puerto Rico's exports and approximately 90 per cent of the country's imports.[12] Puerto Rico's inclusion in the Coastwise Shipping Act of the United States also gave U.S. shipping companies a monopoly over the island's commercial trade. These companies were able to raise arbitrarily freight charges when they deemed it necessary, without regard for any negative effects these actions might have on the Puerto Rican economy.

The complimentary relationship between the U.S. government and U.S. economic interests was most fully evident in respect of sugar. The principal reason for the expansion of the sugar industry was the U.S. government's decision to extend it complete tariff protection against all non-Cuban sugar and 80 per cent of Cuban sugar.[13] However, in 1934, the new Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act reduced Puerto Rico's tariff advantage in order to give priority to Cuban and U.S. sugar interests.

This decision all but eliminated the small cane farmer and ensured the dominance of the large sugar corporations.

Finally, significant amounts of U.S. federal funds entered the Puerto Rican economy, especially after the 1929-1933 depression, for public works, agricultural subsidies and other activities. U.S. government funds appropriated for Puerto Rico during the period 1933 to 1946—in direct aid and loans—amounted to almost $230 million.[14] These funds played a vital role in opening up the country to American exports, manufactures and investments.

Consequences for Puerto Rican Development

The Puerto Rican economy at the end of the first four decades of American rule was misdeveloped and stagnant. An extreme dependence on sugar, chronic unemployment and underemployment, absentee monopoly land ownership and a steady decapitalization in the form of external profit remittances were features of the society. ". . . Aside from sugar, private interests on the mainland made no significant effort to exploit the resources of the Island through capital investment."[15] The economy remained geared to a stagnating industry subject to political decisions taken outside of the country. Within this industry, four U.S. corporations held sway over 40 per cent of sugar output and more than 50 per cent of total sugar acreage.[16] The U.S. government's support for the maintenance of the economic status quo was evidenced by its summary rejection of the Puerto Rican Policy Commission's "Chardón Plan." Prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Chardón Plan" represented a detailed study of the most serious problems plaguing the Puerto Rican economy. The U.S. government was highly critical of its major recommendations—particularly those pertaining to the need for agrarian reform—and preferred, instead, to engage in marginal reforms while the basic economic arrangements remained intact. Continuous and almost total U.S. control over Puerto Rico's foreign trade paralledled these developments. Between 1930 and 1940 this dependence actually increased. Almost 97 per cent of Puerto Rico's total trade was with the United States in 1940, compared with just under 93 per cent in 1930.[17]

The growth of a sugar monoculture and the concentration of land ownership in the hands of some large U.S. corporations and a few wealthy Puerto Rican families—such as the Serralles family—drastically affected the emerging internal class structure. Puerto Rico did not experience the development of a national bourgeoisie along the lines of those groups that emerged in ninetheenth century England and the United States; that is, a dynamic, anti-aristocratic bourgeois class conscious of its common interests as a class and of its common interests as against those of other classes. The Puerto Rican colonial elite, lacking the ability and/or capacity to engage in capital accumulation became "intermediaries between the hegemony of the colonial power and Puerto Rican society."[18] They were administrators for the absentee owners of large corporations, committee to economic self-aggrandizement and limiting the social demands of the masses.

The situation of the urban and rural proletariat changed minimally between 1898 and 1940. Governments during this time were criticized for being "of the insolent rich, of the corporations, of the oppressors, of the miserable judicial, political and religious bosses. . . ."[19] The majority of wage laborers in 1928 received from 60 to 80 cents a day. A study of the Puerto Rican economy by the Brookings Institution in 1930 called the life situation of the masses "deplorable." The per capita income of Puerto Ricans declined from $126 in 1930 to $120 in 1940.[20]

Unemployment and exploitation of labor were accompanied by another factor which further exacerbated the situation of the Puerto Rican worker. The sugar and, to a lesser extent, tobacco industries had expanded on land previously engaged in food production for local consumption. Consequently, a precipitous decline in food production occurred, necessitating increased purchases of foodstuffs (because of the tariff laws) from the expensive U.S. market. This had a substantial effect on the cost of living, as illustrated by the fact that 33 per cent of the cost of food imports from the U.S. in 1928 stemmed directly from the tariff.[21]

Luis Muñoz Marín aptly described the stark reality of the four decades of Puerto Rican development after the U.S. military intervention in 1898:

> . . . the development of large absentee-owned sugar estates, the rapid curtailment in the planting of coffee—the natural crop of the independent farmer—and the concentration of cigar manufacture into the hands of the American trust, have combined to make Puerto Rico a land of begars and millionaires, of flattering statistics and distressing realities. More and more it becomes a factory worked by peons, fought over by lawyers, bossed by absent industrialists, and clerked by politicians. It is now Uncle Sam's second largest sweatshop.[22]

Dependent Industrialization: The New Economic Development Strategy, 1940-1973

The decision to identify economic development with a policy of industrialization and the later promotion of the tourist industry represented sharp breaks with the pre-1940 dependence on agriculture. These strategies were designed to attract foreign capital to the island, and they led to a form of dependent industrialization as opposed to the dependent agriculture of the earlier period. Foreign capital controlled industrial enterprises while employing a group of landless, middle sector functionaries serving the needs of this capital. The pattern of dependent industrialization expressed itself in a marked dependence on U.S. capital (both private and government) and U.S. economic aid (both direct and indirect). A stable political climate, little or no threat of expropriation, no restrictions on external profit remittances, and the ability to maximize profits through tax exemptions and labor exploitation were encouraging signs to the U.S. investor. Of the 1,406 firms promoted under the industrialization program between 1948 and 1967, nearly 70 per cent were set up by foreign capital and almost 90 per cent of these were owned by U.S. intersts.[23]

By 1940 the agricultural sector had entered a period of increasing stagnation. The crucial sugar sector was unable to compete on the international market, partly because of the U.S. relationship and partly because of the lack of technology and a highly mechanized productive process. The tobacco industry also was in decline. Nevertheless, over 60 per cent of the employed population were engaged in activities related to agriculture, which was also the major preoccupation of the banking, commercial and financial sectors. In addition, almost half of the urban labor force were employed in the home needlework industry financed by U.S. capital and managed by local entrepreneurs. "The hazardous dependency upon agricultural production was graphically illustrated . . . in the statistics of the insular export trade (for 1946), with sugar contributing just over 7 per cent, and needlework products nearly 16 per cent. Puerto Rico was clearly in the general category of primary-producing countries exporting for a world market and subject to international price fluctuations and political arrangements beyond their power to infuence."[24]

With the overwhelming support of the rural masses, the Popular Democratic Party (hereafter P.D.P.), under the leadership of Luis

Muñoz Marín, was swept into political power in the 1940 national elections. Muñoz Marín had campaigned on a platform of:

> Definitive enforcement of the 500 acre law, to distribute thousands of acres among workers and farmers, with the necessary facilities for their life on the land and for its cultivation.[25]

According to the 1940 Census of Agriculture, 342 farms covered or were in excess of 500 acres of land. These farms included 31 per cent of all the agricultural land and 44 per cent of the total value of land, buildings and equipment.[26]

U.S. government concern for the popular nationalism of the new government was soon allayed by its actions. An authority on the land reform program observed that Muñoz Marín was "not preaching revolution against Washington . . . He actually hoped for aid from the Federal government which, he suggested, could limit sugar quotas for the corporations to the amount of sugar that could be produced on 500 acres, and withold subsidies from the violators."[27] The 1941 Land Law, which established the Land Authority to enforce the 500 acre restriction, specified that land would be acquired in one of three ways—through expropriation with adequate compensation, by public sale, or through mutual agreement between the Land Authority and the corporation(s) concerned. The policy, as implemented, did not deviate from these methods. In the meantime, government aid to the agricultural sector was being directed toward the landowner rather than toward the landless agricultural laborer.

By the late 1940's, it was clear that the abolition of the corporate latifundio had not taken place, and was not about to occur. Only 12 of the 33 corporations holding land in excess of 500 acres had been drastically affected by the 1941 Land Law. Of the four U.S. corporations that dominated the sugar industry, two continued to retain control of all of their land.[28] The Puerto Rican goernment's commitment to redistributive policies gave way to an emphasis on increasing productivity as a means whereby the country might solve its chronic economic problems. Productivity was equated with industrialization which, in turn, was bound to result in a "dependence on mainland capital, as the government had attempted to build industrial plants during the war and discovered more capital was needed than it had. Politically, this dependence prohibited any radical break with the United States."[29]

The continued political hegemony of the United States government over Puerto Rico and the refusal of client political elites to support any major changes in the island's political status have been important factors favoring U.S. economic penetration. The electoral success of the P.D.P. in the 1948 national elections, for example, was based in part on its support for a Puerto Rican constitution. However, the P.D.P.—supported legislation introduced into the U.S. Congress to this end was not intended to alter the island's client status. The U.S. House Committee on Public Lands in reporting on the proposed legislation observed that it "would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social and economic relationships to the United States."[30] Only the Nationalist Party opposed the legislation, calling it "a colonial measure intended to keep the island permanently 'enslaved' to the U.S. . . ." [31] But Muñoz Marín had long since discarded his earlier support of independence in favor of a 'permanent union' with the United States.

In March 1952, a referendum was held in Puerto Rico on the proposed constitution. Although the vote in favor of ratification was decisive, over 20 per cent of the electorate opposed it. U.S. Congressional approval of this decision was accompanied by the following statement by the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Public Lands:

> I think it may be stated as fundamental that the Constitution of the United States gives Congress complete control and nothing in the Puerto Rican constitution could affect or amend or alter that right . . . .[32]

The United States government was not prepared to abrogate its determinant role in the affairs of Puerto Rico under any circumstances.

The P.D.P. has continued to support a dependent political status for Puerto Rico *vis a vis* the United States and—with the exception of the 1968 elections won by the pro-statehood New Progressive Party—has remained the majority party on the island since 1940. The present P.D.P. Governor, Rafael Hernández Colón, elected in 1972, has stressed the need for "maximum self-government" only within the context of the Commonwealth or "permanent union" framework.[33] This framework has facilitated the entry of foreign capital into the island and the resultant external control over the economy.

The new industrialization strategy began in 1942 with the establishment, by the Puerto Rican government, of an Industrial Development Company, a Development Bank and a Planning Board. In 1950, the various government agencies involved in the new program were placed under the authority of the Economic Development Administration (FOMENTO). The promotion of Puerto Rico as an ideal location for external investment in industrial enterprise was largely initiated with the Industrial Incentives Acts of 1947 and 1948. These Acts offered a series of tax exemptions as inducements to foreign investment. At the same time, the government continued to emphasize the advantage of lower wage scales in Puerto Rico as compared with the United States. This "Operation Bootstrap" program also was prepared to support the new capitalist entrepreneur in a number of other ways: through technical assistance, the training of personnel for the new factories, loans and other financial subsidies.

The tax exemption law of 1947-1948 was described by Milton C. Taylor, in his detailed study of the subject, as follows:

> Even under the least favorable circumstances, the tax exemption program assures eligible mainland investors tax savings which appear to be financially appealing; while under the most advantageous circumstances, virtually complete tax avoidance is possible both during the process of earning income and when profits are avoided.[34]

It therefore came as no surprise when the Economic Development Administration reported in 1956 that subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises operating in Puerto Rico under the tax exemption program were averaging up to 10 times the profits obtained by the parent company in the United States.[35] By 1960, over 600 U.S. business-industrial concerns had entered the island economy.

Table 1 sharply illustrates the ability of the U.S. investor to maximize profits as a result of tax exemptions.

The Industrial Incentives Act as revised in 1963 continued to provide for complete tax exemption for qualifying firms, as well as exemption from property taxes, license fees and excise and other municipal taxes. Furthermore, depending on the industrial sector in which the foreign enterprise decided to locate its operation, complete tax exemption could now be enjoyed for a period of up to 17 years (as compared with a maximum of 10 years under the previous Acts). For firms locating in areas away from metropolitan San Juan in particular, other government incentives included payment of "the costs of training supervisory personnel, salaries of supervisory personnel while training production workers, payment of building rent, payment of mortgages on building purchases, payment of freight on machinery and equipment from point

TABLE 1

If your net profit after U.S. corporate income tax is—	Your net profit in Puerto Rico would be—	Your gain from tax exemption	
		Amount	Percent
$17,500	$25,000	$7,500	43
$29,500	$50,000	$20,500	69
$53,500	$100,000	$46,500	87
$245,500	$500,000	$254,500	104
$485,500	$1,000,000	$514,000	106

Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business, *Tax Treatment of U.S. Concerns with Puerto Rican Affiliates,* 88th Congress, 2nd Session, April 16 and 17, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p.326.

of origin to plant site, and costs of certain additional facilities needed to carry on the operation—such as power stations, transformers, electrical installations, machinery and equipment installation and other relevant costs.''[36] The Economic Development Administration, through its ''Operation Bootstrap,'' has assisted nearly 2,000 foreign enterprises, through a total investment of over $2 billion, to set up operations in Puerto Rico since 1940.[37] The inducements to foreign investors have been substantial: a stable political climate with no threats of expropriation, excessive tax exemptions, low production costs, a plentiful supply of cheap labor, a lack of controls over the repatriation of capital, government subsidies and loans and other incentives contributing to profit maximization. The industrialization program also has generated an increasing dependence on U.S. capital. At least 100 of the 500 largest U.S. corporations have located in Puerto Rico under the auspices of the Economic Development Administration. U.S. investments have been channelled into chemicals, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, textiles, footwear, surgical products, metal products and machinery, electrical products, electronics, pharmaceuticals and motor vehicles. These investments have been made by U.S. corporations asuch as General Electric, Ford Motor Company, Kayser-Roth, Phelps Dodge, R.C.A.—Westinghouse, Commonwealth Oil Refining, Gulf Oil, Union Carbide, Sun Oil, Phillips Petroleum Company, PPG Industries, Hooker Chemical Corporation, American Cyanamid and Reichhold Chemicals.

The bulk of foreign investment during the 1950's went into chemicals and the consumer goods industry. The majority of these operations were U.S.-owned and most of their machinery and raw materials were imported. The profit differential between the Puerto Rican subsidiaries and equivalent U%S%-located subsidiaries was considerable. In 1957, the average manufacturing profit in Puerto Rico before taxes was 34 per cent on investment and 16 per cent on sales, compared with U.S. figures of 20 per cent and 8 per cent.[38] However, the latter figures were subject to U.S. federal tax assessments while the profits made in Puerto Rico were tax exempt.

The number of new factories in operation as a result of "Operation Bootstrap" grew from 548 in 1957-1958 to 1,003 in 1964-1965, and then jumped dramatically to 1,674 in 1967-1968 when heavy capital investments were beginning to establish a foothold in the Puerto Rican economy.[39] By 1973, total investments in the petrochemical sector alone were almost $1.3 billion.[40]

There were two important features of this heavy industry expansion process. First, it was characterized by the introduction of capital-intensive technology that increased production and profitability but generated few jobs and even exacerbated the unemployment problem. Between 1962 and 1967, for example, the average number of Puerto Rican workers employed in the factories set up under the industrialization program declined from 80 to 55 per factory.[41] Existing petrochemical plants, on the other hand, have only been able to create the meager total of 7,700 new jobs.[42] This type of expansion made labor costs a small proportion of the overall expenditure of foreign corporations and allowed for the payment of relatively high wages to the semi-skilled labor force employed in these plants and factories. Such a policy minimized the possibilities of labor unrest in a situation where stability of the labor force was essential, and maximized profits for the external investor.

The second feature of this process was its marginal contribution to the overall socioeconomic development of Puerto Rico. These subsidiaries of foreign corporations were linked to the corporations as part of vertically integrated structures. They were "enclaves" in the penetrated society, engaged in "assembly plant" industrialization— via the importation of large quantities of capital equipment and raw and semi-processed goods. When Phillips Petroleum Company decided to invest $45 million to develop a petrochemicals complex in Puerto Rico in 1967, *Business Week* observed:

> Actually, petrochemicals are only one reason why Phillips and other oil companies want to set up shop in Puerto Rico. After petroleum imported onto the island has been refined, a large amount becomes motor fuel, which can be shipped to markets on the U.S. East Coast.[43]

More recently, the Puerto Rican government announced plans for a new $560 million petrochemicals complex "to handle about two million (barrels per day) of crude oil, half to be transhipped in small tankers to the United States East Coast and the other million to be refined locally."[44] By 1969-1970, 40 per cent of Puerto Rico's imports were in the form of raw materials to be processed and refined on the island, and then reshipped to the United States for sale and consumption.[45]

Some other tendencies regarding the industrialization process should be noted. Since 1960, there has been an increasing trend on the part of existing foreign investment to make future investments, not in the expansion of existing operations, but in the acquisition of indigenous enterprises. Between 1960 and 1966, U.S. entrepreneurs outlayed $55 million in pursuit of this activity.[46] This increasing denationalization of the Puerto Rican economy has been accompanied by the displacement of small and medium sized local retail and wholesale businessmen by U.S.-owned supermarkets and department store chains such as Grand Union, Sears and J.C. Penny. U.S. consumer goods industries, however, have shifted their Puerto Rican subsidiaries to locations away from the island—emphasizing the power of external corporations to make decisions independently of the particular economies in which they have investment interests. "In the case of Bacardi's insistence on locating a new bottling and labelling plant in Jacksonville, Florida, the most the government could extract from the company was the undertaking that all the rum bottled in the new plant would be of Puerto Rican origin, thus protecting revenue from excise taxes—$54 million last year—and an important source of income for the island's fast-failing sugar industry."[47]

There has been some attempt on the part of the present Puerto Rican government to diversify its sources of investment for industrialization away from an almost total dependence on U.S. capital. But no effort has been made to alter the terms of dependence. The giant Japanese multinational corporations, Nippon Zeon and Mitsubishi, in collaboration with Commonwealth Oil Refining, have agreed to invest $15 to $20 million in a petrochemicals project for the production of components used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber and other chemicals, most of which will be exported.[48]

Infastructural economic assistance by the U.S. government has been a key ingredient in Puerto Rico's economic development program. Direct U.S. government expenditures on the island for military operations and numerous subsidies, grants, credits, guarantees and services have played a central role in the ability of Puerto Rican governments to finance programs of education, housing, health and welfare—and to cushion the consequences of a large and continuing balance of payments deficit that has been a fact of life for all island governments since 1940. The remission of U.S. federal taxes ($50 million in 1959 to about $261 million in 1970) and customs duties, for example, "have been the major source of finance for the social security system."[49]

Table 2 indicates the singular importance of direct and indirect U.S. government aid to the development effort.

TABLE 2. U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND LOANS MADE BY FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES IN PUERTO RICO, 1945-1966. SELECTED YEARS ($ MILLION)

Year	Total Federal Government Expenditures	Loans made by Federal Agencies
1945	104.8	2.4
1950	119.6	3.4
1955	189.3	5.6
1960	189.8	31.1
1965	264.7	16.7
1966	326.2	95.6

Sources: Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role of the Financial Sector in the Economic Development of Puerto Rico* (New York: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1970), p.32.

Net government expenditures averaged in the vicinity of 11 per cent of the island's gross national product during the 1945-1966 period.[50] U.S. government aid in the form of customs duties, excise duties and grants-in-aid amounted to $390,741,000 in 1972.[50]

External economic assistance promoting U.S. penetration has, at the same time, prevented or incapacitated indigenous sources from engaging in capital accumulation for investment in industrial activities. A steady increase in the per capita annual income has not effected the level of savings, which has remained extremely low or even negative over the last three decades. Puerto Rican governments and U.S. investors have fostered this consumptionist orientation, largely benefiting the U.S. exporter. It also has resulted in the establishment of a number of sophisticated advertising agencies and market consultant firms, such as U.S. subsidiaries of McCann-Erickson and Young & Rubicon. Between 1953 and 1963 consumer spending of the average Puerto Rican family increased by 84 per cent, according to a study by the Puerto Rican Department of Labor.[51] The greatest increases in expenditure were on personal items, houses, household goods, motor vehicles and overseas travel. Total spending on food and basic needs, as a proportion of overall consumption spending, actually declined. A feature of this development has been the increasing purchase of imported goods. In 1967, imported consumer items represented 25.2 per cent of total consumption in Puerto Rico as compared to only 4 per cent in the case of the United States.[52] This has been a contributing factor to the island's balance of payments difficulties.

Thus, U.S. government assistance has acted as a device for facilitating the export of U.S. goods to Puerto Rico. In the process it has undercut efforts by indigenous industrialists to develop local industries. Aid has functioned as a political tool to facilitate economic exploitation and, indirectly, capital drainage.

Industrialization and the Socioeconomic Situation of the Masses

1. Income

The rapid growth in personal incomes in Puerto Rico since 1940 has not resulted in a more equitable distribution of income, nor in any substantial lessening of the income disparities between urban and rural areas. In 1972, per capita income stood at $1,713.[53] After more than three decades, Muñoz Marín's initial policy of an annual per capita income of at least $2,000 still is to be achieved.

After the first six years of P.D.P. rule, the resident commissioner of distribution remained virtually unchanged despite economic expansion, of wage earners on the island had incomes not exceeding $500 a year.[54] During the period 1940-1950, 70 per cent of all families received 30 per cent of the insular income, and the majority of wage earner's families did not include anyone who was fully employed. Two-thirds of rural wage earning families were in this situation as compared to two-fifths of urban families.[55] Even though annual per capita climbed from $120 in 1940 to $764 in 1963, the distribution of income became increasingly skewed. Between 1953 and 1963 the total money incomes received by the poorest one-fifth of the population declined from 5 per cent to 4 per cent, while the share of the one-fifth of the population with the highest incomes increased from 50.5 per cent to 51 per cent. The major beneficiaries of this trend were the burgeoning middle sectors, whose share of money incomes rose from 46.8 per cent to 49.5 per cent.[56] In other words, income distribution remained virtually unchanged despite ecnomic expansion, while the position of the lower income groups relatively worsened. Furthermore, in respect of urban-rural differences, we find that the per capita income of San Juan residents in 1963 averaged $1,062 compared to $484 for the rest of the island.[57]

The Division of Public Welfare of the Puerto Rican Health Department estimated that $2,000 was the minimum annual income needed to satisfy a family's basic living requirements in 1964. But, acording to Puerto Rican Planning Board data for that year, 25 per cent of families earned less than $500 annually, almost 43 per cent earned less than $1,000 annually and nearly 70 per cent of families earned incomes below $2,000.[58] No significant upward trend is observable in subsequent years. Over 100,00 families still receive incomes of less than $500 a year, and in 1968-1969 emergency food supplies had to be distributed to 20 per cent of the island's families.[59] Income distribution has continued to be a persistent problem for successive Puerto Rican governments. No serious attempts have been made to implement policies designed to redistribute income nationally and to close the gap between urban and rural income levels.

2. *Wages*

The puerto Rican wage scale structure has been employed by island governments as an inducement, second only to tax exemptions, to attract foreign capital. A recent full page advertisement in the *New York Times* by the Economic Development Administration exemplified this policy:

> Puerto Rican workers are eager, skilled and dependable. Real wages are closer to the minimum than on the mainland. There are no federal taxes on corporate or personal income in Puerto Rico. And Puerto Rico can offer you up to 100 per cent tax exemption from Commonwealth and local taxes on income and property.[60]

By the end of the 1940s, wage levels for workers in industry and agriculture remained abysmally low, both in absolute terms and in comparison with equivalent wage levels in the United States. The average weekly earnings of the Puerto Rican agricultural worker in 1945 was $5, while his counterpart in industry received $12 a week. By comparison, the average weekly wage of the U.S. worker employed in industry in 1945 was $47.50.[61] Average hourly wages in the Puerto Rican industrial sector were almost three and a half times lower than the U.S. average.[62] In some Puerto Rican industries, the exploitation of labor—for U.S. benefit—was even worse than these figures suggest. The average hourly wage in the 'sweatshop' needlework industry was less than 35 cents—at a time when the U.S. Department of Commerce concluded that a reasonable standard of living for a fully employed worker in this industry would require at least 81 cents an hour.[63]

For over two decades, Puerto Rican governments have opposed application of the U.S. minimum wage standards to Puerto Rico on the grounds that it would be "fatal to industrialization."[64] It would not only seriously affect Puerto Rico's ability to compete on the international market, but it would increase unemployment and endanger the continued existence of many local enterprises. The U.S. Congress has, by and large, supported this position, and allowed the application of a lower (than U.S.) minimum wage on an industry-by-industry basis. Whereas the U.S. minimum wage tends to be the base wage, the minimum wage in Puerto Rico approximates the average wage. The present P.D.P. government has vigorously pursued this wage exemption policy.* The puerto Rican working class, as a consequence of this policy, has been forced to pay U.S. prices for imported foodstuffs and other commodities with wages well below the U.S. minimum level.

---

*Although subjected to a Presidential veto, minimum wage legislation authorizing a raise in the U.S. minimum wage from $1.60 to $2.20 passed the Congress in August 1973. This legislation included the following provision regarding employees in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands:

> Employees making less than $1.40 per hour under the most recent wage order be increased 12 , an hour annually from the effective date until they reach $1.40. Thereafter their wages are increased by 15 , per hour each year until parity is achieved with the mainland minimum. Employees earning $1.40 or more an hour be increased 15 , per hour each year after enactment until parity is achieved. See *Congressional Record*, Vol. 119, No. 125, August 2, 1973, p.S15503.

As revealed in Table 3, the ability of Puerto Rico to achieve wage parity with the United States is seriously open to doubt. Not only has the wage differential between the two countries remained substantial over time, but it has increased in recent years.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, PUERTO RICAN AND UNITED STATES, 1959-1972

Year	Puerto Rico	United States	Differential
1959	.87	2.19	1.32
1960	.92	2.26	1.34
1961	.99	2.32	1.33
1962	1.06	2.39	1.33
1963	1.13	2.46	1.33
1964	1.18	2.54	1.36
1965	1.24	2.61	1.37
1966	1.30	2.72	1.42
1967	1.39	2.83	1.44
1968	1.55	3.01	1.46
1969	1.65	3.19	1.54
1970	1.76	3.36	1.60
1971	1.88	3.56	1.68
1972	1.99	3.81	1.82

Sources: International Labour Office, Geneva, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1968 (pp. 525, 526) and 1972 (p. 547); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Monthly Labor Review*, August 1973, p. 114; U. S. Department of Labor, Workplace Standards Administration, *Minimum Wage & Maximum Hours Standards under the Fair Labor Standards Act*, submitted to Congress, 1971, p. 37; U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972*, p. 235

In the six year period 1959-1956, the differential in average hourly earnings increased by 5 cents from $1.32 to $1.37. In the following six year period 1966-1972, the differential increased by 45 cents. A similiar trend is evident with regard to the average weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing industries in Puerto Rico and the United States.[65] The ability of Puerto Rican governments to hold down wages for the benefit of the external investor has been one of the 'social costs' of the country's industrial growth.

3. Employment

Stagnation in the agricultural sector and the increasing tendency toward the growth of capital-intensive industrial enterprises has resulted in the persistence of a serious unemployment problem in Puerto Rico. This situation would have been far worse had not 621,000 persons of employment age migrated to the United States between 1950 and 1972.[66]

In 1940, almost 50 per cent of the employed labor force was engaged in agricultural production, which accounted for 31.2 per cent of the country's national income. By 1972, only 4.4 per cent of the labor force were employed in agriculture, compared to 19.2 per cent in manufacturing, 18.4 per cent in trade, 17.8 per cent in government and 17.1 per cent in services.[67] Total employment declined between 1950 and 1960, primarily because new technologically sophisticated industrial plants were unable to absorb a rapidly expanding labor force. The labor force was expanding partly because unemployed agricultural laborers were drifting into the urban areas. In 1962-1963 enterprises assisted by the Economic Development Administration created 21,300 new jobs, while the natural increase in the working population alone exceeded this figure nearly threefold.[68] Unemployment during the 1950s and early 1960s hovered at between 12 and 14 per cent of the labor force, although such figures didn't reflect under-employment and ignored the factor of external migration. The average annual unemployment rate for males during the period 1950 to 1958, for example, was approximately 25 per cent in the 14 to 24 age group.[69]

Nearly half the population continued to depend for its livelihood on agriculture in 1967, even though government assistance to agriculture remained inadequate. High levels of under employment and unemployment and the movement of untrained rural workers to the cities were features of island life; and farm production continued its rapid decline. Sugar production dropped every year after 1963, and the 1966-1967 crop was 463,000 tons below the U.S. quota for Puerto Rican sugar. Tobacco production also fell substantially during these years.[70] Meanwhile, the majority of employment opportunities being created by the new industrialization were for skilled technical personnel.

In 1971 the Puerto Rican Planning Board issued a study on the employment situation in which it tacitly agreed with the contention of a number of authorities that unemployment on the island was close to 30 per cent of the labor force, and that it would have been much higher "were it not for large scale migration to the United States mainland and an expanding number of job-seekers who have simply dropped out of the labor force and are uncounted."[31] Nevertheless, the government has continued to support the development of capital-intensive industry that requires skilled labor that is in short supply on the island. The Economic Development Administration continues to ignore the unemployment situation and to emphasize that "heavy industry is our answer."[72]

4. *Tourism*

The decision by the Puerto Rican government in 1949 to invest over $7 million in the construction of the island's first tourist hotel (the U.S.-owned Caribe Hilton) was followed by a number of other inducements designed to encourage the growth of a tourist industry. Under the Industrial Incentives Acts, tourist hotels owned or operated by foreign corporations or individuals were entitled to the full benefits of the tax exemption program. This government subsidized industry, perceived as crucial to the industrialization effort, functioned to generate minimal consequences in terms of internal economic development.

The expansion of the tourist sector resulted in increased economic activity in the construction trades industry. Both these developments extended U.S. control of the economy and increased Puerto Rican dependence. The building boom was centered in the urban areas, and contributed little to the country's productive resources or to the living conditions of the Puerto Rican working class. On the contrary, these new (predominantly U.S.-owned) tourist hotels, gambling casinos and apartment buildings further decapitalized the economy through an increase in external profit remitances. A characeristic of this development was the growth of luxury hotels at the expense of low or moderate cost accomodations. The Puerto Rican Industrial Development Company and the Government Development Bank made fifty-two loans to hotels and guest houses between 1949 and 1964, totalling $11,875,000. However over 60 per cent of these funds were intended for the building of eight luxury hotels.[73] The accompanying rise in tourist costs "all but eliminated the lower income visitors, while those with incomes in excess of $10,000 have increased 41 per cent to an average of nearly 60 per cent of the annual total number of visitors to Puerto Rico."[74]

The phenomenal growth of the tourist industry during the last decade is evidenced by the following figures. Numbers of tourists to Puerto Rico rose from 350,000 in 1960 to over 1,000,000 in 1970. Tourist expenditures increased from $60 million in 1960 to more than $200 million in 1971. By the end of 1971, the number of first class hotel rooms had risen to almost 10,000.[75] Paralleling this growth has been the creation of a variety of nonproductive service sector employment opportunities characterized by low wages and the growth of a lumpen proletariat that attached itself to the industry.

Gordon Lewis, in a study of the satellite character of the tourist-based Virgin Islands economy, describes a situation that might usefuly be applied to Puerto Rico:

> (The Virgin Islands is) a tropical extension, frequently artificial and always vulnerable, of the American capitalist economy. Its extraordinary dependence on imports . . . has intensified . . . as the tourist industry, through the dispersion of income into the local structure . . . has generated new demands for imported food and clothing, consumer durables and materials and equipment required by trade and industry. The tourist industry itself is derivative, while a sizeable proportion of its receipts are returned to the United States mainland for the purchase of supplies and services and to those foreign sources from which the gift shops obtain much of their merchandise.[76]

Consequences of the New Economic Development Strategy

In voicing his support for the dependent industrialization policy and the maintenance of the existing political and economic relationships between the United States and Puerto Rico Muñoz Marín has referred to Puerto Rico as "a political mutation . . . a Latin American country compoased of good citizens of the United States."[77] This position has been reiterated, with small variation, by all Puerto Rican governments since 1940.

This development strategy—based on external penetration and control—has had serious negative consequences for Puerto Rican society. Dependent ruling groups, rooted in urban and foreign elites, have proved incapable of integrating internal skills (manpower) and resources for autonomous and rational economic development. The use of tax exemptions to encourage foreign corporate investment, for example, has depleted government resources and undercut the government's ability to finance indigenous industrial expansion and development of the public service sector.

The United States has played a determinant role in the Puerto Rican economy and polity since 1940. Politically, there has been no major challenge to the unilateral power of the U.S. government over the island. Limited political autonomy has remained a constant—with the acquiescence of client political elites. Economically, the integration of the domestic elites into the enterprises of the U.S. corporation has allowed the latter to influence the behavior of the indigenous political elites and, over time, to wield increasing power and control over the society. The investment decisions of the U.S. corporation has, furthermore, resulted in the island's uneven and distorted economic development.*

U. S. domination of the Puerto Rican economy has undermined the country's claim to be a sovereign entity. Total U.S. investments in the economy amount to over $1.3 billion.[78] U.S. investors continue to control over three-quarters of all assets in the industrial-manufacturing sector. The First City National Bank of New York and the Chase Manhattan Bank alone hold in the vicinity of one-third of the total assets of all banks chartered on the island. U.S. capital also controls other important sectors of the economy: the retail industry, housing construction, insurance, communications, domestic and foreign transportation, tourism and associated service sector operations. "Indeed, the old type of sugar absenteeism has merely been succeeded by a new type of industrial absenteeism. The absentee landlord of the old days has been replaced by the absentee shareholder of the new."[79]

The U.S. Federal Regulatory Agencies, responsible for overseeing the actions of U.S. corporations, have tended to support their unhindered operations in Puerto Rico. These corporations employ only a small minority of Puerto Ricans in important managerial positions, and their decisions regarding production, location and employment are made by the Central Offices in the United States—based on needs and perceptions as part of a global network—with little regard for the social and economic consequences such decisions might have for Puerto Rico. "The surplus is in reality tied to the needs and strategy of the corporation as a whole."[80]

Economic dependence has made Puerto Rico highly vulnerable to changes and fluctuations in U.S. economic activity. The U.S. economic recession of 1953-1954 almost halted migration from Puerto Rico to the United States and drastically reduced the level of U.S. investment in the island. The number of U.S. subsidiaries established under 'Operation Bootstrap' averaged three a month during the period July-December 1954, as compared to 10 a month during the first six months of 1953.[81] A second U.S. recession in 1957-1958 also had serious consequences for the Puerto Rican economy. Production for export among established firms declined and the newly established enterprises were unable to absorb the additional unemployed workers who resulted. The decline in migration to the U.S. also was accompanied by the return of Puerto Rican workers in the U.S. "whose low seniority in their U.S. jobs made them among the first to be layed off."[82]

---

*Imperialism, in its overall features, is both developmental and exploitative. Foreign corporate investment initially creates new productive facilities and extracts wealth. In the long-term, however, it usually results in lopsided development (the creation of 'enclaves' of high production), and reinforces the class divisions and regional differences in the society. This has been the Puerto Rican experience.

Werner Baer has argued cogently that Puerto Rico did not experience the full impact of these recessions because of their short duration and the "substantial backlog of investment commitments" that had accumulated during the preceeding period. The fact that the U.S. recessions did not persist over a much longer time period meant that new capital investments in Puerto Rico were not significantly curtailed. Since the relative impact of the growth trend was unlikely to continue indefinitely, future U.S. economic recessions conceivably could be more damaging to the Puerto Rican economy. Baer calculated that without the "growth trend factor" of the 1950s, exports and labor earnings would have declined far more than they actually did during the years 1953-1954 and 1957-1958.[83]

The effect of the 1970-1971 U.S. recession on the Puerto Rican economy offers some evidence in support of Baer's contention. More than 100 factories closed down, and the number of new plants and expansions promoted by the Economic Development Administration fell by 23 per cent in 1970 and 21 per cent in 1971.[84] The U.S. Small Business Administration made 7,402 disaster loans to Puerto Rican enterprises affected by the recession, amounting to over $18 million. By comparison, only 10 loans, totalling $160,000, were made during the entire period 1963 to 1969.[85] Manuel Casiano, administrator of the Economic Development Administration, blamed these developments on "the prolonged economic recession in the U. S."[86] Inflation, declining exports, the inability to diversify trading relationships and the downward trend in previously bouyant growth sectors such as tourism and manufacturing all were consequences of the impact of the U.S. recession on the Puerto Rican economy. Not surprisingly, the "traditional safety valve" of out-migration to the U.S. fell from 44,082 in 1969-1970 to 1,811 in 1970-1971.[87]

The Class Structure

The changeover from dependent agriculture to dependent industrialization has had a fundamental impact on the Puerto Rican class structure. The traditional agricultural elites were displaced by the urban entrepreneur, the government bureaucrat and the capitalist rancher. The new upper class is in commerce (such as the Ferré family), finance, government, real-estate, construction and the high-paying professions. Dependent industrialization also has generated an expanded middle sector "strongly committed to the attainment of possessions, comfort and convenience, economic and physical security, quality education, and other modern values."[88] The consumptionist orientation of this group spawned enterprises based on the importation of U.S. goods to satisfy its needs. Salesmen, clerks, managers and advertisers—acting as 'middle men' for the U.S. producer—promoted and encouraged this tendency. The marked hostility of this middle sector group toward the working class has been paralleled, in the political arena, by its support of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party. This support was a crucial factor in the victory of Luis Ferré and the New Progressive Party in the 1968 national elections.

Dependent industrialization has failed to reduce the level of stratification (inequality), class differentiation and the low level of mobility that previously existed. It has resulted, however, in the emergence of a class of dependent indigenous capitalists "who have taken adantage of the process of industrialization to make a profit in the construction industry, in real estate speculation, in mortgage and loan businesses, and as intermediaries and agents for the great North American companies."[89] It has also created a disorganized and exploited working class lacking stable sources of income and employment. Within this class three groups can be delineated: a small segment of semi-skilled, relatively highly-paid workers in the new capital-intensive industries; a traditional industrial proletariat of low paid labor, and a burgeoning subproletariat that has no prospects for absorption into the industrial labor force.

This subproletariat strata is composed largely of individuals attempting to escape the poverty, exploitation and lack of opportunities in the rural areas. They move to urban slums or to the outskirts of the cities, and their conditions of life are characterized by intense social and economic deprivation—by a subsistence urbanism. Their impact on the national allocation of resources and on the productive system is negligible. Employed mainly in the service sector in occupations linked to the tourist industry—petty vendors, street peddlers, clerks, promoters, entertainers, caterers, prostitutes, drug sellers, shoe-shine boys, messengers, gardners, car watchers, doormen and porters—their life situation is one of unstable work opportunities, low pay and continual insecurity. The quasi-service occupations, in particular, require no capital and are marginal to the economy as a whole. This subproletariat group has been aptly referred to as "supporting characters."[90] They are "a loose group of social 'floaters' sustained by very little sense of group consciousness,"[91] a fact well illustrated by their apparent support of the pro-middle sector, pro-statehood New Progressive Party in the 1968 national elections. By 1970, employment in the service sector had risen to 16.7 per cent of the total employed labor force, and was surpassed only by manufacturing with 19.3 per cent and the wholesale-retail trade with 18.7 per cent.[92]

The disintegration of corporate agriculture initially weakened the basis for the organization of a cohesive working class that could have provided the foundation for a political movement. The social basis for a working class movement was increasingly fragmented by the subsequent industrialization process that led a large sector of the working class (especially the subproletariat) to perceive the problem of poverty in individual terms, susceptible to individual solutions, leading to individual mobility. The result has been a stable and controlled working class rather than a class-conscious one.

The U.S. government and U.S. corporate investors have contributed heavily to the proletarianization and marginalization of a large segment of the Puerto Rico population, and to the denationalization of the island's economy. These developments, in turn, have generated a number of social and economic inequalities which have persisted over time. The most important of these have revolved around the questions of income and employment.

Puerto Rico's annual per capita income growth since 1940 has been quite remarkable when compared with those of other Latin American countries. However, such comparisons provide a misleading yardstick with which to measure the island's performance, because of the incorporation of the Puerto Rican economy within the U.S. economic structure. The valid comparison is with the United States.

We can see from Graph 1 that the absolute differential between Puerto Rico and the United States has increased substantially since 1951, and that the gap has been widening at an increasing rate since the mid-1960's. In 1972, the average per capita income for the U.S. was $4,492 (Mississippi $3,137), while that of Puerto Rico stood at only $1,713. Furthermore, inflation has had a more serious effect on wages in Puerto Rico. The compound rate of inflation from 1950 to 1967 averaged 3 percent per year in Puerto Rico, but only 1.9 per cent in the U.S.[93] In 1972 the cost-of-living index for Puerto Rico rose 3.8 per cent.[94]

FIGURE 1. PER CAPITA PERSONALL INCOME, PUERTO RICO AND UNITED STATES. 1951-1972 (SELECTED YEARS)



Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, *Survey of Current Business*, Vol. 51, No. 8, August 1971, p. 31 & Vol. 53, No. 8, August 1973, p. 43; Rita M. Maldonado, op. cit., p. 44; Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Puerto Rico*, No. 4, 1969, p. 10 & No. 4, November 1971, p. 14; Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, *Puerto Rico: Financial Facts, 1972*, November 1972.

Unemployment figures for Puerto Rico and the United States also present a sharp contrast (Table 4).

TABLE 4. RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT, PUERTO RICO AND UNITED STATES, 1950-1972. SELECTED YEARS (%)

Year	Puerto Rico	United States	Differential
1950	13.7	5.3	8.4
1955	14.3	4.4	9.9
1960	12.1	5.6	6.5
1961	12.6	6.7	5.9
1962	12.6	5.5	7.1
1963	11.8	5.7	6.1
1964	11.1	5.2	5.9
1965	12.0	4.5	7.5
1966	12.3	3.8	8.4
1967	12.2	3.8	8.3
1968	11.6	3.6	8.0
1969	10.4	3.5	6.9
1970	11.2	4.4	6.8
1971	11.9	5.9	6.0
1972	12.3	6.2	6.1

Sources: International Labour Office, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1957 (pp. 151, 152) and 1968 (p. 387) and 1972 (p. 427); U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census on Population. General Social and Economic Characteristics. United States Summary*. June 1972, p. 1-350; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Unemployment in Puerto Rico*, Fiscal Years 1971-72 and 1971-72. Special Labor Force Report. Number 71-1E, p. 3; U. S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, *Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment*, July 1973, p. 37.

Puerto Rico has experienced an unemployment rate of over 12 per cent for the years 1950 to 1972, while the U.S. yearly rate has averaged just under 5 per cent. The unemployment differential has remained relatively unchanged over this period. A slight lessening of the gap in recent years has been a function, not of an improved situation in Puerto Rico, but of an increase in unemployment in the United States. The kinds of U.S. enterprises attracted to Puerto Rico under the industrialization program have been designed to exploit labor and take advantage of relative wage scales, rather than to expand employment opportunities. The incapacity of this type of industrialization to absorb the laboring class has been instrumental in shoving migrants into the U.S. urban slums.

In 1972, the situation in agriculture was critical. Almost 15 per cent of the agricultural labor force were unemployed and there was a continued migration to the urban areas, particularly among sugar and coffee workers.[95] In the recent period, government investment in agriculture has been negligible, notwithstanding the fact that the island's agricultural trade deficit has continued to grow. This deficit has been largely responsible for the overall balance of trade deficit, which has increased Puerto Rico's foreign debt service requirements to approximately 20 per cent of its annual export earnings.[96] Yet agricultural development remains neglected and the increasing poverty of the masses is ascribed to a rapid population growth, medical advancements and the effects of U.S. economic recessions on out-migration, rather than to structural defects in a development program based on dependent industrialization. A study of the economy in the late 1960's, commissioned by the Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture, concluded on the following note:

> The danger signals for Puerto Rico are clear. In an economy with few raw materials and a growing labor force, agriculture must be developed to provide food, to eliminate agricultural-import requirements, to establish home demand for industrial output, and to provide jobs in rural areas.[97]

Proletarianization and marginalization have had their greatest impact on the internal migrant driven to the urban areas because of the stagnation in agriculture and the possibilities offered by urban industrialization.* These migrants formed the bulk of the subproletariat strata. They have enjoyed marginal improvements in their life situation—such as increased schooling and medical care—as a consequence of their changed locale. However, many social scientists have attempted to magnify these relative improvements, to maximize these marginal changes outside of the relevant framework within which they should be analyzed, viz, in terms of urban society. Rather than emphasize relative improvements over previous circumstances, it is more accurate to focus on the absolute exploitation in present circumstances. The class structure thus becomes the most relevant unit of comparison. 'Improvements' in the situation of the subproletariat must be evaluated in terms of the position of the classes in the same urban milieu. From this perspective, as we have seen, the subproletariat is the most excluded class in society in receiving government services, and in its capacity to make any significant impact on national politics.

In assessing the consequences of the growth of the tourist industry on Puerto Rico's development process a number of questions present themselves. Who benefits from tourist development? Have specific classes taken advantage of this process? Has the tourist industry contributed to an improvement in the socioeconomic situation of the masses, or has it been merely another way of concentrating wealth?

The major beneficiaries of tourism in Puerto Rico have been foreign (primarily U.S.) investors. The tourist industry has not generated new sources of income for reinvestment in productive activities on the island. Rather, it has absorbed government capital in the form of tax exemptions, subsidies and loans. In 1971, for example, the Puerto Rican government loaned the "financially troubled" Dorado Hilton up to $500,000 and announced that four or five other hotels in similar circumstances would receive loans of from $50,000 to $1 million.[98] U.S. capital in the form of hotel and other accomodation investment, U.S. manufacturers with an increased market for U.S. goods, U.S. transportation industries (especially airlines) and U.S. tourists have benefited most from the tourist development. The incentives offered the U.S. investor have been geared to profit maximization.

The expenditures made by Puerto Rican governments have created the basis for tourism on one hand and the degradation of the mass of the population on the other. The 'spillover' from the benefits accruing to U.S. capital and the U.S. tourist has been the creation of a lumpen-

---

*Since 1940, urban-rural migration has been continuous and pronounced. The urban population increased by 58 per cent between 1940 and 1950, while the rural population increased by only 1 per cent. In the following decade, the population of San Juan and the adjoining municipalities increased by 27.4 per cent. Between 1960 and 1970, the urban population increased from 44.2 per cent to 58.1 per cent. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Planning Board, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, *Puerto Rico, Statistical Yearbook 1951-1952,* p. 1; Henry Wells, *The Modernization of Puerto Rico* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 186; U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population, Vol. 1,* 'Characteristics of the Population.' May 1972. p. 53-9. In contrast, the development strategy of the Castro government in Cuba has been in the direction of stabilizing, if not increasing, the agricultural population. By concentrating productive investments in expanding the agricultural sector and in building up the agricultural population [via the provision of schools, medical facilities, etc.]—to keep people gainfully employed in the rural areas—the growth of urban shantytown/slum settlements and a sub/lumpen proletariat has been prevented. In 1967, for example, the migration of persons from Havana to the rural province of Oriente [28,203] exceeded by over three thousand the movement of persons from Oriente to Havana [24,989]. See James Petras, "Socialism on One Island: A Decade of Cuban Revolutionary Government," *Politics and Society,* Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1971, p. 211.

proletariat. The social and political overhead costs of tourism have included prostitution, organized crime, gambling (which the *Hispanic American Report* called, in 1958, "one of the government's main sources of revenue"[99]) and drug addiction. According to local government authorities, approximately 100,000 of the island's 2,700,000 people are addicted to drugs.[100] The "social physiognomy" of San Juan has been transformed into a replica of pre-1959 Havana.[101]

Tourism also has contributed to the deterioration of the physical environment through car rental agencies, sandwich stands, souvenir shops and restaurants. Client political elites have facilitated the penetration of U.S. oil and petroleum interests into the economy without attempting, until very recently, to control the massive water pollution aspects of their activities. In human terms, tourism has led to the emergence of a dependent proletariat strata clustered in low-paying occupations. This represents the industry's "pay-off" to the indigenous population. In return for the rights to acquire natural resources to construct hotels and gambling casinos, and repatriate profits abroad, the U.S. investor offers degrading and unstable job opportunities to a segment of the population.

Tourist development also has resulted in the virtual expropriation of areas of public domain by U.S. and Puerto Rican investors. Luxury hotels have been built along the finest beach fronts, which are then declared off-limits to all but hotel guests. Puerto Rican government attempts to reverse this trend have been unsuccessful, partly due to the lack of a comprehensive long-range plan applied to land resources. A government decision to refuse permits for the construction of luxury hotels in the Condado section of San Juan is instructive in this respect. The aim of government policy was "to stop the development of a tourist 'wall' between Puerto Ricans and their sea. At the same time, permission to construct high rise condominium apartments on the same choice real estate produced the tourist 'wall' everyone was trying to prevent."[102]

The Ferré government (1968-1972) accelerated the construction of tourist facilities. During the final legislative session before the 1972 elections, the Puerto Rican Congress "approved various bills giving this industry a strong boost, including tax exemption to real estate investment trusts that are created on the island, exemption of condominium financing and a 50 per cent tax exemption to guest house opertors."[103] Total tourist expenditure in 1972 was $259 million, an increase of $25 million over the previous year.[104]*

---

* Owen Jefferson has convincingly argued, in a study of the Jamaican tourist industry, that "the impact of tourist expenditure tends to be associated with an almost intolerable rise in the cost of living in the areas concerned." Owen Jefferson, "Some Aspects of the Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica," in *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean,* eds., Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1972), p. 117.

Conclusion: Dependence and Puerto Rican Industrialization

The old dependency of classical imperialism created export-oriented societies with structures of production geared to the needs and demands of the metropolitan capitalist economies. These penetrated societies were characterized by metropolitan capital investments in extractive raw material industries and agriculture. They also represented markets for the export of manufactured goods from the metropolitan centers. The new dependency of the post-1945 period "is basically technological-industrial dependence,"[105] made possible through the support given it by strategic economic classes within the penetrated society. It is "a condition in which the growth or expansion of a firm or country is contingent upon the need to import capital products or techniques over which it has little or no control; because the society lacks the ability to substitute other products, sources or funds or techniques, and because it lacks the internal capacity or drive to innovate or create."[106] Dependence, in this view, is not a function of the decision to import technology, but of the type of technology imported and its relationship to the development process. In a dependent capitalist society such as Puerto Rico, imported technology has a negative impact on the socioeconomic situation of the masses and it is not viewed by local elites as leading to autonomous development based on indigenous sources. On the contrary, it is a means whereby external forces institutionalize their control over the development process through the creation of dependent domestic elites.*

---

*An autonomous country "depends primarily on the mobilization of internal resources and has the capacity to choose the source of its external inputs." James Petras & Thomas Cook, "Dependency and the Industrial Bourgeoisie: Attitudes of Argentine Executives Toward Foreign Economic Investment and U. S. Policy," in *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, ed., James Petras (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 144. Both autonomy and dependence are relative notions. Cuba, for example, has a skewed trade pattern *vis a vis* the Soviet Union, but it has retained its ability to make choices and explore different options regarding the allocation of internal resources. The Soviet Union neither owns Cuban economic resources nor maintains a direct leverage over internal economic development.

One form of this dependence is evident in present-day Argentina, where external penetration and the resulting dependence are supported by both foreign and national groups in the industrial sector. The fact of dependence is not in dispute; only the terms under which it takes place are matters for discussion. Argentine industrial executives in national firms support dependency that does not result in their total displacement by foreign capital. As Petras and Cook have observed:

> External dependence is not an external phenomenon: it has its roots in the attitudes and behavior of almost all Argentine industrial executives. The Argentine executive seems to perceive foreign entrepreneurship as necessary to Argentine development . . . National capital is integrated into a dependent relationship with foreign capital. This interconnection of interests makes the industrial executives a major conduit for external penetration.[107]

Another contemporary example of dependent industrialization in Latin America is the case of Brazil. Like Puerto Rico, Brazilian economic growth since 1964 has been characterized by a distorted industrial development based on capital-intensive heavy industry and the creation of a consumption-oriented middle class. While the growth rate reached 11.3 per cent in 1971, inflation—averaging around 20 per cent annually—has been a continuing problem.[108] The industrialization program has developed on the basis of a wide range of financial inducements to foreign capital to invest in the country. The expansion of the productive base has been accompanied by regional imbalance, structural unemployment and increasing marginality, labor exploitation, and social and political repression of the Brazilian lower classes. The agricultural sector in Brazil has been stagnating and between 1967-1971 for each dollar increase in foreign reserves the Brazilian foreign debt grew by $1.80.[109] In Brazil, the integration of the state and foreign capital in the economic expansion has been an important factor in the dependent capitalist development: ''. . . both are the principal participants in the key dynamic investment and productive sectors, and there is no important contradiction between them as far as the decision making process is concerned.''[110]

Although there is no one dependency model, some development theorists have argued that dependency characterized by capital drainage leads to underdevelopment and permanent stagnation.[111] Yet, both the Brazilian and Puerto Rican experiences suggest that growth can occur through dependency. Brazil, with an enormous market and a government able to depress wages and engage in widespread repression, has created high rates of growth over a short period of time through a massive influx of foreign capital. However, any theory of dependent capitalist development must distinguish between growth (GNP) and development (social justice, the distribution of power, etc.).[112] Societies can exhibit development without growth. Post-1959 Cuba's economic expansion and capital investment in diversified productive activities has been paralleled by a low overall rate of growth. This is a function of the transition toward future economic autonomy. Brazil, by comparison, has exhibited growth without development. So, it would appear, has Puerto Rico. Specifications of the conditions under which one or the other takes place involve an analysis of the class structure of the society, of the social framework within which development takes place.

The impact of external forces on Puerto Rico's development process has been twofold. In the short-term, foreign investment created new productive facilities and contributed toward a substantial growth rate.* In the long-term, these investments have distorted the pattern of economic development that has occurred. Furthermore, the conditions for the entrance of foreign investment into the economy have been incompatible with the growth of strong, autonomous social and political organizations of the lower classes. One of the social and political costs of dependence on external capital for development has been the emergence of a controlled labor force rather than militant, politically conscious working class movement. Where countries project a strong sense of national cohesiveness and have a strong, centralized and disciplined political organization, external penetration is made more difficult.

---

*Maurice Halperin has perceptively noted that the concept of gross national product (GNP) is a misleading concept to apply to underdeveloped or developing societies, because it invariably includes both goods and services. But, for an economy like Puerto Rico's, "only the production of material goods can have any relevance to growth." Services, on the other hand, "absorb capital and other resources desperately needed for production and hence retard economic growth." Evaluation of the meaning of GNP also depends on the kind of production that is taking place. ". . . an increase in output that reflects the expansion of monoculture or foreign exploitation of natural resources or the manufacture of luxury goods for domestic consumption would invariably be counted as a contribution to economic growth in the statistical compilations. However, in terms of the only kind of growth that makes sense for an underdeveloped country, the principle connotations of such an increase would very likely be unfavorable." Maurice Halperin, "Growth and Crises in the Latin American Economy," in *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*, eds., James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett World Library, 1968), pp. 60-62.

Puerto Rican governments rationalized a policy of industrialization based on foreign investment by reference to the notion of capital scarcity. Only an influx of capital, it was argued, could trigger development in a capital scarce society. However, the problem has been the lack of controls over the use of earnings within the country (conspicuous consumption, external profit remittances, etc.). The crux of the issue has been the misuse of resources and the utilization of the surplus created by the capital-intensive technology. The nature of the State determines the nature of surplus disposal, whether it will favor national or sectoral development. Imported technology has not bee organized for overall societal development, as the continuing unemployment and poverty amply demonstrates. The capital intensive pattern of industrial enterprise has absorbed a minimum of laborers in a labor surplus society. The Puerto Rican political elites have ascribed this problem to rapid population increases, and emphasized the imortance of migration to the U.S. But the critical factor is not the population per se, but the relationship of the population to the productive forces. Where the latter continues to develop new job opportunities, the unemployment-population problem no longer exists. In rapidly developing countries based on egalitarian patterns of development—such as revolutionary Cuba—there are actual labor shortages. Conversely, a growing population can also be an asset in attempts to get out of underdevelopment. In the context of a revolutionary socialist political leadership—Communist China is a case in point—manpower can be substituted for the lack of machinery and external economic assistance.*

The industrialization process has had a negative impact on political consciousness in Puerto Rico. Massive movements of capital and ideas from the United States has affected a whole series of related services such as education, culture and the mass media. This development has undercut the basis for radical political appeals and has created a dependent strata of subproletarians and lumpen-proletarians. The external manipulation of consciousness has created formidable obstacles for revolutionaries seeking a social basis for fundamental socioeconomic and political change.

---

*The ability to motivate people to work and sacrifice implies a capacity on the part of the political elites to gain belief and trust, and the moral authority to impose discipline where necessary. This is impossible in a rigidly stratified society such as Puerto Rico where sacrifices would result in differential impacts on different classes.

NOTES

1. William A. Williams, "The Large Corporation and American Foreign Policy," in *Corporations and the Cold War,* ed., David Horowitz (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 78.

2. *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Papers, Speeches,* edited by Walter LaFeber (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 129.

3. Chester Lloyd Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1916), p. 100.

4. Quoted in Robert J. Hunter, "Historical Survey of the Puerto Rico Status Question, 1898-1965," in *Status of Puerto Rico.* United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1966), p. 56.

5. Ibid., p. 76.

6. Henry Wells, *The Modernization of Puerto Rico* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 87.

7. Thomas C. Cochran, *The Puerto Rican Businessman* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959), p. 23. Although there was a high proportion of individual land ownership at the time of the U.S. military intervention, 2.18 percent of the farms accounted for over 72 per cent of the agricultural land. "A high percentage of farmers were owners, but the bulk of the land belonged to a chosen few." Bailey W. and Justine Whitfield Diffie, *Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge* (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1931), p. 22.

8. Ibid., pp. 140-141, 53.

9. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role of the Financial Sector in the Economic Development of Puerto Rico* (New York: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, December 1970), p. 23.

10. Diffie and Diffie, *Porto Rico,* p. 181.

11. Matthew O. Edel, "Land Reform in Puerto Rico, 1940-1959," Part One, *Caribbean Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1962, p. 27; Also see Diffie and Diffie, *Porto Rico,* pp. 85-86.

12. Puerto Rico Planning Board, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, *Puerto Rico, Statistical Yearbook, 1951-1952* (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico), p. 221.

13. Diffie and Diffie, *Porto Rico,* p. 141.

14. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role,* p. 24.

15. Thomas C. Cochran, *Puerto Rican Businessman,* p. 41.

16. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role,* p. 23.

17. Puerto Rico Planning Board, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook,* p. 221.

18. Manuel Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 80.

19. Santiago Iglesias discussing the period of U.S. Governor Yager (1913-1921), as quoted in *The United States in Puerto Rico 1898-1900* by Edward J. Berbusse (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1966, p. 228.

20. Victor S. Clark, et al., *Porto Rico and its Problems* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930), p. xx; Rita M. Maldonado, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

21. Diffie and Diffie, p. 155.

22. Luis Muñoz Marín, "The Sad Case of Porto Rico," *The American Mercury*, Vol. XV1, No. 62, February 1929, pp. 138-139.

23. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, p. 27. For some earlier studies of the program see Teodoro Moscoso, "Industrial Development in Puerto Rico," *The Annals*, Vol. 285, January 1953, pp. 60-69; W. Arthur Lewis, "Industrial Development in Puerto Rico," *The Caribbean Economic Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2, pp. 153-176; William H. Snead, *Fomento: The Economic Development of Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association Pamphlet, No. 103, March 1958).

24. Gordon K. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 115.

25. Edel, "Land Reform," Part One, p. 30.

26. Harvey S. Perloff, *Puerto Rico's Economic Future: A Study in Planned Development* (Chicago, Illinis: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 34.

27. Edel, "Land Reform," Part One, p. 31.

28. Edel, "Land Reform," Part Two, *Caribbean Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 4, January 1963, p. 48. In 1961, one of the four largest U.S. corporations, Central Aguirre, was still remitting profits of almost $1 million a year. Ibid.

29. Edel, "Land Reform," Part One, p. 56.

30. Quoted in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Puerto Rico, A Survey of Historical, Economic, and Political Affairs, 1959* (by Robert J. Hunter). 89th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print, November 25, 1959 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 16.

31. *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. 111, No. 11, November 1950, p. 22.

32. Quoted in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Puerto Rico: A Survey*, p.19.

33. Quoted in Carl T. Rowan, "Critical Puerto Rican Challenge," *Washington Star*, August 3, 1973, p. A11.

34. Milton C. Taylor, *Industrial Tax-Exemption in Puerto Rico* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 28.

35. *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. IX, No. 11, December 1956, p. 534.

36. Ernst & Ernst, *Puerto Rico: A National Profile* (International Business Series Publications, March 1971), pp. 24-25.

37. Ibid., p. 19; "Puerto Rican Economy Moving Ahead Rapidly," *Journal of Commerce*, August 16, 1971 (Section 2), p. 19.

38. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Puerto Rico*, No. 30, May 1960, p. 9.

39. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Puerto Rico, U.S.A.* (Washington, D.C., September 1971), p. 61.

40. "Puerto Rico's Vast Petrochemical Plans Raise Both Economic Hope and Questions," *Business Latin America*, May 24, 1973, p. 168.

41. Miguel Soler, "The Proletarization of the Puerto Rican," *NACLA Newsletter*, Vol. 1, No. 5, July 1967, p. 3.

42. "Puerto Rico's Vast Petrochemical Plans," p. 168.

43. "A Boost For Puerto Rico Boom," *Business Week*, July 29, 1967. p. 69.

44. "Puerto Rico's Vast Petrochemical Plans," p. 167.

45. Ernst & Ernst, *Puerto Rico*, p. 9.

46. Economist Intelligence Unit, No. 4, October 1966, p. 12.

47. Ibid., No. 3, August 1971, p. 13.

48. "Puerto Rico Lands Large Japanese Venture For Its Growing Petrochemical Sector," *Business Latin America*, July 19, 1973, p. 226.

49. Sir Harold Mitchell, *Caribbean Patterns: A Political and Economic Study of the Contemporary Caribbean* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), p. 118; "Puerto Rico: Commonwealth for ever?," *Latin America*, Vol. 1, No. 14, July 28, 1967, p. 106.

50. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, p. 32.

50A. commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic and Financial Research, *Economy and Finances, Puerto Rico 1972*, p. 26.

51. "Puerto Rican Family Spending Survey Probes Changing Consumer Habits," *Business Latin America*, February 8, 1968, p. 46.

52. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, p. 39.

53. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Government Development Bank, *Puerto Rico: Financial Facts, 1972* (November 1972).

54. "Aid Planned Here For Puerto Ricans," *New York Times*, January 1, 1947, p. 25.

55. Sol Luis Descartes, "Financing Economic Development in Puerto Rico," *The Caribbean Economic Review*, Vol. 11, No. 1, May 1950, p. 85; "Puerto Rico Finds Income Increase," *New York Times*, August 1, 1954, p. 25.

56. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, pp. 24, 44; Henry Wells, *Modernization*, p. 156.

57. "Puerto Rican Family Spending Survey," p. 48.

58. Isal Abstracts, *Puerto Rico*, Vol. 4, No. 34 (Year 4), p. 13.

59. *NACLA'S Latin American & Empire Report*, Vol. V1, No. 6, July-August, 1972, p. 4.

60. *New York Times*, March 21, 1971, p. 58.

61. Harvey S. Perloff, *Puerto Rico's Economic Future*, p. 149.

62. *Facts on File*, Vol. X, No. 524, November 10-16, 1950, p. 369.

63. *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. V1, No. 7, August 1953, p. 21.

64. Luis Muñoz-Marín, as quoted in *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. VIII, No. 10, November 1955, p. 470.

65. AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION WORKERS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO, 1959-1972 ($)

Year	Puerto Rico	United States	Differential
1959	31.78	88.26	56.48
1960	33.56	89.72	56.16
1961	36.56	92.34	55.78
1962	39.33	96.56	57.23
1963	40.99	99.63	58.64
1964	44.09	102.97	58.88
1965	45.57	107.53	61.96
1966	48.30	112.34	64.04
1967	52.00	114.90	62.90
1968	57.74	122.51	64.77
1969	61.20	129.51	68.31
1970	64.59	133.73	69.14
1971	69.94	142.04	72.10
1972	74.23	154.69	80.46

Sources: International Labour Office, Geneva, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1968 (pp. 525, 526) and 1972 (p. 571); U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Monthly Labor Review*, August 1973, p. 114: U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972*, p. 235.

66. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, Annual Supplement 1972, p. 31. During the 1948-1952 period, the labor situation was further eased by the absorption of some 40,000 men into the U.S. armed forces as a result of the Korean War. Most of these men would otherwise have been part of the civilian labor force looking for employment. See A.J. Jaffe, *People, Jobs and Economic Development* (Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 46.

67. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, pp. 29-30; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of the Treasury, op. cit., p. 7.

68. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business, *Tax Treatment of U.S. Concerns with Puerto Rico Affiliates*. 88th Congress, 2nd Session, April 16 and 17, 1964, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 74.

69. See Table 4 in text; Everett W. Reimer, *Social Planning: Collected Papers 1957-68*. CIDOC Cuaderno No. 22 (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1968), pp. 67-68.

70. Tobacco production declined from 37,900 lbs. in 1965 to 9,920 lbs. in 1969. Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit., No. 3, July 1967, p. 12 and No. 1, January 1968, p. 2.

71. "Companies to Feel Puerto Rican Labor Pinch," *Business Latin America*, July 8, 1971, p. 214.

72. Manuel Casiano, administrator of the Economic Development Administration, as quoted in Ibid.

73. Robert C. Mings, "Puerto Rico and Tourism," *Caribbean Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1968, p. 16.

74. Ibid., p. 18.

75. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic and Financial Research, *Economy and Finances, Puerto Rico 1968*, pp. 9-10.

76. Gordon Lewis, "The U.S. Virgin Islands: Prototype of the Caribbean Tourist Economy," in *Politics and Economics in the Caribbean*, eds., T.G. Matthews and F.M. Andic. Special Study No. 8 (University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1971), p. 237.

77. Luis Muñoz Marín, "Puerto Rico and the U.S., Their Future Together," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 1954, p. 541.

78. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 1, January 1969, p. 11.

79. Gordon K. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power* p. 143. The U.S. Pentagon also owns 13% of Puerto Rico's land area, testifying to the island's strategic importance as a base from which the U.S. can exercise its control over unstable political situations in the Caribbean. See *NACLA'S Latin America & Empire Report, op. cit.*, p. 4.

80. Norman Girvan, "Multinational Corporations and Dependent Underdevelopment in Mineral-Export Economies," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1970, p. 516.

81. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business, p. 252.

82. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 22, June 1958, p. 10.

83. Werner Baer, *The Puerto Rican Economy and United States Economic Fluctuations* (University of Puerto, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Social Science Research Center, 1962), pp. 146-147.

84. "Industrial Growth in Puerto Rico Slowed Sharply in Fiscal 1971," *Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 1971, p. 23.

85. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 119, No. 124, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, p. E5335.

86. Quoted in "Industrial Growth in Puerto Rico," p. 23.

87. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 1, February 1972, p. 15. The position of the U.S. as the island's only significant trading partner has weakned only marginally in recent years. In 1969-1970, the U.S. received approximately 89 per cent of Puerto Rico's exports and supplied just under 80 per cent of its imports. In 1971, the figures were 76 per cent and 92 per cent respectively. See Puerto Rican Planning Board, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, *External Trade Statistics, 1970* (June 1972), pp. 399, 552; U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972*, p. 798. For the impact of the recession on the tourist industry, see Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, *Progress in Puerto Rico: Basic Facts*, Vol. VII, No. 2, Second Quarter 1971.

88. Henry Wells, *Modernization*, p. 333.

Manuel Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico*, p. 176. In pre-1959 Cuba, U.S. economic penetration had also transformed the Cuban bourgeoisie into "a dependent comprador stratum of foreign business interests." James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 22.

90. Eduardo Seda-Bonilla, "Dependence as an Obstacle to Development: Puerto Rico," in *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean*, eds., Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1972), p. 104.

91. Gordon K. Lewis, *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power*, p. 189.

92. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, Annual Supplement 1972, p. 32; Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic and Financial Research, *Economy and Finances, Puerto Rico 1972* (November 1972), p. 7.

93. Rita M. Maldonado, *The Role*, p. 43.

94. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 2, May 1973, p. 16.

95. Ibid., No. 3, August 1972, p. 11 and No. 1, February 1973, p. 13. Sugar production declined from 625,000 tons in 1967 to 325,000 in 1971. Tobacco production in the same period declined from 12,184,000 lbs. to 4,821 lbs. Ibid., Annual Supplement, 1972, p. 34. The number of active sugar mills dropped from 41 in 1934 to 15 in 1971. See Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture, Office of Agricultural Statistics, *Facts & Figures on Puerto Rico's Agriculture 1969-70* (Santurce, Puerto Rico, June 1970), p. 34.

96. H. Erich Heinemann, "Puerto Rico: The Word is Growth," *New York Times*, June 17, 1968, p. 58. Puerto Rico's balance of payments deficit has grown from over $40 million in 1940-1941 to in excess of $520 million in 1967-1968. See Puerto Rico Planning Boad, Bureau of Economics and Statistics, *Puerto Rico, Statistical Yearbook, 1951-1952*, p. 221 and Puerto Rico Planning Board, Bureau of Economic and Social Analysis, *Statistical Yearbook, Puerto Rico 1968*, p. 169. Another factor contributing to this state of affairs related to the U.S. statutory requirements giving U.S. shipowners a monopoly of shipping lanes between the two countries. U.S. shipowners, with at least the passive support of the U.S. Maritime Board, have acted arbitarily to increase freight and other costs on a number

of occasions. Between 1946 and 1958, for example, freight charges were increased on five separate occasions. See Earl Parker Hanson, *Puerto Rico: Ally for Progress* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), p. 77. In no instance was the Puerto Rican government as much as consulted. These actions have often meant the demise of indigenous enterprises operating on low profit margins.

97. H. Erich Heinemann, "Puerto Rico: Growth," p. 58.

98. "Puerto Rico Steps Up Tourism Rescue Effort, Plans Loans to Hotels," *Wall Street Journal,* April 19, 1971, p. 10.

99. *Hispanic American Report,* Vol. XI, No. 11, December 1958, p. 613.

100. "Puerto Rico Takes Action on Problem of Drug Addiction," *New York Times,* July 29, 1973, p. 51.

101. Quoted from 'Declaration of Puerto Rican Socialist Party' in *NACLA'S Latin America & Empire Report,* Vol. V, No. 8, December 1971, p. 13.

102. Robert C. Mings, "Puerto Rico and Tourism," p. 14.

103. "Puerto Rico's Legislative Session Not as Hard on Business as Expected," *Business Latin America,* July 20, 1972, p. 230.

104. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Government Development Bank, *op. cit.*

105. Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism,* eds., K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1971), p. 228.

106. James Petras & Thomas Cook, "Dependency and the Industrial Bourgeoisie: Attitudes of Argentine Executives Toward Foreign Economic Investment and U.S. Policy," in *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution,* ed., James Petras (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 144.

107. Ibid., p. 162.

108. J. Serra, "The Brazilian 'Economic Miracle'," in *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution,* p. 133.

109. Ibid., pp. 108-109.

110. M.C. Tavares & J. Serra, "Beyond Stagnation: A Discussion on the Nature of Recent Developments in Brazil," in *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution,* p. 77.

111. See, for example, Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969) and Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism,* op. cit., pp. 155-181.

112. Fernándo Henrique Cardoso fails to make this distinction in an otherwise interesting essay, "Dependency and Development in Latin America," *New Left Review,* No. 74, July-August 1972, pp. 83-95.

The Development of Social Classes and Political Conflicts in Puerto Rico*

Angel G. Quintero Rivera

The political history of Puerto Rico generally has been interpreted either in terms of great political leaders or in terms of the internal ideological conflict over the colonial status of the island–that is, the conflict among those favoring assimilation to the metropolis, those in favor of "autonomy," and those for independence. These approaches often are intermingled, since the great political leaders are seen in terms of their positions regarding the status issue, and the conflict over status is personalized in the maximum leaders. This essay aims to show the limitations of these approaches[1] and the importance of analyzing (jointly with the colonial problem) the development of class conflicts in Puerto Rico's colonial situation.[2]

The concept of class is used in this essay as a historical formation, not as a statistical occupational category; not as a thing that is, but as a phenomenon that happens. As the English social historian E. P. Thompson has stated:

---

*This article has been abridged by the author from the original published in Ramírez, Buitrago, and Levine, eds., *Problemas de desigualdad social en Puerto Rico* (San Juan: Libreria Internacional, 1972). This book is being translated into English and will appear with the title *Problems of Social Inequality in Puerto Rico*. The version of the article which appears here was translated from the Spanish by Adalberto López and has been abridged slightly in the text and greatly in the footnotes. The article appears here with the permission of the author.

> Class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared) feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations . . . Class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.[3]

Therefore, in our view, a social class cannot be analyzed except within the context of the socio-economic structure that serves as the foundation of its experiences and in terms of its relation or conflict with the other classes, where its reactions, makings and creations become manifest.

The Plantation Economy

The study of the history of social classes in Puerto Rico in the twentieth century has to begin with an analysis of the process of change from a semi-feudal hacienda economy to an economy dominated by capitalist plantation agriculture. This transformation began in the latter part of the nineteenth century, but really gathered impetus with the North American occupation of the island in 1898. The economic policies of the first North American governors were geared to facilitate the creation and growth of large North American sugar and tobacco companies. Already by the end of the second decade of this century, these companies (specially those involved in sugar production) had become masters of the Puerto Rican economy.[4]

The sugar plantations, although in a rural setting, developed basically the same relationships that are identified with the capitalist system, which has been usually analyzed as an urban phenomenon.[5] First, the relations between employer and employee were of a purely economic character.[6] The former considered the employee an economic good and strived to get the maximum profit out of his work. Second, man no longer sold his produce but his labor power. The sale of his labor power came to constitute his main economic activity; he became a wage earner. Third, since the sale of his labor power bcame the principal economic activity of the worker, his economic life came to be centered on money. The agricultural worker no longer produced for himself; once he sold his labor power he was left with nothing but his wages, which he needed to meet his needs. In this context, economic betterment meant higher wages that would allow him to increase his purchasing power. Fourth (and closely related to what has been said above), man was separated from his product. Separated, because he did not own it, and because the division of labor that was introduced by the plantation-mill complex did not allow him to produce something in its totality (the worker went to cut the sugar cane, not to produce sugar). The worker was also separated from his product, because the technological changes introduced into the plantation-mill production process did not allow him to understand the productive process as a whole.

Finally, the plantation system generated a trend toward homogeneity among the workers. This trend is found in the settlement patterns that the system generated: primarily, housing clusters or small villages (*aldeas*) exclusively inhabited by plantation workers.[7] The pattern was more homogenizing when these villages were created by the sugar companies themselves.[8] The trend towards homogenization is also found in the relations between capital and labor. If the relations between owner and worker were purely economic in character, and the difference among the workers' wages minimal, the relations between owner and worker were therefore, fundamentally the same for all. All workers were subject to the same form of exploitation. In addition, the tasks performed on the plantation were of such a nature that they limited the possibility for the development of special skills. Thus, social distinctions among the workers were hindered.

The breakdown of the social relations that had characterized life in the hacienda—dominant economic structure prior to the establishment of the plantation system—had two very important results. First, the elimination of the affective bonds and shared life between owner and worker allowed interstrata struggle, and, second, the weakening of these vertical social relationships strengthened the horizontal ones.[9] The life of the worker went on almost exclusively within his own class, and a more clear-cut class culture developed.

Furthermore, the commercial character of plantation agriculture—the concentration on the production of a cash crop oriented towards an external market—made the plantation dependent on a favorable wider social system, on what Edgar Thompson has called "the social system of plantations."[10] Similarly, as has already been suggested, the plantation system generated a money economy and a home market. These developments helped to broaden the vision of the workers. They did not find themselves solely under one administrator or owner, but in the lowest scale of an entire social organization on which the plantations depended: they were not the "long-suffering ones" *(los sufridos)* of the hacienda, but the poor (*los pobres*) of Puerto Rico.

As the plantation economy spread through Puerto Rico, a rural proletariat began to emerge. The myths of hacienda life crumbled for this group which, given its position in the new system of production, began to develop an image of an ideal new social order at the same time that it struggled to establish it.[11] This class found (and formed) organizational expression in the Free Federation of Laborers (*Federación Libre de Trabjadores*—FLT) whose genesis dates back to the organizational activities of artisan groups at the end of the nineteenth century, but which materialized in the large sugar cane plantations and tobacco processing factories. From the FLT emerged the Socialist Party, which was basically its political arm. Aiming towards the creation of a new order of social relations, the political expression of the working class turned against the social order which then prevailed: against the hegemonic culture of hacienda life. Its antagonic class was, therefore, the Puerto Rican hacienda owners.

It is worthwhile, at this point, to make a brief conceptual digression to the ways in which Puerto Rican history has been interpreted, an issue raised at the beginning of this article. The emergence of the FLT and the Socialist Party have been usually interpreted from the perspective of the great-leader conception of history: as the creation of labor leader Santiago Iglesias Pantín. I have attempted to present a new perspective in analyzing this phenomenon; to explain the emergence of the FLT and the Socialist Party in terms of the change from a semi-feudal hacienda economy to a capitalist plantation agriculture, analyzing the development of a new class situation and the conflicts it generated.[12]

Bearing in mind the class nature of the Socialist Party and the socioeconomic structuring of the society at the moment, one can better understand the makings and actions that led to the formation of this class-struggle organization. Only in this way can one understand and explain the strikes, the burning of sugar fields, the fiery speeches of anarchists such as Eduardo Conde, the large number of workers' papers that appeared in the early years of this century (*El Porvenir Social, Yo Acuso, La Miseria, Alba Roja, El Pan del Pobre* . . .), the participation of Santiago Iglesias in the conventions of the American Federation of Labor, the workers' study groups (where workers met to discuss the great socialist writings), the creation of the Red Circle of Proletarian Theater and other similar developments.

The Triangular Conflict of the First Decades Under North American Domination

The emergence of capitalist agriculture in the island also had a tremendous impact on the Puerto Rican *hacendados* and subsistance farmers. Some of these subsistance farmers became workers in the sugar plantations.[13] Others began to plant sugar cane to be processed in the North American sugar mills (the small *colonos*) or to plant tobacco whose processing and marketing was controlled by North American companies. These formerly independent farmers became then dependent on the North American companies and on the commercial system.

The *hacendados*, which constituted the hegemonic class in terms of its dominance in the way of life, could not be considered the dominant segment within the ruling class during the period following the North American invasion of 1898. The government imposed by the invaders destroyed the political power the hacienda owners had enjoyed before,[14] with the implications this had on the loss of control over economic policies. Gradually, they also lost their dominant position in the economy to the North American sugar and tobacco companies, which followed upon the heels of the North American troops. This undermined their hegemonic position.[15] By the first decade of North American domination the *hacendados* had begun to present (though timidly) an opposition, which culminated with the pro-independence declaration of the political party that represented their class (the Unionist Party) in 1913.[16]

Thus, in these first decades of North American colonial rule in Puerto Rico, a triangular political conflict was evident: on the one hand, there was the recently developed plantation proletariat; on the other, the *hacendado* class (with the backing of hacienda laborers and peasants); and above both, the colonial power (with its Puerto Rican intermediaries). This triangular conflict combined the phenomena of internal class struggle and class-based conflicts with the colonial metropolis.

The party that represented Puerto Rican hacendados, the Unionist Party, had also the largest political support. It won the election of 1904 and was not defeated at the polls until 1932. The political organization of the plantation proletariat constituted during this period a minority force when compared to the Unionist Party. Many areas of the island still were under the economy of haciendas and peasants, and in the plantations the process of transforming a total vision of world and social life, rooted in the agrarian situation that previously existed, was a process that required time. Given these political realities, the plantation proletariat had to resort on occasions to the power of the metropolis (to organizations like the American Fedration of Labor—AFL—or directly to the government of the United States) in its struggle against its antagonic class, the hacendados.[17] This had a tremendous impact on its ideology.

The practice of appealing to the power of the metropolis has led those who have interpreted the politics and history of Puerto Rico in terms of the status issue to place the Socialist Party and the FLT during those first decades of North American colonial rule among the groups favoring assimilation to the metropolis.[18] Yet, the issue of the island's status was not a frequent theme in working-class writings of that time; the status issue was of secondary importance, not the center of their concern and activities. Also, there was no unanimity within the workers' movement on the status issue. On the contrary, there were great differences that often generated bitter arguments in the Party's conventions.[19] In addition, the available documents show that taking a position on the status issue in those first decades meant a difficult and painful process for many working class leaders.[20] Some of these leaders, for example, saw an independent republic as a prerequisite for socialism, for the creation of the new social system to which they aspired. At the same time, however, they realized that independence at that time would have brought about the absolute political preeminence of the *hacendados*. Independence would have turned the triangular political conflict into a dual conflict, in which the hacendados would have been in a more advantageous position. The apparent assimilist character of some of the actions of the FLT was really a weapon or shield in their class struggle against the Puerto Rican *hacendados*. It was the class struggle which led the workers into taking a position on the status issue, not vice-versa.

It is important to keep this point clearly in mind, because in order to analyze the nature of the political conflicts in these decades it is necessary to identify the social groups who represented or supported the colonial metropolitan power in the island's internal politics, and it is erroneous to include the plantation proletariat and their organizations among these groups. The social groups that represented the interests of the metropolis in Puerto Rican politics were mainly the groups that formed the core of support of the pro-statehood Republican Party (Republican, because of its ties with the American Republican Party). Within this party one can distinguish three principal social groups.[21]

First, there were the Puerto Rican middlemen at the service of North American corporations: specifically, managers, corporation lawyers, and so on down the corporation bureaucratic hierarchy to foremen. Some of these managers and lawyers gradually became shareholders in the companies, and by the late twenties and thirties were among the wealthiest families on the island.

In a similar social situation were a small group of Puerto Rican landowners who were able to reorganize their holdings and productive system along the lines of the North American companies. A narrow conception of class interests might lead some to conclude that there was a situation of potential antagonism between these local landowners and the absentee-owned companies, their competitors in the capitalist economic game. The foundations of their economic power were based, however,on the capitalist mode of production, on the entire socio-economic organization that the plantation system created. Since this socio-economic organization was being threatened both by the socialists of the FLT and the *hacendados* of the Unionist Party, the class interests of Puerto Rican plantation owners came to be centered on the defense of the system, which was the basis of their position in the means of production.

Plantation agriculture, with its concentration on a single export cash crop, reduced greatly the availability of certain goods previously produced locally. This explains the rapid growth of a merchant class in Puerto Rico that became tied to the U.S. market. Since the island was now under the tariff system of the United States, the merchants who flourished during the first decades of the century were those dealing with trading houses in New York, Baltimore and Philadelphia, and not the old merchant group that had controlled the trade between the island and Spain.[22] The success and *raison d'etre* of the new merchant class (and the Puerto Rican middlemen alike) was the integration of the Puerto Rican economy into that of the United States. For the merchants, as for the middlemen, statehood represented the perpetuation of this integration.

The third social group that formed the core of support of the Republican Party—and that to a great extent gave the Party its ideology, in the way of life it proposed—were the professionals of the beginning of the century: doctors, engineers, federal employees and a small group of white-collar workers. Their interests as a social group were centered around the development of a modern, professionalized and bureaucratized way of life in which they would play a central role. To these professionals as a group the North American preeminence in the island meant a possible gateway for "modernization."

The Revival of the "Bourgeoisie"

The decade of the thirties in Puerto Rico was a period of hopelessness and uncertainty. The three main political groups had lost their significance in terms of the way of life they represented. The social structure of the hacienda, which the Unionist Party supported, was in bankrupcy. The hope of a new "modern" social order that the North Americans had been expected to bring and that had been advocated by the Republican Party in its early years was destroyed by the blatant colonial policies of the United States itself.[23] (The governors of the island, for example, were usually appointed to pay for political debts or political favors, and the island became a sunny spot where North American military officers and politicians could retire with an honorable position.)[24] Finally, the Socialist Party—the party of the workers—had fallen into a simple trade-unionist position, striving only for higher wages and better living conditions, and thus burying the aspirations of the working class for a new and radically different social order.

The thirties were also years of crisis for international capitalism, the years of the world depression. The depression made the contradictions within the capitalist system more evident. The plantation economy, with its emphasis on the production of one cash crop, had placed the island's economy in a position of total dependency on the commercial system. The great crisis in international commerce had, therefore, disastrous consequences on the Puerto Rican people. The depression accounted for a tremendous rate of unemployment in the island: 60 per cent of the labor force. (The FLT did not organize this mass of unemployed workers, which was then, definitively, one of the most important sectors of the working class. It lost, thus, its relevance as *the* working class struggle organization in this situation.[25]) Faced with these developments, hopelessness became general among the various sectors of Puerto Rican society.

The only political group that in the thirties represented an alternative of hope for a different way of life was the Nationalist Party. Some of the elements in this alternative, however, were unacceptable to the culture and ideology of the Puerto Rican proletariat.[26] Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party, though a small group, was at the center of the major political events of the thirties.

The breakdown of the hacienda social organization and the growing importance of the professions in a socio-economic system of greater macro-integration (and specifically the importance of public school teaching with the expansion of the educational system) led many *hacendados* and owners of medium-sized farms to sell their lands in order to assure a professional education for their children. Many moved to the large urban centers to facilitate their children's education. Thus, this second generation of the *hacendado* class became more linked to the liberal professions than to agriculture. This generation—born when the social structure of the hacienda was beginning to crumble and when its class had lost its political and economic hegemony—found itself in a secondary position in the social hierarchy. This fostered the development among its members of a more radical ideology oriented to change. The image of modernity which the Republicans of the beginnings of the century had presented, was transferred to this new social group.[27] With strong roots in the traditions and culture of the hacienda system, this new petty-bourgeoisiemaintained the support of the hacienda laborers and of the small *colonos*, while at the same time its new and more radical ideology and its lower social position made possible an alliance with an important sector of the proletariat that had become discontented with the decaying political organizations that in the past had represented it.[28]

Since the *hacendados* had lost their class hegemony and also to a very great extent the control over the means of production, the Puerto Rican plantation proletariat came to realize that the *hacendados* were no longer their antagonic class. By the Thirties it had become clear to the island's proletariat that its real class enemies were the great absentee North American corporations which controlled the sugar industry.[29] These corporations had also been, for many years, the enemies of the *hacendados* and small *colonos*. These corporations were the image of colonial capitalism in Puerto Rico; a system whose contradictions and weaknesses had been made clear by the crisis of the world depression. Thus, an alliance of workers, small *colonos*, a few remaining *hacendados*, and the new "*hacendado* bourgeoisie" emerged in the form of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), whose program was basically one of opposition to the evils and injustices of the economic and political colonialism represented on the island by the power of the great North American sugar corporations. The PPD won control of the insular senate in the elections of 1940 and an ample majority in both the senate and the house of representatives in all the elections from 1944 to 1964.

These victories were accompanied by the granting of greater self-government to the island, to the point where it could be said, for the first time in the history of Puerto Rico under U.S. colonial rule, that the PPD was not only the majority party but the governing party as well. The PPD government initiated a series of radical programs. Among these was the nationalization of certain privately owned utilities (electrical service, for example) and attempts at agrarian reform. Although initially in favor of independence,[30] the *Populares* decided to let the status issue rest during the years of World War II[31] and concentrated their efforts on their economic program.

The key posts in the insular government in the decade of the forties went mostly to members of the new generation of radical professionals (mostly sons of the old *hacendados).*[32] The social structure of the hacienda being destroyed, this group, as a class, needed to find a new economic basis to establish its social hegemony. Following the example of Roosevelt's New Deal and always hoping for the support from New Deal administrators in the US, this class found in government planning of the economy a new base for economic power: They emerged as technocrats in a new industrial welfare state. After an initial attempt to develop state-owned enterprises, the new technocrats concluded that the easiest way to bring about the industrialization to which they were committed was to attract (in a planned manner) private North American capital to the island. Realizing that independence and radical socio-economic programs were an obstacle to this, the leadership of the PPD adopted autonomy as its political goal, took a more moderate stand and moved progressively to the right on socio-economic issues.[33]

Industrialization was brought about primarily by attracting subsidiaries of North American firms. The new industrialization policy of the PPD government (i.e. the policy of facilitating North American investment) depended greatly on maintaining a low wage level that would be attractive to North American investors. In 1950, for example, the average hourly wage in Puerto Rico industries was 27 per cent of the average hourly wage in the United States.[34] To maintain such a wage level, government control of labor unions (or, at the very least, deliberate efforts to weaken them) became a necessity.

Thus, the decade of the forties was one of conflict between two groups that had allied themselves at the beginning of the decade: a conflict between the emerging class of technocrats (sons of the old *hacendados*) and the working class. It was not difficut for these technocrats to establish control or to weaken the labor movement in Puerto Rico, for during the decade of the forties Puerto Rican society experienced a series of social processes that gradually fragmented the working class as a class; destroyed a whole "culture" in which the plantation proletariat was forged.

This occurrence, which can be labeled the "unmaking of the plantation proletariat" has to be seen in terms of the transformation which the Puerto Rican economy experienced in the forties; a transformation from plantation to industrial economy. Although this process got under way in the early Forties, it became particularly intense at the end of that decade and thereafter. (See Graph 1) This transformation of the economy changed the structure of production. It changed what had served as a base for shared experiences, around which there had been developing an identity of interests; interests of a purely economic nature, and interests that implied a whole way of life.

GRAPH 1. RATE OF GROWTH OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY AND OF MANUFACTURING (AVERAGE PERCENTAGE EVERY FIVE YEARS).



(Source: This graph is taken from José Herrero, *La mitología del azúcar, un ensayo en historia económica de Puerto Rico* [manuscript of a book in preparation],though we are merely reproducing the general tendencies of the curves not the exact relationships between coordinates.)

During the forties other processes reinforced this "unmaking" which, as has been explained, had as its basis the economic transformation that the island was undergoing. Among these changes one can point to the following: First, the emergence of a new social type in Puerto Rico, the veteran, who was a result of World War II and the Korean War. Many veterans were of plantation-proletariat origin, but making use of the facilities made available to them by the Veteran's Administration (facilities for study, loans for small businesses or to buy cars and become taxi or *públicos* drivers and credit facilities to purchase homes in new middle class housing development) gradually separated them from their class of origin.[35] Whereas in the first three decades of North American rule, the only means available to the plantation proletariat to improve its economic condition was collective trade union action (strikes, collective bargaining), the Veteran's Administration introduced a channel for individual economic improvement. This opened cleaveges in the culture of combativeness of the proletariat.

In the same way, the massive emigration of Puerto Ricans to New York and other industrial centers in the US mainland, an emigration that was encouraged and facilitated by the PPD government,[36] gave working-class families on the island a channel for individual economic improvement without class struggle.

As has been pointed out above, the Puerto Rican program for industrialization relied greatly on the establishment on the island of subsidiaries of North American firms. The unions that represented the workers in the home firms in the United States set out to unionize the Puerto Rican workers employed by the subsidiaries on the Island. U.S. trade unions (the so-called 'internationals') invaded the island and created a climate of competition among the unions to represent the workers. This also contributed to the growing cleaveges in working-class solidarity, which had emerged among the plantation proletariat and historically had been channeled through a single labor union, the FLT.

The third factor that reinforced the "unmaking" of the plantation proletariat was the change in the legal structure concerning labor relation brought about by the Taft-Hartley Law. The illegalization of solidarity strikes (of fundamental importance in the history of the FLT), the measures that implied abolition of wildcat strikes (which had been a characteristic tactic of the Puerto Rican proletariat in its struggle), and the complicated procedures that placed the rich North American unions in an advantageous position in the conflict with local labor unions to represent Puerto Rican workers, brought about the disintegration of the type of struggle which the plantation proletariat had been developing.

Since industry offered better wages than agriculture, the new class of "sons of old *hacendados*" made use of the drive towards industrialization (Operation Bootstrap) as *mystique* to control the class struggle, to bring passivity to the working class and its organization.[37] Luis Muñoz Marín—main leader of this new class and governor of Puerto Rico from 1948 to 1964—For example, stated in a speech he delivered to a congress of workers, that the function of the labor movement in Puerto Rico was to *cooperate* with the "economic development" of the island; a development being carried out or guided by the government. He implied that to "cooperate with economic development" meant not to disrupt government policies or frighten or alienate foreign investment (which, as has been explained above, formed the base for the industrialization of the island) by any sort of militant struggle.[38]

Since better wages were associated with industry, and since industry was brought about through government efforts, economic well-being was seen as being dependent on government. Whereas in the plantation economy economic improvement was linked to the collective trade-unionist struggle, in the new situation of industrialization it became associated with submission to government programs. In this way, the class of "sons of old *hacendados*" revived (with the differences in new socio-economic structure) the paternalism of the old hacienda system.[39]

During the entire decade of the fifties, industrialization was seen as being brought by or linked to the programs of the Economic Development Administration (*Fomento*). Yet, by the late sixties (industrial capitalism being firmly established in the island) industrialization begins to be seen as an autonomous phenomenom. And faced with this new pattern of relations of production the working class began a process of remaking.

At the end of the forties, as a result of the process of industrialization, the social structure of the island began to change in its middle strata. A small group of Puerto Ricans who were able to become industrialists and merchants along North American lines and style emerged; a group whose class interests were linked to the type of socio-economic organization of the United States.[40]

The old guard of the Republican Party—the middlemen of the plantation economy—maintained control of the party in spite of the fact that the party was progressively becoming a party of new middlemen.[41]

The potential conflict that this development implied came to a climax in 1966 when a group of new middlemen took over and created a new party: the New Progressive Party (PNP). Taking advantage of the internal conflicts that were raging within the PPD and the growing disenchantment with that party the PNP won the elections of 1968.

The electoral triumph of the PNP represented the victory of those in Puerto Rican society whose interests are intimately linked to the colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, and who, by advocating statehood, seek to make that relationship permanent. It was a victory made possible, nevertheless, by an urban working class protest vote against the PPD.[42] In this sense, its electoral support had a very weak basis: the residents of *caseríos* and *arrabales*, for example, were not committed to the PNP's politics; they supported this party as a protest against a government which they had begun to realize was not for their benefit. The weak base of '68 PNP's electoral support was demonstrated by their defeat in the following elections, when working-class people cast again their protest vote. The phenomenon of the protest vote, jointly with a recent intensification in labor militancy and other forms of working-class defiance, is an indication of the beginning of the remaking of a working class consciousness; a consciousness that will eventually lead to the formation of a working-class political force that will again seek the transformation of society in terms of the proletariat's culture of solidarity

NOTES

1. Some of these limitations are analyzed in Gervasio García in "Apuntes sobre una interpretación de la realidad puertorriqueña," *La Escalera*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1970.)

2. I have presented in more detail elsewhere the problem of the conceptions of history in interpretations of our national reality. See *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico*, edited by Angel Quintero Rivera (Río Piedras, 1971), Preface. See also, Angel Quintero Rivera, *El liderato local de los partidos y el estudio de la política puertorriqueña* (Río Piedras, 1970). In the latter work I specifically criticize the "great leader" conception of our political conflicts (or "theory of the grandee").

3. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1968), pp. 9-10.

4. For details see, Raymond Christ, "Sugar Cane and Coffee in Puerto Rico," Part I; "The Role of the Priviledge and Monopoly in the Expropriation of the Jibaro," Part II; and "The Pauperization of the Jibaro—Land Monopoly and Monoculture," in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 7, nos. 2-3 (1948). For facts on the domination of North American sugar corporations see B. W. and J. W. Diffie, *Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge* (New York, 1931) and Victor S. Clark, et al., *Porto Rico and its Problems* (Washington, D.C., 1930), especially the appendices.

5. Sidney Mintz makes a good presentation of this issue in "The Folk-Urban Continuum

and the Rural Proletariat Community," *The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LIX, No.* 2 (1953).

6. Sidney Mintz, "The Plantation as a Socio-Cultural Type," in OAS, *Plantation Systems in the New World* Washington, D.C., (1959). See also, Julian Steward, "Perspectives on Plantation," Ibid.

7. *Symposium on the Geography of Puerto Rico,* Edited by Clarence F. Jones and Rafael Picó (Río Piedras, 1955), pp. 343-361, presents maps that illustrate the patterns of settlement in rural areas given the type of cultivation to which these areas are devoted. The pattern of settlement in small villages (*aldeas*) in areas devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane are in clear contrast to the patterns of total dispersion which appear in areas devoted to the cultivation of tobacco and minor crops, crops generally identified with small independent landholders. The maps showing areas under coffee cultivation, generally identified with the hacienda pattern of land tenure, show certain population clusters. But in these areas, the isolated household predominates (and the degree of isolation of these households is greater than in the areas devoted to the cultivation of tobacco and minor crops).

8. The Roig Company, in the region of Yabucoa and Humacao, and the Aguirre Company in municipalities such as Santa Isabel, for example. Photographs and descriptions of some of these settlements created by the companies themselves are found in *The People of Puerto Rico, A Study in Social Anthropology,* edited by Julian Steward, (Urbana, 1956) and in Sidney Mintz, *Worker in the Cane, a Puerto Rican Life History* (New Haven, 1960).

9. This manifests itself, for example, in the patterns of *compadrazgo* (co-parenthood). Among the plantation proletariat, the *compadres* were generally friends, co-workers; in areas of Puerto Rico where small or medium-sized peasants predominated, the ties of *compadrazgo* were usually established principally among relatives; and in *hacienda* situations, the workers tended to establish such ties with those above them (e.g. the *hacendado*) in the social ladder. See, Sidney Mintz and Eric Wolf, "An Analysis of Ritual Co-Parenthood," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1950).

10. Edgar Thompson, "The Plantation as a Social System," in OAS.

11. In my work, *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico,* I present an extensive bibliography that includes references to these centers as well as to the development of the image of and aspirations for, a new society. Also, one of the documents presented in this anthology, "Páginas rojas" by Juan S. Marcano (a shoemaker of Caguas), is in itself an example of the ideal social order to which the Puerto Rican working class aspired in the second decade of this century.

12. This approach does not imply that the specific actions of leaders or militants lack importance. My argument is that these actions—obviously indispensible for a comrehensive analysis—have to be placed in the context of economic history and the dialectics of class conflicts.

13. See, Miguel Melé Muñoz, "La pequeña propriedad en el desarrollo de Puerto Rico," in *El libro de Puerto Rico,* edited by E. Fernández García, San Juan, (1923). See also, José Enamorado Cuesta, "Porto Rico after 24 years of American Rule" *Current History* (April 1923). A sociological analysis subsequent to these studies is found in Crist, "The Pauperization of the Jibaro."

14. A few months before the North American occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898, the island had acquired from Spain an Autonomic Charter. This document practically conceded political power in the island to the class of *hacendados.*

15. This helps us understand the position of Mariano Abril, ideological spokesman of the *hacendados* and Muñoz Rivera's right-hand in the newspaper *La Democracia,* towards working-class organizations. His position may be summarized as follows: The *hacendados* have been losing their power, so there does not exist in Puerto Rico the basis for a class struggle. All segments of society are equally oppressed by colonial capitalism, which constitutes the real enemy. (Mariano Abril, *El socialismo moderno,* San Juan 1911). With respect to this issue see also the attacks which José de Diego launched against the FLT in his "Cuestiones obreras," a speech he delivered as President of the House of Delegates and which appears in his Nuevas campañas *(Barcelona 1916).*

The transformation of economic structures which Puerto Rico experienced during these first years under North American colonial rule, not only placed the class of *hacendados* in a different social position, but also transformed their very nature. The tremendous growth of commercial activity—even at the level of everyday life—and the importance which the professions began to assume in a system of greater macro-integration, gradually pushed the class of *hacendados* into a process of "bourgeoisification." This class maintained its roots, however, in the hacienda life (at least until the decade of the 1930s) and the economic relations which that implies. For this reason, the most correct term to be used when referring to this class in the second and third decade of this century may be perhaps a combination of terms or a combined term, for example, "the hacendado bourgeoisie."

16. Bolívar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños* San Juan, (1959), Vol. I, p. 156.

17. A very clear example of this can be seen in the *Memorial* which the FLT sends to the U.S. Congress in 1913 under the title *The Tyranny of the House of Delegates of Porto Rico* which has been reprinted in Quintero Rivera, *Lucha obrera.*

18. Interpretations within the "theory of the grandee" add that it was due to the fact the Santiago Iglesias, being a Spaniard by birth, did not feel *"el llamado de la nacionalidad"* ("the call of nationality").

19. In the Assembly of the Socialist Party in 1919, a group of the most important leaders of the Party (Manuel F. Rojas, Secretary General; Alfonso Torres, who later on was chosen Secretary General; and Julio Aybar, Vice President of the Assembly and editor of the most important workers' newspaper at that time —*Unión Obrera*— among others) defended the "Socialist Industrial Republic" as a goal. Discussion on this issue was lengthy and heated, but no vote was taken on it. (Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño, *Programa, Constitución Territorial y Actuaciones,* 1919, which also appears in Quintero Rivera, *Lucha obrera.* Bolívar Pagán in his *Historia de los partidos,* presents a somewhat tergiversated account of the incident).

20. For example, Manuel F. Rojas, who in the assembly of the Socialist Party in 1919, was the one who led the offensive in favor of the adoption of a resolution supporting a Socialist Republic, in 1914 had written the book *Cuatro siglos de ignorancia y servidumbre en Puerto Rico* in which he expounds, with obvious pain, his objections to independence, objections which he explains in terms of the class situation at that time.

21. An analysis of social groups in the Republican Party is difficult for three main reasons: First, from 1904 (when the Unionist Party won the elections) to 1917 (when the Socialist Party participated in elections for the first time), the Republican Party was the opposition party. Even after the creation of the Socialist Party, a clearly proletarian party, the Republican Party continued to be an opposition party to those sectors of society that could not identify themselves with the working class. In this sense it brought into its fold

members of groups similar to those in the Unionist Party who were disgusted or in competition with them. (In almost all small Puerto Rican towns there were Puerto Rican *hacendados* in the Unionist Party and rival *hacendados* in the Republican Party. Already in 1914, a foreign observer, A. H. Verrill, indicated that there was a lot of "sporting" in these parties, something pointed out twenty years later by the Puerto Rican essayist Antonio S. Pedreira in his *Insularismo* published in 1934).

Second, in spite of being an *opposition party* in terms of the internal political struggle, the colonial situation of the island and the triangular nature of political conflict which has already been pointed out, permitted the Republican Party to be to a certain extent the *government party,* given its identification with the most powerful element in the "triangle": the metropolis. Thus, the governmental patronage received by the party attracted to the party a number of people who wanted a share in that patronage. This development was pointed out as early as 1899 by W. Dinwiddie, has been repeated in various subsequent documents, and was even elevated to the level of being used to categorize the party by the political scientist Robert W. Anderson in *Party Politics in Puerto Rico* (Standard, 1965). To categorize the party essentially in terms of patronage, however, is to lose sight of the more fundamental issue of what were the class interests which the party represented. But, nevertheless, the fact that the element of patronage was present in such a significant way obviously makes difficult an analysis of internal social groups.

Third, the leader of the Republican Party, Dr. José Celso Barbosa, was a Negro and his leadership introduced the racial element in support for the party. This type of support was found primarily among negroes in the middle sectors of urban society (school teachers, musicians, minor bureaucrats, a few artisans). This racial base of support, however, is not found among black members of the proletariat who refused to identify themselves with Barbosa who, in spite of being black, carried on the life style and had the world vision of the bourgeoisie. (In his writings on the racial issue one can detect a tremendous unconsciousness regarding the problem of social classes. See, José C. Barbosa, *Problema de razas,* (San Juan, 1937).

These are three elements of great importane in the Republican Party which make difficult a class analysis of the political movement this party represented, since they represent interests and sources of support which are interlaced with class interests. Nevertheless, I sustain that in spite of the fact that these elements are important, an analysis of social groups in the Republican Party is far more illuminating and helps one understand in a more profound way the positions which the party assumed.

22. Thomas Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (Gainsville, 1960) and A. Hyatt Verrill, *Porto Rico, Past and Present* (New York, 1914), also identify small merchants with the Republican Party.

23. See, for example, Luis Muñoz Marín, "Porto Rico: An American Colony," *The National* (April 1925), Diffie, *Porto Rico;* and Lepoldo Cuban, "A Porto Rican View of American Control," *Current History* (March 1930).

24. This is described in detail by Roberto H. Todd in his *Desfile de governadores de Puerto Rico, 1898-1943* (San Juan, 1943). It is interesting to point out that Todd was not anti-American. On the contrary, he was pro-American, and one of the leading spokesmen of the Republican Party. He presents these details with some bitterness and disillusionment.

The North American, A.H. Verrill (*Porto Rico,* p. 134) pointed out as early as 1914 this tendency to use the governorship of Puerto Rico as a reward for political favors in the U.S.

25. Data for unemployment in, Porto Rico, *Report of the Governor* (Washington, D.C., 1930). The unemployed organized themselves independently to struggle for a transformation of the system. In 1940,the unemployed were a major source of support for the Popular Democratic Party. See Juan Sáez Corales, "El movimiento organizado de los desempleados y la industrialización de Puerto Rico," in CGT, Asociación de Chóferes, *Album* (1941).

26. For example, its solemnity, its Catholicism, its defense of the Hispanic tradition.

27. This is tied to the relations which this group gradually established with the leaders of the New Deal in the United States. See, Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics*, 257. See also the memoirs of the New Deal North American governor, Rexford G. Tugwell, *The Stricken Land* (New York, 1947).

28. This was principally the group which months before the elections of 1940 had abandned the FLT and had created a new syndicalist organization, the General Confederation of Workers (CGT).

29. Already in 1936, a member of the Socialist Party, José L. Novas ("Política puertorriqueña," *Ambito*, 1936) proposed the creation of "a united anti-imperialist front on behalf of independence and social justice."

30. See, the political platform of the PPD of 1940 in PPD, *Compilación de programas* (San Juan, 1956).

31. This appears to have been the policy of leftist groups: it was necessary to liquidate facism first; to enter into conflicts with the United States at that time would have been to weaken the power of the Allies. See, for example, the political report presented before the second national assembly of the Communist Party by its president Juan Santos Rivera, *¡Contra Hitler en el mundo! ¡Contra el hambre en Puerto Rico!* (San Juan, 1942).

On the importance for the United States of holding on to Puerto Rico during the war years see, Judd Polk, "Plight of Puerto Rico" *Political Science Quarterly* (December 1942) and, better yet; Tugwell, *Stricken Land*. Tugwell relates how he tried to convince Puerto Rican politicians to let the status issue rest until the war was over.

32. See, Tugwell, *Stricken Land*; Thomas Aitken, *Poet in the Fortress* (New York, 1964); and Clarence Senior, "Research and Administration in Economic Reconstruction," *Journal of Social Issues* (1947), as examples.

33. This process is presented in critical terms by Gordon K. Lewis, "Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Change in an Underdeveloped Area," *Journal of Politics*, XVII (1955), pp. 614-50, and in favorable terms by E. P. Hanson, *Transformation, The Story fo Modern Puerto Rico* (New York, 1955), On that issue see also, Luis Nieves Falcón, "El Futuro ideológico del PPD," in *Diagnóstico de Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, 1971).

34. Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory, *Wages, Productivity and Industrialization in Puerto Rico* (New Haven, 1965), p. 20.

35. John P. Augelli in "San Lorenzo: A Case Study of Recent Migrations in Interior Puerto Rico," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (January 1952), describes this situation in a town in the interior of the island. Other descriptions can be found in Steward, *People of Puerto Rico*.

36. This has been inferred from the following document: Puerto Rico, Department of Labor, *Trade Unions and the Puerto Rican Workers* (Rio Piedras, 1952) and from the "clarification" of Teodoro Moscoso in *Un discurso y una aclaración* (San Juan, 1950).

37. A concrete example can be found in the attacks which the PPD launched against the organization of a labor union in one of the state enterprises. The leader of that union at the

time, Félix Morales, reacted with a magnificent reply. See, Félix Morales, *Tres Maquinarias y lucha con fantasmas* (San Juan, 1945).

Another example is constituted by the speech of Teodoro Moscoso, one of the most important architects of the industrialization policies of the PPD, entitled *El progreso técnico y los trabajadores* (San Juan, 1958).

38. Luis Muñoz Marín, *Función del movimiento obrero en la democracia puertorriqueña* (San Juan, 1957). Moscoso, in his *Un discurso*, clearly pointed out that the solution to the economic problem of Puerto Rico laid in industrialization through foreign capital investment and that "the great task of the labor movement" was to help create "the favorable conditions" necessary to attract that capital: "any demand that is so excessive that it forces to close one single industry is an attempt against the welfare and the future of the entire Puerto Rican people."

Ralph Hancock, *Puerto Rico, A Success Story* (Princeton, 1960), chapter 8 (Manpower) explains how in face of this situation, the struggle of the labor movement was carried at the governmental administrative level (specifically within the Minimum Salary Board) rather than at the level of the industry.

39. Muñoz Marín in *Función del movimiento obrero* openly tells the workers that improvements in their standard of living have been brought about by the government rather than by the efforts of the labor unions.

40. The Ferré family is probably the best example of this group of Puerto Ricans.

41. Robert W. Anderson, *Party Politics*, points this out in general terms.

42. Marcia Quintero, *La elecciones de 1968 en Puerto Rico, análisis estadístico por grupos socio-económicos* (San Juan, 1972); and Rafael Ramírez," Marginalidad, dependencia y participación política en el arrabal" in Rafael L. Ramírez, Carlos Buitrago Ortiz, and Barry B. Levine (eds.), *Problemas de desigualdad social en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1972) or his *Politics of the Urban Poor* (in press).

The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Struggle For Independence in Puerto Rico

Juan Manuel Carrión

The forms of class struggle in Puerto Rico have always been affected by the colonial status of the island. The conflicts that the division of society into classes produces in Puerto Rico are mediated through the specific characteristics of colonial rule. The struggle against the bourgeois state is at the same time an anti-imperialist struggle. But in Puerto Rico the characteristics of American colonialism (a certain degree of "liberalism" in comparison with the European colonial traditions, American bourgeois-democratic institutions, the high level of development of the productive forces, etc.) and the particular socioeconomic development of the island[1] have made it seem as if these two struggles are not parallel. In fact, for a period they were viewed as antagonistic.

The aim of this essay is to address the issue of Puerto Rico's failure to achieve independence and its significance for the present political conjuncture of the island. It will be argued that this issue has to be understood in terms of the class nature that up to now has characterized the proindependence position and the particular forms of class struggle that American colonialism has brought about in Puerto Rico. It will be emphasized that the petty bourgeoisie is a social class whose analysis is of crucial importance to the understanding of Puerto Rico's struggle for independence in this century. Although the essay aims to make a contribution to the clarification of Puerto Rico's complex forms of class struggle, final answers to the issues it addresses are beyond its objectives and possiblities.

Class Determination of the Petty Bourgeoisie

The petty bourgeoisie should not be confused with the bourgeoisie or capitalist class. These are two distinct social classes, differentiated not by criteria of size or scale but by their insertion in different social relations of production. The bourgeoisie is made up of those social groups that have possession or control of the means of production in capitalist society and are the direct beneficiaries of the system of exploitation of wage labor upon which capitalist society is based. The bourgeoisie are the purchasers of labor power for the purpose of surplus-value creation. In contrast, the petty bourgeoisie is not an exploiting class nor one of the basic classes in the capitalist mode of production. In capitalist social formations, the petty bourgeoisie exists as an intermediary class whose individual members aim to reach the position enjoyed by the bourgeoisie but are constantly menaced by the strong possibility of falling into the ranks of the working class.

The petty bourgeoisie is composed of two basic social groups. First, there is that social class defined in relationship to the simple commodity form of production.[2] This class is made up essentially of those social agents who are not compelled to sell their labor power, those who—like small merchants, small manufacturers, and independent artisans—possess their own means of production and do not depend primarily on the purchase of labor power. It also includes those in the so-called "liberal" professions who sell their services without entering directly into the labor market or who, because of their academic credentials, have special advantages in that market, such as medical doctors, lawyers, etc. Such elements constitute the traditional petty bourgeoisie, as defined by Nicos Poulantzas.[3]

The second social group of concern here is the new petty bourgeoisie, a group defined in terms of unproductive labor. By productive labor is understood labor power directly exploited in capitalist social relations of production, labor power that is directly responsible for the creation of surplus-value or that is essential for the realization of it, and occupies a subordinate position in the productive process. The working class is defined in relationship to productive labor. Unproductive labor is labor power exchanged against revenue, labor power that has its *raison d'etre* in the exploitative character of capitalist production without being exploited labor. This is labor power that does not produce surplus-value. It is labor power that is necessary only because capitalist production is based on exploitation and the maintenance of such a system requires specialized agents that must be paid. The labor of these wage earners are *faux frais*, incidental costs of production that exist in relationship to the exploitative character of capitalist production and whose income is derived from the surplus-value generated by productive labor. Examples of members of the new petty bourgeoisie are wage earners in government administration and services and management and supervisory workers in the private sector.

In Puerto Rico the petty bourgeoisie has played a very important role in the struggle for independence. But the outcome of its role in the anticolonialist struggle differs from what has been typical in many Third World countries.[4] Unlike many of the latter, in Puerto Rico the petty bourgeoisie has not been able to lead other classes in the common pursuit of national independence. To understand that it is important to examine the salient characteristics of political struggle in Puerto Rico.

The Petty Bourgeoisie and Political Struggles in Colonial Puerto Rico

Political struggles in Puerto Rico, by reason of its colonial status, have been dominated by the "National Question." Since the beginning of this century, political parties in the island have had as one of their basic differentiating elements what in Puerto Rico is known as the "status question." Since 1898, the two polar alternatives have been statehood and independence, but the dominant position has been the indefinable option of autonomy.

The present political conjuncture in Puerto Rico is characterized by the advance of the statehood option and the apparent collapse of the autonomist one following the crushing defeat of the Popular Democratic party (PPD) by the New Progessive party (PNP) in the 1976 general elections. It is a political conjunture also characterized by the incapacity of the proindependence movement to take advantage of the present socioeconomic crisis. That movement remains extremely weak in spite of the growth it has experienced in the last ten years. Since the late 1960s there has been a reversal and containment of the process of decline of proindependence support during election time, and independence continues to be the immediate goal of progressive movements in Puerto Rico. A decisive advance toward that goal, however, has not been attained. To understand this it is critical to realize the obstacles that the proindependence movement has confronted in this century and the relationship to that movement of the Puerto Rican petty bourgeoisie.

The traditional answer of the Puerto Rican proletariat to proindependence clamor has been: "independence for whom?" (a phrase coined by Santiago Iglesias, one of the most important working-class leaders in the early part of this century). Supporters of independence in Puerto Rico have been incapable of presenting to the Puerto Rican people an acceptable project of national independence. They have not been capable of convincing the Puerto Rican proletariat that it is in its interest to have an independent Puerto Rico.

Sectors of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie have, on occasion, flirted with independence, but they have long since abandoned this option, their integration to American capital being practically total. In 1913 the Union party (the main party of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie at the time) had independence as its "supreme ideal."[5] In the early 1940s, Luis Muñoz Marín, leader of the PPD (a direct descendant of the Union party), declared that independence was *"a la vuelta de la esquina"* ("around the corner"). For many top leaders of the PPD during that period, independence was the ultimate goal, while economic improvement and more local self-government were seen as immediate objectives preceeding that goal. But the position of the PPD shifted, and since the 1960s its main commitment has been to "permanent union" with the United States. In 1978, Muñoz Marín chastised ex-Governor Rafael Hernández Colón for the latter's defense in the United Nations of the notion of "Free Association," i.e., a greater level of autonomy for Puerto Rico than is currently enjoyed by the island. Even in its most lukewarm forms, "Free Association" is seen by the majority of the leadership of the PPD as dangerous to the "ideal" of permanent union that allegedly most Puerto Ricans support. In sum, the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie seems to have rejected even the most "extreme" forms of their predominant autonomic belief.

The movement for independence has, from its beginnings, been characterized by a strong petty-bourgeois content. This is the case when one examines both the class origins of its leadership and the political ideology that has dominated the movement for so long. Even today, in movements such as that represented by the Puerto Rican Pro-Independence party (PIP) the weight of the petty bourgeoisie is of special importance.[6] Until recently the proindependence option has been a project without a special program that could appeal to the laboring masses of Puerto Rico. Independence was advocated either with the purpose of restoring a Puerto Rico of small proprietors (a Puerto Rico that, as presented by such advocates, never really existed) or as the response of an offended Puerto Rican dignity. Self-respect, it was argued, made independence necessary. This could be sufficient reason for some elements of Puerto Rican society to support independence, but not for the majority of the Puerto Rican people. The heroic behavior of the most militant sectors of the proindependence movement (i.e., the Nationalist party) could not compensate for this lack of social content in the proindependence program. The proindependence movement remained for a long period as the left-wing of the bourgeoisie, as the national consciousness the bourgeoisie was incapable of having. In these circumstances the petty bourgeoisie has been the main source of support for independence. That was the case in the past; that is the case today. How did such a situation come about and how has it affected the struggle for independence? The question could be posed in the following terms: What social classes were most affected by the American invasion of 1898 and the subsequent domination established by American capital? What social classes have had and have today the most to gain from independence? The answers to these questions will in turn shed light on why the petty bourgeoisie has played such a predominant role in the proindependence movement and why the movement has up to now met only with failure.

The American invasion of 1898 was received with joy by the majority of the Puerto Rican people.[7] To many working people the invasion meant the elimination of the archaic and oppressive Spanish colonial judicial system and an end to widespread abuses such as those committed by the notorious *Guardia Civil*. It also meant the expectation of the 8-hour work day[8] and the right to form trade unions and to strike. Also, after the occupation, American institutions were seen and used by working-class elements as instruments of defense against the native ruling class, i.e., against the incipient bourgeoisie that had developed in the course of the nineteenth century and whose members were seen by the workers as their traditional class enemies.[9] When, in 1901, for example, this incipient bourgeoisie had Santiago Iglesias arrested because of his organizing activities among the working class, it was because of their connections with the American Federation of Labor and arguments based on U.S. law that his supporters were able to obtain his release.[10]

Like the majority of the working class, the incipient Puerto Rican bourgeoisie (with the exception of those sectors more closely tied to Spain) also received the U.S. occupation with open arms. This was particularly the case of bourgeois sectors linked to sugar cane production, inasmuch as the invasion represented free entry for that product into the U.S. market. The petty-bourgeoisie, too, was well disposed to accept the American occupation. For them, the U.S. represented the ideals of democracy and freedom of opportunity for which they yearned so strongly. The petty-bourgeois mythology of the "self-made man" that the U.S. had always propagated coincided with their most strongly felt sentiments. The ideal of the "self-made man," after all, is the *non plus ultra* of petty-bourgeois myths. From professionals to artisans, the American occupation was seen by most as marking the beginnings of an era of democracy and freedom.

The first two parties to be formed in Puerto Rico in the aftermath of the American occupation and the establishment of U.S. colonial rule were the Republican party and the Federal party. Both were the parties of the incipient Puerto Rican bourgeoisie and both supported statehood. The Republican party, however, was from the start more unconditional in its advocacy of the statehood option, whereas, within the ranks of the Federal party there existed the political elements that later on were to articulate the first forms of anticolonial resistance in Puerto Rico.[11]

The working-class sector that in 1915 was to form the Puerto Rican Socialist party was also characterized by the presence within it of advocates of statehood. Although initially the workers-socialist movement refused to take a position on the "National Question," when it finally did, it did so in support of statehood.

In sum, in the years immediately following the American occupation of the island, political alignments in Puerto Rico were mostly in favor of statehood. But as could be expected, the "honeymoon" (as some have called it) between many Puerto Rican supporters of the American presence and the new American colonial regime was short lived. Among the first to be affected negatively by the new colonial situation were sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. The development of U.S. capitalism in Puerto Rico meant, for many of them, proletarianization. One of the pressing needs of the new socioeconomic system was a large labor force that could be available for exploitation by the large absentee U.S. corporations that came to dominate the island's economy. For this purpose thousands of small landholders were displaced in a short span of time and independent artisans, especially cigar makers, increasingly became wage earners.[12] Confronted with this situation, some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie soon discovered that they had nothing to gain from the colonial system the U.S. had imposed. They realized that they were among the principal victims of the socioeconomic transformation the American colonial regime was sponsoring. Increasingly they came to the conclusion that their potential for national political leadership and the possibilities for social and economic advancement could increase with independence. It was from sectors of this disappointed and threatened petty bourgeoisie that the first demands for anticolonial resistance emerged. And it was they, under the leadership of Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón,[13] who were instrumental in the formation in 1904 of the Union party, the first political party in Puerto Rico to include independence as one of its goals. These same sectors, still led by Matienzo Cintrón, were later on (in 1912) also instrumental in the founding of the *Partido de la Independencia*, the first strictly proindependence party in Puerto Rico's history. Sectors of the proindependence petty bourgeoisie which remained in the Union party were successful in getting the party in 1913 to drop from its political program statehood as an acceptable option.[14]

Although the Union party had been founded with the support of proindependence sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, the party's leadership was dominated by sectors of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie as represented by Luis Muñoz Rivera. From its founding to 1932 it was the dominant party in Puerto Rico's colonial politics. Between 1932 and 1940, under the name of the Liberal party, it was the largest and most important party in the island although it was not the party in government. In 1938, elements in the party led by Luis Muñoz Marín broke away and founded the Popular Democratic party (PPD) which quickly came to dominate Puerto Rican politics and which maintained that dominance until the 1970s.

The political movement that, in direct descent, goes from the Union party to the PPD corresponds to the basic political line followed by most sectors of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie. It is a political line characterized by indecision and ambiguity, an ambiguity which for a long period manifested itself as a continuous swing between proautonomy and proindependence positions. It is interesting that Antonio Barceló, leader of the Union party and later of the Liberal party, was the man who first used the term "Free Associated State" (the official name in Spanish of the island's present colonial arrangement) and who later on called for "independence even if we starve to death." Equally illustrative of the political ambiguity of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie is the political trajectory of Luis Muñoz Marín. It was as a supporter of independence and with the support of the most radical and proindependence wing of the Liberal party that he broke away from that party and established the PPD. Yet, it was he who later on led the repression of the proindependence tendencies within the party and embraced Barceló's concept of the "Free Associated State."

Before 1946, the politics of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie were partly characterized by momentary alliances with the patriotic petty bourgeoisie, that is, that sector of the petty bourgeoisie which supported independence. Although in these alliances the patriotic petty bourgeoisie was always relegated to the subordinate position, its influence on the ideology of the Union party, the Liberal party and, to a lesser extent, the PPD was of consequence. The patriotic petty bourgeoisie had sufficient social weight to dispose the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie towards proindependence positions. Proindependence propoganda, if properly used, could mobilize petty-bourgeois voters for bourgeois-dominated parties such as the Union party and the PPD. But the attachment of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie to independence was never deep. Independence was seen as a "lofty" ideal that was "impossible" to achieve. On occasions it was used opportunistically by the local bourgeoisie to pressure the U.S. into granting concessions of self-government. But the bourgeoisie was always ready to abandon independence when it was to its advantage. As one author has put it, "the idea of independence was used as a garment is used to protect oneself against the weather: it is put on whenever needed and discarded when considered a burden."[15]

The petty-bourgeois character of the proindependence movement in Puerto Rico is reflected in the fact that the purely proindependence parties have always started as breaks of petty-bourgeois elements from the main bourgeois political line. As a secondary class in the capitalist mode of production, the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of presenting a long-range political option separate from the political positions of the two main social classes of capitalist society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Until recently the efforts of the patriotic petty bourgeoisie were aimed at gaining the favor of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie. But, as already emphasized, the attachment of that bourgeoisie to independence was always ambiguous and hesitant. The bourgeoisie has always lacked the willpower to take a clear stand on behalf of independence. Because of its initial and subsequent weakness vis-à-vis U.S. imperialism, the capacity of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie to become a national bourgeoisie has always been nil. The conflicts they might have had and do have with the metropolitan bourgeoisie have always been secondary to the class conflicts that ensue locally. In the final analysis, the American state is the strongest guarantee that the capitalist system has in Puerto Rico, and as such, it is also the basic guarantee the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie has for the maintenance of local supremacy. Given the ambiguity of the political position of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie and its eventual rejection of independence, it is perhaps not surprising that the patriotic petty bourgeoisie eventually had to break politically with it and form parties of its own. In 1922 the Nationalist party was founded by petty-bourgeois elements that broke away from the Union party. In 1946 the militant proindependence wing of the PPD abandoned that party and established the Puerto Rican Independentist party (PIP). But visible as they may have been, without the support of either one of the two main classes of capitalist society—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—these parties of the petty bourgeoisie remained politically impotent. The rejection of independence by the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie made impossible any meaningful alliances between these parties and those of the bourgeoisie. A critical question becomes why these parties were not able to attract the support of the proletariat.

The Proindependence Project and the Working Class

As has been emphasized already, the proindependence movement has until now been dominated primarily by the Puerto Rican petty bourgeoisie. It has been essentially a petty-bourgeois project. Given this situation and the possibilities of independent national development that the domination of American capitalism imposes on Puerto Rico, an independent, nonsocialist republic could not be anything but a neocolony, a state independent in name only as was Cuba before the Revolution. Such a neocolony would mean a worsening of the conditions of the Puerto Rican masses, for it would mean local bourgeois domination without the limitations for exploitation (Federal minimum wage laws, the right to strike, etc.) that the American state presently imposes with its colonial control. The Puerto Rican proletariat has long understood that independence could easily mean an increase in its immediate class oppression and exploitation. Consequently, it has denied its support to the proindependent movement. The feelings of many workers was clearly expressed by the Puerto Rican labor leader Eduardo Conde early in this century:

> It is not necessary to argue whether the Americans are worse or better than the Puerto Ricans in power. But at least with them we have the liberty of protesting their errors which we cannot do with the Puerto Ricans, because in so attempting they will beat in our ribs and we will lose our liberty.[16]

The colonial situation was not only seen by working-class leaders as preferable to a "tropical republic" of local despots, but closer ties to the source of colonial subjection, the U.S., were increasingly pursued. Ties between the Puerto Rican and American labor movements were seen as extremely important for local economic struggles. Thus, the *Federación Libre de los Trabajadores* (FLT), the main working-class trade-union organization in Puerto Rico in the first decades of this century, sought and obtained an early affiliation with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) of Samuel Gompers. Since the AFL was in good terms with the American bourgeoisie owing to its policies of class collaboration, the Puerto Rican labor movement could expect through the AFL some degree of access (limited, but nonetheless important) to the power structures of the metropolis. In 1901 Santiago Iglesias, head of the FLT, was named General Organizer for the AFL in Puerto Rico.

From the beginning of Puerto Rico's history as an American colony, one of the tools of the Puerto Rican working class in the local class struggle has been to oppose the political structures of the metropolis (with its relatively progressive labor laws) to the local structures of colonial exploitation.[17] The application to Puerto Rico of the U.S. constitution in all its aspects became one of the persistent goals of the Puerto Rican working class, a goal which eventually led to the taking of prostatehood positions.

From 1898 to 1900, Puerto Rico was administered by U.S. military governors of whom the first was Major General John R. Brooke. He maintained the Insular Cabinet of the Autonomic Government that had been established under Spanish rule in 1897 and was presided by Luis Muñoz Rivera. In the years preceding the American occupation, the trade-union activities of Santiago Iglesias had been strongly repressed, a repression actively supported by the incipient Puerto Rican bourgeoisie composed of men like Muñoz Rivera. In fact, when U.S. troops landed in Puerto Rico in 1898 Santiago Iglesias was in jail. In the course of the occupation Santiago Iglesias obtained his freedom and resumed his trade-union activities. Nevertheless, he and the emerging labor movement continued to be persecuted, not by the new American authorities, but by the local Puerto Rican bourgeoisie which dominated the Insular Cabinet that was allowed to function for a while. At one time Santiago Iglesias was brought before Muñoz Rivera, the president of the Cabinet, and the following confrontation (recorded in an early American report on the island) took place:

> *Muñoz Rivera:* Tell me, is there a workman's club in Sol Street, 62?
> *Santiago Iglesias:* The workmen have rented a house there with the object of forming an association.
> *M.R.:* I understand that your meetings are with the object of inciting the people to illegal acts.
> *S.I.:* That is untrue. They meet to defend labor and uphold the government which came to Puerto Rico to end despotism and robbery. Therefore, at our meetings we only attack the rougues who, under the Spanish government, exploited us workmen.
> *M.R.:* Where is this club and under what authority have you formed it; and do you hold meetings?
> *S.I.:* It is at Sol Street, and we meet under the guaranty of the great republic, which allows liberty of association and protects the lawful, rich and poor alike.
> *M.R.:* You are a foreigner[18] and have no right to mix in politics or the defense of any class. Under the Spaniards you were imprisoned and, owing to me, obtained your liberty, and I thought...
> *S.I.:* (To himself) That is false. It was you who had me imprisoned, when you held me for seven months. You made General Marín believe that I was an anarchist and propagandist of assassination of the Spaniards, and you did the same with General Brooke.

> *M.R.:* . . .that on being released you would have other ideas. I counsel you to leave the country. I speak in the name of the military government, and if you don't you will have a bad time.
> *S.I.:* (Rising indignantly) In order to defend the working classes I will swear allegiance to the United States and will continue my labor as before. I shall not leave.[19]

The threats against Santiago Iglesias continued and for a while he was forced to seek safety in the United States. It was during his stay there that he established contacts with the AFL.

It was logical, then, for the Puerto Rican working class to oppose any measure towards the restructuring of Puerto Rican society as an independent neocolony which would be dominated by men like Luis Muñoz Rivera, as it was logical for them to oppose such a restructuring in the following decades. This explains the seemingly paradoxical alliance that was established in the early 1930s between the Republican party, the pro-Statehood party of the sugar corporations and the fiercely pro-American sectors of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie, and the Socialist party of Santiago Iglesias, the party of the Puerto Rican working class. This alliance has in many ways continued despite the disappearance of the Socialist and Republican parties in the 1950s and 1960s repsectively.

Today, the New Progressive party (the party of the prostatehood bourgeoisie) counts on the support of some of the most impoverished sectors of Puerto Rican society. Broad sectors of the Puerto Rican proletariat strongly support the prostatehood party. The New Progressive party (PNP) also has a strong bastion of support among the lumpen proletariat,[20] the most deprived sector in Puerto Rican society. This sector does not starve because of federal handouts of which the Food Stamp Program is the most important. Bourgeois political parties in Puerto Rico compete as to which is more able to increase federal handouts in the island. The system generates a beggar mentality on which the lumpen proletariat nurtures itself. Statehood becomes the assurance that handouts will continue. It would, of course, be misleading to argue that all votes for the PNP are votes for statehood. But there is no doubt that, in terms of the immediate economic interests of broad sectors of the Puerto Rican poor, there are advantages in statehood. It is not at all surprising that the present prostatehood governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero Barceló, is the author of a book entitled *Statehood is for the Poor.*

The Puerto Rican working class has long understood that independence either as a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois project is against its interests. An independent Puerto Rico, either as a protectorate of the U.S. or on friendly terms with the U.S. government (in other words, independence as the triumph of local capitalist forces) is nothing more than a camouflage for an increase in the exploitation and oppression of the majority of the Puerto Rican people, the working class. The American Constitution and the laws in favor of the working class (relatively speaking, of course) that the class struggle and the high development of the productive forces in the U.S. has permitted, apply to Puerto Rico. The institutions of the American bourgeoisie have been beneficial to the Puerto Rican proletariat in its resistance to the potential for superexploitation on the part of the local dominant classes.

As already shown, the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie has never been strongly supportive of independence. Its members have taken a proindependence position when they have felt "put off" by their American masters, when metropolitan contempt has aroused their anger. Autonomy, however, has always been their ideal.[21] In other words, their aim has been to have free reins in the exploitation of the native labor force while maintaining a close association with American capital. This was particularly evident during the colonial administration of Governor Rafael Hernández Colón (1972-1976) when a project asking for more autonomy was presented to Congress. Two of the most significant areas in which greater autonomy was desired were in the determination of wage and environmental policies. The goal was the opportunity to lower the wages of Puerto Rican workers and weaken or eliminate some of the antipollution laws that the U.S. state enforces. In other words, the overall goal was greater opportunities for exploitation in Puerto Rico.[22]

The case of the petty bourgeoisie is different. In an independent republic, even if it is a neocolony, this class would have possibilities of leadership and even of entry into the ruling sectors of society that they do not have in the colony and would not have under statehood. Both the current colonial rule and statehood mean control of governmental activities by the U.S. government. Under statehood such control would be more direct. If it is difficult for the petty bourgeoisie to compete in the political and economic arena under the present colonial situation, it would be even more difficult under the complete and total control of U.S. corporate capitalism. In contrast, independence means an increase in the sphere of local state control; it means consulates, embassies, and a greater field of action in the making of local decisions. The positions within the local power structures that independence would bring would open new and extremely important avenues for social advancement to sectors of the petty bourgeoisie.

The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Crisis of the Proindependence Movement

The highest point reached by the proindependence movement was in the 1930s and 1940s. It was a period of prolonged economic crisis when the benefits of colonialism were hard to perceive. During this period the patriotic petty bourgeoisie was following the designs of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors (made up primarily of technocrats) who increasingly came to reject independence as an alternative and aimed instead to a new rearticulation of the colonial connection. By the mid-1940s, the patriotic petty bourgeoisie in the PPD came under pressure from Luis Muñoz Marín, the indisputable leader of the party and by then an opponent of independence anxious to rid his party of proindependence elements. In 1946 these elements broke away from the PPD and founded the Puerto Rican Independentist party (PIP). The new party, led by Gilberto Concepción de Gracia and dominated by petty-bourgeois elements, grew in importance in Puerto Rican politics, but that growth was short lived. In 1952 the PIP was the second most important party in the island. In 1960 it received so few votes that it lost its electoral franchise.

The decline of the PIP is related to changes in the class structure of Puerto Rican society in the post-World War II period. The process of colonial industrialization sponsored by the PPD had tremendous effects on the island's social formation. As the process of economic transformation intensified in the 1950s, so did the proletarianization of more sectors of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The class base of the PIP was clearly deteriorating at a very rapid rate. As Table I below shows, between 1950 and 1970 the size of the traditional petty bourgeoisie decreased by about 40 per cent.

TABLE I. SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS AS PERCENTAGE OF THE LABOR FORCE, 1950-1970

	1950	1960	1970
Males, excluding those employed in agriculture	21.7%	17.0%	13.0%
Males and females, excluding those in agriculture	16.3	14.2	10.4
Males and females, employed in agriculture	16.6	13.2	17.3

Sources: Puerto Rico 1960 Census, Table 51, p. 125;
Puerto Rico 1970 Census, Table 50, p. 205.

The numerical decline of the traditional petty bourgeoisie is even more noticeable in the census figures for managers and administrators as shown in Table II below.

TABLE II. SELF-EMPLOYMENT AMONG MANAGERS AND ADMINISTRATORS EXCEPT FARM, 1950-1970

	1950	1960	1970
Total numbers	30,644	35,288	45,137
Number of Wage and Salary Earners	8,174	15,800	30,350
Number of Self-Employed	22,470	19,488	14,787
% of Self-Employed	73.3%	55.2%	32.7%

Sources: Puerto Rico 1960 Census, Table 52, p. 126;
Puerto Rico 1970 Census, Table 48, p. 201.

In sum, the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the mainstay of the proindependence movement, is extremely weak and in many cases fringes with the lumpen proletariat.

As the traditional petty bourgeoisie has declined, a new petty bourgeoisie has emerged. One of the sectors of Puerto Rican society which has experienced dramatic growth since the late 1940s and early 1950s has been government employees, one of the most important components of the new petty bourgeoisie. As Table III below indicates, the number of government employees in Puerto Rico increased by 105 per cent between 1950 and 1974.

TABLE III. INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN PUERTO RICO, 1950-1974

Year	No. of Government Employees	%of the Labor Force
1950	78,021	13.9
1954	75,000	14.0
1960	101,968	18.5
1964	121,000	19.0
1970	149,247	23.5
1974	222,000	28.6

Sources: For the 1950, 1960, and 1970 figures, the censuses of Puerto Rico for those years. For the 1954, 1964, and 1974 figures, David Helfield, *Relaciones del trabajo en el servicio publico, problemas y recomendaciones* (3 vols.), Puerto Rico, 1974-1975, Vol. I, p. 24.

For this new petty bourgeoisie, made up of government employees and intermediary executives and supervisors in the private sector, independence is not an attractive option. Their position in the class structure responds to the needs of capital in controlling the contradictions and conflicts that exploitation provokes.[23] Their existence and the degree of importance they have in Puerto Rico is made possible by the financial resources that, directly and indirectly, the U.S. state provides to the local colonial political structures. The parasitic nature of most of the labor of the new petty bourgeoisie could not be at all maintained in an independent republic and even less in a workers' state. Many sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie can be (and often are) as reactionary as, and in many cases more reactionary than, sectors of the traditional bourgeoisie. Given the position of the new petty bourgeoisie in Puerto Rico's contemporary class structure and the nature of its economic interests, it is not at all surprising that it constitutes one of the major sources of support for the statehood option advocated and led by that sector of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie represented by men like Luis Ferré and Carlos Romero Barceló.

The Present Political Conjuncture and the Tasks Ahead

In the present political conjuncture, the statehood option has been strengthened not only by the rise of the new petty bourgeoisie but also by the present economic crisis in which Puerto Rico finds itself. The colonial developmental project launched in the late 1940s (Operation Bootstrap) that for many years gave so many dividends to both local and metropolitan bourgeois sectors and made possible an improvement in the standard of living of the Puerto Rican people, is now in a phase of deep structural crisis. One important consequence of the prolonged crisis that has come to characterize the economic substructure on which the autonomist project of the PPD was based, is the opening of new opportunities for the prostatehood sectors of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie.

In the present conjuncture in the Puerto Rican class struggle, the option independence-socialism still has little support. Yet, given the socioeconomic crisis through which Puerto Rican society is currently going, that option becomes even more necessary. The present colonial arrangements are clearly defective. All the myths of sustained growth developed in the 1950s and in the 1960s have been eroded by the crisis of the 1970s. In today's Puerto Rico unemployment has reached levels unknown since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The indebtedness of the Commonwealth government has reached astronomical proportions. And the petrochemical industry, upon whose growth the hopes of the colonial leadership in the 1960s were based, is now going through a deep structural crisis. Yet, the proindependence option (and even less the socialist option) has not been widely accepted in Puerto Rico as an alternative to the crisis.

The lack of firmly organized working-class organizations has prevented the presentation of nonbourgeois alternatives to the crisis. The "socialist alternative" advocated by the Puerto Rican Socialist party does not have sufficient roots in the working class to make it a plausible alternative. The issue is not only the theoretical comprehension of the necessity for a working class content in the proindependence project, but also its ideological concretization in this class. Independence and socialism are not automatically associated by the working class. There are too many historical sources of suspicion and distrust. A petty bourgeois organization such as the Pro-Independence Movement (MPI), founded in 1959 by groups originating in the PIP and ideologically inspired by the Cuban Revolution, does not become the party of the working class nor is it seen as such merely because it changes its name to the Puerto Rican Socialist party (PSP) and formally adopts Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. Firm roots in the working class have not been established in spite of the sincere and exhausting efforts that have been carried out in that direction. To Puerto Rican workers, the PSP remains an organization alien to their traditions and common-day life. It is seen as just another petty bourgeois organization trying to use them for purposes they do not feel are theirs.

A conjunction between the proindependence and socialist positions, although theoretically understood, has not been attained at a concrete level that could give a correct orientation to the political class struggle. Independence as an abstract ideal, as a refusal to be *eñangotao* (to squat, used a synonym for submissiveness), as the ideal of those who in contrast to the majority are not *panzistas* (to think with your belly, to give prime importance to economic considerations), still carries a lot of weight within the proindependence movement. As any other system of domination, colonialism has created a structure of ideological acceptance among the Puerto Rican people. In Puerto Rico this is reflected in a feeling of inferiority and impotence of which *eñangotamiento* is its main manifestation. To attack this ideology is an indispensable element in any struggle against colonialism. But it is not sufficient. That struggle must be given a popular social content.

The development of activities of defiance against colonial and metropolitan authorities, although important, is not sufficient to break the colonial mentality that sways over Puerto Rican society. Terrorism or armed confrontations with the power holders are of little consequence in the anticolonial struggle if they do not have the support of the masses. Without the active participation of the people in mass movements, such acts remain the solitary activities of alienated persons. Without a clear understanding of the immediate aspirations and preoccupations of the common people all efforts are futile. Without an understanding of the contradictions that may exist in relationship to the objectives of overthrowing the bourgeoisie (e.g., what are the possibilities of real improvement in the living conditions of the working class as a consequence of a revolution?) no appropriate political strategy can be devised. It is not at all convincing to argue that independence by itself will improve the situation of the Puerto Rican masses. Independence must include a restructuring of the bases of class power in Puerto Rico. But who is going to carry out this task? Who is going to lead the struggle? Up to now the social class that has led the struggle for independence has been the petty bourgeoisie. But until recently its main thrust has been to get the support of the Puerto Rican bourgeoisie (a class that has denied its nationhood), and it has failed. By itself the petty bourgeoisie cannot achieve independence. The achievement of independence, of real sovereignty, can only be the product of the laboring masses of Puerto Rico, specifically the working class.

The first objective of the proindependence movement, then, must be to develop into the party of the working class. This means the political organization of the working class, with all the difficulties and problems that implies. But a successful struggle for independence necessitates the support of classes other than the proletariat. To succeed in breaking the power of the bourgeoisie, the working class must be able to present its class interests as common to society as a whole. It must weaken the ideological hold the bourgeoisie has over almost all classes in society. It must bring to its side the nonproletarian allies the bourgeoisie currently has. The working class has to limit the scope of the forces that nurture counterrevolution. And in Puerto Rico classes like the petty bourgeoisie and the whole spectrum that constitutes the lumpen proletariat have an importance that the working class must take into consideration. In this context, those sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie whose situation may lead into conflicts with the capitalist class assume great importance. Which are these sectors and how can they be brought to support a proletarian class position?

As a beginning, one can focus on those sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie who, because of their position in the job structure, tend to be characterized by high levels of alienation. Good examples of such sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie are professional and semiprofessional workers whose wage levels do not allow for much social advancement, and clerical employees whose income and social status are not basically different from those of the proletariat. Such sectors might also include many government employees whose position is not one of supervision and/or management/administration, such as public-school teachers. Here one finds poorly paid workers united to some extent by membership in a trade union with *independentista* leadership. But the position of this leadership vis-à-vis management is weak (it has lost, for example, its only strike), and the proindependence position of the union leaders is not predominant among the rank and file.

Another example of a potentially alienated sector of the new petty bourgeoisie are workers in the government corporation that deals with water resources. In this corporation, nonsupervisory professional workers belong to the *Hermandad Independiente de Empleados Profesionales de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados* (HIEPAAA). This union is composed primarily of engineers and other highly educated workers, many of whom have M.A.'s and even Ph.D.'s. For many of these workers, the expectations they had when they became employeeof this government corporation were crushed by the reality of the jobs they came to fill. In Puerto Rico they are highly paid workers. But the job regimentation to which they are subject and the contradictions that exist between their expectations and the real possibilities for social advancement tend to generate antagonism between them and management. Within the spectrum of trade-union organizations in Puerto Rico, the HIEPAAA is a progressive union. It has an honest leadership and is characterized by militant attitudes in the area of economic struggle.

Members of the HIEPAAA, public school teachers, and others mentioned above are but some examples of sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie that a proindependence socialist movement must approach and whose support is important in that movement's struggle for power. But what methods should be used to approach such sectors of the new petty bourgeoisie? For this there is no easy answer. The proindependence socialist option must represent clear and concrete gains for them as well as for the proletariat and the lumpen proletariat. But in Puerto Rico, unlike in other Third World countries, this is not an easy task. In situations of classic colonial domination such as those existing in Angola under Portuguese rule, for example, independence was easily perceived by broad sectors of society as bringing concrete and immediate gains. This was so because in Angola the forms of *absolute* surplus-value exploitation were predominant. In Puerto Rico, in contrast, the norm is *relative* surplus-value exploitation. The high development of the means of production in Puerto Rico and the high levels of labor productivity that that implies means that the massive pauperization of the laboring masses is not a required ingredient for, nor the outcome of, exploitation. There is no doubt that the Puerto Rican proletariat is exploited and that levels of income in the island are far below those of any state of the Union. But they are clearly much higher than the levels of income that prevail in the Third World. Poverty in Puerto Rico does not, in general terms, imply the misery that poverty in most Third World countries implies. A neocolonial republic could very well mean an intensification of exploitation in the island which would result in the type of poverty so widespread in the Third World. And it is precisely because of that clear possibility that the traditional independence option advocated by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements has been rejected and will continue to be rejected by the Puerto Rican masses. Only through the establishment of an independent *socialist* republic will the vast majority of the Puerto Rican people have something to gain. Only through such a republic will the Puerto Rican people be able to take charge of their own destiny and, by controlling the country's means of production and their productive capacity, improve their economic and social conditions. This is the only type of independence from which the Puerto Rican people can benefit. But because the tremendous obstacles the struggle on behalf of such an independence faces, it is the most difficult one to achieve.

Conclusion

The most important advocate of Puerto Rican independence in this century, Pedro Albizu Campos (1891-1965), often declared that "the

Fatherland is valor and sacrifice" (*"La patria es valor y sacrificio"*). He was correct. The establishment of an independent Puerto Rican republic is a jump into the unknown that only hard work and sacrifice can make possible. Nationalism is an autonomous entity, not entirely explained in terms of economics and class struggle. The source and development of movements for national independence are not to be found exclusively in certain forms of class alignments, nor can their existence be understood solely in terms of the class struggle. Cultural traits and historical traditions shared by all classes in society can often function as important unifying elements which, on occasions, transcend class division. Nonetheless, nationalism, as any other ideology, must respond to the socioeconomic conditions of the terrain in which it is born and develops. In the long run it can only function in relationship to the different class interests confronting each other in society. Nationalism can be an important element for social agitation and mobilization, but it must be linked with practical and immediate goals.

It is now generally accepted by the left wing of the proindependence movement in Puerto Rico that only in a socialist Puerto Rico can real independence be attained. But this understanding, which remains at a high level of theoretical abstraction, has not yet been translated into concrete "bread and butter" terms. Only by demonstrating the material advantages of a socialist republic will the advocates of such a republic have any chances of generating support among the Puerto Rican people. Independence will have a chance of becoming a reality only when it stops being the pet project of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and becomes the collective goal of broad sectors of the Puerto Rican population under proletarian leadership.

NOTES

1. On this subject, see Pedro Juan Rua's articles, "Puerto Rico, Colonia Clasica?" and "Notas Sociologicas sobre el Puerto Rico de hoy" in *Bolivar Ante Marx* (Ediciones Huracán, Mexico, 1978).

2. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value* (Moscow, 1969), Vol. I., pp. 407-409.

3. Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (New Left Books, London, 1975).

4. The importance of the petty bourgeoisie in class struggles in the Third World has been enormous. It has been, on many occasions, a decisive element in confrontations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It has been especially important in anti-imperialist struggles. See Gerard Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World* (Penguin Books, 1978) and Regis Debray, *La crítica de las armas* (Siglo XXI, México, 1975), Vol. I.

5. Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños* (San Juan, 1972), Vol. I, p. 156.

6. "The P.I.P. was made up of proportionally more professionals than the other two Puerto Rican parties." Roberta Ann Johnson, *The Puerto Rican Independentist Movement*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Harvard University, 1971), p. 176. See also Manuel Maldonado-Denis, "Declinar del movimiento independentista puertorriqueño?," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, Vol. IX, No. 3 (September 1965), p. 294.

7. This is not to say that no opposition against the American invasion and occupation took place. There was some, but it was short-lived and limited. There was no significant social group in Puerto Rico ready and willing to defend Spanish colonialism against American imperialism. On local opposition to the invasion, see Juan Manuel Delgado's articles in *Claridad* "Las partidas sediciosas del '98" (March 7-13, 1978) and "Homenaje al guerrillero Aguila Blanca" (July 21-27, 1978).

8. In 1899 the American military governor, General Guy Henry, signed a law establishing the 8-hour work day in Puerto Rico. Although the law was not widely applied at the beginning and the labor movement had to fight for its application, it represented an important improvement for the working masses.

9. "[After the invasion] each group began to see in the Colossus of the North the potential champion of its own ambition... The representatives of the new wage-earning class, who were becoming conscious of the terrible implications of a *laissez-faire* economy for the sellers of surplus labor and who had quickly learned the hard way that no sympathy for their plight would be forthcoming from their insular exploiters, were principally interested in mainland institutions as possibly constituting erratic, but occasionally serviceable, courts of appeal from colonial injustices and as a means of restraining the freedom of employers in the exploitation of labor." Miles Garvin, "The Early Development of the Organized Labor Movement in Puerto Rico," *Latin American Perspectives*, Summer 1976, p. 22.

10. See M. Galvin, *ibid*, and Truman R. Clark, *Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975) p. 21.

11. The main group involved in the formation of the Union party was made up of members of the Federal party.

12. The process of proletarianization among artisans is skillfully described in A. G. Quintero Rivera, "Socialista y tabaquero: la proletarización de los artesanos," *Sin Nombre*, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (January-March 1978).

13. Luis M. Díaz Soler, *Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón: Orientador y guardián de una cultura* (Instituto de Literatura Puertorriqueña, Río Piedras, 1960), Vol. I.

14. A.G. Quintero Rivera, "El Partido Socialista y la lucha política triangular de las primeras decadas bajo la dominación norteamericana," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 54 and 81.

15. Jaime Ramirez-Barbot, *A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Ohio State University, 1973), p. 22.

16. In the newspaper *Justicia*, June 5, 1915, quoted in *Notes for a History of the Puerto Rican Emigration*, Conference on Historiography, Center for Puerto Rican Studies, CUNY, 1974, p. 136.

17. "The working class sometimes resorted to the metropolitan power in its struggle with the local bourgeoisie, a tactic that left deep impressions in its ideology." A.G.

Quintero Rivera, ed., *Worker's Struggle in Puerto Rico* (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976), p. 52.

18. Santiago Iglesias was born in La Coruña in northern Spain. He migrated to Cuba where he was persecuted by the local colonial authorities for his organizing activities among workers. It was as a result of that persecution that in 1896 he fled to Puerto Rico.

19. Henry K. Carroll, *Report on the Island of Porto Rico, its Population, Civil Government, Commerce Industries, Productions, Roads, Tariff and Economy with Recommendations* (Washington, D.C., 1899), p. 317.

20. The term lumpen proletariat should not be interpreted as insulting although (as with the term petty bourgeoisie) it has been used as such among "vulgar" Marxists. By lumpen proletariat is understood all those social agents that the process of capitalist production has pushed to the margins of society and has forced to live on hustling and handouts. They are the permanently unemployed. They constitute that group in society that in relationship to the principal areas of capitalist production has been made superfluous, that sector of society for whose members day-to-day survival has become most difficult. In a country such as Puerto Rico, where the official rate of unemployment has never been less than 11 percent and where real unemployment is currently close to 40 percent, this class is heavily represented in the class structure. The lumpen proletariat includes prostitutes, pimps, drug-pushers, and all those in "criminal" occupations. It also includes many social-welfare recipients and dropouts from society in general.

21. In 1912, Luis Muñoz Rivera stated that independence was his *desideratum* but autonomy his *modus operandi*. In other words, independence was impossible but, for honor's sake, it had to be defended if the U.S. refused to grant "self government." He wrote:

> La independencia es un ideal puramente abstracto. No puede realizarse. No se realizará nunca. Lo consignamos, lo mantenemos, porque hay cosas superiores al cálculo, no sumisas al cálculo. Y una de ellas, la más alta, el honor, individual o colectivo. Tal vez llegue yo a abroquelarme en el y a convertirle en mi única bandera de combate; será cuando no reste ninguna posibilidad de que se nos de lo nuestro. Y será tambiénla última protesta, tan inútil como nuestra labor política, pero sin duda más noble y más bella.

Cited in Bolivar Pagán, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

22. James Petras and Juan Manuel Carrión, "Contradictions of Colonial Industrialization and the Crises in 'Commonwealth' Status," in James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Classes in the Third World* (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979).

23. Proletarian sectors exist in those areas of economic activity that because of contradictions in capitalist development have fallen within the sphere of government control. There are several activities in Puerto Rico that are no longer profitable to private capitalists but are indispensable for the normal functioning of the economy. An example of such activities is the production of electricity. In Puerto Rico this is controlled by a government corporation. Productive workers in it form one of the most militant sectors of the trade-union movement in the island. Their leader is a member of the Central Committee of the Puerto Rican Socialist party. There are other examples of productive workers whose employer is the government. But this type of worker is atypical. The majority of government employees are unproductive workers.

The Development of Annexationist Politics in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico

Aarón Gamaliel Ramos

Annexationist politics have been both a persistent and forceful phenomenon in the modern history of Puerto Rico. From the U.S. occupation of the island in 1898 to the present the proposal to convert Puerto Rico into a state of the U.S. has been a central theme of island political life. But the extent of support for annexationist political projects throughout this period has varied depending on the magnitude and forms of colonial dependence and on prevalent metropolitan attitudes toward the incorporation of territories.

As in other colonial experiences, the sources of support for annexation come primarily from those social groups that benefit from economic, political, and cultural linkages with the metropolitan power. Yet, contrary to the elitist patterns of support in other colonial situations, support for annexation in Puerto Rican society in this century has derived from both elite groups and popular sectors.

Given the significance of this phenomenon in Puerto Rican social history, it is surprising that so little attention has been devoted to its analysis. This essay aims to present a general overview of the socio-historical trajectory of annexationist politics in Puerto Rico during the period of U.S. domination, focusing on its social composition and political contradictions.

Historical Background

Preoccupation with Puerto Rico's political status under Spanish rule was a late historical development.[1] Within the Spanish structure of colonial domination both Puerto Rico and Cuba had an unequal position vis-à-vis the peninsular provinces. The Spanish colonies lacked autonomy to deal with their internal affairs, and those born in the islands had second-class citizenship.

The Spanish Revolution of 1868 had a profound impact on Puerto Rican politics. The Liberal Reformist party, which grouped the island's landed gentry, sought the extension to Puerto Rico of the reforms introduced in Spain. In the light of this historic scenario two tendencies developed within the Liberal Reformist party in 1870. *Asimilistas* sought an end to the colonial status of Puerto Rico through the granting of Spanish provincial status to the island and citizenship rights and priviliges similar to those enjoyed by Spaniards. Another faction, the *autonomistas*, argued for large measures of decentralization under an autonomous charter. With the passage of time *autonomismo* became by far the more powerful of these two political factions. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century *asimilismo* remained a weak force with very limited impact on Puerto Rican politics.[2]

Several factors explain the weakness of the assimilationist movement in pre-1898 Puerto Rico. One was the consistent reluctance of Spain to consider changes in the colonial system. Opposition to political reform thrived in Spain as it did among the privileged Spanish establishment in Puerto Rico. Fearful of losing the privileges enjoyed, the conservatives organized the *Partido Incondicional* in 1870 with the specific objective of impeding political reform.[3] Supportive of the status quo was the Spanish urban elite composed of military officers, administrators, the higher clergy, and the Spanish merchants who carried the bulk of their commerce within the context of the Spanish empire, "moved by fear that any change would endanger their interests."[4] Thus, conservative intransigence to political reforms in the colony weakened the legitimacy of assimilationist proposals and increased the struggle of the autonomists' sectors of Puerto Rican society.

Economic considerations also played a vital role in the political alignments of the creole elite. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the Puerto Rican economy expanded through increases in agricultural production.[5] With the growth of an internal market, the Puerto Rican *hacendados* and small farmers moved their economic orientations towards the United States. Because Spanish commercial restrictions curtailed the development of this social class, they inclined towards political autonomy as a way of evading the Spanish mercantilist barriers. *Asimilismo* hence remained the political project of a small minority of merchants and farmers tied to the Spanish economy.

With the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico these tendencies promptly dissolved. Ironically, it was from the ranks of the autonomist movement that the initial base of support for statehood during U.S. rule emerged.[6]

Origins of Annexationist Politics Under U.S. Rule

United States domination of Puerto Rico had an ambiguous impact upon the island's social structure. While it debilitated the dominant position the landed class of *hacendados* had enjoyed before 1898, both capitalist penetration and U.S. political institutions were, in the estimation of other social groups, positive developments. Penetration of capital into the agrarian exporting sugar economy dislocated the traditional hacienda system, drastically changed the land-tenure patterns, and upset the prevalent patriarchal cultural patterns. Thus, the social classes that suffered by this occurrence at the beginnings of the century moved towards protestation of the U.S. presence in Puerto Rico. Organized in the *Partido Unionista* in 1904, these groups fluctuated ideologically between autonomist and proindependence political projects.[7]

On the other hand, capitalist penetration and political modernization represented advantages to other segments of Puerto Rican society, which aligned themselves within the ranks of annexationist politics. Thus, the *Partido Republicano* of the beginnings of the century represented a broad convergence of social groups.[8] A key element in the party was the elite that benefited from its economic or political linkages with metropolitan interests. The most salient group during this early period was formed by an urban professional sector (doctors, federal employees, etc.) which gave the *Partido Republicano* its initial aggressive and utopian ideology. This sector dominated the leadership of the party until the death of José Celso Barbosa (the party's leader) in 1921. The *Partido Republicano* also had within its ranks a group formed by intermediaries at the service of the big sugar corporations that were becoming increasingly preeminent in Puerto Rico's economy.

This group, composed of corporate lawyers, administrators, and managers in the sugar economy, emerged, with the death of Barbosa, as the dominant political elite of the annexationist movement.

The *Partido Republicano* was supported by other social groups that were benefiting from changes in the colonial economy. Puerto Rican landowners who turned to the production of sugar became highly dependent on U.S. corporations and the system of preferential policies for sugar in the U.S. market, and therefore supportive of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico. In a similar situation of dependence were those merchants who increased their trade with the U.S., deriving advantages from the expansion of importing and commercial activities in the island as the internal market for goods was reduced.

During the early period of U.S. domination, the *Partido Republicano* had a popular base of support. U.S. rule introduced a series of changes in the economic and political structure about which there is diversity of opinion but whose impact upon the disadvantaged masses is undeniable. Wage labor in the sugar industry broke down the traditional patriarchal social relations based on the submission and dependence of landless workers on the landed gentry. This, and the extension to the colony of the modern forms of social domination typical of advanced capitalism—the political party system, individual and collective rights, etc.—that had been absent under Spanish colonial rule, increased the capacity of the disadvantaged groups in the island in their social and political struggles both against internal oppression and the new forms of economic exploitation. This is a phenomenon of great importance whose impact has not yet been fully explored. The extension of the political institutions of the metropolis to Puerto Rico during this period enabled the masses to become actors in the political process. While the Spanish political system had been based on a restrictive participation of the masses, the U.S. introduced universal suffrage and other organizational rights that had a crucial significance in the ideology of workers and disadvantaged groups in Puerto Rican society.

Annexationist politics after 1898 emphasized the presence of modern political institutions, freedoms and practices that Spanish colonialism had rejected vehemently: individual freedoms, separation of Church and state, political equality. The political program of the *Partido Republicano* in 1899 summarized these issues:

> we proclaim the empire of liberty and individual rights, especially universal suffrage for all American citizens, poor or rich.[9]

Although an obscured theme in the sociological literature of Puerto Rico, there is some evidence suggesting that blacks were a fundamental component of the annexationist movement. As U.S. rule increasingly undermined the political hegemony of the white creole classes (among which racist attitudes were widespread), the Puerto Rican black population saw in the new situation the opening of avenues for social and political mobility.[10] The fact that Barbosa was black may explain in part black support for the *Partido Republicano.*

It is also important to emphasize that during this period in the early history of the *Partido Republicano* the party received the support of certain working-class sectors which were then in the process of organizing into labor unions. Statehood was seen by several working-class leaders as a guarantee of the right to organize and strike and of other prolabor laws existing in the U.S. and introduced into Puerto Rico after 1898.

Harsh economic exploitation, widespread poverty, and political impotence marred the idealistic conceptions on which the statehood movement had been founded, and led to political cleavages in it. In 1915 Santiago Iglesias, the leader of the Free Federation of Labor, organized the *Partido Socialista* which, in the course of the 1920s, took a stand on behalf of statehood as the best means of improving the conditions of the working class and the poor in general. With the creation of the *Partido Socialista*, the popular base of the *Partido Republicano* was drastically reduced. The following table shows the electoral impact of this event (figures are percentages of total votes cast):

YEAR	*REPUBLICANOS*	*SOCIALISTAS*
1914	40.4	—
1917	34.5	14.0
1920	26.0	23.7
1924	11.9	22.1

The departure of popular elements from the *Partido Republicano* precipitated by the founding of the *Partido Socialista*, the death of Barbosa in 1921, and the ascent to the leadership of the Republican organization of the class of Puerto Rican intermediaries at the service of U.S. corporations, led to new ideological trends in the statehood movement.

The death of Barbosa in 1921 marked the end of control of the party by those sectors (best represented by Barbosa himself) that had imprinted the organization with its initial idealistic posture. The sequence of leaders that followed Barbosa—José Tous Soto, Rafael Martínez Nadal, Celestino Iriarte, and Miguel Angel García Méndez—were all corporate lawyers intimately linked to the great sugar corporations. Confronting a deteriorating economic situation (especially in the 1930s), a political system in which real power lay in the hands of North American administrators like the presidentially appointed governor, and the sad social conditions under which the vast majority of the Puerto Rican population lived, the *Partido Republicano* moved to a more realistic stance. The party's program now proposed that statehood should be requested only after the island's social and economic problems were finally resolved and tuned its politics to a mere defense of the U.S. flag as the guarantee of a permanent relationship with the U.S. Thus, the statehood political project became a long-range utopia to be preceded by transitional political formulas.[12] This ideological turn in the *Partido Republicano* was also prompted by U.S. attitudes toward the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union, which stressed the need for a "preparatory stage" for the achievement of statehood.[13]

Because of its linkages with U.S. corporate interests, the statehood movement became increasingly an enemy of social and political reform. World depression during the thirties further aggravated the crisis of colonial society, exacerbating poverty and social disintegration. Stigmatized as the defender of the status quo, the *Partido Republicano* experienced drastic reductions in political support.[14] Fearing that this decline would lead into a trend towards eventual separation of Puerto Rico from the United States, the *Partido Republicano* entered into an electoral coalition with the *Partido Socialista*, which won the 1932 and 1936 elections.[15]

As the social and economic crisis of the 1930s deepened, the colonial situation became a growing metropolitan concern. During the New Deal period, the U.S. government openly opposed agrarian interests in the island and shifted its policy towards support of those sectors in Puerto Rican society committed to social and economic reform.[16] With the formation in 1938 and the electoral victory in 1940 of the *Partido Popular Democratico* (PPD), a party with a program of social reform and industrialization, the statehood movement in Puerto Rico entered another phase of rapid decline in Puerto Rican political life. In the 1936 elections, the Republicans had received 27.7 per cent of the votes. In 1940, they received 23.6 per cent and in 1944, 17.1 per cent. During the elections of 1948, their share of the vote declined to 13.8 per cent. In the course of the 1950s, however, this trend was reversed, to a great extent by the consequences of the program of reform and industrialization of the PPD government.

Annexationist Politics in the Post-World War II Period

The 1950s were a turning point in the evolution of annexationist politics in Puerto Rico. The changes in the economy produced by industrialization, the establishment of Commonwealth in 1952, and the breakdown of rural society were all contributing factors in the revival of support for statehood.

During the forties, as a result of the industrial transformation of Puerto Rico engineered by the politically dominant PPD, a Puerto Rican industrial elite headed by Luis Ferré made its appearance in the annexationist camp. This prostatehood industrial sector was formed by those Puerto Rican industrialists who arranged their productive concerns along the technology and style of U.S. capitalism. This sector introduced into the annexationist movement a more aggressive commitment to statehood. Symbolic of this were the changes in the *Partido Republicano*. In 1948 the party (known then as the *Unión Republicana)* changed its name to *Partido Estadista Republicano* (PER). Adding "statehood" to the party's name reflected the commitment of these sectors to a permanent relationship with the United States. Ideologically, the party stepped out of the smugness of prewar politics and started to deal with a concrete program for the achievement of statehood.[17]

The PER was a transitional organization from the old agrarian to the new industrial setting, and thus had a mixed composition. While the old sectors still headed the party, the new aggressive industrial sector assumed a leading role, giving the PER its ideology. The political life of the PER, from 1948 to 1968, reflected the tension between these two groups: those that historically had been linked to the U.S. sugar interests in the island and were led by Miguel Angel García Méndez, and the new merchant and industrial elite represented by Luis Ferré.

Ferré became a key figure in this transitional era. Having both historic and family ties with the old *republicano* tradition (e.g., he is a relative of García Méndez), Ferré served the function of ideological liaison between the old and new prostatehood sectors. As a coleader of the PER, he was influential in the presentation of a formal statehood proposal in 1956, assumed a leading role during the sixties when the U.S.-P.R. Status Commission examined the status question, and led the modern statehood sectors in the formation of the *Partido Nuevo Progresista* (PNP) in 1968.

During this period, support for statehood grew at unprecedented rates. Having gained a mere 14 per cent of the votes in the 1948 elections, and 13 per cent in 1952, the PER subsequently moved to become the main opposition force in Puerto Rican politics. In 1956 the PER received 25 per cent of the votes, 103 per cent more than it had received in 1952. Conversely, although the PPD continued to win the electoral contests, it became a force in decline during this period. In 1956 the PPD (which had received 64.5 per cent of the votes during the 1952 elections) received only 61.7 per cent of the votes. By 1960 its share had declined further to 57.4 per cent.[18]

The changes in Puerto Rico's political status brought about by the establishment of Commonwealth (*Estado Libre Asociado*) in 1952 was also an important factor in the ideological transformation of the PER. As indicated earlier, one main obstacle confronted by annexationist politics during the agrarian exporting period had been the U.S. insistence on a preparatory stage. Commonwealth came to be viewed within the prostatehood ranks as that stage, that is, as a transitional step on the road leading to full-fledged statehood for Puerto Rico.

The changes in U.S. policy towards the incorporation of noncontiguous territories was yet another factor in the revival of annexationist politics in the island during the early fifties.[19] The granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii in 1959 debunked widespread beliefs regarding U.S. reluctance to accept Puerto Rico as a state.

In addition, the annexation of a racially distinct territory like Hawaii increased the confidence of the PER that cultural differentiation would not be a significant block in the way to statehood.[20]

The drastic reduction in support for independence played an important role in the development of annexationist politics during this period. Having received 20 per cent of the vote in 1952, the *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño* (PIP) suffered dramatic declines in the electoral contests that followed: 13 percent in 1956 and less than 3 per cent in 1960.

As a result of the persistent conflict over the status question in the sixties, a U.S.-P.R. Status Commission was formed to study the status question. The Commission pointed out two main obstacles to statehood. One was the problem of internal consensus posed by the fact that no territory had ever achieved statehood without a petition above partisanship.[21] Secondly, the report stressed economic viability as a key factor in statehood for Puerto Rico.[22] These two issues were to become the central concern of annexationist politics with the end of the political life of the PER in 1968.

Current Annexationist Politics in Puerto Rico

As a result of the process of industrialization, the urban middle strata of Puerto Rican society expanded. Agricultural activities lost importance in the economy while urban and industrial activities enlarged.[23] While in 1940 45 per cent of the population was involved in agricultural activities, this figure had declined to 23 per cent in 1960 and 10 per cent in 1970. On the other hand, the industrial economy increased the number of people involved in services and the government sector.[24] Bureaucratic employment increased at a rapid pace. Whereas employment in the government sector had been only 3 per cent of the labor force in 1940, it steadily climbed to 8 per cent in 1950, 11 per cent in 1960, and 18 per cent in 1970. These changes led to the formation of a middle social strata with economic linkages to and/or ideological affinities with the U.S.

Similarly, since the industrialization process relied on the influx of U.S. capital into Puerto Rico, industrial occupations, too, became highly dependent on the relationship with the United States.[25] A new social sector emerged out of this integration with the U.S. economy. This sector, formed by corporate lawyers, administrators in U.S. industrial and commercial enterprises and part of the growing government bureaucracy, became ideologically inclined towards annexation. Out of this sector a new social group with a radical posture towards statehood organized separately from the PER during the sixties. Critical of the PER for its weak stance in the status question, organizations like *Ciudadanos Pro-Estado 51* (Citizens for the 51st State) assumed an extremist ideological posture. It was from the ranks of this group that Carlos Romero Barceló emerged as the new leader of radical statehood politics.[26]

The 1967 plebiscite provided the setting for the final cleavage between the old and new sectors within the PER, and the formation of a new prostatehood political organization under the ideological leadership of the extremist group led by Carlos Romero Barceló. The traditional leadership of the PER, led by García Méndez, opposed the holding of a plebiscite on the status question. Advocating participation as a measurement of the forces of statehood, Ferré led a splinter group—*Estadistas Unidos*—to a dramatic electoral performance. This political organization was the immediate predecessor of the *Partido Nuevo Progresista* (PNP) organized by Ferré in 1968. The PNP won the elections of that year, thereby ending the political hegemony of the PPD in postwar politics.

RESULTS OF THE 1967 PLEBISCITE

	No. of Votes	*Per Cent of Total*
Commonwealth	425,132	60.4
Statehood	274,312*	38.9
Independence	4,248*	.6

Source: P.R. Commonwealth Board of Elections

Where did this new wave of statehood militancy come from? Historically, statehood has been a predominantly urban phenomenon. While the PPD's main base of popular support has been consistently the rural areas, both the PER and the PNP received the largest returns in the large towns and cities.[27] For example, in the 1960 elections, the PER received 40 per cent of the vote in the metropolitan areas, while its island-wide vote was scarcely 32 per cent. This pattern became clearer after the 1968 elections when the PPD lost most of the major urban centers while retaining the larger portion of the *municipios*.

---

*The major political parties representing statehood (the PER), and independence (the PIP) boycotted the plebiscite.

Furthermore, annexationist phenomena tends to thrive amongst some of the working class; and is the ideological tendency of the marginal masses in the urban areas.[28] Support for statehood amongst the urban marginal sectors of Puerto Rican society can be explained by the series of structural changes that took place in the Puerto Rican economy during the decade of the sixties. The initial phase of the industrialization process in the late 1940s relied mainly on the implantation of labor-intensive U.S. industrial enterprises. Combining this with massive migration to the United States, Operation Bootstrap (as the industrialization program of the PPD regime became known) attempted to maintain a low level of unemployment in the island. However, as the colonial industrialization process became more tied to multinational capital, the program of industrial attraction was reoriented towards the highly mechanized capital-intensive industries that made little usage of the enormous supplies of labor.[29] The consequence of this was a growing process of marginalization as a result of growing unemployment.

The marginal population agglomerated in the urban areas, and became highly dependent on government services for survival. Because of the critical levels of unemployment and marginality in Puerto Rico, the colonial governments came to rely more and more on drastic increases of federal funding to deal with this problem. Thus, the amount of federal funds involved increased from 95 million dollars in 1960 to 143 million dollars in 1965, to 313 million dollars in 1970. By 1975 the amount of Federal transferences to the island had reached 1.1 billion dollars. In analyzing this phenomenon it is important to note that, while federal funding in Puerto Rico had historically been devoted to infrastructural projects, during the late sixties the allocation of funds included large amounts for those areas directly related to the social and economic survival of individuals (e.g., housing, food programs, health, etc.).

The social and economic dependence of the marginal population on the government structures creates a new form of paternalistic political relations. In the past, the dependence of the masses in the context of political domination was based on an exhange of loyalties between a charismatic leader and the dispossessed masses. The new populist annexationist politics has substituted the "father figure" by an external bureaucracy.[30] Thus, today the PNP preaches statehood as a project of the poor, of the marginal, in a context of social and economic dependence. But this is, moreover, an ambiguous pattern insofar as the marginal masses are politically unstable and are prone to realignments with those sectors than can best manage external support.

Today, annexationist politics in Puerto Rico is at a crossroads. The PNP has achieved the historical feat of expanding support for statehood among a broad segment of the population by emphasizing the theme of economic dependence on the United States. On the other hand, it is precisely the question of dependence that most actively works against the U.S. considerations for annexation because of the pauper conditions of the island.[31] Thus, in the end, the two problems that have historically haunted the annexationist movement in Puerto Rico—consensus and economic viability—stand facing each other as unsolvable issues of the statehood agenda.

NOTES

1. Throughout the nineteenth century, political life in the island was dominated by two tendencies: conservatism and liberalism. But it is only after the establishment of a parliamentary system in Spain that political parties emerge in Puerto Rico with a formal preoccupation with the status question. In 1869 the conservatives were organized as a political party supporting unconditional allegiance to Spain. In the following year creole groups founded the *Partido Liberal Reformista*. Both these parties were elitist organizations operating within the context of limited suffrage. Thus, the Puerto Rican masses had little to do with this problem. See Lidio Cruz Monclova, *Historia de Puerto Rico en el siglo XIX*, 3 vols. (Río Piedras, Editorial Universitaria, 1957-1964).

2. Thus the context of political inequality during the period of Spanish colonialism had a profound impact upon the ideological inclinations of the insular classes towards autonomism. See, for example, Pilar Barbosa del Rosario, *Historia del autonomismo puertorriqueño*, 2d. edition, (San Juan, 1974).

3. The *Partido Incondicional Español* had as its fundamental objectives opposition to the extension of political reforms to the island and "the conservation of the national integrity of Spain," pledging in its program to support any Spanish government as deemed useful in maintaining the status quo in Puerto Rico. A very useful review of social and political developments in the island throughout the nineteenth century appears in Adalberto López "Socio-Politico Developments in a Colonial Context: Puerto Rico in the Nineteenth Century," Adalberto López and James Petras, eds., *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans*, (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974).

4. In Lidio Cruz Monclova, *Historia de Puerto Rico*, III, p. 2.

5. On these developments in the Puerto Rican economy in the late nineteenth century see, A. G. Quintero, "Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico" in this text.

6. While the salient antagonism throughout the nineteenth century was between Spanish conservatives and creole reformists, there were important differences in the liberal reformist camp. Orthodox and Fusionist tendencies had progressively divided the Autonomist party in 1897. The former faction, led by José Celso Barbosa, assumed a radical autonomist republican stance; while the later, led by Luis Muñoz Rivera, proposed a fusion with the Liberal party in Spain in the struggle for reforms in the island. During the occupation of Puerto Rico by the U.S. in 1898, both factions became supporters of annexation: the *Partido Liberal*, formed by *hacendados* and farmers, became the *Partido Federal* in 1898; and the *Partido Republicano* (1898) inherited the social components of the *Partido Ortodoxo*. With the passage of time the political differences between these two groups became clearly defined, as the *Partido Republicano* came to represent the main annexationist force in the colony, while the *Federales*—reorganized in the *Partido Unión de Puerto Rico* in 1904—became the chief advocates of the autonomist solution.

7. Unlike Spain or England, the United States lacked experience as a colonial power. Hence, there was confusion as to the outcome of the occupation. The initial annexationist alignment of the landed classes of Puerto Rico was prompted by their belief that the United States would organize a system in Puerto Rico in which they would retain their hegemonic political and economic position. Thus their program read:

> El Partido Federal declara que acepta y aplaude el hecho de la anexión, consumado tras la guerra, considerando que Puerto Rico será un pueblo próspero y feliz a la sombra de la bandera americana y al amparo de las instituciones federales.

However, as U.S. policies in Puerto Rico came to threaten more and more their interests as a class, they moved to protestation of U.S. domination of the island. See Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños*, 2 vols. (San Juan, Libería Campos, 1959).

8. An analysis of the social composition of the *Partido Republicano* during these years is extremely difficult because of the intensive pattern of political realignments occurring throughout this period of dramatic social and economic transformation. A useful inquiry has been presented by A.G. Quintero Rivera, "The Development of Social Classes and Political Conflicts in Puerto Rico," in this text. See especially note 21 of his article.

9. See the program of the *Partido Republicano* in Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos*, Vol I.

10. Because Puerto Rican social sciences have not yet fully dealt with the myth of the absence of a race problem in Puerto Rican society, the question posed by the political alignments of blacks remains to be examined. Some suggestions have been presented in the collection of anthropological studies edited by Julian Steward, *The People of Puerto Rico* (University of Illinois Press, 1956).

11. This point is presented by Robert Anderson, *Party Politics in Puerto Rico* (Stanford University Press, 1965). The move from the initial, idealistic to the more realistic stance

was prompted by U.S. coolness towards the issue, the internal socioeconomic conditions of the island, and the context of political impotence. See, for example, 'Manifiesto de Barceló y Tous Soto' (1924), in Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos*, pp. 227-234.

12. The *republicanos* proposed a "territorial status" to be followed by statehood. Such a status would include features as an internally elected governor, extension of federal benefits to the island, and other steps.

13. The program of the *Union Republicana* in 1917 asked the U.S. Congress to commit itself to granting statehood to Puerto Rico once educational, economic, and other problems were solved. The student who embarks in the study of annexationist politics during this period will find constant references made by both U.S. officials and Puerto Rican statehooders to the presence of the U.S. flag over Puerto Rico—not to statehood as the immediate goal.

14. In response to the political force of the labor-oriented *Partido Socialista*, an alliance was formed in 1924 between the two main elite groups, the *Partido Unión* and the *Partido Republicano*. This *Alianza* received 51.8 per cent of the votes during the election of that year, while the socialists received 48.1 per cent.

15. The coalition was an unstable political force dominated by the *republicanos*. See Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos*, 2nd volume, pp. 1-116.

16. See Thomas Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (University of Florida Press, 1960). This shift in U.S. policy towards Puerto Rico was manifested in the appointment of Rexford Tugwell as governor of Puerto Rico. Tugwell assumed a militant attitude on behalf of the industrialization of the island and against agrarian interests. On this topic see R. Tugwell, *Public Papers*, (Washington: 1945).

17. An interesting analysis of *republicano* politics appears in Robert Anderson, *Party Politics*. It was Anderson who first examined the nature of ideological changes in the *republicano* organization in the post-World War II period.

18. The PDD received 58.0 per cent of the votes in 1964 and 39.8 per cent in 1968 when it lost to the prostatehood PNP.

19. See Robert Hunter, "Historical Survey of the Puerto Rico Status Question, 1898-1965," in *The Status of Puerto Rico*, Selected Background STudies prepared for the U.S.-P.R. Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico (Washington, 1966).

20. Relative to the cultural question the Status Commission report stated:

> There is a cultural question relating to Statehood. If Puerto Rico became a State it would be a case of an area possessing a homogeneous, distinctive culture being incorporated into the United States. The experience of Hawaii, although so very different in many important ways, attests to the capacity of the U.S. citizens and the union of States to develop full Statehood with cultural diversity and without territoral contiguity.

The Status of Puerto Rico, p. 15.

21. The Status Commission report emphasized the problem of internal consensus:

> It is the belief of the Commission that Puerto Rico is at a stage in its history where the question of status should be elevated above partisanship. No area has ever achieved Statehood without a broad public demand transcending party

> lines. The most important requirement for Statehood is the achievement of a clear majority for Statehood; such a positive climate of consensus and understanding is a sine qua non to the achievement of Statehood for Puerto Rico.

The Status of Puerto Rico, pp. 14-15.

22. Economic viability was the other central problem stressed by the Status Commission. The report read:

> Economics is one of the vital factors in a Puerto Rican decision to seek a congressional decision to grant Statehood. The extensive economic studies which have been conducted do not resolve clearly the question of whether Puerto Rico is now prepared, or if not now, when in the future Puerto Rico will be prepared to assume the economic responsibilities and adjustments of statehood. Unless an appropriate substitute for Puerto Rico's present special economic arrangements can be provided, it is clear that were Statehood to be granted now, it would have severe and probably disastrous consequences.

The Status of Puerto Rico, p. 14.

23. The urban population grew from 30.3 per cent of the total population in 1940, to 40.5 per cent in 1950, to 44.2 per cent in 1960. By 1970 it had already reached 58.1 per cent. Similarly, industrial activities increased dramatically as shown by the table below:

EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR: 1940-1972

Sector	**1940**	**1950**	**1960**	**1970**	**1972**
Agriculture	44.7	36.3	23.0	10.2	7.9
Manufacturing	10.9	9.2	14.9	19.1	19.0
Commerce	10.5	15.1	17.9	18.7	18.4
Services	14.3	12.9	13.8	16.7	17.0
Government	2.5	7.6	11.4	15.3	17.6

Sources: U.S. Census of Population, 1970; and Puerto Rico Planning Board.

24. This is reflected in the occupational structure. While in 1940 only 3.1 per cent of the population was involved in professional, technical, and related occupations, this figure had increased to 7.7 per cent in 1960, and 11.1 per cent in 1970. Conversely, while 35.1 per cent of the population was made up of farm workers in 1940, by 1950 the figure had declined to 30.9 per cent. By 1960 it was 19.9 per cent. In 1970 only 5.6 of the employed were involved in farm activities.

25. See, Morris Morley, "Dependence and Development in Puerto Rico," in *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans.*

26. Romero Barceló, too, follows the tradition of corporate lawyers assuming leading roles in the annexationist movement. Interestingly, Barbosa and Ferré are the historical exceptions.

27. This relationship has been examined by Marcia Quintero, *Elecciones de 1968 en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, 1972); and by Kenneth Farr, *Personalism and Party Politics* (San Juan, 1973).

28. Marcia Quintero, in her study of the 1968 electoral contest in Puerto Rico, found that the PNP was supported in the wealthiest and the poorest sectors of Puerto Rican society.

29. During the decade of the sixties the Economic Development Administration shifted its emphasis from one of attracting factories into the consumer-goods industry to one of introducing chemical and petrochemical plants that generate few jobs. With openings for foreign capital investment in other countries of the Caribbean region, Puerto Rico ceased to be a profitable area for the low-capital industries.

30. This problem obviously requires further investigation. Both Luis Muñoz Marín and Felisa Rincón reproduced this pattern of a leader with an intimate contact with the population which was typical of the hacienda system. With urbanization and industrialization these sociopolitical patterns of domination were disrupted, and substituted by impersonal and bureaucratic forms of dependence. This process has been exmained by Anibal Quijano and Francisco Weffort, *Populismo, Marginación y Dependenia* (Editorial Universiatria Centroamericana, San José, 1973).

31. Metropolitan attitudes toward statehood have changed in recent years. After the Borg Report, important official sectors in the U.S. have moved to support statehood. This trend is possibly related to a combination of factors. First, there is the need to protect the vast amounts of U.S. capital in Puerto Rico. Second, there is a geopolitical factor, emerging out of the radical political changes in the Carribbean area and the need of the U.S. to remain a "Caribbean power." Third, there are the international pressures to solve the colonial problem in Puerto Rico. Finally, there is the problem of persistent political division in Puerto Rican society relative to this question.

Women in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico

Edna Acosta-Belén

In order to gain a full perspective on the experience of women in twentieth century Puerto Rico, it is imperative to consider their presence within the diverse socioeconomic and cultural contexts of Puerto Rico's historical development. Because the social and historical roles of women have generally been ignored or undermined, the task of reconstructing and reevaluating traditional inaccuracies and omissions has been and continues to be a difficult one. Fortunately, it is a task which, in recent years, has involved some of Puerto Rico's most committed and talented scholars. The main goals of this essay are to summarize some of their research on the subject and to provide a general framework for the study of the Puerto Rican woman. It is in no way intended to be a detailed or exhaustive analysis.

A sociohistorical overview of the role and status of women in Puerto Rican society would be incomplete without an outline of the role of women among the Taino inhabitants of pre-Hispanic Boriquén. Recent research has demonstrated that, in Taino society, the matrilineal family tradition was extremely important and that, through maternal, paternal or marriage ties, women had access to the highest stations of the Taino social structure. According to Jalil Sued Badillo, important women such as Yuisa (or Luisa), in the region known today as Loiza Aldea, and Guayervas in the Otoao region, are, among others, described in Spanish documents of the early sixteenth century as *cacicas* (chiefs).[1] It has also been shown that Taino women were taught to handle weapons and often fought in battles side-by-side with their men. They participated fully in the production of goods and in religious and other ritual ceremonies. One of the two main deities of the Tainos was Guabancex, the earth goddess. In a matrilineal agrarian society as that of the Tainos, it is not surprising that great powers were attributed to this goddess.[2]

The influence and power that Taino women shared with the men came to an end with the Spanish conquest and colonization of Boriquén in the early 1500s. Both Taino men and women were subjected to systems of forced labor and other forms of exploitation which, together with the Spaniards' policy of religious and cultural genocide, tore to shreds the fabric of Taino society. During those early years in the history of Puerto Rico as a colony of Spain, the sexual exploitation of Taino women by Spaniards was commonplace. All these developments, combined with diseases such as measles and smallpox (introduced into the island by the Spaniards and against which the Tainos had no biological protection), brought about a catastrophic decline in the Amerindian population. By the latter part of the sixteenth century there were almost no Tainos left in Puerto Rico. To replace partially the rapidly declining Amerindian labor pool, the Spaniards imported black slaves to work in the gold fields and agricultural establishments.

In the years after the Spanish occupation of Puerto Rico, many Spaniards entered into illegitimate unions with Taino and black slave women; miscegenation and concubinage were widespread realities of Puerto Rican colonial society. The offspring that resulted from most of these unions became, in most cases, the responsibility of the mothers. Thus, families headed by women were not uncommon.

Spanish women who migrated to Puerto Rico in the footsteps of the men who occupied and settled the island for Spain played a critical role in the society that was evolving.[3] They were important as transmitters of Hispanic culture and values, and thus had a tremendous impact on the development of Puerto Rican culture and society. Also, during the centuries of Spanish colonial rule, many women contributed to the economy, an economy which Marcia Rivera Quintero has described as "organized on the basis of independent peasant producers for family consumption." Since this kind of work cannot be defined in monetary terms, she continues, it is "almost impossible to calculate or quantify women's contribution to subsistence agriculture."[4]

Puerto Rican colonial society during the period of Spanish rule was, like societies throughout the Spanish American world, a male-oriented society in which the subordination of women to men was almost absolute. Women were conditioned to be obedient daughters, faithful wives, and devoted mothers. Their inferior status was reinforced by juridical inequality. Laws concerning the family and community property in marriage limited the rights of women. It is a revealing commentary on contemporary Puerto Rican society that some of these laws are still in effect.

Throughout the first three and a half centuries of Spanish colonial rule in Puerto Rico there was an absence of feminist consciousness and feminist movements. This situation was evidently the result of the low educational and employment levels of the vast majority of the female population. As Isabel Picó has argued, "under these circumstances it was not possible for a true feminist movement to develop as it did in England, France, the U.S. and other countries which had experienced greater economic and social complexity."[5] By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the idea of women's emancipation was being discussed by an educated liberal elite of the creole *hacendado*, an elite that advocated the abolition of slavery and the independence of Puerto Rico from Spain. Members of this elite emphasized in their writings the need to educate women and prepare them to participate in society.[6] It is in the writings of Ignacio Guasp, José Pablo Morales, Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, Eugenio María de Hostos, Salvador Brau, and Gabriel Ferrer that proposals for the improvement of women's education and greater participation by women in society were first propagated. This intellectual liberal elite saw the improvement in the status of women as a step in the direction of social progress for the country. Although they did not advocate total equality among the sexes (politics, for example, was still seen as the domain of men), they defended the right of women to an education and to practice professions from which they had traditionally been excluded.

In the second half of the nineteenth century women themselves began playing a more viable and assertive role in Puerto Rican society and politics. There existed, for example, a small group of educated women, also members of the privileged *hacendado* class, who actively participated in the movement for Puerto Rican independence. Women such as Mariana Bracetti and Lola Rodríguez de Tío are well known for their political militancy and defense of the Puerto Rican nationality. Bracetti, also known as "Brazo de Oro," embroidered the flag of the Puerto Rican republic, declared at Lares during the aborted insurrection (the Grito de Lares) of 1868, and went to prison for her revolutionary activites. Rodríguez de Tío was also a militant separatist. One of the most important literary figures of that period, she is the author of "La Borinqueña," a poem that exhorted the Puerto Rican people to join the armed struggle against Spanish colonialism. She was eventually forced by the colonial authorities to go into exile in Cuba, where she died.

Economic changes in the second half of the nineteenth century were also having a major impact on Puerto Rican women. For slightly more than three centuries the Puerto Rican colonial economy had been characterized by independent subsistence producers. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, these gave way to the expanding hacienda system. As Angel Quintero Rivera has shown, the hacienda represented a structural step towards capitalism, since its emergence implied not only a separation of the direct producer from the means of production, but also the development of a class in need of selling its labor.[7] As capitalism became increasingly the dominant mode of production, women were incorporated more and more into the labor force, and thus came to play a more visible role in society.

As a consequence of the American invasion and occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898, many socioeconomic changes took place that deeply affected the lives of Puerto Rican men and women. The American sugar and tobacco corporations that became established on the island gradually monopolized the Puerto Rican economy and transformed the traditional agricultural system of the semifeudal hacienda into a full-scale capitalistic plantation system. This economic transformation led to a growing proletarianization of the masses and to the emergence of a militant labor movement.[8]

The role of the Puerto Rican woman in the labor movement and the militancy of feminist groups during the first few decades of this century have been generally ignored by what are considered the country's official histories. During this period the feminist movement in Puerto Rico was characterized by two major trends: the petty bourgeois and the proletarian.[9] Norma Valle has explained how these two trends developed in a parallel fashion, but functioned at two very distinct and separate social levels. The suffragist leaders were educated women who were primarily concerned in obtaining for women the right to vote. Organizations such as the Puerto Rican Femenine League and the Puerto Rican Association of Women Suffragists, founded in 1917 and 1925, respectively, played a leading role in this effort. The work and militancy of women such as Ana Roqué de Duprey, Isabel Andreu de Aguilar, Mercedes Solá, Carlota Matienzo, and others, were critical in bringing about the passage of the suffrage bill. In 1932 Puerto Rican women participated for the first time in elections.

The proletarian trend of the feminist movement developed as an integral part of the organized labor movement. Since the beginning of the century a variety of women workers (especially tobacco strippers, seamstresses, hemstitchers, needleworkers, and domestics) were joining labor unions. Picó has described how "women tended to join men in the ranks of organized labor and experienced their own sense of strength and power in trade unions."[10] The vanguard of the women's emancipation movement was represented by the Free Federation of Labor (FTL) which also waged legal battles in favor of universal suffrage and against the poor working conditions faced by women during this period.[11]

One of the most extraordinary women labor leaders of the first decades of this century was Luisa Capetillo, a socialist and a writer who argued on behalf of equal rights for women, free love, and human emancipation, and whose writings still await further study. She was a crusader who tried to raise the consciousness of workers through her active participation in the labor movement, and who is most remembered for her challenge of social conventions and becoming the first woman in Puerto Rico to wear slacks in public.[12]

Among other women who played leadership roles in the Puerto Rican labor movement were Concepción (Concha Torres) who, in 1902, became the first woman on the island to give a speech at a public rally; Juana Colón, a militant socialist and active organizer of the tobacco strippers; Genera Pagán and Emilia Hernández, who presided over the Women's Organization Committee of the FLT; Franca de Armiño, who led the Popular Feminist Association, founded in 1920.[13]

The crisis and decline of the capitalist plantation economy during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the rapid increase in unemployment which resulted, had a negative impact on the feminist movement. During that decade most feminist organizations began to dissolve. Many women were forced by circumstances to work in home-based needlework as a way of making a living, and thus became increasingly isolated from the major social struggles.[14]

In contrast to the "desperate thirties," the 1940s were a decade of political and social reforms introduced by the Popular Democratic party (PPD) under the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín. Founded in 1938, the PPD committed itself to a series of social, economic, and political reforms for the country and was seen initially as a supporter of eventual independence for Puerto Rico. The party received the support of the discontented masses which had been greatly affected by the economic decline of agricultural capitalism and the resulting unemployment, and which could not respond ideologically to other political movements.[15] The PPD's motto of *"Pan, Tierra, y Libertad"* ("Bread, Land and Liberty") was at the time a symbol of hope to the poverty-striken masses, both in the rural areas and in the cities.

The PPD won the elections of 1940 and 1944, and in 1948 its undisputed leader, Luis Muñoz Marín, became the first governor in the island's long colonial history to be elected by popular vote. By then, the party had opted against independence and for a permanent association with the U.S. The reasons for this shift are complex, but it is helpful to keep in mind that the leaders of the PPD were mostly the offspring of the old *hacendado* class whose preeminence in Puerto Rican society had been destroyed by the socioeconomic changes precipitated by the U.S. occupation of 1898. Through the PPD they had been able to establish control of the island's politics. But they needed a new economic base to establish and consolidate their social hegemony. Angel Quintero Rivera has suggested that they achieved it by becoming "the technocrats of a new industrial welfare state."[16] Industrialization became the main goal of the PPD and Operation Bootstrap was born. This massive industrialization scheme, however, could not be realized without a massive influx of North American capital into the country. That capital was attracted through a system of tax exemptions and assurances of cheap labor. And, as PPD spokesmen came to argue, that flow of capital, on which the country's economic expansion became dependent, could only be assured by the maintenance of close ties to the U.S. Thus, Muñoz Marín came out clearly against independence and became instead a spokesman for greater autonomy, an effort that culminated in the establishment in 1952 of the *Estado Libre Asociado* (better known to North Americans as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).

The anti-independence stand of the PPD and its persecution of proindependence elements did not, however, put an end to the activities of the latter. In 1946 disenchanted members of the PPD broke away and founded the Puerto Rican Independence party (PIP). In the late 1940s and in the 1950s this was the most important proindependence party in Puerto Rico. But it was not the only one. Numerically small but far more militant than the PIP was the Nationalist party which, since its founding in 1922, stood uncompromisingly against the U.S. presence on the island. During the 1950s women played an important political role within this party. The courage of nationalist women is best exemplified by the actions of Blanca Canales during the Nationalist revolt of 1950 and Lolita Lebrón during the 1954 attack on the U.S. House of Representatives. Both were imprisoned for their roles in these events.

The rapid process of industrialization of the 1950s and the transformation of the Puerto Rican economy from one based on a plantation system to one characterized by an industrial-technological mode of production was accompanied by a process of modernization that had a great impact on Puerto Rican values and institutions associated with the old agrarian society. Some writers view the changing role of women and their increasing visibility in all spheres of society as part of what they consider the process of Americanization of Puerto Rican society and the acceptance of values that are detrimental to Puerto Rican culture. According to Isabel Picó, this "defensive cultural conservatism" explains why the feminist movement during the last two decades has developed apart from the national liberation struggle.[17]

Despite the dramatic changes experienced by Puerto Rico since the 1940s and the changing role of women, sexism and male chauvinism remained deeply rooted in Puerto Rican society. Institutions and social and cultural patterns inherited from the past continue to deny and deprive women of real equality. Puerto Rican women generally remain underrepresented in professions of power and social influence and are generally absent at the higher levels of government. They receive lower salaries than men in proportion to their years of formal education.[18] Sexual discrimination in the professions and the labor force in general is widespread.

The roots of sexual discrimination and the segregation of sexual roles are ingrained in the socializing process itself. Schooling plays a significant role, as has been demonstrated by Haydeé Yordań in her analysis of basic texts used by the Department of Public Education throughout the Puerto Rican school system. She found that ideas and models for differentiating activities according to sex are inculcated in children through the use of these texts. While boys are presented as aggressive, strong, and with mechanical ability, girls are portrayed as passive, dependent, and physically and emotionally fragile.[19] Celia Fernández Cintrón and Marcia Quintero Rivera have described how stereotyped concepts of women exist and are encouraged by the family and the school. They write:

> Maxims such as "a woman's place is in the home," "a women's chief functions are those of wife and mother," "the good women is the docile one (*la mansita*)" are frequently heard in Puerto Rico. To these sayings is also added the notion that women, because they are nervous and emotional are not capable of solving the problems of life.[20]

Enrollment figures for higher education in Puerto Rico reveal that, in most instances, women constitute a larger proportion of total enrollment than men.[21] Yet, it is important to note that the enrollment of women in the professional schools (e.g., law, medicine, architecture, etc.), that is, in programs leading to potentially influential and upper-income professions, is significantly lower than that of men.[22] Even when women overcome the many obstacles they face and obtain degrees in professions which traditionally have been considered "masculine" professions, their professional practice and employment opportunities are minimized. There is often a wide gap between the education received by women and their actual employment. And it is important to keep in mind that, although in the past four decades the level of involvement and participation by Puerto Rican women in the professions has increased dramatically and women are increasingly more active and visible in public life, the proportion of women in the labor force is less than it was in the 1930s. In 1970, for example, women constituted 22.9 per cent of the labor force. In 1930 the figure had been 26.1[23]

As far as politics is concerned, it is true that since the 1940s women have served in important government posts as Secretaries of Social Services and Education, in the Supreme Court, in the Senate and House of Representatives, and in the city halls of numerous towns, including San Juan itself. These, however, are exceptions. Politics and government in Puerto Rico continue to be dominated completely by men. In sum, Puerto Rican women are still lacking the support system from the socioeconomic, cultural, and juridical structures necessary to better utilize the educational opportunities available to them and to achieve full equality in society.

With the resurgence of a more militant feminist movement in various parts of the world in the 1960s and 1970s, the study of fundamental subjects related to the experience of Puerto Rican women as the forgotten participants of historical and social processes has become a primary focus of open debate and of contemporary research. The influence of women's organizations such as the now-defunct Federation of Puerto Rican Women, the Commission for the Improvement of Women's Rights in Puerto Rico, and he National Conference of Puerto Rican Women in the U.S. has been important. Not only have they contributed to generating an atmosphere of open discussion and debate of issues affecting women, but they have also provided important services and developed valuable materials in the arduous consciousness-raising process.

Because sexism and male chauvinism remain so deeply rooted in Puerto Rican culture and society, there is often a tendency to dismiss the issue of women's liberation as merely a manifestation of the increasing North American influence on Puerto Rico and as a divisive issue in the more important struggle for national liberation. This type of argument is often simply a manifestation of disguised male chauvinism and a subtle way of attempting to perpetuate the inferior status of women. There is no contradiction between women's struggle for equality and national liberation. The two are complimentary, not mutually exclusive and antagonistic. Puerto Rican women will thus continue to struggle, through their individual and collective efforts, for their legitimate rights in society and to foster and promote the difficult but necessary cultural and social changes which are so long overdue.

NOTES

1. Jalid Sued Badillo, *La mujer indígena y su sociedad* (San Juan, n.p., 1975).

2. Eugenio Fernández Méndez, *Art and Mythology of the Taino Indians of the Greater West Indies* (San Juan, Ediciones El Cemi, 1972).

3. Richard Konetzke, "Emigración de mujeres españolas durante la epoca colonial," *Revista Internacional de Sociologia*, 3 (1945), pp. 123-150, and Marcia Rivera Quintero, "The Development of Capitalism in Puerto Rico and the Incorporation of Women into the Labor Force," in Edna Acosta-Belén, ed., *The Puerto Rican Woman: Selected Essays* (New York, Praeger, 1979).

4. *Ibid.*, P. 15

5. Isabel Picó, "The History of Women's Struggle for Equality in Puerto Rico," in June Nash and Helen Iiken Safa, eds., *Sex and Class in Latin America* (New York, Praeger, 1976), pp. 202-213.

6. Norma Valle Ferrer, "Feminism and its Influence on Women's Organizations in Puerto Rico," in Acosta-Belén, ed., *The Puerto Rican Woman.*

7. Angel Quintero Rivera, "Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico," in Adalberto López and James Petras, ed., *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 87-117.

8. See Angel Quintero Rivera, "Socialista y tabaquero: La proletarización de los artesanos," *Sin Nombre*, i, No. 4 (June-March 1978), pp. 100-137.

9. Valle Ferrer, "Feminism."

10. Picó, "The History of Women's Struggle," p. 208.

11. See Angel Quintero Rivera, ed., *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico* (San Juan, CEREP, 1971).

12. See Picó, "The Hisotry of Women's Struggle," and Carmen Rivera de de Alvarado, "La contribución de la mujer al desarrollo de la nacionalidad puertorriqueña," in *La mujer an la lucha de hoy* (Rió Piedras, Editorial KIKIRIKI, 1972), pp. 39-47.

13. See Picó, "The History of Women's Struggle," p. 209.

14. Rivera Quintero, "The Development of Capitalism."

15. See Angel Quintero Rivera, *Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huracán, 1976).

16. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

17. Picó, "The History of Women's Struggle," p. 210.

18. *Census of Population: Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1970), Table 157.

19. Haydeé Yordán, "La influencia de los textos primarios de Instrucción Publica en la diferenciación de roles femeninos y masculinos en los niños," (Unpublished thesis, University of Puerto Rico, 1974). See also Commission for the Improvement of Women's Rights, *Sexism in the Classroom* (San Juan, The Commission, 1977).

20. Selia Fernández Cintrón and Marcia Rivera Quintero, "Bases de la sociedad sexista en Puerto Rico," *Inter-American Review*, 4 (1974), p. 241.

21. Oficina de Planificación y Desarrollo, *Compendio de las estadísticas de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, año académico 1975-1976* Río Piedras, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1977).

22. Civil Rights Commission, *La igualdad de derechos y oportunidades de la mujer puertorriqueña* (San Juan, the Commission, 1973), p. 125.

23. Isabel Picó, "Empleo y desempleo en Puerto Rico," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 19 (June 1975, pp. 141-165.*

The Unveiling of a Nation: Puerto Rican Literature in the Twentieth Century

Sandra Messinger Cypess

In 1508 the Boriquén of the Taínos became the Puerto Rico of the Spaniards when an expedition led by Ponce de León invaded and occupied the island. In the following three centuries the roots of Puerto Rican culture and the Puerto Rican nation developed, but a true Puerto Rican literature did not emerge until the nineteenth century. Until that time, Puerto Rico was not truly in control of a unique national cultural literary expression, although there was always literary activity on the island.[1] The ideas and preoccupations which began to take root in the nineteenth century have now flowered and blossomed so that at this point in the twentieth century, Puerto Rico's literary expression has produced works which can be enjoyed and appreciated by both Puerto Ricans and the rest of the world. In this examination of some of the key figures and works which have contributed to the creation of a Puerto Rican national literature, it should be recognized at the outset that a full understanding of that literature (and of the arts in general) can only be appreciated when viewed in terms of the sociopolitical conditions from which it emerged, sociopolitical conditions that have been shaped primarily by the colonialism imposed on Puerto Rico first by Spain and then by the United States.

One of the first important figures in the creation of Puerto Rican literature is the Arecibeño Miguel Cabrera, who wrote *Coplas del Jíbaro*, in 1820. This poem can be distinguished from Spanish literature or Hispanic American literature because it uses the regional language of the unique Puerto Rican rural type known as the *jíbaro*, a word derived from the Taíno *jiba*, or forest. This figure is the Puerto Rican counterpart of the U.S. hillbilly, with the addition that it has come to symbolize the truly native Puerto Rican, a combination of indigenous and European elements. In this work, the *jíbaro* questions the application of the Spanish Constitution in matters dealing with its colony. His attitude is critical of Spain and reveals an awareness of Puerto Rico as a colony in relation to a dominant Mother country which imposes its power. The work was censored and its publication prohibited. The importance of Cabrera's work lies in its expression of a national consciousness and its recognition of a unique national language that will be developed further by other writers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Other important events which foreshadow the emergence of a Puerto Rican national literature include the publication of the first known poetry by a Puerto Rican woman, María Bibiana Benítez (1785-1873). Her ode, "La ninfa de Puerto Rico" (1832), was followed by further poetic and dramatic pieces based on the Romantic themes of the day such as independence and freedom, but she anticipates later writers by attaching these general, abstract ideas to Puerto Rican realities. Her play, *La cruz del Morro*, reflects in its form elements of a Spanish literary tradition, but in context, refers to national history—the Dutch invasion of the Island in 1625. This play is not the first drama by a woman, nor is it the first Puerto Rican national play. Both these honors go to another nineteenth century figure, Carmen Hernández de Araújo (1832-1877), whose *Los deudos rivales* is considered by theater historian Antonia de Sáez to be the first manifestation of a national drama on the island.[2] These two figures exemplify the productivity of women writers in Puerto Rico, a tradition which continues to this day.[3]

Another key development in the literary scene is the publication of the first anthologies—*Aguinaldo puertorriqueño* (1843) followed immediately by *Album puertorriqueño* (1844), two collections of poetry and prose which were the product of a group effort by authors motivated to "compose and publish a completely indigenous book. . ." This group effort served as a stimulus for young writers of the day and included the poems of Alejandra Benítez, Miguel Cabrera and Daniel de Rivera. The two anthologies are historically important for their combination of many genres by different authors, women and men—not at all the pattern in the rest of the Hispanic world—and for their emphasis on native expression. Daniel de Rivera, of Ponce, whose work was included in these anthologies, can be considered among the first Puerto Ricans to put into print demands for independence from Spain. In his poem *Agüeybana el bravo* (1854), the Taíno Indian chief Agüeybana engages in combat with the Spanish invaders and comes to represent resistance to Spanish rule, and thereby functions as a symbol of national independence.

One of the most popular works of this period was *El Gíbaro* by Manuel A. Alonso, which dates from 1849 and by its title shows the same regional-national awareness of Cabrera's *Coplas*. This concept of national identity becomes a recurrent theme in Puerto Rican literature, to be found in the later poetry of Luis Lloréns Torres, Juan Antonio Corretjer, Pedro Pietri, in the dramas of Francisco Arriví and René Marqués, as well as in the prose of Jose Luis Gonzáles and Luis Rafael Sánchez, among others.

Alonso, a native of Caguas, and a medical doctor as well as a writer, had contributed to the *Album puertorriqueño* of 1844. *El Gíbaro* is also a combination of prose and poetry, a series of twenty-one scenes or vignettes which revolve around a definition of Puerto Rican identity expressed by means of his folkloric sketches. Like Cabrera, Alonso describes the customs of the *jíbaro* and faithfully imitates, by use of a phonetic spelling technique, the manner in which the *jíbaro* talks, a technique that reaches great significance in the twentieth century in such salient examples as Marqués's drama *La carreta*, Sánchez's novel *La guaracha del macho Camacho*, and in the short stories of González and Pedro Juan Soto's *Spiks*.

Despite the strict Spanish censorship to which all Puerto Rican works were subjected in this period, Alonso was able to publish the book under the guise that it had educationally informative goals, to compare the state of studies in Puerto Rico with those on the Peninsula, where most wealthy Creole parents sent their children. *El Gíbaro* should be remembered today for its varied and original description of life in Puerto Rico. Alonso wrote it after he had been in Spain for eight years and wanted to recreate a souvenir of his homeland. He describes the dances of Puerto Rico, already an integral aspect of national culture. His detailed reproduction of a *jíbaro* wedding is interesting as a faithful reminiscence of rural customs and linguistic expressions, as is his description of a cockfight in scene eight. Alonso's use and definition of indigenous terms will later be developed in the Naturalist novels of Manuel Zeno Gandía. It is also interesting that Alonso included scenes that are both rural and urban, another thematic concern which Puerto Rican writers of the twentieth century will continue. His essay on Santiago Vidarte is not only a good example of literary criticism, but shows his own critical acumen in selecting Vidarte, now considered the first important Puerto Rican poet.

The content of Vidarte's poetry, like Alonso's, features native geography, characters, vocabulary. His *Recuerdo de mi patria* (1844) initiates the edenic theme in island poetry. Puerto Rico is equated with the Biblical Eden and is glorified, just as in "La jibarita" Vidarte presents an idealized version of the *borinqueñas* as the most beautiful of all women.

While *El Gíbaro* is considered the birthstone of Puerto Rican national literature by such diverse critics as Francisco Manrique Cabrera and Juan Flores[4], Margot Arce de Vázquez, another contemporary literary critic of Puerto Rico, calls attention to Alejandro Tapia y Rivera (1826-1882) as "the father of our literature."[5] The famous Teatro Tapia of San Juan is named in his honor, a testament to his dramatic contribution, but he also cultivated all literary forms. He belongs to the group of intellectuals who formed a nucleus of patriot-writers before 1898, among whom were the famous essayist-educator Eugenio María de Hostos (1839-1903), the major nineteenth century Puerto Rican historian Salvador Brau (1842-1912), and the poets José Gautier Benítez (1848-1880), Santiago Vidarte and Lola Rodríguez de Tío (1843-1924). Tapia was the most prolific, writing for newspapers and journals, in addition to his poems, plays, short stories, and social novels. In 1848 his first work, the historical drama *Roberto D'Evreux* met the fate of Cabrera's *Coplas*; that is, the Spanish government prohibited the publication of the play since it disapproved of the way Tapia treated royalty who were characters in the play.

Tapia's esthetic orientation followed the Romantic school, with its interest in historical drama and in sentimental passion, but he also showed himself to be a true national figure in terms of his themes: his exaltation of the Taíno, and the pre-Columbian past, as seen in *La palma del cacique*; his exposition of the social problems of prejudice, as seen in the play *La cuarentona* (1867). While elsewhere at that period in Hispanic America writers were also attempting to explore their roots in the indigenous, pre-Columbian past, it should be noted that the expression of these nationalistic ideas by Puerto Rican writers occurred while the island was still under the jurisdiction of Spain.

In the many works of Tapia he reveals his literary imagination and creativity and his philosophical talents. The long epic poem *La Sataniada* (1878) is the first Puerto Rican piece to explore the mysteries of life and death and other theological questions. Its philosophical theme anticipates the existential inquiries of today in its attempt to penetrate the meaning of life, the destiny of man and the enigmatic totality of the cosmos.

While Tapia is the most outstanding figure of Puerto Rican Romanticism, his friend José Benítez (nephew of María Bibiana Benítez) is considered the best poetic voice of this period. His two fundamental themes are his devotion to his *patria*, and the love inspired by a woman. A true Romantic figure, he suffered from tuberculosis and lived a Bohemian life. For expressing liberal ideas, such as his support of the establishment of the First Spanish Republic in 1873 and the independence of Puerto Rico, he lost his job as a clerk in the provincial governmental office. This impelled him to found *La revista puertorriqueña* in 1875, a biweekly paper that was the vehicle of expression for the Creole intellectuals of its day. Before he died, he wrote "Canto a Puerto Rico," in tone a Romantic poem, with historical details, and with the political theme of hope for the future independence of the country.

For some young Puerto Rican intellectuals who have the advantage of a historical perspective formed within the framework of socialist thinking, the work of Gautier represents "mystical patriotic visions" which ignore the economic and political servitude of the workers at that time.[6] Thus, the socialist leader Ramón Romero Rosa, in direct contrast to Gautier, warned that "the worker should not be a patriot in the mystical sense of the word nor allow himself to be swayed by the fanaticism involved in all religions."[7] Romero Rosa and his ideology is better represented by the literary work of Francisco Gonzalo "Pachín" Marín (1863-1897) and Lola Rodríguez de Tío. Both can be considered in the same category as José Martí of Cuba in that they are poets and patriots.Like so many independent-minded writers before him, Pachín Marín was forced to leave Puerto Rico and subsequently traveled to Santo Domingo, Venezuela, New York and finally to the

Cuban battlefield, where, again, like Martí, he died during the fight for Cuban independence. His poems can be biting and ironic, in contrast to the more edenic verse of Gautier Benítez or the ethereal concepts of José de Diego (1867-1918), another important poet and political figure of the period. While all three sound a patriotic note, it is Marín with his famous sonnet "El trapo" who asks for freedom in a defiantly iconoclastic way more similar to the attitudes of the working-class vision of Romero Rosa.[8]

Pachín Marín's death in Cuba is another indication that many writers and thinkers of his time were not narrowly patriotic, fighting only for their own land's independence from Spain, but were united in a pan-Antillean struggle against colonialism, as can also be seen in the works of Lola Rodríguez de Tío. Her conception of a Puerto Rican national anthem, "La borinqueña," exhorts Borinquen to follow the revolutionary example of Cuba. Lola's poem, written to the music of a dance already known as *La borinqueña*, was inspired by the events of 1868 referred to as *El grito de Lares*. This aborted attempt to overthrow Spanish rule and establish an independent Puerto Rican republic was planned by the well-known national figure Ramón Emeterio Betances and his followers.[9]

Lola, as she is affectionately referred to, was the first Puerto Rican woman to be well known beyond the borders of the island, and was friends with other distinguished writers of her day, from her compatriot Eugenio María de Hostos to the Nicaraguan Rubén Darío and the Cuban José Martí, initiators of *Modernismo* in Hispanic America. Married to the businessman Bonocio Tío Segarra, also sympathetic to the indpendence movement, she named their first daughter Patria, symbolic of the quest that marks all her work. Lola did not just offer her home as the center of literary and political activities; she actively contributed to them, as exemplified by "La borinqueña." Because the words of this song were clearly revolutionary and *independentista* in content, they were considered subversive by the Spanish government, and she was forced into exile, living in various American cities, from Caracas, Venezuela to New York City. She was with Martí when they both were exiles fighting from afar for the independence of the Antilles. She also participated in the 1887 Movimiento Autonomista Puertorriqueño and the War of Cuban Indpendence. With several volumes of poetry to her credit, her themes were generally about her exile and the liberation of Puerto Rico, although religious and family scenes were also important, as seen in "A mi esposo ausente," and "Adios a mi casita." *Mi libro de Cuba* (Havana, 1893) contains many of her poems, written in forms which are considered typical of popular verse, the *décima* and the *copla*. Just as Lola does not fit the stereotype of Latin women, Puerto Rico was also the home of other women writers in the nineteenth century, with many more to appear in the twentieth, in both the political and artistic spheres. In her study of Puerto Rican culture, María Teresa Babín refers to Ana Roqué de Duprey (1883-1933) as another woman of the period subsequent to Lola who was active in setting a model for feminine participation in the political and cultural life of Puerto Rico.[10] Lola was more like Hostos in that they both were exiled and forced to work for their *patria* beyond Puerto Rico, while Salvador Brau and Ana Roqué wrote and lived on the island. Roqué was one of the feminist leaders who was instrumental in finally seeing that Puerto Rican women were enfranchised in 1932.

In any survey of the nineteenth century in Puerto Rico, the educator-philosopher-sociologist-writer Eugenio María de Hostos (1839-1903) stands out. He is known beyond the borders of the island for his fine literary expression, his Renaissance-like erudition, and his dedication to the cause of independence. Encompassing more than twenty volumes, the work of Hostos is studied as an outstanding example of Positivist writing, and includes essays of literary criticism, his political thought, ethical ideas, as well as his *Diario*, and his only novel, *La Peregrinación de Bayoán* (1873), written around 1963 and an example of Romanticism similar to *María* (1867) by the Columbian Jorge Isaacs. In 1888 he published *Moral social*, his most famous book as a Positivist sociologist. Hostos' work well deserves the attention it receives. It is interesting that in part because he lived in many American cities, his work is more well known than that of Salvador Brau (1842-1912) who was also a well-rounded figure—dramatist, journalist, poet, novelist, essayist and historian of Puerto Rico.

Brau wrote a sociological essay in 1886 entitled "La campesina" which chronicled the serious plight of the rural women. He asked for the right to education of the *jíbara*, and interestingly, related her plight to the Spanish colonial system under which Puerto Rico was functioning. He extended his critical gaze to the plight of the working classes in his 1882 essay *Las clases jornaleras*. While his idea of ethnic characteristics may seem dated today, it is important to note that Brau makes reference to the tripartite inheritance of the Puerto Rican—to his Indian, African, and Spanish heritage. Brau's historical works, *Puerto Rico y su historia* (1894) and *Historia de Puerto Rico* (1904), are examples of his important contributions to Puerto Rican historiography.

In the area of historical writing, Brau was followed by the medical doctor Cayetano Coll y Toste (1850-1930), who was named in 1913 Official Historian of Puerto Rico. His three volume recompilation of *Leyendas Puertorriqueñas* (1924-25) reveals another aspect of his cultural labors and provides a rich resource of the folkloric treasures of the island.

Brau's examination of the rural environment was also continued by other writers, most notably by Manuel Zeno Gandía (1855-1930), considered the most outstanding writer in the Naturalist vein in Puerto Rico. That is, Zeno's work follows the patterns set by Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism and Emile Zola's "slice-of-life" perspective, which generally centers on the more disagreeable and ugly elements of reality. Zeno was a physician as well as a man of letters and a political activist, so that his detailed clinical descriptions of the poverty, deprivations, and sordid environment of rural life ring true and have a clear social implication. His four major novels center on the workers' conditions, first in the rural sugar and coffee plantations and then in the cities. His is not a mere folkloric view, but emphasizes the moral and socioeconomic consequences of the political system, and in that way his work anticipates the themes and preoccupations of contemporary socialist-oriented writers. *La Garduña*, written in 1890 and published in 1896 was followed by *La charca* (1894), considered to be the first major Puerto Rican novel. The story takes place on a *cafetal*, or coffee plantation, on the banks of the Río Grande de Arecibo. His central character, the paternalistic landowner Juan del Salto, is a complex man whose racial thinking anticipates that in Antonio Pedreira's *Insularismo*. In contrast to del Santo is the young peasant woman Silvina who is a finely drawn, complex personality whose presence in the novel concretizes social struggle in the work. While by contemporary standards his style may seem verbose and his characters stereotyped and flat, Zeno Gandía was successful in using his novels to criticize social injustices both in rural areas and in the urban settings of *El negocio* (1922) and *Redentores* (1925).

Zeno's work presents to Latin American letters an important contribution in the Naturalist frame. At the same time he served as a model for his compatriots. Enrique Laguerre's famous novel *La llamarada* (1935) continues the rural settings of *La Garduña* and *La charca* with a socialist's concern for the worker's condition. Laguerre's *Solar Montoya* (1941) and his psychological novel *El 30 de febrero* also reveal the vitality of the tradition set by Zeno Gandía.

Zeno, like his compatriots Lola Rodríguez de Tío, Hostos, and Brau, lived and created literary works during a period of intense political, social and economic upheaval. While most North Americans may consider the Spanish-American War of 1898 to be one of a few months duration, it should be remembered that for both Cuba and Puerto Rico, the years before 1898 were marked by consistent struggle and with a strong spirit of resistance to Spanish rule. Although the slow process of self-identification of *lo puertorriqueño* was proceeding throughout this period, 1898 brought an abrupt change in political status vis-à-vis Spain, and the hoped-for removal of the yoke of colonialism. But, instead of Pachín Marín's or Lola's *libertad*, the island saw itself pass from one imperialistic orbit to another. National sovereignty was still an unfulfilled, edenic vision. Just as the reaction to classical European colonialism varied among the writers, so, too, did their response to the North American presence. Whatever the result, one element was certain: a new set of influences, a different language and culture would now freely enter Puerto Rico, just as Puerto Ricans were supposedly free to travel to the U.S. mainland. No doubt, the Puerto Rican national expression was inevitably and irrevocably changed by the events of 1898. By this time, Puerto Rico had assimilated a pre-Columbian cultural world with imported African and European contributions. The new political affiliation with the U.S. would now bring about new themes, new locations, increased linguistic difficulties and involvements, and a new literary expression inextricably interrelated with the newly imposed political and economic systems.

Hostos and Zeno Gandía with Julio J. Henna were emissaries to Washington to present to the new colonial power the case of self-determination for Puerto Rico. Zeno was so absorbed by the new politcal struggle that his literary career was halted for a long time. It was not until 1922 that *El negocio* was published, a novel in which his political preoccupation is his main thesis. His characters are broken people living within a sordid environment, an economic atmosphere of disaster parallelled by the political injustice felt by Zeno Gandía to be the underlying tragedy of his country. It is an example of *literatura comprometida,* literature with a decided political direction, that is to be the major current of Puerto Rican letters in the twentieth century.

This period of political and cultural upheaval in Puerto Rico is also a period of change in the rest of Latin America insofar as literary trends are concerned. Jose Martí in Cuba and Rubén Darío of Nicaragua represent two of the key figures in a trend known as *Modernismo,* a term used to designate a new style of writing forged by the Hispanic Americans independently of the Old World, although clearly, many elements of the past were assimilated into the new movement. In Puerto Rico, *Modernismo,* which did not reach the island until much later than the 1888 date usually marked as the initiation of the height of Modernist activity, is primarily reflected in the genre of poetry, as it was in other Hispanic areas. The work of the important group of Puerto Rican poets stimulated by the movement in the early decades of this century reflects ideas and preoccupations of Puerto Rican writers; at the same time they show the influence of the Hispanic-American models. Luis Lloréns Torres (1876-1944), Evaristo Ribera Chevremont (1896-), and Luis Palés Matos (1898-1959) are outstanding representatives of Puerto Rican lyricism and enjoy international reputations. They worked with the prestigious journal *Revista de las Antillas* (1913-1914), among others, which signaled the Puerto Rican brand of Modernism and the various other *ismos* in vogue at the time. It was almost as if each poet were attempting to create his own esthetic and to give it a special name to distinguish his work from that of any other poet. It is said that in Puerto Rico there were more vanguardist *ismos* created than in any other area.[11]

Luis Lloréns Torres, for example, is associated with *pancalismo,* that is, a word he created to refer to "all beauty," the goal of his poetry. This period of his work is known for its attempt to create audacious metaphors and new rhythmic forms, including the initiation into Puerto Rico of free verse. In the prologue of the collection *Sonetos sinfónicos* (1914), he defines the poet as the one who reveals "the beauty of creation not seen by others," and his themes there concern the unity of man with nature, showing the influence of Walt Whitman, a poet whose works he helped introduce to the island. As Lloréns's work developed, he focused more on the folkloric elements of his homeland, to the point that he is credited by some with an intent to "nationalize" poetry in Puerto Rico. Like Alonso's *El Gíbaro,* Lloréns concentrated on the *jíbaro* and the customs and traditions of the indigenous past so that the vocabulary, figures, and scenes he created glorify the native elements and help to define what is distinctly Puerto Rican. Perhaps this was Lloréns Torres's way of dealing with the U.S. occupation of the island. He raised his voice in opposition to the North American presence and consequently is associated with the defense of the Spanish cultural heritage. Among his best-known poems are "Bolívar"—a biographical and emotional poem in honor of the Great Liberator of Hispanic America; "Velas épicas" about the discovery of America; "La canción de las Antillas" which also entitles a collection of poems (1929), and the "jíbaro" poems: "Valle de Collores," "El patito feo," "Campesina criolla," "Rapsodia criolla," "Canto a la mujer puertorriqueña." Like Lola, he, too, preferred popular poetic forms, the *décima* and the *romance,* and by using rustic language, he exalted the commonplace with his vigor and fresh approach. His *Alturas de América* is a collection which incorporates poetry from 1913 to 1940, and is clearly creole, or regional, in nature.

In addition to his poetic work, Lloréns was a lawyer and journalist and wrote historical essays as well as the drama *El grito de Lares.* Written in 1914, it was not published until 1927. It is an historical drama which uses the 1868 revolutionary attempt as a means to express his own concept of a free Antillean Federation. The prologue to the drama was written by Luis Muñoz Rivera, well-known as a political figure, who also wrote poetry before turning to his more political oratory and essays. Here Muñoz pens a diatribe against the U.S. and the injustices of the invasion and calls for liberty, themes that are continued in the Lloréns play. The friendship between the two men reveal the similarity in their attitudes towards Hispanic culture and the U.S. presence. Their names may be linked with José de Diego in that they all are more concerned with a change in government affiliation, rather than sweeping socioeconomic reforms. Nevertheless, Lloréns Torres included so many popular images and motifs that he has become one of the most well-known poets of Puerto Rico.

Another outstanding poet of this period is Luis Palés Matos, who began publishing in 1915 with *Azaleas.* In the early part of his career he was associated with "diepalismo," a theory he formulated in 1921 with the poet José I. De Diego Padró, in which they insisted on the importance of onomatopoeia in verse, or the creation of words which mimic natural sounds (using tun-tun-tun in a poem to reflect a drum's beat, etc.). In 1925 Palés wrote "Pueblo negro," the first of many poems with an Afro-American motif, and thus initiated a key movement in Puerto Rican literary history. Palés is considered one of the first to publish a poem with this theme, acknowledging the importance of the African heritage in Puerto Rico. Other poems in this vein are "Danza negra," "Majestad negra," "Mulata-antilla," all included in the collection *Tuntún de pasa y grifería* (1937), which showed his virtuosity in rhythmic effects and the creation of onomatopoetic sounds as well as his interest in the Afro-American theme. Because of his folkloric interest, and his attention to the phonic quality of words, Palés's work has been compared to that of the Spaniard Federico García Lorca, especially the latter's work in *Romancero gitano*. It should be noted, however, that although Palés did highlight in this period of his work Afro-American figures, sounds, rhythms, and picturesque details, he did not pretend to see the black experience from within, in comparison with the poems of the Cubans Nicolás Guillén and Emilio Ballagas, whose works seem more concrete and natural and stress the social theme. Palés also has a satiric and biting perspective in some of his poems, such as "Elegía del Duque de la Mermelada," and "Lagarto verde," where he mocks the pretensions of people. In other poems he introduces the dynamic and dialectical nature of the relationship between blacks and whites. "Lamento" and "Intermedios del hombre blanco" are good examples.

Palés Matos is considered one of the most important poets of Puerto Rico. In his descriptions of the special qualities of his land he expresses both a personal and a collective vision, cast in a poetic form that shows his ability to employ many diverse styles with a unique mastery of rhythmic effects within the Spanish language.

Evaristo Ribera Chevremont also has received international attention for the quality of his poetic achievements. Throughout his long career, his poetry has maintained its rich variety of themes, styles, and lyrical experiments in meter and rhythm. Unlike Lloréns Torres, Ribera's work describes not only the external scene—the Puerto Rican geography—but also centers on an internal landscape of spiritual preoccupations—solitude, pain and death. More introspective than other poets of his generation, Ribera first concentrated on the renovation of the image and the metaphor and tried to eliminate any extraneous or anecdotal elements, similar to the practice of the Spanish group of *Ultraísta* poets whom he had known during his stay in Spain during 1918-1924. Despite his interest in "pure" poetry, he also raised a critical voice of social consciousness, especially in *Barro* (1945), which can be considered a poetic version of the program against social injustice put forth by the Popular Democratic party.[12]

Ribera's first *Antología poética*, published in 1954, contained work from 1924 onward, along with the sonnets *La llama pensativa*, and revealed his interest in classical poetic patterns, which has led critics to call him a "classicist." When he published *Inefable orilla* (1961) and *Principio del Canto* (1965), he showed that his creative vitality had not diminished with age. Though his poetry no longer sets the major pattern for Puerto Rican poets today, his work is internationally known and appreciated.

Ribera Chevremont's allusions to social protest combined with a love of nature, find strong articulation in the poetry of Julia de Burgos (1914-1953). Hers was a singular voice whose song was both Puerto Rican and universal, as was her imagery, whether she addressed herself to the themes of love, the night, death, or her *patria* and its landscape, its rivers, or its social inequities and need for justice. Her poems are contained in *Poema en veinte surcos* (1938), *Canción de la verdad sencilla* (1939), *El mar y tú y otros poemas*, published after her tragic death in 1953 in New York City. Of the six poems dedicated to the rivers of Puerto Rico, the most famous is "Río Grande de Loíza," which becomes a kind of autobiography rather than a mere description of the river near where she was born. Through her masterful expression, she develops a cosmic vision of union with the universe. Considered a classic now in Puerto Rican poetry, it has been compared to the other famous Hispanic American poems inspired by powerful water sources, such as the Cuban José María Heredia's "Al Niagara." Burgos also contributes a feminist note to Puerto Rican poetry when she criticizes the limited role to which women are relegated in society. "A Julia de Burgos" presents a series of contrasts between "the frigid doll of social falsehood," engendered by the bourgeoisie, and the hidden, independent woman who represents the essence of being.[13] Opposed to that socially domesticated woman stands the Julia de Burgos who affirms her rebelliousness and spirit of independence. Her poetry protests against all forms of social injustice, as she exclaims in "Desde el puente Martín Peña," where she exhorts the workers to protest injustice, to lift their fists in anger. Her feminism strikes a contemporary note because she opposes inequalities at all levels and the oppression of any group by another.

It is important to note that Julia de Burgos first began to publish in the 1930s and that her work extends beyond the limits of the bourgeois social class. Hers is not an isolated voice at that time, nor is it coincidental that during the 1930s there was a great literary renaissance. The first generation of Puerto Rican intellectuals to reach maturity under the North American occupation came of age in this decade, after having lived through the law imposing the English language in the schools, the Foraker and Jones Acts, which organized the political status of Puerto Rico vis-à-vis the United States, as well as the unstable social and economic conditions which had changed rapidly under North American hegemony.[14] The unstable conditions also had an effect in the literary sphere, motivating a reevaluation of past values and practices, encouraging creative revolution in the sense that traditional forms of expression were rejected and a new content, more reflective of emerging minority ideas, was forged. In the 1930s, then, a significant number of important literary figures came to the fore, many of whom were women, perhaps because in any revolutionary atmosphere, it is easier for the minority voice to step into the clearing. Josefina Rivera de Alvarez, in her own important contribution *Diccionario de la Literatura Puertorriqueña*, calls this decade a veritable "feminine parnassus."[15]

It would be easy at this point to overwhelm the reader with the long list of names of writers of the 1930s considered worthy of mention because of their literary and cultural contributions, a fact which points to the great productivity of the period and the emerging maturity of the national expression. Whether the form chosen was the essay, poetry, drama, or fiction, the overriding themes concerned the need for urgent social reforms, political and economic changes, and, above all, an exploration of the identity of the Puerto Rican in relation to the past Spanish and present North American influences. It is undeniable that the particular historical fate of the island to pass from one colonial orbit to another conditioned the search for a truly national spirit.

The writings of Antonio Pedreira (1899-1939) can be looked upon as a touchstone of today's inquiry into self-identification. Pedreira's key work is *Insularismo* (1934), which has been praised by many Puerto Rican intellectuals since its publication, including María Teresa Babín, Margot Arce de Vásquez, to the recent, more critical analysis of Juan Flores in his *The Insular Vision: Pedreira's Interpretation of Puerto Rican Culture*, published by the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños of the City University of New York (1978).

It can be said Pedreira brought serious attention to Puerto Rico in the twentieth century because of his scholarly approach and analytical inquiry into the Puerto Rican personality. It should be noted, however, that Pedreira discounted the importance of indigenous and African elements in the creation of Puerto Rican culture and conveyed a latinized conception of national identity. A contrary view is expressed by his contemporary and friend, Tomás Blanco (1900-), whose *Prontuario histórico de Puerto Rico* (1935) is the first attempt to offer an explanation of the Puerto Rican nation through a synthesis and interpretation of its historical evolution. Blanco's *El prejuicio racial en Puerto Rico* (1942) and his study of the African elements in Puerto Rican culture in general and in the poetry of Palés Matos in particular are also important contributions. He suggests that the real differences among the races do not depend upon any intrinsic qualities, but rather, to the uneven economic and social development of the different groups (see Flores, p. 21). After writing essays, Blanco turned to the short story, and his "Cultura. Tres pasos y un encuentro" is an example of his cultural beliefs in fictional form. In the story the *jíbaro* and the black woman, Ña Belén, seem to be the real possessors of culture, rather than the citified couple called "He" and "She." Blanco's work is important because of its positive evaluation of the totality of Puerto Rican culture and for the careful and expressive style he employs to convey his ideas. As with the best of any literature, his work sets a standard of asthetic value as well as of thematic and psychological import.

Along with Pedreira and Blanco, Concha Meléndez (1896-) should also be recognized for her role in the establishment of the Department of Hispanic Studies at the University of Puerto Rico, which had been founded in Río Piedras in 1903. Like Pedreira, she is a proponent of the affirmation of Hispanic culture, and her contributions include numerous studies of Hispanic-American writers. Margot Arce de Vásquez (1904-), Cesáreo Rosa-Nieves (1901-), and Francisco Manrique Cabrera (1905-1978) are only a few of the outstanding figures whose contribution rests on their work as interpreters of Puerto Rican literature as well as originators of creative work.

Meléndez's interest in Hispanic-American literature signals a trend in which Puerto Rican intellectuals turn away from Spain and its literary patterns and toward American countries. This emerging pattern is supported by the presence of fine cultural journals such as *Indice, Asomante,* started by the inspiration of Nilita Vientós Gastón, and the founding of the Instituto de Literatura Puertorriqueña in 1935 and the Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, which continues to publish and promote the works of native authors.

Another significant moment in Puerto Rican literary history is the publication of *La llamarada* (1935) by Enrique Laguerre. This novel has been compared to other great Hispanic-American regional landmarks—Rivera's *La voragine*, Güiraldes's *Don Segunda Sombra*, and Gallegos's *Doña Barbara*. Laguerre focuses not only on the folkloric aspects of of life in the sugar-cane fields, but also on the social and economic problems resulting from the cultivation of one crop on large plantations run by absentee owners, to the detriment of the *jíbaro* workers. Laguerre goes beyond the category of a regional novelist by including psychological analyses of the rural *jíbaro* and of the intellectual who is conscious of the crucial economic and social crises of the island at that time.

As one of Puerto Rico's more prolific novelists, Laguerre's subsequent works traced the past of the nation from the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, beginning with *La resaca* (1949), down through his own generation. The political parties, workers' organizations, and events of 1910-1935 are found in *Los dedos de la mano* (1951). *La ceiba en el tiesto* (1956), considered technically superior to the earlier novels, shows Laguerre's skill in using new techniques; at the same time it is a vivid psychological chronicle of Gustavo Vargas and his generation hard-hit with the problem of racial admixtures, Puerto Rican political nationalism, and the emigration of so many people to New York City.

This theme is also seen in another novel of 1956, *Los derrotados* by César Andreu Iglesias, who also sounds the call of Puerto Rican independence. It should be added that Iglesias's novel has as its characters proletarian workers rather than the *jíbaro*, a characteristic which becomes more and more dominant as the 60s and 70s are reached.

Laguerre's final novel in this series, *Cauce sin río* (1962), repeats the diary form of *La llamarada*, and is a critique of a society that is disoriented and in search of its own identity. Laguerre has written many more works—including short stories, essays, as well as an historical play, *La resentida* (1944), which focuses on the events after 1898. In whatever form he uses, Laguerre always appears conscious of exploring the various geographical and cultural elements which go into the formulation of the Puerto Rican national identity.

Emilio Belaval is another key figure in Puerto Rican literature who initiated his career in the 1930s. He first became known as a short-story writer with his collections *Cuentos para colegiales* (1918-1932) and *Los cuentos de la Universidad* (1935), which offer critical views of university life. *Cuentos para fomentar el turismo* (1934-35), is considered his best work and one which influenced succeeding generations. The ten stories in this collection function in ironic contrast to the title, revealing Belaval's originality. Although in general his style is similar to other thirties writers, in that his stories are realistic, contain regional details, and show a strong sense of social preoccupation, Belaval also added a bitter ironic note by showing the exploitation of the *jíbaro* and the *jíbara*.

Belaval's contribution to Puerto Rican literature also resides in the important groundwork he initiated for a national theater on the island. His program for a dramatic society pointed out the need to encourage contemporary Puerto Rican playwrights by providing the means to stage their plays using the new techniques of lighting, direction, acting, etc. He also hoped to create an audience for quality works of esthetic and national value. The Ateneo de Puerto Rico, a cultural group composed of most of the intellectuals of the time, held a contest for native dramatists in 1938, and three winning plays were produced. To carry on this momentum, Belaval organized a theatrical group in 1940 which he named Areyto, using a Taíno word which referred to their dramatic dances. While Areyto functioned for only two years, it was the source of inspiration for the series of experimental troupes that, in subsequent decades, were the continued source of motivation for a national theater.

The next important event in contemporary Puerto Rican theater takes place in 1958 with the establishment of the First Theater Festival. The plays chosen to be presented were by the four men who were considered to be the most instrumental in the development of the theater in Puerto Rico: Belaval's *La hacienda de los Cuatro Vientos*, René Marqués's *Los soles truncos*, Manuel Méndez Ballester's *Encrucijada*, and Francisco Arrivi's *Vejigantes*. These names were to become increasingly familiar in Puerto Rico and, in time, in other countries as their work gained in international renown.

It is interesting that each play in the first Festival presented a different aspect of Puerto Rican life. Méndez Ballester's work takes place in Spanish Harlem and, using a naturalistic technique, examines the devastating effect of the city on the unsophisticated Puerto Rican family which finds itself caught in its trap. Belaval's *Hacienda* presents a conflict of ideologies between the generations of a wealthy landowning family in the nineteenth century. The historical battle between Spaniard and creole is reenacted in the play.

Arriví's *Vejigantes* has more than historical importance, for it is an esthetically viable play as well as a realistic presentation of the problem of racial discrimination in Puerto Rico. In addition, it explores in dramatic form the need to find a reality, a national identity without the spiritual mutilation that comes from the rejection of any portion of one's identity. The title is an indigenous word used to describe a folk festival, and reminds the contemporary audience of its Indian roots at the same time that it calls attention to the African elements in Puerto Rican society. Arriví has continued to make important contributions to the theater as a playwright, with many titles to his credit, as well as in his role as drama critic and historian as seen in his work *Areyto Mayor*, published by the Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña in 1966. *María Soledad* (1947), *Club de Solteros* (1953), and *Coctel de Don Nadie* (1964) are some of Arriví's well-known works.

The contributions of René Marqués (1919-1979) stand out in the theater, as they do in relation to every genre he explored. At the time of his death he was recognized as one of Puerto Rico's most prominent contemporary writers. Throughout his life, he expressed his political and cultural ideas, which he transformed into enduring literary works. With more than a dozen plays, Marqués made an important impact on Puerto Rican theater not only for the themes he presented, but also for his technical skills, his symbolic use of lighting and auditory details, his manipulation of shifting levels of time, all seen so clearly in *Los soles truncos*, considered by some to be his best play. Before that, he had written a number of works, among which *La carreta* (1953) may be his most popular play, since it represents for many Puerto Ricans a faithful dramatization of their journey through life. Speaking in the *jíbaro* accent, the family of *La carreta* moves from the rural countryside to San Juan and then to the slums of New York City, suffering the reversals of fortune occasioned by their uprooting and then finding their authentic identity in a return to their land. Most of Marqués's work centers on this cultural conflict between the traditional values and the materialistic progress introduced by foreign influences. This theme is also seen in *Los soles truncos*, although the story ostensibly deals with three sisters whose lives are isolated from the economic progress of the island. In *La muerte no entrará en palacio* (1957), Marqués presents a more thinly disguised version of aspects of recent Puerto Rican history. His criticism of foreign influences is again seen, but the play also represents an interesting literary attempt to combine the classical form of tragedy with a theme of political commitment. *Un niño azul para esa sombra* (1960) portrays a child destroyed by his father's defeat and may be seen as a critique of Puerto Rico's nascent independence movement, but it is also rich in symbolic values which are expertly integrated with the staging techniques. In *El apartamiento* (1964), Marqués broadens his scope to include a social awareness of the problems of Hispanic America in general, caught in a battle between humanistic values and technological materialism.

Just as Marquées's work emphasizes Puerto Rico's separate identity in the face of the pressures from North American influences, so, too, his writings also show his interest in innovations in world literature and in universal themes. His two collections of short stories, *Otro día nuestro* (1955) and *En una ciudad llamada San Juan* (1959), also offer good examples of this significant aspect of Marqués's work. Thus, "Otro día nuestro" possibly offers a comment on Pedro Albizu Campos, an important figure in the *independentista* movement, but it also describes any human being caught in a conflict between inner needs and outer reality. At the same time Marqués was able to recreate the historical reality of Puerto Rico, he also knew how to make the particular elements reflect universal themes. Ideas associated with Existentialism—time, anguish, death and suicide, the absurdity of life—are found in Marqués's work, intertwined with Puerto Rican reality. In addition, he has been associated with the theory that docility is the dominant personality trait of the Puerto Rican. His essay, translated into English as "The Docile Puerto Rican; Literature and Psychological Reality," may be his most controversial and influential piece.[16] Whether or not one accepts his opinion on this issue, the reactions it has aroused and the self-examination engendered can be considered important in the development of a Puerto Rican cultural identity. Marqués will be remembered for the force of his vision, for his interest in interpreting the reality of his native environment as he saw it, and for remaining at the same time aware of international trends and universal preoccupations.

With Marqués's death, Puerto Rican theater may look to the talents of Luis Rafael Sánchez (1936-) and Myrna Casas (1934-) among the writers of the recent promotions. Casas's first play was *Cristal roto en el tiempo* (1960), presented at the Third Festival with Sánchez's *Sol 13, interior* (1961) being produced in the following year. While Sánchez has gone on to write important works of fiction other than drama, Myrna Casas has been associated primarily with the theater. She has experimented with a number of techniques, from the "well-made play" of *Eugenia Victoria Herrera* (1963) to the vanguardist *Absurdos en soledad, La trampa, Impromptu de San Juan* (1964). In addition, whether as actress, director, and producer of plays, or as chair of the Department of Theater at the University of Puerto Rico, Casas has played a strong role in the continuation of the theatrical tradition on the island.

In the area of fiction, Marqués had belonged to the "Promotion of the Forties," as he called it, which encompassed the writers after Belaval and Laguerre and roughly covered the period to 1959, with Abelardo Díaz Alfaro (1919-), José Luis González (1926-), and Marqués himself among the most important writers. While they continued the preoccupation with national identity that had marked the 1930s, these writers were also more oriented to international literary events, aware of the new techniques of the French, Russians, North Americans, English and other Spanish-speaking writers. In addition, their work added new themes which reflected the changing socioeconomic and political events in the country. Industrialization and its moral, social, and psychological consequences are explored, along with Puerto Rican participation in the Korean War. In relation to general preoccupations, time as a philosophical problem becomes a concern in fiction, as does the existential solitude of the human being. More and more, the emphasis is away from the *jíbaro* and toward the city dweller, located either on the island or in New York City. Another significant reflection of social changes is the presence of women as protagonists, not as the idealized figure of the Romantics, but as a figure who could create circumstances and act on her own accord. Also in consonance with this anti-Romantic approach was the new use of Puerto Rican landscape. It was no longer the enchanted, edenic place, but a backdrop to help in the psychological characterizations which were the major focus.

While Marqués begins his analysis of the new promotion with reference to Díaz Alfaro's *Terrazo* (1947), it is really the important stimulus of José Luis González which must be considered the primary force in Puerto Rican fiction. González was born in Santo Domingo, of a Puerto Rican father and Dominican mother, and was brought back to his father's birthplace when he was four. He was brought up in San Juan, where he received a degree in social science from the University of Puerto Rico. In 1957 he went to New York City where he pursued postgraduate study in political science at the New School for Social Research and experienced first-hand the problems of Puerto Ricans there. He has called himself a militant Marxist since 1943, when he came of age by publishing his first collection of stories, *En la sombra*, after his eighteenth birthday. From that time, González has traveled extensively and since 1953 has resided in Mexico. Nevertheless, he is a Puerto Rican writer, because of the language he uses, the characters he creates, and the themes he treats. His early models, as he worked to create his own unique style, were the Dominican Juan Bosch, an expresident and major writer of that country, and Ernest Hemingway. His works show, too, his dedication to politics and to the national independence of Puerto Rico. González is often mentioned by later writers as the source of their inspiration, so his role in Puerto Rico is creative on many levels.

González initiated the trend away from verbosity, rhetorical excesses, and instead preferred succinct, short stories in which dramatic tension builds. A good example is the brief yet poignant "La carta," a one-page work that depicts the poverty, frustration, and misery of the *jíbaro's* move from his rural environment to the urban center of San Juan, more eloquently than any sociological treatise. In the prologue to his third book, *El hombre en la calle* (1948), González noted that, until then, there had not been an "urban literature" in Puerto Rico. He focused on the man in the street, whether he was in Puerto Rico in "La carta" or transplanted to the concrete ghetto of New York, in "En Nueva York." The latter is his first short story dealing directly with the New York experience and reflects the observations he made as a student at the New School.[17] He continued this scene of the emigrant's experiences in his first novel, *Paisa* (1950). His protagonist Andrés remembers his family's past on the island as he tries to survive in the barrios of New York. When Andrés is killed in an attempted robbery, the message of *Paisa* is clear—according to González, the overwhelming prejudice against Hispanic minorities makes survival impossible. González uses a style that contrasts his own literary language in narration with the dialogue of his characters in which he attempts to reproduce authentic speech patterns in the manner of Alonso's *El Gíbaro*.

Gonzalez's 1954 collection, *En este lado*, contains some of his best-known stories: "En el fondo del caño hay un negrito," "El pasage," and "Santa Claus visita a Pichirilo Sánchez." These are masterful works with psychological depth, no excessive verbiage, and a poetic style.

Balada de otro tiempo (1978) represents the further development and maturity of González. This novel examines the 1930s in Puerto Rico, the people who lost their way during those turbulent times of social and political upheaval. Deliberately using the conventions of the 30s in his style of expression, González nevertheless shows the sophistication of his literary technique in his manipulation of three points of view, of a husband and wife and of the wife's *jíbaro* lover. The *Balada* reveals the repercussions that social processes have on literary and cultural events. The novel offers a good review of the literary figures of the period, mentioning Palés Matos, and Lloréns Torres, one for the Afro-Antillean influence, the other for his *jibarista* vision. It should be noted, however, that a significant change has taken place in Puerto Rican cultural life. While Blanco and Pedreira examined the past in order to learn about it, González and his contemporaries appear to be examining the past in order to reject it; they want to know about the past as a means of changing the present.

Pedro Juan Soto (1928-) has publicly acknowledged the importance of José Luis González as his master in the use of thematic unity to weave tales, in stylistic considerations regarding the use of adjectives and expressions which were considered "bad words." From the very title of his collection, *Spiks* (1956), Soto implied that he would examine all elements of Puerto Rican life in a frank, realistic way. He has taken a particular derogatory word and showed the humanity of the people so labeled. The stories of *Spiks* are also important in the way they capture faithfully the colloquial language of the humble people and eloquently reveal their painful and frustrating experiences which are so often difficult to verbalize. The urban focus of González is continued in this collection, with such prize-winning stories as "Los inocentes," whose theme is that the Puerto Rican is not at home in New York. "Garabatos" also reveals that theme while focusing on the unemployed person, who is not unemployable, but unable to find employment in a hostile environment. *Usmaíl* (1959), his first novel, was followed by *Ardiente suelo, fría estación* (which received in 1959 the Ateneo de Puerto Rico prize for the novel), *El francotirador* (1969), and *Temporada de duendes* (1970). Each successive works draws Soto closer to Puerto Rico and away from New York, yet his characters are often the same man on the fringes of his society, perhaps Soto's symbol for the Puerto Rican vis-à-vis national sovereignty, the recurring theme of so many writers. In terms of literary technique, Soto is also like other Puerto Rican and American writers in using the innovations of Kafka, Sartre, Hemingway, Faulkner, and Joyce.

Emilio Díaz Valcarcel (1929-) was also influenced by González. One of his major thematic concerns, however, is the Korean War, in which he served as one of the many Puerto Rican soldiers drafted into the U.S. service. In his first collection, *El asedio* (1958), the story "El sapo en el espejo" exemplifies his work in that the protagonist is a paraplegic veteran of the Korean War. Nevertheless, the sordid details are contrasted with an eloquent and poetic style, sharp psychological insight, and an economy of style that is impressive. His four short-story collections published between 1963 and 1971 have been anthologized under the title *Panorama*, and his novels *Figuraciones en el mes de marzo* (1971) and *Inventario* (1972) have assured him an international reputation.

Two recent works in fiction by Luis Rafael Sánchez and Rosario Ferré may show best the direction of contemporary Puerto Rican fiction. Sánchez had solidified his reputation in drama with *La pasión según Antígona Perez* (1968), which combined a Puerto Rican reality with the classical Antigone myth. The critical and popular claim of the work has been overshadowed now by his novel *La guaracha del macho Camacho* published in Argentina by Ediciones de la flor in 1976. The work caused a literary sensation for its style and technique, and a social scandal for its thinly disguised references to many figures of contemporary political and cultural life in Puerto Rico and to many aspects of Puerto Rican life. While it by no means possesses a naturalistic or realistic technique, it is a faithful artistic recreation of contemporary society, the social and moral decomposition of bourgeois Puerto Rico which preoccupies so many writers. Rosario Ferré in *Papeles de Pandora* (1976) also presents the same absurd and grotesque characters of the upper class, using Sánchez's same technical decomposition of narration and point of view to reflect the theme of moral decay. Sánchez is especially witty, and his language is particularly regional in its use of colloquialisms and phrases. He writes in "Puerto Rican," just as Cabrera Infante or Severo Sarduy write in "Cuban," that is, in the vernacular of the island. Though *La guaracha* at first appears almost impenetrable to the non-Puerto Rican, the regionalisms and the confusions of narrative technique are soon overcome, and the work becomes intelligible in all its humor and humanity, showing the absurd and the marvelous in the reality of Puerto Rico.

The recent Puerto Rican novel and theater now compete well with the poetry, which has always had the strongest literary tradition and contributed major figures to the larger context of Hispanic-American poetry. While Lloréns Torres, Palés Matos, Ribera Chevremont and Julia de Burgos may be considered alongside such figures as Gabriela Mistral (Chile), Pablo Neruda (Chile) or Cesar Valiejo (Peru), other poets have also been developing and forging a reputation.

The three major themes of Puerto Rican poets already found in the nineteenth century continue to be God, love, and *patria*. Just as with Gautier Benítez, or Lola or Julia de Burgos, the work of Juan Antonio Corretjer (1908-) repeats these themes. In addition, he is considered the first poet after Pachín Marín to embody a revolutionary ambition in his work.[19] Corretjer became famous for his neocreole poem, *Amor de Puerto Rico* (1937), written while he was in exile. His subsequent poems also combined the poetic with the political. His

"Tierra nativa I," included in the 1951 collection *Tierra nativa*, openly called action to "liberate" Puerto Rico; at the same time it painted an evocative picture of the island's landscape. His long epic, *Alabanza en la torre de Ciales* (1953), received eloquent praise from critic José Emilio González, who pointed out its impressive imagery, its integration of a multiplicity of elements that make it a kind of national poem of Puerto Rico as it evokes the past, present, and a possible future for the island.[20] Corretjer's work represents the new generation of poets who are interested in recreating a faithful poetic portrait of the distinctive elements of their land by using avant-garde poetic techniques. At the same time, they identify with the plight of the people who are in need of social justice.

Francisco Matos Paoli (1915-) also shares Corretjer's political militancy and adds his vision of the world as an emanation from God. His *Canto a Puerto Rico*, which won the 1952 Ateneo Prize in poetry, shows his beautiful imagery as he creates an evocation of the Island. *Canto de la locura* (1962) is perhaps his most famous work, and although it does not have the difficult images of earlier pieces, reveals his strong religious faith. His use of the condition of insanity is very provocative, for on the one hand, it symbolizes something lacking in the state of being—the presence of evil—and on the other, signals the possibility of the creative adventure. The polemical nature of madness in society will reappear as a theme in the 1970s.

Hugo Margenat (1933-1957) died young, but in his brief career is considered to have set the pattern for Puerto Rican poetry of the generation of the 70s. He was a political figure, as founder and member of F.U.P.I. (Pro-Independence University Federation) and initiated the student protests of the 60s. In poetry, he also combined the lyrical and the political, as seen in his collections *Lámpara apagada* (1954), *Interperie* (1955), *Mundo abierto* (1958), and *Ventana hacia lo último* (1960). Again, love of *patria*, love, and God are the major themes of his work.

There are many new young poets like Iris Zavala (1936-), Pedro Pietri (1944-), Victor Hernández Cruz (1949-), Etnairis Rivera (1949-), who travel from Puerto Rico to New York, who use Spanish, English and Spanglish, who, in particular, address the *patria*, asking for independence, and in general, oppose exploitation on all levels. As in the fiction represented by Sánchez's *La guaracha del macho*

Camacho or Ferré's *Papeles de Pandora*, the poets seem generally to incorporate aspects of nationalism with an orientation towards socialism, but there is also the employment of myth and hallucination as an approach to revolutionary commitment.

As the 1980s come into view, Puerto Rico is similar to other Hispanic-American countries in that its literary expression represents a multifaceted and multitalented vital experience. However, because so many Puerto Rican writers who live in the United States, and even those who remain on the island, are influenced by English, the polemic arises whether that literature written in English should be considered part of the national literature. Yet, this situation, in which many people have left the island but still "live" in its culture, should be reminiscent of the similar experience which existed over a century ago. Alonso's *El Gíbaro* and the anthologies of the 1840s were produced by Puerto Ricans who had traveled to Spain to study, and their writings were a product of their nostalgia for their homeland. Thus, Alonso can be compared in part to Iris Zavala, Pedro Pietri, Etnairis Rivera, etc., who, although they may have left the island, still relate to their *patria*. Beyond this polemic, it is also evident that the quality of production of the contemporary writers such as René Marqués, José Luis González, Pedro Juan Soto, Luis Rafael Sánchez, and the growing talents of Rosario Ferré, Juan Antonio Ramos, and Victor Hernández Cruz, to name only a few, substantiate that Puerto Rican literature has created an authentic, personal language in which to write of its particular problems, but at the same time, has transcended the specificity of itself to reach universal significance on the merit of its talent and relevance.

NOTES

1. For a description of the literary production of that time, see the work of María Teresa Babín, *Panorama de la cultura Puertorriqueña*, (Biblioteca Puertorriqueña, 1958), pp. 283-311.

2. See Antonia Sáez, *El teatro en Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras; Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1950), p. 20.

3. The following works place particular emphasis on the contribution of women in Puerto Rico: Edna Acosta-Belen's essay in this text; Sandra Messinger Cypess, "Women Dramatists of Puerto Rico," *Revista/Review Interamericana*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1979), in press; Angela Negrón Muñoz, *Mujeres de Puerto Rico: desde el período de colonización hasta el primer tercio del siglo* XX (San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1935).

4. See Francisco Manrique Cabrera, *Historia de la literatura puertorriqueña* (New York, Las Americas Pub. Co., 1956); Juan Flores, *The Insular Vision: Pedreira's Interpretation of Puerto Rican Culture* (New York: Centro Working Papers, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 1978), p. 30.

5. Margot Arce de Vázquez and Mariana Robles de Cardona, *Lecturas puertorriqueñas: Prosa* (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1967), p. 13.

6. See Ricardo Campos and Juan Flores: *National Culture and Migration: Perspectives from the Puerto Rican Working Class*, (New York: Centro Working Papers I, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 1978), p. 8.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

8. *Ibid.*

9. See Adalberto López, "Socio-Political Developments in a Colonial Context: Puerto Rico in the Nineteenth Century," in *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans*, eds., López and James Petras (Cambridge: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 70-75.

10. See Babín, pp. 353-356.

11. See Cesáreo Rosa-Nieves, *Aguinaldo Lírico de la poesía en Puerto Rico* (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1958).

12. José Emilio González, "La poesía puertorriqueña de 1945 a 1963," *Asomante*, 20, no. 3 (1964), pp. 52-74.

13. See her poems in *The Puerto Rican Poets/Los Poetas puertorriqueños*, eds., Alfredo Matilla and Iván Silén (New York: Bantam Books, 1972) pp. 60-77.

14. See Diana Christopulos, "Puerto Rico in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Survey" in *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans*, pp. 123-163.

15. Revised edition, (San Juan: Ediciones de la Torre, 1970), I, p. 460.

16. See René Marqués, *The Docile Puerto Rican, Essays*, tr. by Barbara Bockus Aponte, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976).

17. John C. Miller, "The Emigrant and New York City: A Consideration of Four Puerto Rican Writers," in *MELUS*, 5, no. 3 (1978), p. 84.

18. Pedro Juan Soto, in the Introduction, to José Luis González, *Veinte Cuentos y Paisa* (Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1973), p. 11.

19. See *The Puerto Rican Poets*, p. xv.

20. "La poesía puertorriqueña de 1930 a 1954," *Asomante*, II, no. 1 (1955), 90-91.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

In addition to the works mentioned in the notes, the following books should also prove useful:

Babín, María Teresa and Stan Steiner, eds., *Borinquen, An Anthology of Puerto Rican Literature* (New York: Knopf, 1974). Selected works in English translation that offers an historical survey of Puerto Rican literature.

Hill, Marnesha D. and Harold B. Schleifer, *Autores puertorriqueños: Una guia bibliografica* (Metuchen N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1974). A bilingual annotated bibliography which centers on literature and history, and contains bio-bibliographic information on the authors included.

Vivo, Paquita, *The Puerto Ricans: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: London: Bowker Co., 1973). Includes all topics pertaining to Puerto Rico and provides a brief note on the nature of the works listed.

PART III

Puerto Ricans in the United States

The Puerto Rican Diaspora: A Survey

Adalberto López

1. The Migration

It is doubtful that historians will ever discover who was the first Puerto Rican to migrate from the island to the United States; it is certain that not many were doing so before the United States took Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898. In the second half of the nineteenth century a few affluent Puerto Rican students studied in North American universities, and a handful of Puerto Rican revolutionaries periodically spent time in New York City plotting against Spain, usually working hand in hand with Cuban revolutionary organizations in that city. Numerically more important and certainly less fortunate were the several hundred Puerto Ricans who migrated to New York in search of work or who traveled to California by way of Panama, usually after spending some time in the cane fields of Hawaii.[1] In any event, in the nineteenth century the Puerto Rican migration to the United States was insignificant; by 1910, 12 years after the occupation of Puerto Rico by U.S. troops, the number of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland did not exceed 1,600.[2]

In the first 40 years after Puerto Rico became a colonial possession of the United States, the island underwent a dramatic, often painful, transformation. On the wake of the military occupation by North American troops in 1898, the government in Washington and its insular representatives drafted and implemented a series of policies shrouded in the rhetoric of benevolent paternalism but designed primarily to facilitate the penetration of the island by North American capital and the operations of the dozens of U.S. companies that established themselves on the island in the early part of this century.[3] To facilitate the movement of people and the transportation of commodities, roads and bridges were built; to indoctrinate Puerto Rican children with the value system of the colonial metropolis—i.e. to "Americanize" them—schools were opened all over the island; to train a class of intermediaries and managers, Puerto Rico's first university was established; and to create a better living environment for metropolitan investors and the colonial officialdom, and, possibly, to create a healthier and therefore more productive labor pool, improvements were made in health and sanitation facilities. In 1917, Washington imposed U.S. citizenship upon Puerto Rico and thousands of young Puerto Ricans found themselves in the U.S. armed forces fighting and dying in Europe. Commercial relations between the United States and Puerto Rico grew rapidly, and the island quickly became one of the metropolis' most important overseas markets.[4] Simultaneously, there was a growing concentration of agricultural property in the hands of a few families and absentee North American corporations and the creation of a cash-crop, monoculture, plantation type of economy whose lifeblood was sugar and which led to the emergence of a large rural proletariat whose wages were low and who ordinarily spent part of the year unemployed.[5]

The full consequences of these developments on Puerto Rican society and their effects on migration to the United States remain to be studied and analyzed. One can observe, however, that between 1899 and 1940 the island's population grew from 953,243 to 1,869,255 (primarily the consequence of a rapidly declining annual death rate and a more or less stable birth rate)[6] and that during the 1920s and 1930s there was a growing migration from the rural areas toward the cities and from the island to the United States. With citizenship, Puerto Ricans were free to travel between the colony and the metropolis without the delays and restrictions imposed on other immigrant groups by the U.S. Immigration Service. By 1920 the Puerto Rican population on the United States mainland had risen to almost 12,000, with Puerto Ricans living and working in 44 of the 48 states. Ten years later there were some 53,000 Puerto Ricans on the mainland; by 1940 the figure was close to 70,000 (See Table I).

It was in the years immediately following the end of World War II, however, that the Puerto Rican migration to the United States reached

TABLE 1.* THE PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION TO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED

Year	Puerto Rican Birth	Puerto Rican Parentage	Total
1898	a	a	a
1910	a	a	1,513
1920	a	a	11,811
1930	a	a	52,774
1940	a	a	69,967
1950	226,110	75,265	301,375
1960	596,280	259,444	855,724
1970	811,000	618,664b	1,429,664b

[a] Data not available.

[b] These figures do not include third-generation Puerto Ricans. Estimates on the number of third-generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland range from 50,000 to 300,000.

**Sources:* Laurence Chenault, *The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City* (New York, 1938); *U.S. Census data, 1940-1970; The New York Times,* March 5, 1973.

massive proportions. Between 1940 and 1950 an average of 18,700 Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States annually. In the decade of the 1950s the average rose to 41,200 per year, and in the 1960s it declined to an average of about 14,5000 annually (see Table II and Graph II). In 1953 alone, when the migration reached its peak, about 69,000 Puerto Ricans left the island to settle on the United States mainland. In 1960 the number of Puerto Ricans living in the states was almost 900,000 and in 1970 the number had increased to between 1.5 and 2 million, the figure varying with the inclusion or exclusion of third-generation Puerto Ricans (See Table I).

Although the causes for the massive exodus of Puerto Ricans from the island to the United States in the post-World War II period remain to be studied and analyzed in detail, the explanation for that exodus lies in a combination of rapid population growth in an island 3,435 square square miles in size, high rates of unemployment in Puerto Rico, the prospects of greener pastures on the mainland, efforts by the insular colonial government to channel "surplus" population out of Puerto Rico. The demand of U.S. corporate interests on the mainland for cheap labor, especially in the so-called "services" sector, agriculture, and

TABLE 2.* THE PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION TO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (1946-1971)

Year	Number of Migrants	Year	Number of Migrants
1946	39,911	1959	29,989
1947	24,551	1960	16,298
1948	32,775	1961	-1,754a
1949	25,698	1962	10,800
1950	34,703	1963	-5,479a
1951	52,899	1964	1,370
1952	59,103	1965	10,000
1953	69,124	1966	30,000
1954	21,531	1967	34,000
1955	45,464	1968	18,500
1956	52,315	1969	-7,000a
1957	37,704	1970	44,000
1958	27,690	1971	1,800

[a] Minus figures indicate that during that year more Puerto Ricans returned to Puerto Rico than Puerto Ricans migrated to the mainland.

NOTE: Keeping an exact record of how many Puerto Ricans leave the island every year to live on the mainland is impossible. Thus, all the figures above are rough estimates. In fact, the figures given for the last few years have been questioned by Puerto Rican militants on the mainland who feel that they are too low and the result of a deliberate effort by the Puerto Rican government to minimize the size of the number of people leaving the island. See, *New York Times*, September 7, 1971.

**Sources:* For the period 1946-1964, Migration Division, Puerto Rico Department of Labor, *Facts and Figures, 1964-65* edition; for the period 1964-1971, *New York Times, September 7, 1971.*

highly competitive industries such as the garment industry also was an important factor.

Between 1899 and the 1940s the rate of population natural increase in Puerto Rico rose rapidly from 14.3 to 20.1 per 1,000 of population.* In 1940 the population of the island was about 1,800,000; by the early

---

*This was due primarily to a sharp drop in the annual death rate (31.4 per 1000 in 1899 to 15.8 per 1000 in the 1940s) without a parallel drop in the annual birth rate (45.7 per 1000 in 1899; 40.6 per 1000 in the 1940s). *Facts and Figures*, p.3.

1960s it was over 2,500,00.[7] (It has been estimated that given the present rate of natural increase, by the year 2000 Puerto Rico will have a population of at least 5,000,000 persons).[8] Puerto Rico not only entered the decade of the 1940s with a large population per square mile, but also with a high rate of unemployment and underemployment that was not relieved significantly by the developmental program of the Popular Democratic Party of Luis Muñoz Marín. In spite ofthe construction of hundreds of factories by U.S. companies (attracted to the island by a variety of incentives such as tax exemptions) the economy was not able to absorb a growing labor pool. In fact, statistical evidence suggests that by the early 1950s the developmental program of PPD, with its emphasis on capital-intensive industrialization, aggravated the unemployment problem, especially in the agricultural sector, which became less and less important after 1940. In 1950, in spite of the massive exodus of Puerto Ricans which got under way in the 1940s, the rate of unemployment in the island was 13.7 per cent. In 1972 it was 12.3 per cent, while on the U.S. mainland it was 6.1 per cent. These rates, of course, do not include the tens of thousands of underemployed persons on the island. Whatever the claims of the Popular Democratic regime to having performed an "economic miracle" in Puerto Rico, it was abundantly clear to the vast majority of Puerto Ricans and to those visitors to the island who ventured beyond the self-enclosed world of the great hotels that poverty was widespread and that for tens of thousands of the island's population channels for economic improvement did not exist.

It was the chronic lack of employment on the island on one hand and the demand on the mainland for cheap unskilled or semi-skilled labor in competitive industries (such as the garment industry) and in the "service" sector (janitors, dishwashers, hotel maids, bus-boys, etc.) on the other that accounted primarily for the beginning of a massive migration of Puerto Ricans to the continental United States in the 1940s. The illusory hope of material improvement, of making it in the American dreamland, led tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans to migrate to the mainland. The migration was facilitated by low rates of air transportation between the island and the mainland that were permitted by the Federal Aviation Administration at the request of the PPD government. The latter facilitated and encouraged outward migration as an "escape valve" which it considered beneficial to the island's development and without which, given the patterns of economic growth established by that government, the rate of unemployment in the island would have been unmanageably high. In a study published in 1966, Dorothy and James Bourne estimated that given the rate of population growth and the patterns of economic growth in Puerto Rico in the post-World War II period, without outward migration the rate of unemployment in the island in 1970 would have been 24.7 per cent.[9]

From a demographic point of view the "escape valve" has indeed been successful since, as José Hernández Alvarez has pointed out, "the migration to the United States not only removed one-third of the island's population, but also meant that the children of the Puerto Rican migrants were not added to the population."[10] Alvarez also is quite perceptive when he points to the "escape valve" as an important factor in social control. Had it not been for the withdrawal of one-third of Puerto Rico's population, the social forces for change, which had been generated as a result of the revolution of rising expectations brought about by the PPD developmental program, probably would have propelled the island's population into much more severe situations of unrest and conflict.[11] It also is quite possible that the desire to maintain the population "escape valve" may in part explain why the PPD leadership gave up its earlier commitment to Puerto Rican independence and opted for closer relations with the United States.

GRAPH 1. PUERTO RICO'S POPULATION GROWTH (1930-1965)



GRAPH 2. NET MIGRATION FROM PUERTO RICO TO MAINLAND (1946-1971)



Puerto Ricans, then, migrated to the United States in large numbers not because they hoped for more exciting lives in the big cities of the colonial metropolis or because they had any particular attachment to the U.S. way of life, but primarily because their economic situation had become intolerable on the island and the industrial cities of the mainland appeared to offer them jobs and a better material life. The vast majority of those who migrated were rural, poor, unskilled, relatively young, and seldom with more than a few years of elementary school education. That these Puerto Ricans were attracted to the mainland by the hope of material improvement is illustrated by the fact that at times of economic recession on the mainland the rate of migration declined, and many Puerto Ricans already on the mainland—who were often the first to be fired during such recessions—returned to the island. During the mainland recessions of 1953-1954, 1957-1958, and the early and late 1960s, the rate of migration from Puerto Rico to the mainland dropped, and the number of Puerto Ricans returning to the island from the mainland increased.[12] (See Graph 2)

2. Puerto Ricans on the Mainland

Although by the late 1940s there were Puerto Ricans living in all states of the union, the vast majority of Puerto Rican migrants settled in the New York City metropolitan area. In 1950, 80 per cent of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland lived in New York City. By 1960 that proportion had declined to 60 per cent as more Puerto Ricans migrated from New York City, or from the island directly to industrial centers such as Chicago, Philadelphia and Jersey City. This trend led some observers to predict an internal "diaspora" in which the second and third generation of mainland Puerto Ricans would spread throughout the nation. In absolute terms, there is still a net migration of Puerto Ricans from New York City and from the island to other industrial centers in the United States (as evidenced by the results of the 1970 census). Nevertheless, the proportion of mainland Puerto Ricans living in New York City has remained stable at around 60 per cent. Also, the majority of Puerto Ricans who have migrated from New York City to other parts of the country have done so to areas on the eastern seaboard, often quite close to New York City (see Table 3).

TABLE 3: THE TEN U.S. CITIES WITH THE LARGEST NUMBERS OF PUERTO RICANS ACCORDING TO THE 1970 CENSUS

City	Number of Puerto Ricans
New York City	887,119
Chicago	86,277
Philadelphia	40,930
Jersey City	38,033
Newark (New Jersey)	37,009
Los Angeles-Long Beach	31,210
Paterson (New Jersey)	24,113
Miami	18,918
San Francisco-Oakland	15,231
Boston	11,565
Total:	1,190,405

NOTE: None of the figures above includes third-generation Puerto Ricans.

In the 1930s and 1940s the majority of Puerto Ricans arriving in New York City were settling in Manhattan. And within Manhattan a large proportion moved into East Harlem in the Upper East Side of Manhattan, an area that became known among Puerto Ricans as *El Barrio*. Today *El Barrio* cuts deep into Manhattan, "on two square miles of the highest priced rock in the world," from the East River to Central Park and roughly from 96th to 130th streets on Manhattan's east side.[13] At the end of the nineteenth century East Harlem was mainly German and Irish. Italians began to settle there in the early 1900s, and by 1910 the Italian migration was so vast that Italians had become the second largest group in the area. Jewish immigrants were moving in at the same time as the Italians. By the 1920s East Harlem had become economically depressed and the Germans and Irish had virtually disappeared from the area. Italians and Jews also were moving out, and Puerto Ricans (and blacks from Central Harlem) were beginning to move in. Already in 1930, an Italian doctoral student was writing of an "invasion" of East Harlem by Puerto Ricans. "These people speak their native language, which is Spanish," he wrote, "and they are commonly called 'spics.' "[14] To describe the movement of Puerto Ricans into East Harlem as an invasion is misleading. The growth of the Puerto Rican population in the area was slow and in the late 1930s Italians still constituted the most important ethnic group in the area.[15] But by then it also was the home of the largest Puerto Rican community in the United States. It was during the decades of the 1940s and 1950s, when the exodus from Puerto Rico reached massive proportions, that the Puerto Ricans came to outnumber the Italians (the majority of whom moved out) and East Harlem became increasingly known as Spanish Harlem.

But East Harlem was not the only area of Manhattan being occupied by Puerto Ricans. In the 1950s large numbers of them were settling on the Lower East Side, the West Side and Upper Manhattan. Thousands of them were also moving into the other boroughs of New York City, especially Brooklyn and the Bronx. By 1960 there were more Puerto Ricans living in the Bronx and Brooklyn than in Manhattan. And in the course of the decade of the 1960s the trend among Puerto Ricans was to settle in the Bronx and Brooklyn. In fact, during the 1960s the Puerto Rican population of Manhattan actually declined, from about 225,500 in 1960 to about 185,000 in 1970.[16] The Puerto Rican population of the Bronx and Brooklyn, on the other hand, rose rapidly during the same period. Brooklyn, which experienced the largest increase of all five boroughs, had by 1960 a Puerto Rican population of 180,000; by 1970 that figure had increased to close to 400,000.[17] Richmond and Queens, refuges of an increasingly racist white middle and working class, did not experience such sharp growth in their Puerto Rican populations during that decade. In 1960, for example, Richmond had about 2,500 Puerto Ricans. Ten years later the figure had risen to about 5,000.[18] Within the Bronx the major areas of Puerto Rican concentration in 1970 were the South Bronx, Hunts Point, and Morrisania; within Brooklyn, Puerto Ricans generally were found in Williamsburg, Greenpoint and South Brooklyn (see maps of Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn below).

MAJOR AREAS OF BLACK AND PUERTO RICAN POPULATION IN MANHATTAN, BROOKLYN, AND THE BRONX (1970)



1. Washington Heights
2. East Harlem
3. Lower East Side
4. Lower West Side
5. South Brooklyn
6. Williamsburg
7. Greenpoint
8. South Bronx
9. Morrisania
10. Hunts Point

▒ Majority of Population Puerto Rican
▨ Majority of Population Puerto Rican and Black
■ Majority of Population Black

(*Sources:* 1970 Census data; *The New York Times*, March 6, 1972 and May 29, 1973).

Up to now, the type of Puerto Rican migrant we have been discussing is the migrant who moves to the mainland with the idea of staying for at least a few years. But there is another type of migrant who up to recently has been ignored by sociologists, government officials and Puerto Rican community leaders on the mainland: the Puerto Rican seasonal migrant. The story of the Puerto Rican seasonal migrant remains to be told. What is known now is that by 1970, approximately 50,000 Puerto Ricans—most of whom are young (21-30), married and have had less than 5 years of schooling—migrated from Puerto Rico to the United States to work on mainland farms (mainly in Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania) for periods of six to nine months before returning to the island. Just as the migration of other Puerto Rican migrants has been encouraged and facilitated by the government of Puerto Rico, U.S. business and the U.S. government, the migration of Puerto Rican seasonal migrants has been encouraged by Puerto Rican and U.S. labor contractors as well as agro-businessmen in need of cheap seasonal labor.

3. Spicks, Spiks, or Spics? The "Puerto Rican-Americans"

The tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans who migrated to the U.S. mainland with hopes of somehow "making it" in the American dreamland, did not find the green pastures they had expected. Wherever they settled, the vast majority of them found themselves sharing with blacks and, in California, with the Chicanos the poverty and degradation of ghetto life. The women were overworked and underpaid in bleak garment factories, the men usually got the dirtiest and least rewarding jobs (those white workers refused to take), and they were all usually the proverbial "last to be hired and first to be fired." During the 1950s there appeared to be some marginal improvements, but Puerto Ricans still remained at the bottom of U.S. society. Ghetto life in *El Barrio*, one of the worst slums in the country, the Lower East Side, the South Bronx, and in sections of Chicago, Philadelphia and other industrial centers continued to be for Puerto Ricans a nightmare of cold winters in unheated and roach-infested apartments, of decaying and overcrowded buildings owned by unconcerned and rapacious landlords. It was a world of unsympathetic and bigoted social workers and teachers, brutal policemen, broken families, small children bitten by rats and young men and women driven by their surroundings and hopelessness to crime and drug addiction.[20] In these circumstances and usually in years when the job market on the mainland was tight, thousands of Puerto Ricans returned to the island.[21] But the majority of Puerto Ricans in the United States, who felt that they could not hope for a better life in their homeland, remained in the ghettos of the mainland cities and returned periodically to the island for brief visits. The seasonal migrants, overworked, underpaid and crowded into unsanitary living conditions, were exploited by corporate farmers for the harvest of fruits and vegetables destined for the tables of an America oblivious to their plight. Here and there a Puerto Rican would make it up the economic ladder into a white collar job or profession. A rare few made use of their successes to attempt to do something about the conditions under which their compatriots lived, worked and died. The majority of these upwardly mobile individuals either returned to the island or disappeared into the suburbs or "respectable" neighborhoods, sometimes anglicizing their names or passing themselves off as Spaniards to avoid being labelled "spics" by their racist suburban neighbors.

Perhaps most tragically of all, as the years passed thousands of Puerto Ricans internalized the prejudices of the very society that was exploiting and humiliating them. White Puerto Ricans who on the island had lived next to black Puerto Ricans, now avoided black Americans and often referred to them as "niggers"; black Puerto Ricans often did their best to emphasize their Puerto Rican-ness so as not to be confused with American blacks. And there were a few Puerto Ricans who believed that other Puerto Ricans on the mainland were what they were said to be by the racist society to which they had migrated: drifters, thieves, criminals, loud-mouth dirty people who had moved to the mainland solely to get on welfare roles. This process of internalization of anti-Puerto Rican prejudice among many Puerto Ricans was strengthened by a variety of factors. In the schools Puerto Rican children who often knew only a few words of English were given I.Q. tests in English designed for middle-class whites. They did poorly and were then told, often quite bluntly by unsympathetic teachers, that they were just plain stupid. Guidance counsellors in schools did their best to channel Puerto Rican junior high school graduates into trade schools. Working on the premise that Puerto Rican students were not college material, they often told those students and their parents that it was not in the students' best interest to go to high schools designed to prepare students for college. In the Lower East Side of Manhattan in the mid-1950s young bright Puerto Ricans were pushed by unconcerned and bigoted school officials into schools where they were taught to chop meat, fix cars, clean airplanes, or cook in the city's restaurants, while less intelligent white students went to the more academic high schools and from there on to college. During the late 1950s the number of Puerto Rican students in "prestigious" New York City public high schools (Stuyvesant, Bronx High School of Science, and Brooklyn Technical High School) was infinitesimal. In 1962, in a graduating class of almost 700 students in Stuyvesant High School in Manhattan, there were only three Puerto Ricans.

The biased nature of the mass media in cities such as New York strengthened the tendency of some Puerto Ricans to turn against other Puerto Ricans. English language (e.g. *The Daily News*) and Spanish language newspapers (all owned and controlled by non-Puerto Ricans) invariably sensationalized the crimes of Puerto Ricans and gave Puerto Rican readers an image of their people as criminals.

Given the institutional constraints and prejudices of the society in which they lived, the nature of the mass media, and the attitudes of teachers and those in charge of shaping educational policy in the educational system of the cities, it is not surprising that many Puerto Ricans came to feel ashamed of being Puerto Ricans.

In spite of the discrimination and humiliations to which they were subjected, the Puerto Ricans in industrial cities such as Chicago and New York remained politically passive in the decades of the 1940s and 1950s. It was not that they were not interested in politics; it was simply that the gateways to political participation were closed to them. In New York City Puerto Ricans were kept from political participation first by a literacy test that was conducted in English; then, as the Board of Elections became "enlightened," by an equivalent sixth grade educational requirement that most first generation Puerto Ricans did not meet. Also, the vast majority of politically inclined Puerto Ricans (who within the Puerto Rican community constituted a minority) were kept, directly or indirectly, from joining political clubs that were dominated by old-line Italians and Irish.

Within the Puerto Rican ghettos community organizations appeared to try to cope with some of the social and economic problems of Puerto Ricans, but these organizations rarely drew national attention or funds and ordinarily limited themselves to asking for small and inadequate funds from urban government. Occasionally, an enterprising and clever Puerto Rican with political ambitions would learn the intricacies of urban politics, creep into the urban political power structure, and by delivering periodically some Puerto Rican votes for non-Puerto Rican politicians, would often end up with minor positions in the administrations and staffs of those whom they had helped to elect. But these individuals were few, and the Puerto Rican who was himself elected to office was rare. In 1937 a Puerto Rican was elected to the New York State assembly, a feat that was not repeated till 1953. Compared with the modest achievements of black and Chicano *politicos,* those of the Puerto Ricans were insignificant. There was not among them even a counterpart of the black NAACP or the Chicano LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), save the somewhat ineffectual Council of Puerto Rican and Spanish Organizations of Greater New York founded in 1952 by Puerto Rican *politicos* to "get out the vote." Throughout the 1950s more and more Puerto Rican workers joined labor unions, but within these unions they were discriminated against and rarely enjoyed any power or influence. Among labor union leaders anti-Puerto Rican sentiment was as rampant as it was among the white workers whom those leaders represented.

Then came the chaotic—to some, the glorious—decade of the 1960s. The black civil rights movement became more aggressive. Riots exploded in the black ghettos of several cities. In 1966 Stokely Carmichael made popular the phrase "black power." Soon other young black militants like H. Rap Brown were breaking with the pacifist and legalistic approach of their elders in the civil rights movements and calling for black self-assertion, black pride, and black independence. It was around this same time that the Black Panther Party came into being.

The Chicanos in California and the Southwest took a page from the book of the spreading Black Power movement and they, too, became more militant in their struggle to put an end to the exploitation and degradation to which they had been subjected and were being subjected. Militant Chicano organizations came into being and Chicano marches and demonstrations became common. In California, Cesar Chavez organized Chicano agricultural workers and in 1965 launched the by-now historic strike against the grape growers of the southern part of that state. In New Mexico the glory-shouting Assembly of God evangelist, Reis López Tijerina, first challenged the validity of the state's claims to certain public lands. He then made his much-publicized courthouse raid in Tierra Amarilla, which instantly turned him into a hero of the left in the United States. While Chavez and Tijerina were drawing national attention, Chicano street gangs in East Los Angeles were outfitting themselves as Brown Berets, and Chicano students in universities throughout California and the Southwest were forming aggressive associations that demanded more emphasis on the history and culture of their people.

With blacks and Chicanos attracting federal attention, federal funds, and liberal sympathy and admiration, the American Indians, one of the most ignored and brutalized minorities in the United States, launched their own militant movement with an ideology and approach similar to that of the blacks and Chicanos. The Puerto Ricans, too, were stirred by the developments of the 1960s and they came to the attention of the nation. Riots exploded in Puerto Rican ghettos in the east. New York *políticos* of Puerto Rican background who in the past had operated under the shadows of Democratic politicians suddenly rediscovered themselves as Puerto Ricans. They set out to mobilize the Puerto Rican communities in the same way as Black and Chicano *políticos*, and their job was facilitated by the abolition in New York City of previous requirements which had disenfranchised the vast majority of Puerto Ricans in that city. In 1965 Herman Badillo, who when speaking to Puerto Rican audiences presented himself as 100 per cent Puerto Rican but who in front of non-Puerto Rican groups de-emphasized his Puerto Rican-ness, became the first Puerto Rican to be elected a New York City borough (the Bronx) president. In 1971, he became the first Puerto Rican ever to hold voting membership in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the following year was one of the main contenders for the Democratic nomination for mayor of New York City. By 1965, New York office holders included a Puerto Rican city councilman, a justice of the civil court, a State Senator and three State Assemblymen.

Just as Puerto Rican *políticos* were becoming more active in Puerto Rican communities, many young Puerto Ricans—many of them second and third generation—became more militant on behalf of those communities. Black militants had founded Black Panthers and Chicano militants the Brown Berets; in the late 1960s young Puerto Rican militants set out to imitate that pattern. In 1967 a Chicago Puerto Rican street gang, the Young Lords, turned political and quickly became the most militant organization of Puerto Rican youth in the United States. In the fall of 1968 the group took over Armitage Street Methodist Church, renamed it the People's Church, and turned it into its headquarters, a day care center and a health clinic. While busy working for their communities in Chicago, the Puerto Rican militants of the Young Lords Organization were also busy building coalitions with other community organizations and with militant Puerto Rican groups in other cities. Close contacts were established with young militants in New York City who became affiliated with the Chicago-based group. In 1969, however, the New York group split with the Chicago group over the issue of tactics and the importance of ideology in their movement and founded the Young Lords Party.[22]

Like the Black Panthers, the Young Lords Party was organized into ministerial divisions with specified lines of authority and levels of responsibility. Based in the Bronx and led by young Puerto Ricans like Pablo "Yoruba" Guzmán, Juan "Fi" Ortíz, and Felipe Luciano, the Young Lords Party set out to do in the Puerto Rican ghettos of New York what the Black Panthers and Brown Berets were trying to do in black and Chicano ghettos: to end the exploitation and humiliation to which Puerto Ricans were being subjected and to create in them a sense of pride. "We will not allow the brutalization of our community to go without any response," Felipe Luciano declared. "For every Puerto Rican who is brutalized, there will be a retaliation."[23]

In December 1969 the First Spanish Methodist Church in *El Barrio* was occupied by armed members of the Young Lords Party for 11 days. During the occupation the Young Lords organized a program of free breakfasts for Puerto Rican children, a day care center, and a program for the distribution of clothing to people in the community. They founded a newspaper, *Palante* ("Forward"). And in July 1970 they led a group of almost 200 Puerto Ricans in an occupation of Lincoln Hospital, a squalid 346-bed institution that was created as a nursing home for runaway slaves in 1839. The hospital had been universally deplored as inadequate and obsolete but served 400,000 residents in the South Bronx.[24] The goal of the occupation of the hospital, commonly known among the residents of the South Bronx as "the butcher shop," was to dramatize conditions in the hospital and to make it more responsive to the health needs of the Puerto Ricans and blacks of the South Bronx. After a 12-hour occupation of the hospital, the Associated Press quoted Dr. Antero Lacot, the hospital's chief administrator, as saying that the Lords did a service to the community by dramatizing conditions at Lincoln.[25]

There can be no doubt that the riots that occurred in Puerto Rican ghettos, the activism of Puerto Rican *políticos* and the growing militancy of Puerto Rican youth in the decade of the 1960s had some important and beneficial results. Perhaps most important of all, in the course of the late 1960s Puerto Ricans developed a sense of pride in being Puerto Rican that had been absent among many Puerto Ricans in the past. Being Puerto Rican was no longer a source of shame, but a source of pride, and the phrase "Puerto Rican is beautiful" became as common within Puerto Rican ghettos as the phrase "black is beautiful" was within black ghettos. But the activism of the late 1960s had other positive results. The plight of a people that in the past had been ignored, suddenly came to the attention of the federal as well as city and state governments and institutions of higher learning. Reluctantly the government set out to pacify the increasingly restless Puerto Rican communities by meeting some of their demands. Federal and municipal funds were provided to support community projects and finance housing developments. State and city administrations increased the number of Puerto Ricans working for them. Pressures were brought upon labor unions to open up more opportunities for Puerto Rican workers. Programs were introduced to try to curb police brutality. At Lincoln Hospital more Puerto Ricans were added to the staff. Dr. Julio Cesar Galarce, a Puerto Rican, replaced Dr. Antero Lacot as head administrator of the hospital and Dr. Helen Rodriguez, also Puerto Rican, was named to replace Dr. Arnold Einhorn as chief of pediatrics.[26] In the public educational system programs were launched to meet the needs of Puerto Rican students. More Puerto Rican teachers were hired, bi-lingual programs were introduced, and in many schools (even at the elementary level) courses on Puerto Rican history and culture were created.

Changes occurred at the college and university level also. To meet the demands of young Puerto Rican militants in the South Bronx, Hostos Community College was founded there in 1969. Its president, Candido de León, became the first Puerto Rican in the United States to hold the post of college president. Throughout the state of New York, where the vast majority of Puerto Ricans on the mainland reside, the State University system launched a program designed to bring more Puerto Rican students to its campuses. In the City University of New York (CUNY) a program of open admissions was instituted that quickly brought about a rapid increase in the number of Puerto Rican students in

CUNY units. Even private institutions set about recruiting Puerto Rican students and setting aside scholarship funds to finance their education.

The Puerto Rican students who entered the universities (especially those in New York State) in the late 1960s and early 1970s were on the whole the children of the ghetto, and they carried with them the militancy of ghetto youth. In many campuses of New York State they pressured university, college and community college administrations to establish Puerto Rican studies programs or departments. By the beginning of the decade of the 1970s such programs or departments existed in Brooklyn College, Manhattan Community College, Bronx Community College, Queens College, the State University of New York at Buffalo, and several other CUNY and SUNY units in the state.[27] In addition, by the early 1970s there existed Puerto Rican research centers at SUNY-Buffalo, Queens College, Brooklyn and CUNY. The demands of Puerto Rican students for the creation of Puerto Rican studies programs and research centers were accompanied by demands for courses on Puerto Rican history and culture and the problems of Puerto Ricans in the United States, and for Puerto Rican faculty members to teach them.

But in spite of the sound and fury of the 1960s, governmental and institutional efforts to cope with some of the problems faced by Puerto Ricans on the mainland were feeble when seen in terms of the magnitude of the problems of Puerto Rican communities. Furthermore, these meager efforts to cope with community problems became less and less visible during the 1970s. Many militant organizations were victimized by police repression, infiltration and frame-up trials; others lost their initial vigor. Community leaders were coopted into government jobs, and riots in the ghettos came to an end. A feeling that the "crisis" that had overwhelmed the nation in the 1960s had ended became increasingly pervasive. The sense of urgency to do something about the plight of Puerto Rican communities became less marked; and federal funds to support community projects were rapidly cut down. A subtle reaction against the demands of Puerto Rican and other minority groups for social jutice set in, a reaction that picked up momentum after the re-election of Richard Nixon in 1972. Formal compliance with the legal requirements of "affirmative action" led to the drafting of reports, the gathering of statistics and the preparation of goals for the future. These were substitutes in most instances for implementation of those goals.

Thus, in the early 1970s the vast majority of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland remained concentrated in bleak ghettos where life continued to be as nightmarish as it had been in the past. The descriptions published in the 1950s and 1960s of the poverty and squalor of life in *El Barrio* were still applicable in the early 1970s. By then the South Bronx, where tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans lived, was still one of the most terrifying slums in the United States. In January 1973, Martin Tolchin of *The New York Times* described the South Bronx as "violent, drugged, burned out, graffiti-splattered and abandoned. Forty per cent of the 400,000 residents are on welfare, and 30 per cent of the employable are unemployed."[28] "Rage is a condition of life in the South Bronx," wrote Tolchin, "it permeates the rubble-strewn streets and the unheated tenements. It blazes in the eyes of youth gang members and smolders in the brooding faces of mothers huddled on predawn lines at welfare centers and stacked in rows of benches in hospital emergency rooms and clinics, where many wait an entire day to see a physician."[29] The South Bronx, said Dr. Harold Wise, founder of the Martin Luther King Jr. Health center, "is a necropolis—a city of death."[30] Even for a native New Yorker, the voyage across the Willis Avenue Bridge is a journey to a foreign country; rage and fear are the overriding emotions in a landscape of despair, a world of youth gangs (over 130 of them), dilapidated schools and burned out buildings. The South Bronx is the most devastated area in New York City and probably in the nation. Perhaps not as terrifying, but still nightmarish are the Puerto Rican ghettos of the Lower East Side of Manhattan, South Brooklyn, Williamsburg and Greenpoint.

In spite of some progress made in the educational system in the 1960s, during the 1970s it was still relatively unresponsive to the needs of Puerto Rican students. The assumption that Puerto Rican children were stupid remained widespread among many teachers who were charged with educating those children. Criteria to evaluate "intelligence" and potential educational attainment remained essentially white middle-class. Thus, it was not surprising that the dropout rate of Puerto Ricans in public schools remained exceedingly high. In the public high school school system of New York City, for example, the dropout rate of Puerto Ricans between their junior year in December 1969, and what would have been senior graduation in 1970 was 58.2 per cent. The figure for black students was 51.4 per cent, and 27.2 per cent for whites and others.[31] At the college and university level, the situation was no better during the early 1970s. Whereas in 1971 almost 23 per cent of children in public schools in New York City were Puerto Rican, only 4 per cent of the student body of CUNY and less than 1 per cent of the student body in the State University system was Puerto Rican. In that year only 1.5 per cent of the Puerto Rican population of New York City had received a college education.[32] In colleges and universities Puerto Rican studies programs and departments were coming under increasing criticism by increasingly hostile faculties and administrations. "What will majors in Puerto Rican studies find to do?" they ask, while cheerfully passing out undergraduate degrees in eighteenth century French drama and medieval history.[33]

In the early 1970s the rate of unemployment among employable Puerto Ricans in New York City was over 10 per cent (a figure that does not include under-employment). Of those employed only 2 per cent were professionals while 70 per cent were concentrated in the unskilled, semi-skilled and service jobs that are the most low paid.[34] According to a report published by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1971, "Puerto Rican workers were the most deprived of all workers residing in New York City's major poverty neighborhoods. They were far more likely than others to be unemployed or to hold lower paying jobs."[35] In labor unions the numbers of Puerto Rican workers in the early 1970s were higher than they had been in the past, but policies to keep them out of the high-paying trades and union training programs were still widespread. In the higher echelons of labor union organizations the few token Puerto Ricans enjoyed little if any influence at all.

As in the past, in the 1970s the plight of Puerto Rican seasonal migrants still was ignored, although there were some attempts to bring the migrants' situation to the attention of the nation. Most of these migrants were from the poorest municipalities in Pueto Rico such as Las Marias where the per capita income is $413 a year, and Comerio where it is $418. In the states these workers continued to work from dawn to dusk and to live in dilapidated row houses without adequate sanitary facilities. They did not have the federal protection allowed to non-migrant workers. Irate over the living conditions of Puerto Rican migrant workers in the states, a group of churchmen and others in Puerto Rico established in 1970 the Permanent Committee of Support and Solidarity with Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers. One of the goals of the new group was to solicit funds for an orientation campaign to alert Puerto

Rican farm workers to the problems they will face on the mainland and to tell them where to go to voice their grievances. The group also hoped to bring Cesar Chavez to the island "to impress on him the importance of extending his drive to unionize migrant farm workers to the East Coast as he did with grape pickers in California"[36] At the time of the creation of the Permanent Committee, the Puerto Rican Lawyers Association petitioned Luis A. Ferré, governor of Puerto Rico at the time, to stop sending migrant workers to farms in New Jersey after the Association conducted its own investigation of those farms.[37] But these efforts were not particularly successful. Cesar Chavez showed very little interest in the plight of Puerto Rican migrant workers, the Permanent Committee found it difficult to get funds, and the Puerto Rican government continued to facilitate the movement of seasonal migrant workers from the island and back. Even after the defeat of Ferré in 1972, all that was done by the government of Puerto Rico was to set up a special director within Puerto Rico's migration division to look into the working and living conditions of Puerto Rican migrant workers in the states.[38]

Given the harsh conditions under which Puerto Ricans continued to work and live in the United States during the 1970s, it is not surprising that the rate of return migration to the island increased during that period. Part of the explanation for that return migration has been the increasing difficulty faced by first generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland in finding jobs in an economy where there is a declining demand for unskilled labor in urban industries. But another factor is involved: urban living conditions in the U.S. have deteriorated to the point that Puerto Ricans on the mainland do not think that the availability of better paying jobs on the mainland is worth the price they have to pay in living conditions. Many of those who returned to Puerto Rico in the early 1970s were from the higher social and economic levels of the mainland community who sought to spend their last years in the homeland they had left decades before. But among those who were returning to the island, there were thousands of impoverished and disenchanted individuals who no longer could tolerate life in the ghettos of New York City and other U.S. industrial centers. Many of them were concerned with the growing rate of drug addiction among their children, about crime in the streets, and about the type of education their children were receiving in the U.S. The attitude among of these returning migrants was that if things were bad in Puerto Rico (which in 1972 had an unemployment rate of 12.4 per cent) they were worse on the mainland. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the vast majority of those who were returning to the island for good in the early 1970s were first generation Puerto Ricans. Those who have been born and raised on the mainland are staying on the mainland and continue to face the problems and degradation of ghetto life. It is with these second and third generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland that the solution to the problems of Puerto Rican communities in the states can be found.

4. A Nation Divided: Puerto Ricans and Neo-Ricans

Aside from the exploitation and degradation that migration has meant for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans, the next most important consequence has been the division created in the Puerto Rican nation. Today the Puerto Rican nation is divided (irrevocably so) into two communities: the inner community (i.e. Puerto Ricans who are born, live, and work in Puerto Rico) and the outer community (Puerto Ricans who live and work on the mainland). The two communities share some problems and there still exists between them psychological ties that are being strengthened. Nevertheless, their differences exceed their similarities. Painful as it may be, it must be recognized by Puerto Ricans, both on the mainland and on the island, that the problems of the Puerto Rican communities on the United States have become American problems and that the struggle on behalf of those communities must be fought on the mainland and within the context of American society and American politics.

During the 1960s (and even today) among militant Puerto Rican organizations and militant Puerto Ricans the notion was widespread that the solution to the problems afflicting the Puerto Rican people on the mainland was tied to the resolution of the colonial status of Puerto Rico and that, somehow, once Puerto Rico achieves its independence those problems would be resolved. In the early 1950s the Puerto Rican Affairs Committee of the U.S. Communist Party adhered to this notion. Yet, in 1954 that Committee issued the *Handbook of Puerto Rican Work,* in which it admitted how erroneous the premise was and concluded that the problems of Puerto Ricans on the mainland were not an island problem, but a mainland one. The conclusion went unnoticed, and today there are thousands of Puerto Rican intellectuals and students on the mainland who still adhere to the erroneous belief that once Puerto Rico becomes independent the problems of Puerto Rican communities on the mainland will be resolved. That error led the Young Lords Party to shift their emphasis from militant action in the mainland ghettos to an emphasis on behalf of the struggle for Puerto Rican independence. Fortunately, the leaders of the Young Lords Party, who were rejected by pro-independence groups in Puerto Rico, eventually realized the error they had made, changed the name of their organization to Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization, and once again shifted their emphasis to the struggle for the Puerto Rican communities on the mainland.

The realization that the struggle on behalf of the Puerto Rican outer community (the "Neo-ricans," as they are becoming increasingly known) must be fought on the mainland, and not in Puerto Rico, is becoming more widespread, especially among second and third generation Puerto Rican students. In search of their cultural roots they go to Puerto Rico to study and discover, sometimes quite painfully, that the homeland of their parents or grandparents, no longer is theirs. Most of these students like Puerto Rico and find their experiences there valuable, but they are often made to realize that they are not "real Puerto Ricans." They return to the mainland with a new awareness of the direction to which they must direct their efforts. Several months ago one of my students who went to the island to study for a semester wrote to me:

> Well, Puerto Rico is fabulous. The good always out-weighs the bad. By "bad" I mean things I never knew existed, and more closer to home—the fact that I am a 'New Yorican'. In New York I am a 'spic'; here I am a 'New Yorican'. It is a terrible feeling. To be called a 'New Yorican' is very derogatory and I don't like it. True, I was born and raised on the mainland, but that's not my fault. Due to economic conditions my parents migrated—why do I have to be condemned for it?"

In spite of the growing awareness of the direction to which the Puerto Ricans of the outer community must direct their efforts, there still are many (both on the island and on the mainland) who stubbornly refuse to recognize the division in the Puerto Rican nation that has been created by the diaspora. Some claim that the division does not exist, since Puerto Ricans travel back and forth between the island and the mainland. But such back-and-forth travel applies primarily to the first generation of Puerto Ricans, a generation which still looks back to Puerto Rico with nostalgia (the nostalgia so beautifully and movingly presented in the song *En mi viejo San Juan*) and part of which still hopes to return to the island for good someday. But even among the first generation of mainland Puerto Ricans, a sizeable proportion of it has made the mainland its permanent home. And among second and third generation Puerto Ricans, back-and-forth travel between the island and the mainland is not common. The vast majority of second and third generation Puerto Ricans are on the mainland to stay.

There are many parallels between the outer community of Puerto Ricans and the communities of Algerian workers in France and of Chicanos in the Southwest and in California. Years ago there was a common assumption among fighters for Algerian independence that once Algeria became independent Algerians in France would return to their homeland. Algeria became independent and today there still are tens of thousands of Algerians working and living in ugly slums in Paris and other French industrial centers. Mexico is an independent country. Yet, there still are millions of Chicanos living in ghettos in the United States. There are some, of course, who argue that it is not national independence in itself that is important, but the *type* of regime that is established once independence is accomplished. In other words, the argument is that what is essential is independence *with* socialism. But any one who has any inkling of what Chicanos are all about is aware that if tomorrow Mexico were to become a socialist republic liberated from dependency on the United States, the vast majority of Chicanos would remain in this country, just as if Puerto Rico were to become a socialist republic tomorrow the majority of Puerto Ricans on the mainland would remain on the mainland.

The notion that independence and socialism in Puerto Rico will resolve the problems faced by Puerto Rican communities on the mainland is unrealistic. In what way will the creation of a Puerto Rican socialist republic end the nightmare of life in the South Bronx? In what sense will it heat unheated apartments, drive rats and roaches from the tenements into which so many Puerto Ricans are crowded, put an end to police brutality in the ghettos, and discrimination against Puerto Rican workers in the labor unions? In what sense will such a socialist republic make the school systems of the mainland more responsive to the needs of Puerto Rican students?

None of the above should be interpreted as an implication that Puerto Ricans on the mainland should turn their backs on the land of their parents and grandparents or that they should cease to be concerned about the colonial status of the island and involved in the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico. On the contrary, I firmly believe that it is important for the outer community to maintain contacts with the inner community. It is important that Puerto Rican students on the mainland study the history and culture of Puerto Rico, just as it is equally important that they keep abreast of contemporary developments in the island. I am not trying to imply that the establishment of an independent socialist Puerto Rican republic will have no impact whatever on Puerto Ricans on the mainland. The establishment of such a socialist republic undoubtedly will strengthen the sense of identity and pride in being Puerto Rican that is becoming increasingly widespread among members of the outer community. Also, an independent Puerto Rican socialist republic will be instrumental in bringing to the attention of the international community the plight of Puerto Ricans on the mainland. Nevertheless, the notion that the establishment of a socialist republic in Puerto Rico will resolve major problems faced by Puerto Ricans of the outer community must be destroyed, for only when that notion is given up by Puerto Rican militants on the mainland will a truly meaningful struggle on behalf of the Puerto Rican people on the mainland take place.

Many of the Puerto Rican intellectuals and young militants on the mainland (such as those in the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization) have become or are becoming aware that Puerto Ricans are a divided nation and that the struggle for the solution to the problems afflicting Puerto Rican communities on the mainland must be fought within the context of mainland society and politics. But among them there is a tendency that, although important, can weaken that struggle if it is allowed to go to extremes: This is the tendency to concentrate on theory and ideology rather than on practice. Militant Puerto Ricans are becoming increasingly aware (just as black and Chicano militants are) that the problems of their communities are the result of the system under which those communities are humiliated and exploited. No sensitive observer can fail to see the contradictions of capitalism in the United States: It is a society in which millions suffer deprivations of all sorts, but which has the productive apparatus to feed most of the world and to provide its citizens with a decent standard of living. It is one in which millions of hens are killed to bring up the price of eggs, in which people go hungry and yet millions of dollars are spent on hotels and beauty shops for cats and dogs. It is a society in which a vice president steals and gets away with it but a poor man steals and ends up in Attica prison.

The capitalist system in the United States is becoming increasingly bankrupt. It is a system that does not meet basic human needs. Thus, the conclusion is certainly sound that only when that system is destroyed and replaced by socialism, which is truly concerned about human needs, will the causes of the problems afflicting blacks, Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other groups disappear.

But to sit back and claim that nothing meaningful can be done until the entire system is destroyed is dangerous and can be easily turned into an escape for those who just do not have the strength and the commitment to become involved in militant action on behalf of the Puerto Ricans of the outer community. American society is inherently a conserative society; the capitalist system is well entrenched and well-defended even by those who are hurt by it:—the U.S. working class. U.S. labor bureaucrats are part of the establishment that oppresses Puerto Ricans and other minorities in this country. Racist attitudes are widespread not only among the leaders of the U.S. labor movement, but also among a large sector of the white American working class, which ought to be looked upon as an enemy rather than as an ally in the struggle for social justice in this country. Given the conservative and, in many cases, the reactionary nature of U.S. trade unionism, large sectors of the white American working class, and American society as a whole, those who struggle against the system face tremendous obstacles. The chances that capitalism will be overthrown in this country in the immediate future are small. Thus, the struggle for socialism must be seen as part of a long term struggle that includes a transitional program based on issues that directly affect the lives of the Puerto Rican people on the mainland today.

To summarize, a successful struggle on behalf of the Puerto Rican communities in the United States must be based on a foundation whose cornerstones are the realizations that the independence of Puerto Rico is not the key to the solution of the problems faced by those communities and that the inherent source of those problems, the U.S. capitalist system, will be around for a long long time to come. Equally important must be the realization that the leaders of the struggle on behalf of the Puerto Ricans of the outer community will come from second and third generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland. They are generations that are increasing numerically, that have been the product of the ghettos, and that are free of the nostalgia for the island that still characterizes the first generation of mainland Puerto Ricans. In sum, the children must lead their fathers as well as themselves.

Even after this foundation has been built, the problems faced by those who are leading or will lead the struggle on behalf of the Puerto Ricans of the outer community will be great and the results often disappointing. The struggle must be carried on at every level in every institution of mainland society. It must be carried on within the educational system (both at the pre-college and college level), within health and welfare organizations in the cities, within the legal structure of urban society, within the federal programs that still exist at the community level, within the context of urban, state and federal politics, and, most important of all, within the factories where the majority of Puerto Ricans on the mainland work. Puerto Rican students coming out of law schools should return to their ghetto communities to provide free legal system while at the same time working in institutions from which they can further assist their people. Puerto Rican students coming out of medical schools should return to the ghettos to work in ghetto hospitals and establish health clinics for their people. Puerto Rican students coming out of schools of education should move into urban educational systems and ghetto schools. In sum, young Puerto Rican militants must develop ties with their people even if it means working within institutions that oppress their communities. And all the time they must be making efforts to establish linkages with Puerto Rican factory workers. But before establishing those linkages Puerto Rican militants and intellectuals must free themselves of elitist attitudes. They should not go among the workers as leaders to tell the workers what to do and how to do it, but as allies in a common struggle. Admittedly, all that has been proposed is a piecemeal approach blocked everywhere by tremendous obstacles. But given the direction American society has taken in the 1970s, it is the only viable and productive approach available to Puerto Rican militants.

The young Puerto Rican lawyers, doctors, teachers, social workers and political activists must be militant, and in order to be militant must reach a level of consciousness about the problems afflicting Puerto Rican communities. They must have a commitment to those communities—a commitment and level of consciousness that will prevent them from being coopted into high-paying jobs in firms, institutions and governmental units, which would remove them from physical proximity to Puerto Rican communities and would lead them to put their own material well-being above the needs of their people. In part it is at the college and university level that the needed commitment and level of consciousness has to be created. It is at this level that the Puerto Rican intellectual can play a central role—assuming that he has not already been coopted into the university establishment. If he is seriously concerned about the plight of his people on the mainland, he must use his position within the university to increase the number of Puerto Rican students both at the undergraduate and graduate level, to see that the needs of those students are met through the creation of Puerto Rican studies programs whose emphasis should be on the study and analysis of the problems of mainland Puerto Ricans, to defend those programs in face of increasing criticism from conservative and often reactionary faculties and administrations, and to work together with those students through study groups and other activities. The Puerto Rican intellectual, however, should not limit his role to the confines of the university. He must venture beyond the halls of the ivory tower and establish relations with community groups, with factory workers. And he must do this free of the elitist thinking that still characterizes so many Puerto Rican intellectuals.

The Puerto Ricans who achieve the level of commitment, consciousness and militancy needed for the struggle on behalf of their communities must look out for the pitfalls that will be all around them. They must not fall into the pitfalls of emphasizing theory to the point that it becomes more important than practice. Neither should they fall into the pitfall of condemning what has been described by some as "mindless activism" (i.e. practice without theory), which is more productive than a lot of theory and no activism at all. They should be wary of Puerto Rican intellectuals who preach that Puerto Rican ghetto communities should not be concerned primarily with mundane bread-and-butter issues while they themselves live in comfortable homes and apartments in the suburbs or within the womb-like comfort of a university campus. They should shy away from Puerto Rican *politicos* who are in most cases more concerned about advancing their political careers than about the problems of the people they claim to represent. Finally, Puerto Rican militants must be careful not to step into the pitfall of believing that all Puerto Ricans on the mainland are "sisters" and "brothers". Just as in Puerto Rico there are tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans who have profited from and supported the colonial status in which the island finds itself, so are there on the mainland Puerto Rican parasites who bleed Puerto Rican communities like leeches. There are those (like some of the *políticos*) who under the guise of serving the Puerto Rican communities, exploit them for their own ends. There are the racketeers, the businessmen, the doctors, the lawyers, who use their Puerto-ricanness to prey on other Puerto Ricans. There are the Puerto Rican intellectuals who use Puerto Rican students to advance their own careers, who use the college lecture tour circuit to fill their pockets with cash that could be used by Puerto Rican student groups for more productive purposes. These individuals must be identified, and, when possible, weeded out from our midst.

The partial solution to the problems afflicting Puerto Rican mainland communities—and I say partial because given the nature of American society those problems will never be totally resolved until the entire socio-economic system is overhauled—lies primarily in the emergence of a militant leadership of the type I have described above. That leadership, free of elitist attitudes and romantic notions about the immediate overhaul of the American socio-economic system, must work together with the masses of Puerto Ricans in the ghettos and in the factories. That leadership must come together in a national network. Once the necessary linkages among militant Puerto Rican organizations have been established, the next essential step is to establish linkages with other oppressed minorities such as blacks, Chicanos, and American Indians; for the problems of those minorities are almost identical to the problems of Puerto Ricans. In the past Puerto Ricans, blacks, Chicanos and Indians have been divided, each carrying its struggle more or less independent of the others. Part of the explanation for that has been the rivalry—often encouraged by the federal government—among black, Chicano, Puerto Rican and, to a much lesser extent, Indian *politicos* and community leaders for political spoils and federal grants. Also part of the explanation has been the racism and ethnic hostility that are institutionalized in American life and that have served to pit the oppressed minorities of this country against each other. It is up to the young black, Chicano, Indian and Puerto Rican militants to break the chains of racism and ethnic hostility, to end the rivalries among their communities, and to come together in a united front. Establishing such a front will be difficult, but it must be attempted, for only through such a united front will the struggle of oppressed minorities in the United States for social justice make a major leap forward.

NOTES

1. Harold J. Alford, *The Proud Peoples: The Heritage and Culture of Spanish-Speaking Peoples in the United States* (New York, 1972), p. 124.

2. Laurence Chenault, *The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City* (New York, 1938), p. 53.

3. For a sophisticated analysis of this process see, Angel Quintero Rivera, "Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico," Chapter I of his forthcoming book, *The Making and Unmaking of a Proletariat in a Colonial Society: A Sociological History of the Puerto Rican Working Class.*

4. By 1940, with a population of almost two million, Puerto Rico was the greatest per capita purchaser of U.S. goods. At that time the island was the U.S.'s second largest customer in Latin America and the ninth largest in the world. Quintero Rivera, *Making and Unmaking.*

5. Manuel Maldonado-Denis, *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation,* (New York, 1972), pp. 306-307.

6. Migration Division, Puerto Rico Department of Labor, *A Summary in Facts and Figures,* 1964-1965 edition, pp. 2-3.

7. Ibid., p. 2.

8. Joseph Monserrat, "Symposium on Puerto Rico in the Year 2000," *Howard Law Journal,* Fall 1968, p. 12.

9. Dorothy and James Bourne, *Thirty Years of Change in Puerto Rico* (New York, 1966), p. 45.

10. José Hernández Alvarez, "The Post-Development Crossroads of Puerto Rican Migration," in *A New Look at the Puerto Ricans and Their Society* (Brooklyn College, 1971), p. 75.

11. Ibid., p. 75.

12. Werner Baer, *The Puerto Rican Economy and United States Economic Fluctuations* (Rio Piedras, n. d.), pp. 33-59; *The New York Times,* February 22, 1970 and September 7, 1971.

13. Patricia Cayo Sexton, *Spanish Harlem: Anatomy of Poverty* (New York, 1966), p. 7.

14. Salvatore Cimilluca, *The Natural History of East Harlem from 1880 to the Present* (unpublished M.A. thesis, New York University, 1931), p. 30.

15. Francesco Cordasco and Rocco Galatioto, "Ethnic Displacement in the Interstitial Community: The East Harlem Experience," *Phylon,* Fall 1970, p. 11.

16. Migration Division, *Facts and Figures,* p. 17; *The New York Times,* March 6, 1972.

17. Migration Division, *Facts and Figures,* p. 17; *The New York Times,* March 6, 1972.

18. Migration Division, *Facts and Figures,* p. 17; *The New York Times,* March 6, 1972.

19. Ricardo Puerta, "El puertorriqueño invisible," *La Escalera,* May 1972, pp. 22-31.

20. For a vivid and literary account of life in *El Barrio* in the 1940s and 1950s see, Piri Thomas, *Down These Mean Streets* (New York, 1967). For other accounts of life in *El Barrio* in the 1950s see, Dan Wakefield, *Island in the City: The World of Spanish Harlem* (Boston, 1959) and Christopher Rand, *The Puerto Ricans* (Fair Lawn, New Jersey, 1958).

21. For an account of return migration to Puerto Rico see, José Hernández Alvarez, *Return Migration to Puerto Rico* (Berkley, 1967).

22. Frank Browning, "From Rumble to Revolution: The Young Lords," *Ramparts,* October 1970.

23. For accounts of the Young Lords Party see, Browning, From Rumble to Revolution; and Michael Abramson (ed.), *Palante: The Young Lords Party* (New York, 1971).

24. *The New York Times,* January 17, 1973.

25. *The New York Times,* November 30, 1969.

26. *The New York Times,* November 17, 1970.

27. For a listing and description of several of the Puerto Rican studies programs and

departments in New York State see, University of the State of New York, State Education Department, *Puerto Rican Studies Programs and Related Courses* (Albany, 1973).

28. *The New York Times,* January 15, 1973.

29. *The New York Times,* January 17, 1973.

30. *The New York Times,* January 15, 1973.

31. María Canino, "The New York Public School System and the Puerto Rican," in *A New Look at the Puerto Ricans and Their Society,* p. 102.

32. Josephine Nieves, "The Metropolis and the Puerto Rican Community," in *A New Look,* p. 108.

33. Frank Bonilla, "Beyond Survival: Por que seguiremos siendo puertorriqueños," in *A New Look,* p.96.

34. Nieves, "The Metropolis," p. 108.

35. U.S. Department of Labor, *The New York Puerto Rican: Patterns of Work Experience* (Washington, D. C., 1971), p. 1. The expectation voiced in the first edition of *Beyond the Melting Pot* by Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer that the Puerto Ricans would leap frog from their Black neighbors did not occur. "To the contrary, Puerto Ricans emerged from the decade [of the 1960s] as the group with the highest incidence and poverty and the lowest number of men of public position who bargain and broker the arrangements of the city." (Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, *Beyond the Melting Pot,* 2nd ed., p. 1 xix).

36. *The New York Times,* September 20, 1970.

37. Ibid.

38. *The New York Times,* May 6, 1973.

The Genesis of the Puerto Rican Migration*

Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños

Working-class migration, as a historical phenomenon and as a contradictory social process, should be analyzed within the international context of domination and subordination of nations by more developed socioeconomic formations. That is to say, it should be studied within the very dynamics of the international division of labor, itself a result of the internationalization of capital and the socialization of labor forces on a world scale. In Puerto Rico, this phenomenon begins with North American domination of the Island (1898). On a modest, but characteristic level, the transference of capital, goods and labor begins very early in this century. The beginnings of this process become evident during the period of transition to capitalism in the colony (1870-1898). The migratory currents of the time foreshadow later massive displacements.

Under North American domination, the Puerto Rican labor force has been in constant movement. This has been the case since the beginning of the plantation system when sugar enterprises forced the relocation of the labor force, until the present time when monopoly and transnational capital has generated more complex forms of

---

*This essay is a slightly edited version of the introduction to *Documents of the Puerto Rican Migration (1879-1901)* (New York, 1977) published by the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños of the City University of New York. It appears here with the permission of the Centro. The reader is encouraged to study the historical documents in this publication, the first of a series on Puerto Rican migration. It aims to provide some preliminary information that will help clarify and document the sociohistoric process of that migration.

movement. In this sense, the Puerto Rican working class is a prominent protagonist in the geographic movements of the labor force at the present time. It also plays a similar role in the breaking away from and rebuilding methods of class and national struggle both in the colony and the metropolis.

In order to understand the various geographic movements of Puerto Rican workers (emigration, return, circulation), we should view those displacements against the historical backdrop of the different stages of the capitalist mode of production in Puerto Rico and the United States. The present forms of movement correspond to a historical moment that falls within the larger process of the exploitation of the Island's labor force by the North American bourgeoisie. Let us, then, examine the total process in order to pinpoint and define the role played by migration.

Emigration Under Spanish Domination (1870-1898)

By examining our first migratory currents, we want to illustrate the beginning of an ongoing process of control of the labor force by capital. The approximate period of 1815-1870 was one of accumulation of primitive capital, particularly in commerce. Furthermore, there was an increase in the cultivation of commercial products and substantial population growth. To a large degree, these changes were a result of the Island's entry into the world market. Between 1815 and 1877, the population tripled. Nevertheless, the growth of commercial cultivation within precapitalist relations of production was particularly contradictory. The predominant systems of production (slavery/servilism) were a serious obstacle to the growth of commercial agriculture. The need for a mobile labor force was particularly felt by the sugarcane landowners, who depended on the internal migration from the mountainous regions in the interior of the Island to the coastal plains. From January to May, groups of farmers from the interior, who cultivated minor crops, tobacco and coffee, came down from the mountains to work in the sugar-producing haciendas. This was an unpredictable and irregular migratory flow and, as a result, the sugarcane landowners were constantly complaining of the lack of labor power. In reality, the lack of labor power was the result of the predominant systems of production that hindered the creation of a free and mobile labor force. Government decrees of a feudal nature, such as the Reglamento de Jornaleros (regulations affecting day laborers) attempted to provide landowners with the needed labor. Attempts were also made, both in 1838 and in 1849, to relocate the labor force and to regulate its purchase and sale. Both attempts failed, since the problem stemmed from the landowners' structural inability to effectively proletarianize the peasantry.

After Spain's liberal revolution of 1868, the changeover into a capitalist mode of production began on the Island. At the beginning of the 1870s, fundamental changes occured in the colonial economy: i.e., abolition of slavery and servile labor, and the establishment of sugar mills. During that time there was also a general development in the forces of production but this process stagnated towards the end of the decade. The economic crisis of 1878-79 generally curtailed the initial growth in sugarcane production. Thus, the transition from the hacienda to the plantation remained incomplete.

The fundamental reason for that failure can be found in the contradiction faced by the colony in relation to the metropolis. Spain did not meet its duties as a metropolis and so other nations partially fulfilled these functions on an economic level. Furthermore, the customs and fiscal policies of the metropolis restricted the development of capitalism on the Island.

This process of uneven transition and retrocession provides a first look at the symptoms of relative overpopulation in the countryside. The existing relations of production were incapable of absorbing the growing population. Furthermore, we must take into consideration the forced employment (*prestaciones*) of day laborers (*jornaleros*) in public construction, the tax on foodstuffs, the coin shortage, and the decrease in subsistence farming. All these factors, coupled with a growing population, brought pressure to bear on peasant nuclei who emigrated in response to their misery.

In the 1870s, destitute day laborers and peasants began to leave the Island. Santo Domingo, Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela were among the first to receive the Puerto Rican "braceros." Of the latter countries, Santo Domingo was a constant attraction until well into the 20th century. Ships expressly chartered by farmers' unions there and other parts of the Antilles picked up the emigrants in the southern ports of Puerto Rico. This first migration was seemingly composed primarily of "braceros" from the sugarcane growing region and adjacent areas.

The governing powers were disconcerted and made suspicious by this emigration to foreign countries. Government decrees of that period reflect attempts by the metropolis to keep the labor force within the Spanish political system. Efforts were made to channel the flow of Puerto Rican migrants to Cuba, still a Spanish possession at the time. But until 1898, Santo Domingo continued to be the principal choice of those migrants.

Puerto Rico's professional elite was also concerned by this emigration. The liberal newspapers of the times (1870-1898) questioned the need to expel a labor force that could be reorganized along the lines of the Spanish political system. In 1882, for example, a liberal journalist proposed the industrialization of the Island as a remedy to emigration. Six decades later, in 1944, Puerto Rican liberals proposed that emigration could be used to promote the industrialization of the colony.

The elite also expressed great concern over the migrant's destiny. In reality, the vicissitudes of these first migrants remain largely unknown to us.*

Emigration under North American Domination (1898-1901)

On an international level, the Spanish-Cuban-American War in 1898 gave the United States the opportunity to acquire direct colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The expansion of North American financial and industrial capital outside its national territory opened the way for control of the means of production in the colony and the transformation of the "sugar islands" into exporters of products needed in the metropolis. At the same time, capital acquired a concrete hold over the labor force that changed its geographical location according to the movement and the need for exploitation of North American capital. In this manner, the sugar plantation system established in Cuba, Hawaii, and the Phillipines and the neocolony of Santo Domingo, took on greater importance. This international system of sugar plantations in the service of the metropolis gave way to a particular international division of labor that subjected the people in the new colonies to the patterns of movement of the capital invested in the agricultural operations.

---

*In 1890, Spain's minister in Caracas demanded money from the colonial government in order to repatriate 43 Puerto Rican emigrants stationed in La Guayra (Venezuela). These "jornaleros" were unemployed.

As a consequence of the North American military occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898, the transition to capitalism in the Island gained ground and became more defined. The rapid reorganization of agricultural production under the control of North American capital had a triple impact on the movement of the labor force: 1) the "problem of overpopulation" increased; 2) a large part of the labor force was relocated as a result of internal migrations from predominantly coffee-growing areas to the settlements of the large sugar corporations; 3) the circulation of the Island's labor force through the international plantation system began.

The emigrations to Hawaii that began in 1900 are of particular importance. These displacements served as a successful rehearsal of the capacity for mobility of the Puerto Rican labor force. At the same time they revealed the mechanism of the Puerto Rican migratory process within the control of North American capital.

Reports and newspaper articles of this period (1898-1901) illustrate some of the characteristics of the migration to Hawaii which was fundamentally composed of families from the coffee growing areas. After 1899, coffee growing stagnated and diminished since the United States was primarily interested in the production of sugar.

The first annual report of Governor Charles H. Allen is helpful in determining the changes that occurred in such a short span of time (1898-1901). It also illustrates the policy adopted in relation to the migrants and reveals the disdain and racism of the white North American colonizer. The same is manifested in the 1903 report on Hawaii by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor. Articles in 1900-1901 in the newspaper *La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico* provide vivid proof of the social conditions of the migrants, their adventures and their misery. That history has not yet been written. But those articles show that the history of capital's control over the labor force, imperialist expansion and the mobility of the labor force is filled with death and hard labor. In this journalistic account we find what the official reports omit: the human cost of the process of capital expansion and the geographical relocation of the labor force.

The Puerto Rican working class has been a part of the process of North American expansion since it began. In 1900, 1950, or 1976 (with all the sharp differences that must be established), Puerto Rican workers have been subjected to the oscillations of North American capital, to its expansion and retrocession, to its organic composition, its geographical location and, in general, to the degree of development achieved in the mode of production.

Whether it be in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Cuba, Santo Domingo or New York, whether it be in the sugar mills, in iron mines, picking tomatoes, sewing, or processing petroleum, Puerto Rican workers since their formation as a social class have been controlled and exploited by the North American bourgeoisie. The history of Puerto Rico in the 20th century cannot be completely understood without a serious analysis of this phenomenon.

The Policies of Exploitation and Racism: Puerto Ricans in Hawaii, 1902*

The Porto Ricans, when they arrived, gave the least promise, either as citizens or as laborers, of any immigrants that ever disembarked at Honolulu. The men had been carelessly recruited at a time when the laboring population of Porto Rico was in a condition of acute distress. It is probable that few of them were in a physical condition to make a long voyage when they went on shipboard. They were mostly people from the coffee country of their own island, who had been starved out of the mountains when that region was devasted by the hurricane of 1899. This was followed by a year of idleness, semidependence, and mendicancy in the coast country before they left for Hawaii. They were half starved, anaemic, and, in some cases, diseased. A considerable number of petty criminals, wharf rats, and prostitutes from Ponce and other coast towns accompanied them. They were not so much representatives of the people of Porto Rico as of famine and misery in the abstract when they arrived in Honolulu. Numbers of men afflicted with hydrocele and other diseases, and who were manifestly incapable

---

*Reprinted from "Report of the Commissioner of Labor on Hawaii," *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, No. 47 (Washington, D.C., July 1903). The report provides some useful information about the migration of Puerto Ricans to Hawaii early in this century, gives some glimpses into the working conditions of Puerto Rican migrants in the Hawaiian Islands, and reveals the racism which was so prevalent among North Americans of that age. "Porto Rico" is the anglicized name given to Puerto Rico by North Americans at the end of the nineteenth century and used by them as the official name of the island after the occupation of 1898.

of working, found their way among the immigrants. But this was hardly the fault of the Hawaiian planters, who spent nearly $565,000 to get these men, or more than $192 passage money and recruiting expenses for every adult male arriving, and who were practically interested in their physical well-being.

The Porto Ricans appear to have been well treated during their passage from Porto Rico to Hawaii, and to have been provided with as many comforts as are usually enjoyed by voluntary immigrants from Europe to the United States. But their food, while wholesome and abundant, was not always the kind to which they were accustomed, and they had been made ravenous by long starvation. The first three expeditions passed through San Francisco in the winter, and, although they were brought across the country by the southern route, the lightly clad members were subjected to the inclemencies of what was to them almost an arctic climate. But there were few deaths among them while en route. The hardships of traveling merely prevented any recuperation from the deplorable physical condition in which they had left their homes. When they reached the plantations where they were to be employed, many—especially of the first expeditions, which arrived in the worst condition—were taken directly to the hospitals, which some of them never left alive. Those who were not actually ill were in no condition to work and had to be fed with specially prepared food for some weeks before they could do a full day's labor in the fields. They did not know how to care for themselves. They had to be taught how to live in their new surroundings. They were morally upset by their long travels and changed environment, and many could not acquire the new habits of life necessary to their new condition. So a considerable number became strollers and vagabonds, and, wherever possible, flocked into the towns.

The social regimen of the islands is strict. There is no extreme poverty, and begging is unknown. Any industrious and able-bodied man can always find employment in the country, and planters act upon the theory that a man who doesn't work is bound to steal. So a person without visible means of support is not allowed to remain on a plantation, and as the plantations cover nearly all the settled portion of the islands, it is exceedingly difficult for a man to follow a life of vagrancy with comfort. A certain number of Asiatics contrive to do so, but they live a sort of parasite existence upon their fellows, visiting from plantation to plantation among their more industrious brothers, and do not sink to the social rank or follow the methods of tramps or public beggars. Therefore Porto Ricans so disposed did not find conditions favorable to the *dolce far niente* existence so common among their own country population. They were confronted with the necessity of constant labor, and this was a new situtation to most of them. A fair number are meeting the emergency with credit, and are acquiring habits of persistent industry that they might never have gained in their own country. But a certain proportion have failed to adapt themselves to any sort of an industrious life, and these have drifted from the plantations into the towns or their immediate vicinity and form a class of malcontents and petty criminals.

The Porto Ricans arrived in Hawaii in 11 expeditions, beginning in December, 1900, and continuing until October 19, 1901. There were about 450 in each party, the total number of immigrants being about 5,000 of whom 2,930 were men and the remainder women and children. The exact cost of recruiting and bringing them to Honolulu was $564,191.68, or more than $100 per capita, a sum amply sufficient to assure their comfortable transporation and entertainment while en route. An English translation of the notice in Spanish, posted by agents recruiting laborers in Porto Rico for the Hawaiian Planters' Association, and known as the "Contract under which the Porto Rican laborers went to Hawaii," follows:

AGREEMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF LABORERS FOR THE ISLANDS OF HAWAII

The Planters' Association of the Hawaiian Islands needs laborers for the cultivation of cane and the manufacture of sugar, and therefore makes the following offer to working people and their families who will go to that country:

1. To furnish such laborers, their wives, children, and relatives free passage from Porto Rico to Honolulu, including subsistence and medical attendance during the journey.

2. To furnish such laborer upon his arrival with agricultural employment for the period of three years from the date of actually commencing work; also furnishing employment to his wife and elder children if they so desire.

3. To guarantee the laborer the following wages for each month of 26 working days of actual labor:

	Per month.
During the first year	$15
During the second year	16

During the third year	17

and to pay his wife and elder children, if they wish to work, as follows:

	Per day
Boys from 15 to 18 years of age	$0.50
Girls from 15 to 18 years of age	.35
Women from 18 to 40 years of age	.40

4. The laborer and his family will receive, free of cost, living apartments, fuel and water for domestic use, medical attendance, and medicines.

5. The laborer shall be exempt from personal taxes, he and his family will enjoy the full protection of the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, and his children under 14 years of age will be provided with primary instruction in the public schools.

6. At the conclusion of three years from the time of actually beginning work the planter will pay the laborer $72 bonus, providing always that the laborer shall have worked continually during this period upon the plantation to which he was assigned an average of not less than 20 days in each month.

Upon their arrival in Honolulu the workmen and their families will be instructed in the methods of cane culture followed upon the Hawaiian plantations.

Ten hours consitute a working day in the fields and 12 hours in the mill, it being understood that this work is not continuous, as the laborer is given time to eat his meals and rest from his work.

All overtime in excess of the hours stated will be paid for at the rate of 10 cents an hour; 26 working days constitute a month.

The journey will be made as follows: The laborers will embark upon comfortable steamers for New Orleans, a trip of 4 days; from there they will travel by rail to San Francisco, which will require about 4 days more, and from California they will embark in a Pacific liner, which will take them to Hawaii in 6 days more. The whole journey will occupy about 14 days.

The workmen and their families will be provided by the Planters' Association upon embarking with *clothing, underclothing, footwear, and blankets*, as follows:

For men and boys, 1 pair of shoes and stockings, 1 suit of underwear, 1 shirt, 1 pair of trousers, 1 hat, and 1 blanket. For women and girls, cloth for a dress and undergarments, stockings, shoes, a head cloth, and a blanket.

The climate of the Hawaiian islands is similar to that of Porto Rico, inasmuch as it lies in the 18th degree of latitude, and the temperature does not fall below 15°C. (59°F.) or rise above 25°C. (77°F.), a less degree of heat than in Porto Rico.

The products of the islands are sugar, coffee, tobacco, pineapples, and all the fruits found in Porto Rico, such as bananas, yams, sweet potatoes, etc.

The inhabitants of the islands profess different religious faiths, among them the Roman Catholic, which denomination has many churches and priests there.

From cablegrams and letters received we know that the Porto Ricans, who have gone to Hawaii in the first five expeditions have been given satisfactory

> employment upon the plantations of the islands, as well as their wives and children. This is corroborated by letters which the emigrants have sent to their families in Porto Rico. Letters of a very satisfactory tenor have been received by several commercial establishments in Yauco for delivery to friends. These letters are on file at the Hawaiian agency, at the disposition of any who care to examine them.
>
> Porto Rico, April 16, 1901.
>
> R. A. Macfie,
> W. D. Noble,
> The Agents, San Juan, Ponce, Adjuntas.

So far as a personal visit to every plantation in the islands save one (and that a place where no Porto Ricans were or had been employed), was able to show, the planters appear to have fully kept their side of this agreement. In most cases, however, the men have left the plantations originally employing them and wandered from place to place, taking such positions as their fancy or necessity dictated, like other free agricultural laborers. On nearly every plantation they are given in addition to the wages agreed upon in the "contract" a bonus of 50 cents a week for every week in which they work the full six days. They receive special consideration in many ways that is not shown laborers of other nationalities. One plantation employs a physician for Porto Ricans exclusively, others that do not run plantation stores buy rice and similar supplies at wholesale which they sell at cost to these employees; a planter on the island of Hawaii gives his Porto Ricans a sack of flour in addition to their weekly bonus whenever they work a full month of 26 days, and at another place, where there are nearly 100 employed, they are served with a free luncheon of hard tack and coffee in the field. Among about 100 Porto Ricans interviewed, there was not a single man who complained that he had not received full compensation for his services.

The quarters provided for the Porto Ricans were in many cases new and were usually modeled after those supplied the Portuguese, with whom it was assumed they would associate, and were superior to most of those occupied by Asiatics. They were comfortable cottages, equal to the better class of plantation quarters in the South or in Cuba, and considerably superior to the dwellings of the country laborers in Porto Rico. But complaint is made that, compared with other working people in the islands, the habits of the Porto Ricans are untidy, and, as a result, many were transferred to poorer quarters, and Asiastics and other laborers were put in the homes that were originally built for them. In these things they were compared with the tidy Japanese and other Asiatics employed in the islands, who, as well as the native Hawaiians, are clean about their persons, and this fact reacts favorably upon their surroundings, even when they neglect sanitation and orderliness about their houses.

This fact has prejudiced plantation managers and the people of the islands against the Porto Ricans. They are also unpopular on account of the number of criminals who accompanied them. Petty thieving was extremely rare in the country districts of Hawaii previous to their arrival. In this respect the native Hawaiians are almost perfectly honest, unless corrupted by city influences, and the Asiatics and other laborers are not inclined to pilfer from the whites or to commit any lawless acts that will bring them into direct relations with other than their own people. Heretofore doors and windows of private residences have seldom been locked, and small articles of value and other property have been left about uncared for with perfect security. The planters state that the arrival of the Porto Ricans changed all this, and bring in support of this statement official statistics which show that the commitments per thousand inhabitants to Oahu Prison, Honolulu, during the first 10 months of 1902 were, for the Japanese, 1.1; Chinese, 3; whites, 5.3; Hawaiians, 6.1; and Porto Ricans, 33.2.

The Porto Ricans, on their part, have not been uniformly contented with the conditions they have encountered in Hawaii. Complaints of ill usage and injustice were made. It was claimed that they were charged exorbitant prices at the plantation stores, and were obliged to be at work at unreasonably early hours. A careful investigation failed to disclose any extortion in the prices charged by the plantation stores or any discrimination as to hours of labor. The cost of living is relatively higher in Hawaii than in Porto Rico, so that prices that seem but normal to those familiar with the islands might well appear exhorbitant to the new arrivals. The hours of labor generally observed in Hawaii would naturally seem a hardship to those accustomed to the somewhat easy going Porto Rican methods. Other plantation laborers work rainy days as a matter of course, but over this point considerable trouble with the Porto Ricans in Hawaii occurred. Especially were complaints made by those working in the Hilo and Hamakua districts, and it is in this country that there is the most rainfall. As a result of this climatic condition there has been a gradual movement of the Porto Ricans toward the dryer sections of the islands, and in those regions they are more contented and give better satisfaction as laborers. To repeat a statement already made, the industrial regimen of the islands is a strict one. Hawaii is a country where no encouragement is given to idlers. It is probably the most energetic tropical country in the world.

But the condition of the Porto Ricans in Hawaii has another and a pleasanter side. The hopelessly ill have died, some of the discontented have left for California, and the criminal element has been largely weeded out of the working population in the country. There remains upon the plantations a considerable body of fairly efficient laborers. Representatives of these were interviewed upon all the islands, and without exception they were satisfied with their present condition. There are 539 Porto Rican children in the schools of Hawaii, enjoying educational facilities that are exceedingly rare in their own country. Some of the better-educated men are employed in positions of responsibility, as overseers, storekeepers, office men, and mechanics. Intelligent medical treatment, wholesome diet, and steady labor have improved both their physical condition and their morale. They have lost the dejected, drooping walk that characterized them on their arrival, and step out as freely and vigorously as the jaunty little Japanese. Some of them are saving money. One field hand from Pepeekeo plantation left the islands with $250. Another, the head of a family in the Kohala district, has $110 deposited with a physician in Honolulu, and another informed the writer that he and his family were earning $75 a month, besides house, fuel, and medical attendance, and that he "Thanked God he had come to Hawaii." In a number of instances men had smaller sums than those mentioned deposited with their employers.

Many of the Porto Ricans had recourse to Dr. L. C. Alvarex, the Spanish vice-counsel in Honolulu, as a friendly adviser during the difficulties and misunderstandings attending their arrival, and have remained in correspondence with him since. He has received complaints of harsh treatment from but 3 of the 55 plantations, and when some rumor was circulated through the islands to the effect that the Washington Government would send a transport to take the men back to Porto Rico some of them wrote to protest against this gross injustice, as they considered it, of being deprived of their present opportunities and forced to return to their own country. Of course many of the men are homesick, and probably a very large majority of them would welcome an opportunity to return to Porto Rico. They suffer from the same nostalgia that affects European immigrants to the United States.

The opinions of managers as to the efficiency of Porto Rican laborers differ, but most of those interviewed thought that sifted men, who had remained steadily on the plantations, were satisfactory. From 40 to 60 per cent of the laborers originally received were reported good. A few managers, including one or two with the longest pay rolls in the islands, preferred not to have a Porto Rican in their employ, while others retain in their service all who apply for work. The manager of the Kohala Sugar Company says in his report for 1901: "The Porto Ricans have turned out well and are among the best laborers on the plantation, and are improving greatly."

The annual report of Olaa plantation for the same year contains the following statement by the manager:

> We have on the plantation 237 Porto Ricans, including women and children. Although there is among them a good deal of poor material, the majority of them are fair workers and we have little trouble with them. I think the one prime reason for this is that we have continuously maintained in our employ a thoroughly competent interpreter, so that there has been no misunderstanding between laborers and manager as to what was wanted on either side.

One manager states that the Porto Ricans in his force constantly improve, but that they have to be taught to eat sufficient and wholesome food. Almost the same opinion was recently expressed by a large employer of native labor in Cuba. The manager at Waialua thought the Porto Ricans remaining in his employ were good men, but not equal to the Japanese, while a manager on Kauai and another on Hawaii considered that they accomplished more field work in a day than any Asiatic and nearly as much as a Portuguese or a European. Two cases were actually observed where Porto Rican and Japanese gangs chanced to be working in the same field, in one instance cutting cane and in the other distributing fertilizer, and on both occasions the Porto Ricans were covering ground much faster than the Orientals. There was complaint that Porto Ricans work irregularly, but this is only partially borne out by the figures taken from the books of two large plantations for the months of July and August, 1902. The averages, for men only, are as follows:

Portuguese:	
Average number of men employed	126
Average days worked per month	22.74
Hawaiians:	
Employed	32
Days worked	21.95
Japanese:	
Employed	664
Days worked	21.34
Porto Ricans:	
Employed	125
Days worked	20.85
Chinese:	
Employed	119
Days worked	20

It should be said of the Chinese, however, that since the exclusion law went into effect with annexation* most of the younger and most vigorous workers have gone back to China, leaving behind the gamblers and opium smokers, and those who, on account of age and decrepitude, can not accumulate funds to return to their own country. The best workers among the Chinese are also drafted off to the rice fields by employers of their own nationality, so that altogether only a remnant of the poorest hands remain as day laborers on the plantations. The Porto Ricans are incited to regular work by a special bonus of 50 cents a week for every full week of labor, which inducement is not offered to Asiatics.

There has been practically no change in the number of Porto Ricans working on the plantations during the year 1902, though there was a rapid decrease previous to that time, which would tend to show that after the naturally vagrant and criminal classes were once eliminated the remainder form a reasonably steady class of employees. The figures of the total number, of both sexes, employed at different

---

**Editor's note*: The reference here is to the formal annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 by the U.S. Congress.

dates, as given by the Planters' Association, are as follows:

October, 1901	2,085
February, 1902	1,851
September 30, 1902	1,853

Of the 55 plantations in Hawaii, 34 had Porto Ricans on their pay rolls in the autumn of 1902. One thousand seven hundred men, or slightly more than 58 per cent of the whole number of men imported, were then employed, and were earning an average monthly wage, without bonus, of $17.52. Including the weekly bonus of 50 cents paid to a very large majority of them for regular work, their possible wages were nearly $2 a month more than this, and their real monthly earnings probably averaged between $18 and $19. On one plantation, where the actual wages paid 54 Porto Rican employees were averaged for the month of August, 1902, it was found that they earned $18.85 each, or 51 cents a month more than the Japanese. There were also 172 Porto Rican women employed, at an average wage of $11.13 a month, and 164 minors, whose average wages were $10.20. The occupations of the men were distributed as follows: Four held clerical positions, paying an average of $35.32 a month; 11 were overseers, receiving $30.29 a month; 18 mechanics and mechanics' helpers received $21.57; 29 teamsters received $20.61; 15 wharf men received $19.77; 15 railway laborers received $20; 9 mill hands received $18.20; and 1,734 field hands and common laborers received, without including the bonus, an average of $16.13 a month. The average wages of the Porto Ricans employed on the plantations are therefore higher than those promised them when they left Porto Rico. But slightly more than half of those imported still remain in plantation work. Of these 539 are accounted for by the school children, 166 had been committed to Oahu Prison, and the remaining 2,300 represent minors too young to attend school, those employed off of the plantations, and the vagrant and vagabond population that has collected in Honolulu. Some also have died and a few have left for the Coast. Twenty-three Porto Ricans are also engaged in cultivating on contracts, and are earning about $26 a month besides quarters, fuel, and medical attendance. These are not included among the plantation wage earners enumerated above.

From the planters' point of view an important result of the Porto Rican immigration was the moral effect that their arrival had upon the

Japanese. The latter had begun to fancy that with the enforcement of the Federal Chinese exclusion and contract laws after annexation they were complete masters of the labor situation in Hawaii. They formed temporary combinations for the purpose of striking at critical periods of the planting and grinding season, and in this way had succeeded in forcing up wages. This is sufficiently shown by the rise in the average wage of field hands from 60 to 76 cents a day, or an increase of over 25 per cent, during the year ending June 30, 1901—the first 12 months following annexation. The regular arrival of monthly expeditions of Porto Rican laboring people throughout an entire year largely disabused them of this sense of monopoly and made them much more reasonable in their relations with their employers.

The ultimate effect of the Porto Rican immigration upon the islands will probably be unimportant. Those who remain will doubtless amalgamate more or less with the Portuguese during their transition into Hawaiian Americans. They and their descendants will in all probability be vastly better off then they had any prospect of being in their own country. They have brought with them a criminal element which it may take time to eliminate, but which will find the islands a decidedly discouraging field for operations, and they have faults and weaknesses which it may require a generation or two fully to correct. They are somewhat given to drinking, gambling, and carrying concealed weapons, and are more quarrelsome and vindictive than the other inhabitants. Difficulties sometimes arise between them and the Japanese. The latter are seldom the aggressors and rather fear the Porto Ricans in individual disagreements, but on one or two occasions, when their blood was up, it required prompt and energetic police interference to prevent a sudden extermination of the local Porto Rican population. The customs of the two people are so different that trouble is apt to result if they are placed in neighboring quarters. The Japanese, for instance, have a naive disregard for proprieties of costume and occasionally walk about their camps in an absence of attire that Americans or Europeans tolerate only in works of art. Porto Ricans object to this in case of adults, and one or two small riots have occurred as a consequence. Yet these are but other versions of the race riots and fights between workmen of different nationalities that happen in other parts of the country. They are not common, and none so far has led to serious consequences. His careless disregard of cleanliness renders the Porto Rican a less pleasant neighbor or employee in many respects than an Oriental. But to an outside observer it would seem that despite all his faults he is more desireable as a permanent settler. He possesses the heredity of the Caucasian, and with the discipline of regular work and the encouragement of the social and political environment he finds in Hawaii, he ought to turn out in the course of time a fairly intelligent and industrious citizen.

Vito Marcantonio: Defensor de los Puertorriqueños*

Adalberto López

From the time he was elected to Congress in 1934 until his death in 1954, Vito Marcantonio was not only one of the most visible figures in the American political scene, but also one of the leading radicals of his time, a member of "a species fast becoming extinct in the framework of American party politics."[1] Although Marcantonio is familiar to historians of U.S. labor, U.S. radical movements, and U.S. party politics in the twentieth century, relatively little is known about his relations with the Puerto Rican community of New York City in the 1930s and 1940s and about his position on Puerto Rico's status during those decades. In his time no one outside Puerto Rico condemned U.S. colonialism in the Island as passionately and as consistently as Marcantonio; no one was as visibly active on behalf of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland as he was.

The son of an Italian immigrant woman and an American-born carpenter of Italian descent, Marcantonio was born in 1902 in a five-story tenement on 112 Street and First Avenue in Manhattan's East Harlem.[2] A classic slum since before the turn of the century, East Harlem stretched roughly from Fifth Avenue on the west to the East River on the east, and from the Harlem River in the north to 98th Street on the south. Generally reputed to be one of the most densely populated areas in the country, it was also one of the most poverty-stricken. Although along the East River there were some warehouses,

---

*The title of this essay has been adopted from Chapter XXIII of *Memorias de Bernardo Vega* (Ediciones Huracán, 1977) edited by César Andreu Iglesias.

utility works, and light manufacturing plants, at the time of Marcantonio's birth most of the area consisted of ugly, dark, and filthy look-alike tenements housing tens of thousands of people, "people ever looking forward to the day when they could break away, shake off the stigma of being identified with it."[3] In the 1890s, when Jews were moving into the area in large numbers and Italians were beginning to trickle in, East Harlem was predominantly German and Irish. In the early 1900s Jews became the majority; by the 1920s Italians were fast becoming numerically dominant. In 1930 there were about 150,000 Italo-Americans there, making East Harlem the center of the largest Italo-American community in the country.[4]

Marcantonio studied first in P.S. 85, then at predominantly Jewish De Witt Clinton High School outside East Harlem. An activist since his high school days, he went on to study at New York University where he received his law degree in 1926, one year after his marriage to Miriam Sanders, a New England-born social worker. It was during his student days at N.Y.U. that Marcantonio became associated with Fiorello La Guardia, a fellow Italo-American. Between the two men there developed a close political and personal relationship which, although at times shaken by ideological differences, lasted until La Guardia's death in 1947.

Realizing Marcantonio's political talents, La Guardia brought him into his campaign team in 1924 when he ran successfully as the Republican candidate for Congress in the 20th Congressional District (East Harlem). Upon his graduation from N.Y.U., Marcantonio joined La Guardia's law firm and soon thereafter was entrusted by his mentor with whipping into shape the Fiorello La Guardia Political Club in East Harlem. In 1932 Marcantonio helped organize the Fusion ticket which won for La Guardia New York City's mayoralty election of 1933. In the following year, at the age of 32, Marc (as he was often called by his friends) ran successfully (as a Republican) for La Guardia's old congressional set. During the elections of 1936 Marcantonio was unseated by James Lanzetta, another Italo-American, but he was able to regain his seat in 1938 and to hold it through five successive elections until his final defeat in 1950.

Upon his election to Congress, Marcantonio quickly became a chief spokesman for those groups who were bearing the brunt of the depression of the 1930s. In and outside Congress he spoke for greater aid to the unemployed, supported rent control legislation, argued for higher minimum wage levels, exposed unfair labor practices and abuses, and advocated higher tax rates on high individual incomes and corporate profits. He was a leading opponent of the Taft-Hartley Law which he saw as a violation of labor's right to collective bargaining; sought to improve working conditions in the coal mines; and pleaded passionately for agricultural workers. In the 1940s he defended communists against increasing government harassment and bitterly condemned the House Committee on Un-American Activities as subverting the basic principles of American democracy. During that period he was also one of the leading spokesmen in Congress for the civil rights of U.S. blacks. He vigorously opposed, for example, official segration and the Southern States' poll tax and introduced legislation in the House to end the second-class status of U.S. black citizens. In time, he became a close friend and political associate of W. E. B. DuBois, the brilliant black Marxist historian and educator who once referred to Marcantonio as the only member of Congress who acted "with courage, intelligence and steadfast integrity in the face of ridicule, mud-slinging and cheating."[5] When in 1951 DuBois was indicted by the federal government for alleged communist activities, Marcantonio became his chief defense counsel at no charge, and when Marcantonio was buried in 1954 it was DuBois who delivered the funeral eulogy.[6] In sum, during the years he served in Congress, Marcantonio became identified with the political outcasts of the United States, articulating the aspirations of the poor, and advocating some of the most advanced and progressive social and economic legislation of his time.[7] It is not surprising that when he turned his attention to the issue of Puerto Rico's status his position was as radical as on the other issues in which he became involved during his political career.

At the time that Marcantonio took his seat in Congress in 1935, Puerto Rico had been under U.S. colonial rule for more than three decades. Although in 1917 the U.S. Congress had imposed U.S. citizenship on Puerto Ricans, Puerto Rico remained constitutionally an "unincorporated" territory, "belonging to but not forming part of the United States." In the aftermath of the North American occupation of the Island in 1898, the U.S. government had established there a colonial regime presided over, first by army generals, and then by

North American civilian governors appointed by the President of the United States. Not only were the Puerto Rican people being told what to do and how to do it by North American administrators, but in the years following the occupation of 1898 the Island's economy was shaped and eventually came to be dominated by U.S. corporate interests. By the 1930s Puerto Rico was dependent on the metropolitan economy both for imports and exports and all major sectors of the economy were controlled by U.S. corporations.[8]

Puerto Ricans actively involved in Puerto Rican national politics between 1898 and the 1930s did not accept this situation. The Republican Party condemned Puerto Rico's colonial status as unacceptable and saw in statehood the road to political and economic salvation. The Socialist Party of Santiago Iglesias, at first a truly representative organ of the Puerto Rican working class, gave up its initial radical momentum and joined the Republicans in support of statehood. The Socialist leader, then under the spell of U.S. trade unionism, saw in statehood the solution to the social and economic problems plaguing the Puerto Rican working class. Opposing the Republicans and the Socialists were the Unionists and the Nationalists. For years the Union Party had waivered between support for independence and support for a status between independence and statehood as the solution to Puerto Rico's plight. The Nationalists, on the other hand, had from the genesis of their party in the early 1920s remained fiercely committed to independence as the only acceptable and viable alternative to Puerto Rico's colonial situation.[9]

In the first decades of the century these parties debated, bickered, mobilized their followers, campaigned, and sent representatives to the metropolitan capital. But as the decade of the 1930s got underway, the status situation remained unchanged while the economic situation rapidly deteriorated. The world depression which overwhelmed the capitalist world in the 1930s had devastating effects on Puerto Rico. By 1933 about 65% of the working force was unemployed; there was widespread hunger and disease.[10] The political situation became increasingly tense and political conflicts more marked. Republicans and Socialists stepped up their campaign on behalf of statehood, seeing in total incorporation into the U.S. the solution to the crisis, seemingly impervious to the fact that the U.S. itself was in the midst of a great crisis.

The Unionists, on the other hand, concluded, as had the Nationalists before them, that only through independence could Puerto Rico hope to cope with the crisis. In 1932 the party changed its name to the Liberal Party and under the leadership of Antonio Barceló entered into an uneasy alliance on behalf of independence with the Nationalist Party, then under the firm leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos. In the elections of 1932 (characterized by vote-buying and fraud) a seemingly paradoxical alliance of Republicans and Socialists won control of the impotent insular legislature and elected an equally impotent Resident Commissioner, a man who by virtue of the so-called Organic Acts of 1900 and 1917 could participate in debates in the U.S. House of Representatives but could not vote.

Marcantonio was familiar with the situation in Puerto Rico and in the year following his election to Congress he condemned that situation with a fervor equalled only by Albizu Campos and with a sophistication and perceptiveness which often surpassed that of the Nationalist leader. He described the Puerto Rican people as "the most exploited victims of a most devastating imperialism" and condemned the exploitation of Puerto Rico's people and resources by big U.S. corporations.[11] He attacked a colonial system which placed Puerto Ricans in the status of second-class citizens in their own land, objected vehemently to attempts by the colonial authorities to make English the official language of the Island, and again and again emphasized the devastating effects which the depression was having on Puerto Rico. While advocating the introduction of federal minimum wage laws into the Island, greater aid to the unemployed, and other means of relieving some of the suffering the majority of Puerto Ricans were experiencing, Marcantonio was always careful to point out that these were mere relief efforts, that the only real solution to the problems faced by Puerto Rico was immediate and unconditional independence. "There can never be," he declared, "a solution to the economic difficulties of Puerto Rico until independence is granted to them. So long as Puerto Rico remains a colonial appendage of the United States, an exploited, a one-crop sugar economy, it will continue to wallow in disease and poverty." "I am not so naive," he stated in another occassion, "as to think that independence would overnight end all the problems of the Puerto Rican people. But I do know that independence would release the energy and creativeness of these fine people to meet their problems and to solve them by their own efforts. Without independence I see no solution." Several years later, when the issue of Commonwealth status was being discussed, he declared on the floor of the House:

> The people of Puerto Rico can solve their economic problems only when they have the power to make their own tariff laws, to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements, to make their own coast-wide shipping laws, and to have complete jurisdiction over their territory and land, their waters, their air, and their people. They cannot have these powers under the proposed Commonwealth status. They cannot have these powers under statehood. They can only have these powers under their own sovereignty in a free and independent nation.

In the course of his advocacy of Puerto Rican independence, Marcantonio became a strong supporter of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party and of Albizu Campos. When in 1936 the Nationalist leader was arrested and tried on a charge of conspiracy to overthrow the government, Marcantonio flew to the Island (the first and only time he was out of the continental United States) in an unsuccessful attempt to defend him. The congressman from East Harlem described the court proceedings as a mockery of American judicial principles, accused the prosecution of chicanery, and called for another trial. Having failed, he returned to New York to organize demonstrations in support of Albizu Campos who had been sentenced to ten years in federal prison.[12]

While calling for the release of Albizu Campos and an end to the persecution of Puerto Rican Nationalists by Governor Blanton Winship, a Georgia-born retired general, Marcantonio continued his campaign on behalf of Puerto Rican independence, introducing in Congress several bills to that effect. In 1943, for example, he drafted a bill providing for the immediate independence of Puerto Rico and declared that "self-determination and independence are synonymous."

As a result of his outspoken proindependence position on the issue of Puerto Rico's status, in the 1940s Marcantonio clashed with Luis Muñoz Marín who in 1948 became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico and who ten years earlier had founded the *Partido Popular Democratico* (PPD), the dominant political force in the Island until 1976. Although in his youth Muñoz Marín had been an advocate of independence and had worked with Antonio Barceló in the Liberal Party, in the 1940s he came to argue that the only viable solution to the problems of Puerto Rico was neither independence nor statehood, but rather, an in-between status, what later became known as the Commonwealth solution. Marcantonio labeled Commonwealth a smoke screen, that merely added "an embelishing facade on an ugly and rotten colonial structure." He ridiculed Operation Bootstrap, the developmental program of the PPD regime, as "Operation Booby Trap," and saw little significance in the law of 1947 giving Puerto Ricans the right to elect their own governor. As he declared, "it merely transfers from the President of the United States to the people of Puerto Rico the questionable privilege of selecting one more servant of the empire."

To Marcantonio, Muñoz Marín and his cohorts in the PPD were little more than the stooges and servants of Wall Street interests, the puppets of colonialism. He was particulary incensed by the drive of the PPD regime in the 1940s to suppress proindependence activities in the Island, labeling the "Law of the Muzzle" of 1947 and the "gag laws" of 1948 as "legislative monstrosities," drafted in Washington and passed by a Puerto Rican government which had forgotten the needs and aspirations of its constituents. At one point Marcantonio referred to Muñoz Marín as "the Nero of the Fortaleza"* and described the drive against proindependence forces as the manifestation "of fear and hysteria on the part of the present political leaders on the island. . . .acts of little men who are bent on establishing a paradise for private enterprise by ruthlessly suppressing every progressive force in Puerto Rico."

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Marcantonio's advocacy of unconditional independence for Puerto Rico was the position of a minority of one in the U.S. Congress. Again and again, his bills providing for independence were killed in committee. As the years passed, it became abundantly clear to him that Washington would never grant Puerto Rico independence. The Puerto Rican people, he declared, should hold no illusions; to wait for the U.S. government to grant them independence would be a great mistake. "Only their own united strength," he went on, "the formation of an anti-imperialist front of the whole people against the foreign dominators and their own national traitors is the best guarantee of achieving independence."

While maintaining an unwavering position on behalf of Puerto Rican independence, Marcantonio also worked hard for the growing Puerto Rican community in New York City. Puerto Ricans had been trickling in the city since the turn of the century, but it was not until the 1930s and 1940s (particularly after the end of World War II) that the migration from the Island to the mainland reached massive proportions. By 1950 there were over 300,000 Puerto Ricans in the U.S. mainland, the vast majority of them in New York City.[13]

Within New York City, most Puerto Ricans were settling in Lower Harlem, part of the 20th Congressional District represented by Marcantonio. According to a contemporary observer, in 1921 there were some 15,000 Puerto Ricans in this part of Harlem.[14] About fifteen years later, the communist organizer George Charney estimated that there were well over 150,000 Puerto Ricans there, most of them living in the area from 111th Street to 106th Street, between Fifth and Third Avenues, a section of the city already known as *El Barrio*.[15]

Given the large number of Puerto Ricans in his district, it is not surprising that Marcantonio took an interest in them and did all he could to alleviate their plight. During that period Puerto Ricans were among the poorest of the city's population, holding the most menial jobs. They were floor "boys" and "girls" in the garment industry, dishwashers, laundry workers, porters, elevator operators, janitors, cleaners, etc.[16] As Marcantonio commented, Puerto Rico had become "the source of labor for the jobs which employers cannot convince mainland workers to fill, the lowest paid, the drudgery jobs."

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Marcantonio addressed himself to the problems afflicting the Puerto Rican community, not only in his own district but in other parts of the city as well. He learned Spanish and established close contact with Puerto Rican community leaders. He always managed to have on his staff Spanish-speaking secretaries and lawyers who gave Puerto Ricans free legal aid and advice on how to deal with slum lords or the city's bureaucracy, who helped them find jobs and who, when necessary, got them on the city's relief rolls. Marcantonio also took a strong position against giving Puerto Rican children I.Q. tests designed primarily for middle-class children. He maintained that the New York City Board of Education, in administering these tests, placed Puerto Rican children in an unfavorable position because of inadequate allowances in the tests for linguistic, social, economic and environmental factors.[17]

In dealing with Marcantonio's support of independence for Puerto Rico and his relations with Puerto Ricans in New York City, the question arises of what motivated him. Was it, as many of his critics claimed, simply an opportunistic drive on Marcantonio's part to get the Puerto Rican vote in his district? In 1950, for example, the *New York Daily Mirror* declared that Marcantonio's strength came chiefly from the "hordes of Puerto Ricans enticed here from their home island for the value of their votes."[18] Although this was journalistic mud-slinging designed to discredit Marcantonio, there is no doubt that in the 1940s and for many years afterwards many New Yorkers believed that the interest of the congressman from East Harlem in Puerto Ricans was nothing more than opportunist politics.

It is quite true that Marcantonio was a thoroughgoing politican. He talked politics, thought politics, and spent a lifetime among politicians. "Politics, Congress—this was his life, his bread and wine."[19] But Marcantonio was also a man of principles and steadfast in his commitment to what he believed was right. He was a leading spokesman for the right of agricultural workers and worked hard to improve working conditions in the coal mines; yet, there were few agricultural workers and fewer coal miners among his constituents. In these matters, as in others, it was his radicalism that dictated his stand, the same radicalism that dictated his position on Puerto Rico and fostered his efforts on behalf of Puerto Ricans in New York City. It may even be argued, as Richard Sasuly has, that his support of the Puerto Ricans cost Marcantonio political support among his older Italo-American constituency which resented the intrusion into Harlem of the poverty-stricken newcomers.[20]

But, if just for the sake of argument, one assumes that Marcantonio's position on Puerto Rico and his relations with Puerto Ricans are to be explained primarily in terms of political concerns, this raises some critical questions about the nature of the Puerto Rican community in New York City. Were Puerto Ricans in the city in the 1930s and 1940s sympathetic to Marcantonio's advocacy of Puerto Ricans independence? Did they constitute a voting strength of any consequence in New York City politics? Because so little has been done in terms of studying the political attitudes and the degree of political participation of New York Puerto Ricans in the 1930s and 1940s, the answers to these questions can only be of a preliminary sort. Nevertheless, from some of the evidence available it must be concluded that during those two decades the Puerto Rican community in New York City was far more politicized than has been assumed by many and that among New York Puerto Ricans there existed strong support for independence. In the mid-1930s, for example, an Italian-American doctoral candidate at Columbia University wrote that sentiment for independence was strong among Puerto Ricans in the city and that "organizations for independence have been formed and small contributions are sent back to the island for the cause."[21] In the summer of 1936, after the conviction and sentencing of Albizu Campos, the *New York Times* reported that "ten thousand Puerto Ricans, representing a score of political and social clubs, paraded for three hours through Lower Harlem. . .to protest the attitudes and actions of 'Imperialist America' in Puerto Rico."[22] When George Charney worked in Lower Harlem in the late 1930s he was impressed by the radicalism and proindependence views of many Puerto Ricans in the area. He also pointed out that Puerto Ricans were not just interested in what was happening in their own community or in their home island; he wrote that he had never seen a community "so passionately involved in the Spanish Civil War," openly supporting the Spanish Republic.[23]

As for the electoral strength of the New York Puerto Rican community, it could not have been great in the 1930s and 1940s since most Puerto Ricans were disqualified from voting by literacy and other requirements. Yet, at least in the 20th Congressional District, the Puerto Rican vote may have been significant enough to decide the outcome of some elections. Already in the 1920s La Guardia had realized the potential of the Puerto Rican vote and had taken steps to woo it.[24] Marcantonio did the same, and it is likely that a careful study of the election of 1938 in the 20th Congressional District will reveal that without Puerto Rican support he could not have unseated his opponent, James Lanzetta.

Because the Puerto Rican vote seems to have been, or was seen as being, important to Marcantonio during his campaigns for re-election to Congress and during his campaign for the New York City mayoralty in 1949, Puerto Rican politicians from the Island became increasingly involved in the politics of the 20th Congressional District. In the 1930s Antonio Barceló campaigned for Marcantonio in East Harlem. In the 1940s Gilberto Concepción de Gracia, founder of the Puerto

Rican Independence Party, did the same. Conversely, those Puerto Rican politicians who opposed Puerto Rican independence did their best to undermine Puerto Rican support of Marcantonio in his district and other parts of New York City. Santiago Iglesias was one of these. So were Muñoz Marín and other important figures in the PPD. During the mayoralty election of 1949, for example, Muñoz Marín sent letters to 25,000 Puerto Ricans in the city urging them to vote for William O'Dwyer, the incumbent. Felisa Rincón de Gautier, a political associate of Muñoz Marín and mayoress of the city of San Juan, flew to New York and toured Puerto Rican districts urging Puerto Ricans not to vote for Marcantonio.[25]

Marcantonio failed in his bid for New York's mayoralty in 1949 and in the following year failed in his bid for reelection to Congress. During both campaigns, powerful forces were mobilized against him—the press, corporate interests, and almost all of the established parties. It was the period of the Cold War, the dawn of the McCarthy era. To many, even in his own district, Marcantonio's steadfast commitment to radical social and economic reforms, Puerto Rican independence, and his defense of communists and alleged communists were not only "un-American" but even treasonous. His defeat in 1950 and his death in 1954 (when he was preparing for a political comeback) was applauded by conservatives, red-baiters, and the followers of McCarthy. No doubt Luis Muñoz Marín and his associates in Puerto Rico were relieved by Marcantonio's demise. Yet, for the great majority of the Puerto Ricans in the United States, Marcantonio's death was a major loss. When he died this country lost one of its most honest radicals and Puerto Ricans one of their most outspoken supporters.

NOTES

1. Alan Schaffer, *Vito Marcantonio, Radical in Congress* (Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 211.

2. The only book-length political biographies of Marcantonio are Schaffer, *Vito Marcantonio*, and Salvatore John LaGumina, *Vito Marcantonio, the People's Politician* (Hunt Publishing Company, 1969). See also, Richard Sasuly, "Vito Marcantonio" in Harvey Goldberg, ed., *American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities* (Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. 145-159.

3. Leonard Covello, *The Heart is the Teacher* (New York, 1958), p. 180.

4. LaGumina, *Vito Marcantonio*, p. 2; Patricia Cayo Sexton, *Spanish Harlem: Anatomy of Poverty* (Harper and Row, 1966), p. 5; F. Cordasco and R. Galatioto, "Ethic Displacement

in the Interstitial Community: The East Harlem Experience" in Francesco Cordasco and Eugene Bucchioni, eds., *The Puerto Rican Experience: A Sociological Sourcebook* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1973), pp. 171-185.

5. W. E. B. DuBois, *The Autobiography of W.E.B. DuBois, A Soliliquy on Viewing my Life from the Last Decade of its First Century* (International Publishers, 1968), p. 361.

6. Francis L. Broderick, *W. E. B. DuBois, Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis* (Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 218, 224.

7. The best source for an understanding of Marcantonio's position on the various issues mentioned in this section is the *U.S. Congressional Record*. See also, Annette T. Rubinstein, ed., *I Vote my Conscience. Debates, Speeches and Writings of Vito Marcantonio, 1935-1950* (The Vito Marcantonio Memorial, New York, 1956). Marcantonio's correspondence and other papers are houses in the New York Public Library at 42nd Street.

8. For major developments in Puerto Rico from 1898 to the early 1930s see Truman R. Clark, *Puerto Rico and the U.S., 1917-1933* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

9. For the history of these parties see Bolivar Pagán, *Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños*, 1898-1956 (San Juan, 1972), 2 vols.

10. For a readable and useful account of the impact of the depression on Puerto Rico and efforts to cope with it see Thomas G. Mathews, *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (University of Florida Press, 1960).

11. Unless otherwise stated, all statements by Marcantonio are from the *U.S. Congressional Record*.

12. *The New York Times*, July 27 and August 3, 4, 1936; LaGumina, *Vito Marcantonio*, p. 47.

13. See Adalberto López, "The Puerto Rican Diaspora: A Survey" in Adalberto López and James Petras, eds., *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society* (Schenkman Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 316-346.

14. Rollin L. Hartt, "I'd like to Show You Harlem," *The Independent*, April 2, 1921, p. 335.

15. George Charney, *A Long Journey* (Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 106-107.

16. Helen Wheeler, "The Puerto Rican Population of New York," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol 35 (November-December 1950), pp. 125-126.

17. C. Wright Mills, *et. al., The Puerto Rican Journey* (Harper and Row, 1950), p. 109; LaGumina, *Vito Marcantonio*, p. 105; César Andreu Iglesias, ed., *Memorias de Bernardo Vega* (Ediciones Huracán, 1977), pp. 231-238.

18. *The New York Daily Mirror*, October 23, 1950.

19. Charney, *Long Journey*, p. 112. See also, Sasuly, "Vito Marcantonio," p. 145.

20. Sasuly, "*Vito Marcantonio*," p. 151.

21. Lawrence Chanault, *The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City* (Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 153.

22. *The New York Times*, August 30, 1936.

23. Charney, *Long Journey*, p. 107. See also Iglesias, ed., *Memorias*, for an excellent personal account of Puerto Rican radical politics in New York City during Marcantonio's years in Congress.

24. See, for example, F. La Guardia to Victor Ramos, December 7, 1928, La Guardia Papers, New York Public Library at 42nd Street.

25. *Life*, Vol. 27, November 7, 1949; *The New York Times*, October 17 and 27, 1949; *The New York Herald Tribune*, November 4, 1949.

Poverty and Discrimination: Puerto Ricans in the United States*

Migration to the Mainland

Puerto Ricans were living on the United States mainland more than 140 years ago, when the island was still a secure part of the Spanish colonial empire. During the 1830s, the founding members of a Spanish benevolent society in New York City included several Puerto Rican merchants. By the middle of the 19th century, Puerto Rico was engaged in more commerce with the United States than it was with Spain, and the sea route between San Juan and New York (as well as other mainland ports) was well traveled. In the late 19th century, the movement for independence from Spain was being planned in New York City by groups of Puerto Rican and Cuban patriots. A dozen years after the U.S. takeover of Puerto Rico in 1898, the Bureau of the Census noted 1,513 Puerto Ricans on the mainland.

But large-scale Puerto Rican migration to the United States mainland is a post-World War II phenomenon. In 1940 less than 70,000 Puerto Ricans lived on the U.S. mainland. Ten years later, the migrant community had more than quadrupled to 300,000 persons, and in the following decade, the population nearly trippled. By 1970, persons of Puerto Rican birth or parentage living in the United States

---

*This is an abridged and edited version of *Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future*, a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C., 1976).

numbered at least 1.4 million, and the figure grew to 1.7 million by 1975.

New York City, the first home for millions of immigrants to this country, now became the new home for a massive influx of U.S. citizens from other areas: Puerto Ricans from the Caribbean and blacks from the Southern States.

Between 1950 and 1970, the population of New York City remained stable at 7.9 million, but the city's racial-ethnic composition changed. In those two decades, the Puerto Rican community grew from 3 percent to better than 10 percent of the city's population. In turn, the number of blacks and persons of other races (Asian Americans, Native Americans, etc.) grew from 10 percent to 23 percent of the population. The city's white (non-Puerto Rican) population share dropped from 87 percent to 67 percent.

The earliest Puerto Rican migrants had settled in the East Harlem sector of Manhattan, which came to be known as *El Barrio* (a Spanish word meaning, roughly, "The Neighborhood"). In 1940 about 70 percent of New York's 61,000 Puerto Ricans lived in Manhattan. But the migrants soon began to fan out to the city's other four boroughs. By 1970, *El Barrio* was, still an important Puerto Rican enclave, but the thrust of movement was elsewhere. The Manhattanites comprised only 23 percent of the city's borough (39 percent of the population), followed by Brooklyn (with 33 percent). The outlying boroughs of Queens and Richmond were the homes of 5 percent of the city's Puerto Ricans.

Between 1960 and 1970, the Puerto Rican community in Manhattan dropped by 18 percent, to 185,000 persons. In the meantime, the Bronx community grew by nearly 70 percent (to 316,000 persons), Brooklyn saw an almost 50 percent increase (to 268,000 persons), and the small communities in Queens and Richmond (about 40,000 persons combined) grew by more than 120 percent.

While Puerto Ricans dispersed among the city's five boroughs, they were also moving outside of the city. In 1940, New York City was the home for nearly 90 percent of the migrants from the island. By 1970, only 57 percent of the Puerto Ricans lived there.[1]

There were substantial Puerto Rican communities in Yonkers, Long Island, and further upstate in Buffalo, Rochester, and Newburgh. Across the Hudson River, the Puerto Rican population of New

Jersey grew to 137,000, more than double the figure of a decade previous.

Cities such as Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, and Hoboken all had Puerto Rican communities of more than 10,000 persons by 1970. In New England, large communities evolved in Boston, Bridgeport, and Hartford. Moving westward, the migrants established themselves in Philadelphia, Chicago, Cleveland, Lorain, and Gary. Large communities also developed in Miami and Los Angeles. By 1970, more than 30 U.S. cities had Puerto Rican communities of 5,000 or more persons. In some smaller towns, Puerto Ricans are now an important sector of the population.

Reasons for Migration: Although economics is almost always a key factor in the movement of peoples from their native land, human motivation is never that simple or simplistic. Puerto Ricans fled neither political nor religious persecution, but life on the island for many young adults, particularly in rural areas, may have seemed intolerable. As is the case in many parts of the world, rural Puerto Rico offered a static environment, with few visible avenues for upward social mobility.

In the years following the Second World War, the urban parts of the island began to modernize, offering access to modern homes, automobiles, and other lures of modern life. Television and radio (which became ubiquitous by the 1950s) tempted rural viewers with scenes of life elsewhere. Thousands of Puerto Ricans had served in World War II and later in Korea. They came home with tales of their travels throughout the world and on the U.S. mainland. In other cases, Puerto Rican rural laborers were recruited for seasonal work on U.S. farms and gained a taste of mainland life. Air travel between San Juan and New York was quick and economical (as recently as the early 1960s the roundtrip economy flight between San Juan and New York was less that $100 and it still remains below $200). In many cases, migrants first moved from their rural homes to the island's cities, and then continued northward to the U.S. mainland.

The hardships endured by the earliest migrants became less harsh for the later arrivals, who found relatives and friends waiting, stores that sold familiar vegetables and fruits, and even Spanish-language newspapers and radio and television programs. Migration nourished itself, to the point where some made the 3-hour flight to another world on a whim, or in reaction to some personal setback. If one can sum up motivations, they could all be equated with the search for a better life.

This fact was confirmed in a recent study by a Puerto Rican economist, Dr. Rita M. Maldonado. Her study indicated that "Puerto Ricans emigrate to the U.S. mainland primarily for economic reasons. . .specifically. (1) if the job market in the U.S. is relatively better than that in Puerto Rico, [and] (2) if the average wage in the U.S. is higher relative to that in Puerto Rico. . . ." Her study also appears to indicate that the level of welfare payments and unemployment compensation in the United States is not a decisive factor in encouraging Puerto Ricans to emigrate.[2]

Mainland-Born Puerto Ricans

While the mainland Puerto Rican population has grown rapidly in recent years, its composition has undergone radical change. In 1950, only about one-fourth of the 300,000 mainland Puerto Ricans had been born there. But by 1970, the U.S.-born had multiplied to 646,000, compared with 783,000 island-born migrants. In a decade, they had grown by 111 percent, compared to only 31 percent for their island-born parents.

The two groups (U.S.-born and island-born) can, at this point in history, already be perceived as quite different. The median age for migrants from the island is 30 years, which approximates the median for all Americans. But the median age for U.S.-born Puerto Ricans is only 9.3 years.

While only 25,000 of the migrants are under age 5, more than 163,000 of the U.S.-born are in this preschool category. While more than 650,000 of the migrants are over age 18, only 106,000 of the U.S.-born are over age 18.

The importance of these figures should not be overlooked. The typical Puerto Rican adult on the mainland was born in Puerto Rico. The great bulk of the U.S.-born are still of preschool or elementary school age, and have yet to make their impact upon the community.

Some trends, however, can already be ascertained. Relatively few U.S.-born Puerto Ricans are of marriageable age, but they display a much faster rate of cultural mobility in comparison with their island-born parents. For example, while more than 80 percent of the married migrants have Puerto Rican spouses, only slightly more than 50 percent of the married U.S-born have married within their ethnic group.

AGE OF MAINLAND PUERTO RICANS, BY BIRTHPLACE, 1970

Age	Born in Puerto Rico	Born in U.S.
Under 5 years	25,535	163,038
5 to9 years	42,767	147,622
10 to 14 years	51,967	117,326
15 to 19 years	72,171	66,447
20 to 24 years	108,191	28.940
25 to 29 years	103,642	15,797
30 to 34 years	92,505	11,289
35 to 39 years	79,797	11,066
40 to 44 years	64,568	7,779
45 to 49 years	51,455	4,410
50 to 54 years	37,007	2,368
55 to 59 years	28,625	1,808
60 to 64 years	20,306	1,287
65 to 69 years	13,575	981
70 to 74 years	8,190	394
75 to 79 years	4,870	320
80 to 84 years	2,602	186
85 years and older	2,314	321
Totals	810,087	581,376
Median age (years)	30.0	9.3
Persons under age 18	159,900	474,496
Persons age 18 and over	650,187	106,880
Persons age 65 and over	31,551	2,202

Source: U.S., Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, *Puerto Ricans in the United States*, PC (2)-1 E, June 1973, Table 2, pp 4-5.

The U.S.-born Puerto Ricans seem to be conforming to many of the characteristics of American families. For example, the number of children per 1,000 American women age 25 to 34 is 2,374. Among migrant Puerto Rican women, the number is 2,812 children. For U.S.-born Puerto Rican women the number is 2,272, which is below the national average. the same holds true for women in the age 35-44 bracket.

Cultural adaptation is often a sign of upward socioeconomic mobility, and these trnds offer some cause for optimism. This does not mean that second-generation Puerto Ricans are not confronted with problems similar to those of their island-born parents. Even though their socioeconomic characteristics appear to be higher, when compared to those characteristics of the total U.S. population, even second-generation Puerto Ricans lag behind significantly. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the U.S.-born portion of the Puerto Rican mainland community is still extremely young. Most of the adults, responsible for family support in this crisis-ridden economy, are migrants from Puerto Rico, handicapped by language and a shrinking job market. They have immediate problems which must be addressed now, if their U.S.-born children (who hold such great promise for the future) are not to be irremediably scarred by poverty.

The Jobs and Income Crisis

A March 1975 survey by the Census Bureau (of income the previous year) revealed that Hispanic families in the United States were substantially poorer than the total population of the country, and that Puerto Rican families were the poorest among all Hispanics.

While median family income for the 55 million families in the United States was $12,836, this nation's 2.5 million Hispanic families had a median income of only $9,559.

But even this low amount masked significant disparities within the Hispanic population:

- The 1.4 million families headed by persons of Mexican origin had a median income of $9,498.
- The 644,000 Cuban and other Latin American families had a median income of $11,410.
- Lowest of all was the median income for Puerto Rican families—only $7,629.

The same survey showed that 24.2 million American families (11.6 percent of all families in the nation) lived in poverty. The proportion of poverty among Hispanic families was double the national average, but here again great differences exist among the Hispanic groups. While 14 percent of Cuban families and 24 percent of Mexican familes were poor, nearly one-third (32.6 percent) of mainland Puerto Rican families were mired in poverty.

In New York City, for example, 85 percent of the city's 1 million Puerto Ricans live in low-income neighborhoods of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan. Some of these areas include the worst slums in the nation.

A Puerto Rican government official in New York stated that many Puerto Rican families in the South Bronx and the lower East Side were:

> living with their children in areas that resemble the ruins of postwar Europe, but without hopes of domestic Marshall Plan.[3]

Furthermore, despite the "War on Poverty" of the 1960s, and despite Federal and State equal opportunity laws, Puerto Rican families are falling behind the national income average.

Puerto Rican family earnings were 71 percent of the national average in 1959. But, in subsequent years, while they have continued to increase their incomes, they have fallen progressively behind. In 1974 Puerto Rican family earnings were only 59 percent of the national average. In relative terms, Puerto Ricans are worse off than they were in 1959, before the Federal Government declared a "War on Poverty."

Although Puerto Rican family income in 1959 was well below the national average, the profile of the typical Puerto Rican family coincided closely with the typical U.S. family. Less than 10 percent of the Puerto Rican families had no income earners, nearly half had at least on earner, and more than 43 percent had two earners or more. But, 10 years later, the situation had changed: nearly one-fifth of the Puerto Rican families had no income earners (more than twice the national average), and only 35 percent had two or more earners (compared with more than 50 percent for the total U.S. population).

Sources of Income: The deteriorating economic position of mainland

Puerto Ricans can be better understood when one compares its sources of income with those of the total United States population. According to the 1970 census, more than 15 percent of U.S. families received income from self-employment (independent businesses), compared with less than 4 percent of the Puerto Rican families. While about 5 percent of all U.S. families depended to some extent upon public assistance or public welfare income, this was the case for 24.5 percent of the Puerto Rican families. The 1970 Census showed that 79,863 Puerto Rican families received approximately $188.9 million in public assistance or welfare payments. Despite this gloomy picture of high welfare dependence, it should be noted, however, that the majority of the Puerto Rican families (more than 250,000) were self-supporting and had earnings of nearly $2 billion.[4]

True Unemployment Figures: Unemployment among mainland Puerto Ricans is higher than the national average, but the official figure does not reflect the true extent of unemployment. In 1972, for example, the Bureau of the Census reported that 6 percent of all U.S. males were jobless, compared with 8.8 percent of Puerto Rican males. Among women, the national figure was 6.6 percent, compared with 17.6 percent of Puerto Rican women.

However, official unemployment figures are based on that percentage of the labor force which is jobless. The labor force figure used by the Census Bureau includes only adult persons who are either employed or *actively seeking employment*. This definition does not take into account a large, growing number of persons who have stopped looking for work because they have lost hope of finding it.

For example, while 86 percent of all U.S. adult males are part of the labor force (working or actively seeking work), only about 76 percent of Puerto Rican males are so defined. While nearly 50 percent of all U.S. women are in the labor force, only 32 percent of Puerto Rican women are in the labor force.

Occupation: Puerto Rican workers are heavily concentrated in low-skilled, blue-collar jobs. Furthermore, many Puerto Rican workers are employed in declining areas of New York's light industry (labor intensive) and are subject to layoffs or seasonal employment.

Nationwide, in 1970 more than 33 percent of Puerto Rican male workers and 39 percent of the women were operatives, which includes factory workers, dressmakers, and seamstresses. The second major category for males is services, which includes restaurant and custodial workers. For women, the second largest group is involved in clerical work.

Viewed by industry, in 1960 about 55 percent of Puerto Rican workers were employed in manufacturing, but this share dropped to 41 percent in 1970. The decline coincides with a drastic loss of jobs in New York City's apparel industry.

When compared with the total U.S. population, it is also clear that Puerto Ricans are underrepresented in highly skilled, white-collar work. Even in the "better" occupations, Puerto Ricans are grouped near the bottom of the earning scale. Those in professional and technical work are primarily technicians. Puerto Rican managers and administrators are mostly in wholesale and retail trade, rather than in manufacturing or with large corporate organizations. Among persons in sales, Puerto Ricans are mostly retail clerks rather than insurance or real estate agents. In the clerical field, they are usually clerks, typists, and machine operators rather than secretaries.[5]

In New Jersey, it has been estimated that 68 percent of employed Puerto Ricans hold low-paying jobs. In Newark, according to the 1970 Census, 63 percent of the Puerto Rican workers were operatives and laborers.[6]

In New Haven, Connecticut, Puerto Ricans are "grossly underemployed, and usually limited to low level, unskilled jobs with little hope for advancement." More than 78 percent of Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics in the city were in semiskilled or unskilled jobs, and in nearby Bridgeport, unemployment among Hispanics reached 30 to 40 percent in 1974, compared with 8.8 percent for all residents of the area.[7]

In Massachusetts, too, "the jobs of Puerto Ricans are those of the dishwasher, delivery man, factory worker, and laundry worker."[8] Some 75 percent of the State's Puerto Rican workers have service jobs or are laborers or operatives. Few are in the building and construction trades, in heavy industrial work, or in civil service positions. In Boston more than 49 percent of the Puerto Rican families have incomes below the poverty level, compared with 16 percent of all families in the city.

The picture is not uniformly bleak. A survey of 23 different cities in New Jersey, for example, showed widely varying levels of income for Puerto Rican families in these communities, ranging from a median family income of $3,266 in Atlantic City to $8,683 for families in Plainfield. But the higher incomes occur in smaller towns or suburban areas, with relatively small Puerto Rican populations that have been upwardly mobile.[9]

Some Puerto Rican families have moved up the socioeconomic ladder. Between 1960 and 1970, for example, the number of Puerto Ricans in professional, technical, managerial, and administrative jobs more than doubled, from 15,869 to 34,016. And the number of Puerto Rican families with income over $15,000 per year increased from less than 1 percent to more than 6 percent.[10]

But these gains are modest when viewed in the larger context. During the same period, the percentage of all families with income of $15,000 or more per year increased from 4.6 percent to 20.6 percent. And, while in 1950 about 10.7 percent of Puerto Rican male workers held professional, technical, managerial, or administrative jobs, this figure declined to 8.9 percent by 1970 due to a continued influx of unskilled or semiskilled persons from Puerto Rico.

Thus, the overall job picture for Puerto Ricans remains bleak, in either absolute or relative terms.

Language as a Barrier: The problems of the Hispanic population may be seen as those of the urban poor in general, but, says one report, "severe language. . .barriers faced by the Spanish-speaking usually result in the relegation of this second minority to the lowest socioeconomic position on the ladder of poverty."[11]

Limited ability to speak and understand English severely handicaps Puerto Rican mobility in the job market. Many Puerto Ricans rely upon informal channels of communication, rather than radio, television, or newspapers. For example, 60 percent of spanish-origin workers interviewed in Worcester, Massachusetts, found their jobs through friends or relatives, or "just heard about it." Only 3 percent responded to newspaper advertisements, and only 9 percent were aided by the Massachusetts Division of Employment Security.[12]

Once contact is established with a job source, "inability to speak English eliminates or greatly hampers job opportunities. . . . Most employment sources do not have applications in Spanish. . .[or] Spanish-speaking personnel."[13]

Most training programs which might prepare Puerto Ricans for better jobs are offered only in English. Inability to master English makes it "much more difficult... to assimilate training," and "lack of control of basic English is very often interpreted as a mark of inferior intelligence."[14]

Once on the job, a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican finds that "it is often difficult to communicate with his supervisor or other employees," which "often leads to an early dismissal."[15]

Upon leaving jobs, Puerto Ricans may miss out on services to which they are entitled. A New York City administrator told Commission staff Puerto Ricans may be rejected for unemployment insurance benefits, for example, because applications are in English and they may not understand what information is being requested.

Lack of English hurts not only unskilled or semiskilled Puerto Ricans, but also "hampers and cripples the career progress of thousands of Spanish-speaking men and women, doctors and dentists, as well as laborers and clerks."[16] Of those interviewed in the Worcester study, for example, 28 percent felt they possessed skills which they were not able to utilize in their present occupations. Comparing occupations held prior to coming to the United States with their present jobs, 14 percent of the employed formerly held professional business or white-collar positions, while only 6 percent presently hold such positions.

In Springfield, Massachusetts, 34 of the people questioned had been skilled workers in the service industry, but only 2 currently held such jobs. Fifteen people had been trained for semiskilled jobs in the service industry, but only 3 held such jobs. The Worcester study concluded that the "rate of downward mobility for those formerly in any type of position requiring additional education, training, experience or skill has been 72 percent."[17]

The majority of those Puerto Ricans who suffered this downward mobility spoke only limited English. Language, however, was not the only barrier. Puerto Ricans report that professional degrees or licenses in Puerto Rico, such as those of teachers and nurses, are often not accepted on the mainland.

A special report (issued February 1976) of a conference held by the National Commission for Manpower Policy on employment problems of low income groups noted that: "At all levels of government, there has been inadequate attention to the critical handicap that Spanish-speaking people face because of their language barrier. There is a need to recognize that without a working knowledge of English, a person's ability to get and hold a job, more particulary a good job, is very slim."[18]

Lack of Work Experience: Many Puerto Ricans arrive on the mainland with little or no work experience. In New York, according to one study, "unlike previous immigrant groups, the majority of (Puerto Rican) migrants reported no work experience."[19]

In another survey of 500 Puerto Rican families on New York's lower East Side, 55 percent of the 208 mothers interviewed had never been employed. Only 12 percent of this group considered themselves employable. Two-thirds of the mothers who were working, or had been employed, listed themselves as factory workers. One of seven was in the service industry. None had jobs at the managerial or professional level. Of the 118 fathers present in the households, 92 percent were employed. Two-thirds held jobs in factories or in the service industry. Except for eight former farm laborers, all held the same type of jobs as in Puerto Rico. Only 20 percent of the men had ever received job training on the mainland.[20]

Without useful job experience or training, entry into better occupations is difficult. Automation and rising demands for skilled labor have "seriously narrowed" the avenues for upward mobility for Puerto Ricans.

Discrimination: Even after taking into account these factors (language, lack of skills, etc.), the evidence is compelling that racial, ethnic, and sex discrimination are barriers to job opportunities for Puerto Ricans.

In 1970 all American adults with a high school diploma earned a median income of $9,091, while Hispanic adults with similar diploma earned only $7,980. Among all Americans with 1 or more years of college, median income was $11,887, compared with only $9,114 for Hispanics with 1 year of college or more. A Federal Government study has concluded that "These income differentials undoubtedly reflect to some degree the discrimination in hiring and promotion which confronts Spanish-speaking workers."[21] What is true for Hispanics in general is even more pronounced for Puerto Ricans, who are the most disadvantaged Hispanic group.

Institutional discrimination occurs in the personnel operations of both the public and private sectors. In 1963, for example, Puerto

Ricans were 9 percent of New York City's population, but held less than 3 percent of the city government's 177,000 jobs. By 1971, more than 10 percent of the city's population was Puerto Rican. They held only 6 percent of the 300,000 jobs in city government, and had far less access than blacks or whites to high-paying jobs. Only 3 percent of the administrators and 2 percent of the professionals were Puerto Rican. In 1974, only 500 (1.8 percent) of the city's 30,000 police officers were Hispanic.

In 1972 one-third of all Puerto Ricans in New York City government earned less than $7,300 per year, compared with 20 percent of other Spanish-origin persons, and only 3 percent of all white employees. Only 2 percent of the Puerto Rican city employees earned $13,000 or more per year, compared with 10 percent of other Spanish-surnamed workers and 15 percent of white workers.

In 1972 Puerto Ricans were 5 percent of New York State's population. They held only 2 percent of the 171,000 State government jobs. In 1970 Puerto Ricans comprised only 0.6 percent of the 27,000 employees at the State University of New York (SUNY). In 1973 the New York Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights declared that SUNY was "grossly discriminating against black and Puerto Rican educators and administrators."[22]

In Massachusetts "the schools, State agencies, and employment programs in Boston and Springfield suffer from a continuing lack of Spanish-speaking personnel." In 1972 not one of the 500 social workers in the Boston office of the State department of public welfare was Puerto Rican, and only 1 of 92 social workers at a community service center in Springfield was Puerto Rican.[23]

Similar patterns are found in other parts of the nation. In Chicago in 1974 the rapidly growing Hispanic community accounted for more than 7 percent of the city's population, but only 1.7 percent of city employees.[24] In New Jersey, where Puerto Ricans account for more than 2 percent of the State's population, only 60 (or 1.3 percent) of the 4,588 employees in the State department of labor were Puerto Rican in 1971.[25]

In New York City no Puerto Rican lawyer had practiced before the workmen's compensation board, and none of the arbitrators was Puerto Rican. Three Spanish-language interpreters were hardly enough to go around, considering that one-third of the cases involved Hispanics.

Access to civil service jobs is often blocked by the unavailability of tests in Spanish. The Massachusetts Civil Service Commission administers tests for 25,000 State and 55,000 local government jobs; in 1971, only two of its tests (one for aide in the division of employment security and the other for hospital interpreter) were administered in Spanish.

In New York City, the civil service is perceived as a "mystery" to most Puerto Ricans, and is allegedly "built to keep those in, in, and those out, out."[26]

In Boston, the Federal district court found that the Massachusetts civil service examination for selecting police officers discriminated against blacks and Spanish-origin applicants. The U.S. court of appeals upheld the lower court and ordered the examination revised so as not to discriminate unnecessarily against minority groups. It also ordered that a separate hiring pool be created for minority persons who had passed the revised examination.

Puerto Ricans have also made little headway in gaining access to, or leadership posts in, some New York City labor unions. Fair and equitable representation for "Hispanics is not yet a reality in most referral unions and apprenticeship programs," according to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.[27]

Another observer has charged that, except for carpenters and bricklayers:

> ...the skilled trades remain practically lily white. In trades requiring less skill, such as excavators, concrete laborers, and mason tenders, for which many black and Puerto Rican workers could immediately qualify, the unions, in collusion with the contractors, and with the tacit approval of the city authorities, have succeeded in restricting employment to just slightly more than a token number of nonwhite union construction workers.[28]

Underrepresentation of Puerto Ricans in building and skilled craft unions was an almost unanimous complaint of Puerto Rican leaders who responded to this Commission's inquiries.

The Federal Government and Equal Employment Opportunities for Puerto Rican Workers

It has been argued that mainland Puerto Ricans would be assimilated into American economic life, just as were other ethnic groups, by an expanding and job-creating economy.

Tragically, the American economy of the 1970s has not expanded; it has contracted and thrown many once-employed citizens out of work. Furthermore, the jobs which are expected to increase in greatest numbers in the future are those which, in the past, were usually beyond the reach of newly arrived immigrants, and are now largely inaccessible to most mainland Puerto Ricans. The leading "job growth" category for at least the remainder of the decade is white-collar professional and technical jobs. They are expected to employ 15.5 milliion workers by 1980, a 50 percent increase in such jobs over 1968.

The employment problems of Puerto Ricans have persisted for 25 years. As the U.S. Department of Labor has observed, "No conceivable increase in the gross national product could stir these backwaters."[29] The clear implication, of course, is that the mere growth of the economic pie will not assure a larger piece for Puerto Ricans and other suffering chronic poverty.

The ineffectual role of State and local governments in employing Puerto Ricans places in even sharper focus the role of the Federal Government, which possesses the resources to help disadvantaged groups if it so decides. (For example, the Federal Government's Cuban Refugee Program helped to resettle more than a quarter of a million Cubans in the United States, offering services such as job placement, financial assistance, and vocational training.)

Federal equal opportunity programs have two basic goals: (1) to train, counsel, and place disadvantaged jobseekers from minority groups; and (2) enforce laws and Executive orders that deal with job equality.

Both elements are of critical importance to Puerto Rican workers, who urgently need training in skills that will be in demand in the final quarter of this century, and who are blocked by discriminatory barriers in both the private and public sectors of the economy.

Job Training: Job training is a relatively new concept in the United States. The first comprehensive Federal program was created in 1962 by the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA). The foundation of Federal employment training policy for the next decade, MDTA provided occupational and skill training, research, experimental and demonstration programs, and other related services.

Amended frequently, MDTA was based on the realization that:

> It was the disadvantaged who filled the ranks of the unemployed—those who were discriminated against or were never equipped in the first place to function successfully in the free labor market. The problem was the bottom of the labor barrel, not the top. . . .The unskilled, uneducated inexperienced workers, including those denied experience because of discriminatory hiring practices, were very definitely being left behind.[30]

In 1964 another major program was enacted to aid the disadvantaged unemployed worker. The Economic Opportunity Act, which set up the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the "War on Poverty," created new job training programs such as the Job Corps and the Work-Training Program.

Puerto Ricans and Job Training Programs: In 1970 only 18,600 Puerto Ricans in New York City had completed some type of job training program, contrasted with a total of 300,000 Puerto Ricans in need of training. Half had studied in high school, trade school, or junior college; another 1,200 had received training in the Armed Forces. Only 900 had been served by the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and only 200 had received training in MDTA programs.

Nationwide figures for fiscal year 1973 showed a similarly dismal picture. Of the 119,600 persons enrolled in MDTA training programs, only 1,794 were Puerto Rican.

Such figures dramatize the failure of Federal job training programs to serve Puerto Ricans adequately, and indicate that, at present levels of funding, only a miniscule portion of the needy population will be served in the future.

Probably the most frequent complaint of Puerto Ricans about training programs concerns language. In the February 1972 Commission hearing in New York, Representative Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.) criticized the lack of bilingual training:

> It doesn't make any sense to be spending a lot of money on poverty programs or model cities programs in order to train people when we do not appropriate funds for taining people in Spanish because it is more important in fact, that training be in Spanish for adults who can't speak English, or those that just came from Puerto Rico. They are the ones who desperately need employment and we should have training programs in Spanish so that the adult Puerto Rican community can begin to participate. . . .[31]

In Bridgeport, Connecticut, an aide of the mayor said that he was "not pleased with any manpower program" for the Spanish-speaking.

"English is the hump they never get over," and as a result, the "Spanish-speaking are underserved in most programs."[32]

A New York job training specialist believed that the programs were not reaching those who need them most because the programs "are geared to those most able to profit from them. People have to be trained to be trainable."[33]

Some applicants were unable to pass the tests required for entry to training programs. In Chicago, applicants had to pass a Stanford Achievement Test before entry into the CEP program. The CEP program offered on-the-job training opportunities for unskilled Hispanics, many of whom could not read English beyond the fourth grade level. A CEP administrator in Chicago criticized the test as not being job related, as "culturally biased" in favor of "middle-Americans," and generally "irrelevant and immaterial."[34] The problem was reportedly compounded by the fact that the test was administered by English speakers.

The lack of data on Puerto Ricans also limits the effectiveness of training programs for them. An official of the Bureau of Labor Statistics said that a major barrier to an evaluation of the situation was the lack of current information on significant labor force characteristics. He noted:

> There is no group that addresses itself to developing a body of background information on the economic status of the Puerto Rican in the labor market on a continuing basis, and that is almost pitiful. I suspect that you don't have the awareness of the problems of the Puerto Ricans in New York that you do have, for example, for the other groups, simply because of the lack of availability of data that calls continuous attention to it.[35]

Puerto Ricans and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA): Many Puerto Ricans with experience in job-training programs indicate that the new CETA program offers some promise, at least on paper. They point to Title I, which stipulates that State and local prime sponsors must provide employment and training services, including the development of job opportunities, to those most in need of them, including low-income persons and "persons of limited English speaking ability." In addition, Title III authorizes the Department of Labor to undertake separate special projects, such as the teaching of occupational language skills in the primary language of persons with limited proficiency in English and the development of new employment opportunities.

According to one Labor Department official of Spanish origin: "Everything the Spanish speaking have been asking for is provided in the act."

The key question to some, however, is whether or not the relationship between the local prime sponsor and Puerto Rican community groups still in their political infancy will permit sufficient Puerto Rican participation in program planning and administration.

An official in New York City complained that Puerto Ricans were still not getting their fair share because they lack "political clout."[36] It was feared that CETA could "face off Puerto Ricans against blacks" for available resources in many cities. After reviewing several CETA applications, a Labor Department official told the Commission staff that it was clear Hispanic community organizations were having a minimal effect on local governments.

Concern has also been voiced about funding under the CETA formula. According to several administrators, the formula based on the previous year's pre-CETA employment and training allocation would perpetuate previous shortcomings of such funds in several cities. Moreover, the formula based on the number of unemployed would not include those who have stopped looking for work, a substantial number of whom may be Puerto Rican. And, the formula based on low-income adults would cheat big cities with large concentrations of minorities, a disproportionate number of whom were not counted in the decennial census.

Job training administrators in Boston and Chicago feared that the CETA funding formula would result in a decrease in monies for the nation's large cities in the long run. "All big cities are in the same boat," said a Chicago official, who projected a gradual decline from $32 million to $20 million for Chicago CETA programs. Boston's job training director feared that "big cities will get murdered" by the funding formula, and those most hurt will be persons of Spanish origin in the inner cities.

Both job training adminstrators stated that CETA money would be disproportionately allotted to suburbs and middle size towns. Thus, Newton, a wealthy "bedroom community" in Massachusetts, would enjoy a 400 percent increase in funds, in contrast to the gradual decreases in funds for large cities where most of the severly disadvantaged reside.

Under CETA, local governments would be hard pressed to show quick results. If job training programs were to face cost-benefit analysis, said a New York official, the client of Spanish origin would be most affected. CETA deals primarily with the "employables" to get fast results, according to another observer, and thus would not reach the "neediest of the needy" for whom more time and efforts would naturally be required.

Thus, despite the attractive CETA design, Puerto Ricans and some job training adminstrators voice deep fear that the basic barriers which minimized Puerto Rican opportunities under OEO and Department of Labor training programs will continue to deny them the same vitally needed opportunities under CETA.

Puerto Ricans and Public Service: In November 1975, there were 79,917 full-time employees of Spanish origin in the Federal Government. This was 3.3 percent of the total number of Federal employees, up from 3.2 percent in 1973 and 3.0 percent in 1972. Hispanic employment in the top three career grades (GS-16, 17, and 18) increased from 35 in November 1974 to 37 in November 1975. No separate data exist on Puerto Rican Federal employees, but one must assume that the ratio is also disproportionately low.

The underrepresentation of Puerto Rican and other Hispanic workers in the Federal civil service works against these American citizens in important ways. The Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported, "One of the big problems with the Federal effort in New England to assist the Spanish-speaking community is the lack of Spanish-speaking and Puerto Rican employees. . . .A total of 30 Spanish-speaking and Puerto Rican employees are on a regional staff of 4,800." HEW's regional staff of 1,700 included 12 Spanish-origin employees (six clerical and six professional).[37]

The U.S. Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the compliance agency for ensuring equal employment opportunity (EEO) in the Federal Government. The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act broadened its leadership role and enforcement of EEO matters. It is "fully empowered to direct agency activities to end systematic discrimination and thereby significantly increase the number of minorities in professional and policy-making positions."[38]

In 1970 the President announced a new program to assist persons of Spanish origin to join the Federal civil service. The program included an intensified drive to recruit persons of Spanish origin and the appointment of a full-time Civil Service Commission official as overseer. A key element in the recruitment effort was to promote recognition of the importance of bilingual ability in Federal Government positions involving contact and communication with Spanish-speaking people. Bilingualism was especially useful for informing Spanish-speaking veterans of the availabilty of noncompetitive appointments, disseminating information about Federal job opportunities to high school and college students in Spanish-speaking areas, as well as providing information about various benefit programs (Social Security, unemployment compensation, etc.). The Civil Service Commission has had the responsiblity for implementing the program.

Agencies have too often failed to search out patterns of employment bias, preferring instead to respond to individual complaints. The Civil Service Commission has not conducted a systematic review of practices that have an adverse impact on women and minorities, nor has it brought its own standards into conformity with those required of private and State and local government employers under Title VII. The CSC does not require Federal agencies to develop numerical goals and timetables to increase minority and female employment. There has been "no extensive effort to evaluate and direct improvement of the Federal upward mobility training program," which is of major interest to Puerto Ricans,[39] nor does CSC separate its Spanish-surnamed employment category into Puerto Rican or other groups of Spanish origin.

In light of this record, Puerto Ricans have developed an attitude of suspicion and alienation toward the Federal Government. A New York City community leader summarized this attitude:

> ...the Puerto Rican does not go into Federal Service *pro forma* or through the normal route. He does not know a specific job exists that he may qualify for. He does not receive this information through the media he relates to. Furthermore, he distrusts his acceptance by Federal agencies. He has personally experienced or has heard a pattern of rejection by the Federal Service Entrance Examination route. If he makes an initial probe, he runs into a maze of bureaucratic procedures which lock him out. He also sees a few role models or possibilites for moving up a career ladder. In his mind, Federal jobs and promotion are largely a function of political patronage systems.[40]

Some affirmative action plans to increase Puerto Rican and other minority employment have been announced. Boston has adopted an affirmative action plan to raise Hispanic public employment in each city department to 4 percent, and a Mayor's Commission on Spanish Affairs was formed. The Governor of Connecticut in 1972 appointed a Council on Spanish-Speaking Opportunities "to review and analyze legislation and regulations regarding minority rights as they relate to the Spanish."[41]

In New York, 31 State agencies now have affirmative action programs for minority hiring, monitored by the State human rights commission, which include a Puerto Rican commissioner and Puerto Ricans in all 14 regional offices.

However, implementation of court decisions and affirmative action plans has been painfully slow. In Illinois, for example, despite the Governor's 1973 executive order requiring affirmative action, the State government hired only 112 Hispanics during 1973-74, representing only 1.5 percent hired. This meant that, while Hispanics were 3.3 percent of the Illinois population, they held only 0.9 percent of State government jobs.

Furthermore, a few Puerto Ricans have made use of the services of State and local human rights agencies. A New York community leader observed:

> To begin with, the majority of Puerto Ricans do not even know these Commissions exist. Not only are the offices of these Commissions located at a point in the city where few Puerto Ricans have a reason to visit, but the Commissions as a rule do not make sufficient use of the Spanish communications media. . . . many of the Puerto Ricans . . .are afraid to complain, usually because of their language handicap, but even those who complain are soon discouraged. They either get shoved around from desk to desk or they have to wait long hours. And even when they complete the arduous and complex complaint procedure, the case is either dismissed as having no probable cause, or positive action is so long in forthcoming that he simply gets another low-paying job.[42]

Underrepresentation of Puerto Ricans in public service work is a major discriminatory barrier and undermines the basic concept of equal opportunity.

The Crisis in Education

Data in the previous chapter showed that mainland Puerto Ricans have lower incomes than whites, blacks, and other Hispanic minorities in the United States. The same relationship is evident in terms of education. The typical white American adult has graduated from high school and has had a taste of college; the typical black has completed 9.8 years of school; and the typical mainland Puerto Rican has completed only 8.7 years.

Recent census figures (1975) also show clear differences in education among major Hispanic groups (Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and Cubans), with Puerto Ricans generally at the lowerst rung of the ladder. There is a sharp difference, for example, between the educational picture for Cubans and Puerto Ricans. As for Mexican Americans, while they are less likely than Puerto Ricans to have completed 5 years of school, they are more likely to have graduated from high school. In the younger age brackets (25 to 29 years) Puerto Ricans have made notable progress in education, but still lag behind other groups.

School Enrollment and Dropout Rates: Between 1960 and 1970 the dropout rate for school-age Puerto Ricans fell, particularly for young adults. But a severe dropout problem persists.

During the elementary school years (age 5 to 13), the staying power of Puerto Rican children is quite comparable to the national average: 72 percent of all youngsters age 5 to 6, and 97 percent of those 7 to 13, are enrolled in school.

The dropout problem becomes evident in the age 14 to 17 group. Nationwide, 93 percent of all youngsters in this age group remain in school, compared with 85 percent of Puerto Rican youngsters.

The difference grows more acute in the age 18 to 24 group. Nationwide, while 37 percent of young males remain in school, only 18 percent of the Puerto Rican males are still enrolled (the figures are comparable for women). In other words, young adult Puerto Ricans are only half as likely to be in school as their peers.

In a study conducted in Chicago, the dropout rate for Puerto Ricans in grammar and high school was 71.2 percent. The study indicated that 12.5 percent dropped out in grammar school, while 58.7 percent dropped out in high school.

Students drop out of school for a variety of reasons. While some drop out because they cannot keep up academically, this is by no means the sole reason. Of the 30 percent of U.S. high school students who drop out each year, one-third are in their senior year and have already completed most of the required courses. Most dropouts are bored, find the school unresponsive to their cultural backgrounds, or feel compelled to obtain a job.

By examining several aspects of the Puerto Rican youngster's experience in school, the multiple reasons for dropping out become clear.

Language and Culture: More than 30 percent of the 437,000 Puerto Rican students enrolled in mainland schools are born in Puerto Rico. Each year thousands of children transfer from schools in Puerto Rico to those on the mainland. Spanish is the mother tongue of a major segment of the Puerto Rican school-age population (and is the language used most often in the home, even for those students born on the mainland).

In New York City in 1970, of 362,000 Puerto Ricans under age 18, nearly one-fourth (80,370) had been born in Puerto Rico. About one-fourth (nearly 80,000) of the Puerto Rican and other Hispanic students in New York City's public school speak poor or hesitant English. Birthplace is, obviously, a major determinant of ability to speak English.

It is also clear that birthplace, language ability, and dropping out are closely intertwined. Great disparites exist in the dropout rates of island-born and U.S.-born Puerto Rican youngsters. Those born on the mainland tend to enroll earlier in school and tend to drop out less frequently.

About 47 percent of all mainland Puerto Ricans age 3 to 34 are enrolled in school. But this overall average is misleading: 67 percent of the mainland-born Puerto Ricans in that age group are enrolled, compared with only 28 percent of those born in Puerto Rico. The disparity is very pronounced in the age 18 to 24 group. Among males of this age group, for example, 33 percent of the U.S.-born were still in school, compared with only 13 percent of the island-born. Among males age 16 to 21, about 12,000 of the U.S.-born are not enrolled in school, compared with 32,000 island-born youngsters.

These figures indicate that the dropout rate is more severe among Puerto Rican percentage born on the mainland. Island-born youngsters are more likely to have problems communicating in English, more likely to be unemployed or underemployed, and more likely to be doomed to a life of poverty.

While the education problems of mainland Puerto Ricans are certainly not limited to the island-born, this group is more adversely affected by inadequate schooling. Language is often the key factor that makes them different from other Puerto Rican students, many of whom may sit in the same classroom, or may even be siblings. The fact that these language-handicapped students achieve less and drop out more is compelling evidence that the schools' response to the problems has been inadequate.

One Puerto Rican parent expressed his dismay at the lack of special instruction for his children:

> ...They are practically wasting their time because they are not learning anything. First of all, they don't understand the language. What good does it do to sit there in front of the teacher and just look at her face? It is wasting their time. They don't learn anything because they don't understand what she is saying.[43]

Testing: The use of standardized achievement tests contributes to the failure of public schools to teach Puerto Rican students. IQ and achievement test scores often are used as guides in assigning students to ability groups and to classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR).

Since most tests are given in English, many children are programmed for failure. In Philadelphia, a school official acknowledged that psychological tests are often given only in English and that they form the basis for assessing the mental and emotional states of Puerto Rican students.

Commenting on this point, a Philadelphia psychologist said:

> In my clinic, the average underestimation of IQ for a Puerto Rican kid is 20 points. We go through this again and again. When we test in Spanish, there's a 20 point leap immediately—20 points higher than when he's tested in English.[44]

Some school systems have attempted to overcome the language gap by translating standard IQ tests into Spanish, but these tests are often designed for Mexican American children. (Although Spanish is common to both Mexico and Puerto Rico, there are many colloquialisms peculiar to each area.) A few school systems have experimented with tests developed in Puerto Rico, but testing continues to be a major linguistic and cultural barrier for many Puerto Rican students.

Student Assignment Practices: School systems frequently place underachieving students in low-ability groups, or in classes for the educable mentally retarded, or retain them in grade. Recent arrivals from Puerto Rico are often assigned to lower grades. The rationale for such practices is that students will benefit from special instruction in low-level classes, but the correlation between such placement and improved academic performance is dubious. In fact, the lower level of curriculum and the absence of stimulation from higher-achieving students may be negative factors that further retard the student. If anything, the stigma attached to being labeled a "slow learner" can result in a loss of self-esteem and reinforce the student's sense of failure. Rather than progress out of EMR classes or low-ability groups, students tend to remain there, be assigned vocational (rather than college-bound) curricula, or drop out altogether.

Programs for Language-Minority Children: During the 1960s two types of approaches emerged to overcome the linguistic barriers of language-minority children. One approach, English as a Second Language (ESL), teaches students to communicate in English as quickly as possible. The programs provide instruction and practice in listening, speaking, reading, and writing English. Students are taken from their regular classrooms for 30 to 40 minutes per day for this special help, but otherwise remain in their regular classes for content matter instruction.

By themselves, ESL programs are very limited since they use only English to teach literacy and communication rather than the student's native language to transmit concepts and skills (which might facilitate the learning of English). ESL students inevitably fall behind in the regular classroom, where content courses are being taught.

The second approach, slowly growing in acceptance, is bilingual-bicultural education. A program of bilingual education is:

> (4) (A)...a program of instruction, designed for children of limited English-speaking ability in elementary or secondary schools, in which, with respect to the years of study to which such program is applicable—
>
> (i) there is instruction given in, and study of, English and, to the extent necessary to allow a child to progress through the educational system, the native language of the children of limited English-speaking ability, and such instruction is given with appreciation for the cultural heritage of such children, and with respect to elementary school instruction, such instruction shall, to the extent necessary, be in all courses or subjects of study which will allow a child to progress effectively through the educational system....[45]

This attempt at a total approach includes the teaching of English as a second language, development of literacy in the mother tongue, and the uninterrupted learning of subject areas. It is based on the principle that learning should continue in the mother tongue rather than be postponed until a new language has been acquired. Teaching a child to read first in the language that he or she speaks makes it easier to read and write in a second language, since the basic skills are transferable from one language to another. The inclusion of curriculum materials on the student's culture and background experience also heightens interest in the subject matter.

Hernan LaFontaine, a Puerto Rican educator and the executive administrator of the Office of Bilingual Education for the New York City Board of Education, has noted:

> Our definition of cultural pluralism must include the concept that our language and our culture will be given equal status to that of the majority population. It is not enough simply to say that we should be given the opportunity to share in the positive benefits of modern American life. Instead, we must insist that this sharing will not be accomplished at the sacrifice of all those traits which make us what we are as Puerto Ricans.[46]

Personnel: School personnel have profound influence over the success or failure of students. Not only do they make decisions to promote or retain students in school programs, but also their attitudes and expectations often are reflected in student performance. When they perceive low expectations on the part of teachers, for example, students tend to do less well on tests.

In its investigation into Mexican American education, the Commission found that Anglo teachers tended to favor Anglo children over Mexican Americans in their praise, encouragement, attention, and approval. Predictably, it was also found that Mexican American students participated in class less than Anglo students. No similar study of Puerto Rican students has been carried out, but it is reasonable to assume that the results would be the same.

The impact that teachers and administrators have on the learning environment for students underscores the need for school personnel who reflect the background of students and thus are more likely to relate postively to them. As the Educational Policies Commission noted:

> Despite their better judgment, people of another background often feel that disadvantaged children are by nature perverse, vulgar, or lazy. Children sense quickly the attitudes of school people toward them, and they retaliate against condescension or intolerance with hostility, absenteeism, and failure.[47]

Despite the importance of having Puerto Rican teachers and administrators in districts with large numbers of Puerto Rican students, none of the districts surveyed by the Commission had an adequate representation. Few school systems gather data on the number of Puerto Rican students and teachers, nor is such data now required by the Federal Government. The data that are collected usually refer to "Spanish surnamed" students or teachers, which includes other Hispanic Americans.

New York City has the single largest concentration of Puerto Rican students in its public schools. In fiscal year 1974, nearly 300,000 Hispanic children were enrolled in the public schools, including 256,000 Puerto Rican students. Hispanics accounted for 27.0 percent of total school enrollment (23.1 percent Puerto Rican and 3.9 percent other Hispanic). Despite the fact that more than one-fourth of the student body was Hispanic, only 2.5 percent of the total number of school teachers were of Spanish origin. Only 1,391 of the 56,168 teachers in New York City had Spanish surnames. This figure is considerably larger than the 0.8 percent share 5 years previous, but the disparity between the percentage of teachers and students remained enormous.

One study has estimated that at least 13,700 more teachers of Spanish origin would need to be hired to approach equitable representation in the New York City public schools. This would be nearly 10 times the number in 1973.

The situation is no better in other major cities where Puerto Ricans live. In Chicago (1972), there were 27,946 Puerto Rican students, but only 91 Puerto Rican teachers in the entire system. Of 1,706 administrative and supervisory personnel, only 17 were Puerto Rican. No statistics were available for the number of Puerto Rican counselors.

In Boston (1972), only 5 of the city's 4,729 teachers were Puerto Rican, and not one guidance counselor could speak Spanish. In Springfield, Massachusetts, there were only 5 Puerto Rican and 5 other Hispanic teachers for 1,485 Puerto Rican students. In Philadelphia, less than 1 percent of the teachers were Puerto Rican; only 2 of 532 guidance counselors were Puerto Rican, about 1 for every 4,750 Puerto Rican students. In Bridgeport, Connecticut (1971), the board of education employed only 10 Puerto Rican teachers for nearly 4,000 Puerto Rican students. None of the 23 full-time counselors was Puerto Rican. A plan to recruit more teachers of Spanish origin was vetoed by the school board.

Counseling: Many Puerto Rican students perceive their non-Hispanic teachers and counselors as indifferent or insensitive. One student in Connecticut testified:

> I feel that the teachers don't care about the students...A Spanish-speaking student comes into the room, immediately that person is considered dumb without even being given a chance.[48]

A Puerto Rican student in Camden, New Jersey, echoed the belief that counselors are insensitive to Puerto Rican students:

> The attitude that a lot of counselors had with a lot of friends of mine, because a lot of the individuals that graduated with me from high school are now shooting drugs and doing time in jail [is] to generalize and tell me that my people are dumb, that we make good dishwashers. We can't manipulate our minds, but we're good with our hands, and we are docile....[49]

Few Puerto Rican students are encouraged by high school counselors or teachers to think about college. The president of Hostos Community College in Bronx, New York, cited several instances in which counselors told Puerto Rican high school students that they were not "college material." One girl, who, according to this official, eventually completed her junior and senior years in 1 year at Queens College, allegedly had been removed from a college preparatory curriculum in high school and put into a secretarial course. A counselor at Temple University (Philadelphia) said, "A lot of Puerto Rican kids don't think of college. They're not exposed to the right counselors in high school. They're in the wrong programs: most are in nonacademic courses."[50]

The Courts and Language-Minority Children: The continued unresponsiveness of school districts to the needs of language-minority students has stimulated court action. In *Lau v. Nichols*, the Supreme Court of the United States ratified HEW guidelines contained in the May 25, 1970, memorandum known as the "May 25th Memorandum." The Court decided that:

> Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that before a child can effectively participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education. We know that those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful.[51]

The decision in *Lau v. Nichols* found that a monolingual educational policy does violate HEW guidelines. The Court did not rule on whether the private plaintiffs had a constitutional right to bilingual education. While finding the school district to be in noncompliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court explicitly declined to state what an appropriate remedy for such a violation may be. As of September 1976, Federal district court in San Francisco was reviewing a master plan for bilingual-bicultural education submitted by the school district.

Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education of the City of New York was the first major case concerning equal education opportunity for Puerto Rican children. Puerto Rican students and their parents, ASPIRA of New York, Inc., and ASPIRA of America, Inc. brought action against the Board of Education of New York City individually and on behalf of a class comprising an estimated 182,000 Spanish-speaking students in New York City public schools.

The suit alleged that the school system had failed either to teach Spanish-speaking children in a language that they understood, or to provide them with the English language skills needed to progress effectively in school. Plaintiffs charged they were faced with unequal treatment based on language, and thus were denied equal educational opportunity as compared with English-speaking students.

After the *Lau* decision, plaintiffs moved for a summary judgment. The court, in ruling on the motion, asked both parties to submit plans which, in their view, satisfied the mandate of *Lau* as applied to Puerto Rican and other Spanish-speaking students in New York City's public schools.

Negotiations followed the submission of these plans. With the approval of the court, the parties entered into a consent decree on August 29, 1974, which provided that:[52]

> 1. The board of education would identify and classify those students whose English language deficiency prevents them from effectively participating in the learning process, and who can effectively participate in Spanish.

> 2. By September 1975, the defendants were to provide all the children described above with: (a) a program to develop their ability to speak, understand, read, and write English; (b) instruction in Spanish, in such substantive courses as mathematics, science, and social studies; (c) a program to reinforce and develop the child's use of Spanish, including a component to introduce reading comprehension in spanish to those children entering the school system, where an assessment of reading readiness in English indicates the need for such development. In addition to, but not at the expense of, the three central elements of the required program entitled students were to spend maximum class time with other children to avoid isolation from their peers.
>
> 3. By the beginning of the second semester of the 1974-75 school year, the defendants were to provide all elements of the program to all chidren within the defined class at pilot schools designated by the chancellor. By September 1975, the program was to encompass all children within the defined class.
>
> 4. The board of education was to promulgate minimum education standards to ensure that the program would be furnished to all children within the defined class, and ensure that the program would be provided in each of the community school districts. (On July 21, 1975, after lengthy negotiations, the minimum educational standards were issued by the chancellor.)
>
> 5. The defendants were obligated to use their maximum feasible efforts to obtain and expend the funds required to implement the program. If there are insufficient funds to implement the program, defendants were to notify plaintiffs' lawyers. (As of March 1976, they had not yet notified the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. that there were insufficient funds or insufficient staff.)

In addition to these stipulations, the consent decree included agreements regarding the use, development, and dissemination of appropriate materials and tests, and the recruitment, training, or retraining of adequate staff.

The decree also set specific timetables for completing each task. The defendants were required to consult with plaintiffs concerning the development and implementation of all items in the consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction to hear and settle disputes concerning the adequate implementation of the decree.

Puerto Ricans and Higher Education: An estimated 25,000 mainland Puerto Ricans were enrolled as full-time college undergraduates in 1972. This figure reflects vigorous growth in recent years. In New York City, for example, 1970 census data showed that there were only 3,500 Puerto Ricans college graduates (compared with 2,500 in 1960). That year, only 1 percent of the Puerto Rican adults in New York City were college graduates, compared with 4 percent of black adults and 13 percent of white adults.

The City University of New York (CUNY) had 5,425 Puerto Rican undergraduates in 1969. By 1974, CUNY had 16,352 Puerto Rican undergraduates. This is not only a substantial leap in numerical terms, but also a sign of growing Puerto Rican participation in higher education. In 1969, Puerto Ricans at CUNY represented 4.0 percent of total enrollment; by 1974, they were 7.4 percent of the undergraduates.

In 1974, Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics (defined as Spanish-surnamed Americans) represented 13.4 percent of the first-time freshmen in the CUNY system, compared with 6.0 percent 5 years previous. Further growth of Puerto Rican college enrollment is an immediate possibility since in the 1974-75 school year Puerto Ricans represented 16.1 percent of all students in New York City's academic high schools (the pathway to college), and other Hispanics represented another 4.9 percent.

While there is reason for optimism, the growth trend rests on shaky foundations. Much of the increased enrollment is due to the "open enrollment" policy of the CUNY system and fluctuating levels of federally-funded financial aid and support services. The New York City fiscal crisis has profoundly affected CUNY. On June 1, 1976, Chancellor Robert Kibbee closed CUNY for 2 weeks owing to lack of funds. On June 12, the Board of Higher Education, under intense pressure from State and city officials, voted to charge tuition for the first time. The cost is $775 a year for freshman and sophomores and $925 for upperclass students. As part of the $27 million State aid package, $3 million was authorized for the educational needs of Spanish-speaking students in Hostos Community College.

Figures are not yet available to ascertain how many Puerto Rican students are dropping out due to academic or financial problems. Nor are figures available to show how many Puerto Ricans are actually graduating from college, in comparison with previous years.

In the absence of this data, the only reliable source that offers means of comparison is the limited information supplied by the 1970 census. These data show that, although more Puerto Ricans are going to college, they are much less likely to attend college than are high school graduates from other racial or ethnic groups. In 1970, 45 percent of college-age youths in the U.S. were reported to be engaged in higher education, compared with 15 to 20 percent of blacks, and only 5 percent of Puerto Ricans.

Among college freshmen there has been a smaller percentage of Puerto Ricans than of blacks, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. Between 1971 and 1973, the percentage of black freshmen dropped from 8.6 to 7.6 percent, and of Puerto Rican freshmen from 0.6 to 0.4 percent. At the other end of the academic spectrum, Puerto Ricans constituted only 0.01 percent of all minority group doctoral degree recipients in 1973. (Of 2,884 minority group recipients that year, only 37 were Puerto Rican, with 2 from Puerto Rico.)

The limited data available, and results from field research in New York, Philadelphia, Newark, and Chicago, suggest the following composite of the mainland Puerto Rican college student: The student is more likely to be male than female and from a low-income family. He is the first in his family to go to college and is somewhat older than the average student, as he may have worked or completed military service prior to entering college.

He is likely to be a first-year student at a relatively low-cost, 2-year or community college, or at a college or university with open enrollment policies. He commutes to class in an Eastern metropolitan area or in Chicago. He is receiving financial aid, probably from a variety of sources. He is majoring in the social sciences, perhaps education, Spanish, or social work, rather than the physical sciences. He is severely handicapped by earlier educational deficiencies, particularly in communication skills.

The following profile of Puerto Rican college students was offered in 1970:

> This new population in higher education comes to the unviersity with some very special problems and concerns. They are all concerned with the fact that they are the survivors. . .of an educational system which has succeeded in eliminating 50 percent of their group before they completed school. They are all concerned about the extent of racism in our society.
>
> In a group with a varied racial background, sometimes white, black or, more commonly, some shade in between, they struggle with racial identity and its consequences. They are also concerned with the future status of Puerto Rico and the questions of the time—whether "Puerto Rico is a slave colony of the United States," or "A Showcase for Democracy."
>
> They enter college in a period of general disaffection with the university, its purpose and role in our society. They make increasing demands for courses and programs in the field of Puerto Rican studies and at the same time are anxious that their education pay off in a job which will break the bonds of poverty.[53]

The Puerto Rican student is unlikely to complete his or her education in the normal 2- or 4-year period, but will drop out for a semester or more and return later. Even over the long run, the student has less than a 50-50 chance of graduating. If a Puerto Rican manages to survive the high dropout rate in high school, he or she then must face the steep cost of college and the difficulty of securing financial aid.

Not all Puerto Rican students have access to the open enrollment City University of New York system. Even at CUNY, the cost of fees and related expenses has risen dramatically. Going to a private college is prohibitive for the majority of Puerto Rican students.

Given the impoverished circumstances of the mainland Puerto Rican community, college costs can be met by very few Puerto Rican families, since median family income for mainland Puerto Ricans in 1974 was only $6,779. Tuition alone at Ivy League schools, which averages more than $3,800 per year, is more than half the annual income of most Puerto Rican families. For the 1975-76 school year, fees are $387.50 per semester at Hostos Community College (part of New York's CUNY system), $11 per credit hour at Loop Community College (part of the City College of Chicago), $21 per credit hour at Essex County Community College in Newark, and $242 per semester at Philadelphia Community College. But not all needy students have access to such low-cost institutions.

Shortage of Colleges in the Cities: A shortage of colleges in large cities reduces the opportunities for Puerto Ricans and other low-income students, who can only afford to attend if they live at home.

In 1970 the Carnegie Commission found:

> . . .a major deficit in two types of institutions—community colleges and comprehensive colleges in metropolitan areas, especially those with a population over 500,000. The inner cities, in particular, are not well served. Higher education has not adequately reflected the urbanization of America. Deficits in North Jersey and the eastern side of Chicago are illustrative.[54]

Puerto Rican populations are largest in the Northeastern States and in the Chicago area, both of which were net exporters of college students in 1970. The Carnegie Commission called for 175 to 235 new community colleges in the United States by 1980, 80 to 125 of them to be located in metropolitan areas. It also called for 85 to 105 new comprehensive colleges by 1980, with 60 to 70 of them in large metropolitan areas.

Another study found that nearly three-fifths of the nation's total population does not live near (within 45 minutes drive, one-way) a "free access" college, and that metropolitan residents are only somewhat better served by such colleges than those living in rural areas.

All of these factors have shaped Puerto Rican perceptions about educational opportunities beyond high school. They have combined to reinforce each other, from one generation to the next, so that to the Puerto Rican junior or senior in high school, college is likely to be an alien or remote institution.

Despite this prevailing noncollege orientation, however, many low-income Puerto Rican parents will "sacrifice tremendously" to obtain for their children the highest possible degree of education. They have learned that social and economic mobility depends heavily upon academic credentials. The Puerto Rican student who graduates from high school tends to be very "hardy" and "fiercely determined to enter the mainstream of American society."[55]

While financial aid for college students is more plentiful than it was 10 years ago, Puerto Rican applicants and their parents still must shoulder a heavy share of the cost. In Illinois, for example, after Federal and State financial sources have been used, the remaining unmet need for students of Spanish origin averages $1,097, a very high percentage of family income. In New Jersey, the comparable figure is $337.

Several sources complain that student aid funds allocated to colleges have remained the same, or have been cut, despite enrollment increases. Only about one-third of the 55,000 students who need Federal aid at CUNY are expected to receive it in fiscal year 1976.

The "red tape" involved in getting or renewing aid is often a greater problem than the availability of aid. At Hostos Community College in the Bronx, New York, staff said that "No one knows" when aid might be stopped or cut back, and, partly because some aid programs are so new, "You can't get any straight information on them."[56]

Since so few mainland Puerto Ricans have attended college, important information concerning applications, forms, required statements, curricula, special programs, financial aid, and so forth may not be available from relatives or friends.

College counseling staffs are usually limited, and few have Puerto Rican or other Hispanic counselors. The City College of New York (CCNY) has only one Puerto Rican or Spanish-speaking counselor and one Puerto Rican financial aid counselor for about 1,350 Puerto Rican students. Puerto Rican students frequently complain of the lack of counseling aid, both in high school and in college. It is felt, for example, that more Hispanic counselors are needed at CUNY to reinforce the "self-image" of Puerto Rican students there. Some Puerto Ricans feel that non-Hispanic counselors tend to be more rigid and "go by the book," when more sympathetic and imaginative advice is needed.

A faculty member of the University of Illinois Chicago Circle campus charges that counseling there is "poisonous." He asserts that counseling helped Puerto Ricans to survive "by teaching them tricks, pacifying them, and showing them easy courses." That is one reason, he said, why nearly three-fourths of Puerto Ricans drop out of college, leaving only a miniscule number of graduates.[57]

Puerto Ricans also lack adequate counseling with reference to graduate school opportunities. Furthermore, many counselors are unable to appreciate the "overwhelming" health and financial crises and "intense" emotional problems that face many Puerto Rican students. One observer stated that counseling for Puerto Ricans in college was superior to that which they received in high school: In high school they were told not to attend college.

Largely because of the poor quality of education received in city schools and the failure of educational systems to meet their needs, Puerto Ricans frequently graduate from high school with low grade point averages. They also tend to score lower on college entrance examinations, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).

In 1965 the estimated median achievement test score (nonverbal, reading, math, and general information) for 12th grade Puerto Rican students was 43.1 compared with 52 for white students. An official at the Educational Testing Service (ETS) which designs most college entrance tests, feels that the lack of college experience among most minority group families probably explains their lower SAT scores. Thus, the "B" grade average or high SAT scores required by many colleges are beyond the reach of the typical Puerto Rican high school graduate.

At Essex County Community College in Newark, New Jersey, an estimated 85 percent of the Puerto Rican students require ESL (English as a Second Language) training.[58]

At Northeastern Illinois University, 90 percent of all Hispanic students (including Puerto Ricans) need language assistance, according to a counselor. "Most of the Latin American students here are products of the Chicago school system. Their difficulties are not always one of language, but of inadequate preparation and indifferent educational techniques," he said.[59]

A New York educator said that many Puerto Ricans (as well as other students) continue to graduate from high school ill-equipped for college work.[60] Since Puerto Rican students often are not encouraged to follow a college preparatory program, they may not be as adept at preparing for tests or writing term papers as their white counterparts. A college may have to teach them not only subject matter, but also how to write a term paper.[61]

Few tutors are available to assist Puerto Rican students who have difficulty with college-level work. A teacher at Essex County Community College in Newark, commenting upon teacher overload, noted that he teaches seven courses and so has no time for counseling or tutoring. Many Puerto Ricans "still cannot function" after 2 years because programs of assistance at the college are so limited and ineffective, he said.[62]

Many of the remedial courses designed to upgrade essential skills reportedly fail to achieve their purpose. At Temple University, Puerto Ricans "were thrown into a remedial English course along with other non-English-speaking minority students," and few profited, according to one observer. "They neded a Spanish-speaking teacher."[63]

Speaking of support services at the college level, a Rutgers official said that, "Kids are brought in like cattle" and then "dumped." Students tend to drift and have to counsel each other.[64]

Largely because of inadequate support services, low-income students often feel like "intruders" in a traditionally white, middle-class environment. Having managed to ride into college on "the coattails" of black students, Puerto Rican students are often "an anonymous entity" in affirmative action programs. Receiving little attention from college staff, sometimes living away from home for the first time, noting the absence of Puerto Rican administrators, faculty, and even clerical staff, many are often "lost in the shuffle." Finding the college atmosphere "cold" and "rigid," the temptation to drop out looms large.[65]

For these reasons, Puerto Rican students at most colleges and universities have formed student unions. Unlike the traditional student union, which is primarily involved in planning dances and social events, Puerto Rican groups often perform administrative functions such as student recruiting and tend to devote themselves to key issues concerning their education. These issues include: demands for more Puerto Rican administrators, faculty, and admissions and recruitment staff; increased or continued funding for support programs for Puerto Ricans; support for or creation of Puerto Rican studies programs or departments; greater recruitment efforts aimed at Puerto Rican students in the surrounding community; the alleged channeling of Puerto Rican students into certain curricula and departments; and the steady rise in tuition costs.

Many Puerto Rican students and faculty members perceive themselves on the defensive, as objects of discrimination, fearing that the broadened access to higher education in recent years is now narrowing, and that minority programs face extinction. These views have provoked demonstrations by Puerto Rican students at City College in New York, Yale, the University of Illinois Chicago Circle Campus, and Macalester College in Minnesota. Tension and unrest over feared cutbacks in minority programs and staffs exist at other schools, such as Temple, Lehman College in New York City, and Rutgers's Livingston College.

Many Puerto Rican students assume that, unless they relentlessly press college administrators, they will be neglected. A common sentiment is that the administration "distrusts the legitimacy of Puerto Rican needs and will only respond to pressure."[66] Whatever small gains have been achieved are done by the students themselves with Puerto Rican staff support. Thus, a decision to dismiss an English teacher considered especially effective in developing the writing skills of Latino students at Northeastern Illinois University was rescinded after Latino protests. Macalester College announced it would not terminate its Puerto Rican program after Puerto Rican and other minority students seized an administration building to protest budget cuts in the school's minority program.

The perspective from which some Puerto Rican students view college administrators and policies is shaped, at least in part, by what one faculty member termed an "anti-colonial" attitude and a strong need among many Puerto Rican youth to maintain their cultural and linguistic identity.[67] They are bitter that their language is considered detrimental and a "handicap" in college; they resist what they perceive to be the destruction of their individuality in what they see as the "melting pot" approach to higher education. They want desperately to develop skills that will enable them to live useful, rewarding lives, but they want to do so without having their values and heritage ridiculed or denied.

An Uncertain Future

The Puerto Rican migration to the mainland has been unique. It is the only massive migratory movement to the United States mainland of American citizens. These Americans are generally distinct in language and culture and have different customs. Many have been totally unprepared for "big city" life in the United States, where they found that some of their fellow citizens viewed these differences, along with the matter of color, as more important than their citizenship or hopes.

In the last decade the Federal Government began numerous programs to eliminate poverty. The defects of these programs—particularly inadequate funding—affect all minority and poor Americans. One crucial deficiency, however, has apparently caused many of the programs to fail Puerto Ricans: Those who designed and implemented the programs lacked, almost entirely, an awareness of the Puerto Rican community, its cultural and linguistic identity, and its critical problems. It might be said that much of the indifference and insensitivity characterizing United States-Puerto Rico relations has carried over into the relations between the majority group and Puerto Ricans on the mainland.

Ignorance of Puerto Ricans has fed a pervasive failure of government institutions to help these citizens. Their problems have not been identified with specificity, causing job training and other programs to operate in vacuums. In some cases, the data the programs are based on are so inadequate that those who should be targets for help, such as Puerto Ricans, have been shortchanged.

The Commission heard innumberable complaints about the failure of programs administered by local governments to involve the Puerto Rican community in decisionmaking, either through citizen advisory methods or by employment of Puerto Ricans in policymaking jobs. The same critical underutilization of Puerto Ricans exists at the Federal level. There are very few Puerto Ricans in policymaking positions in the Federal Government. Official insensitivity, coupled with private and public acts of discrimination, has assured that Puerto Ricans often are last in line for the benefits and opportunities made available by the social and civil rights legislation of the last decade.

The Commission found numerous examples of Puerto Rican organizations working to solve their problems on the mainland, such as Aspira, the Puerto Rican Community Development Project, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, the National Puerto Rican Forum, and many local agencies, such as the Hunts Point Multi-Service Center in New York. Drawing upon consistently inadequate aid from public and private sources, these agencies have made a valiant effort to fill the gap in services. This effort to develop institutions identified as Puerto Rican and offering needed services is one of the more hopeful signs for the community.

However, this hopeful development should be contrasted with the fiscal and economic crisis in New York City. The fact still remains that the majority of Puerto Ricans in the United States still reside in New York and that the future health of the city is inextricably bound to the development of the mainland Puerto Rican community.

The Commission's overall conclusion is that mainland Puerto Ricans generally continue mired in the poverty facing first generations of all immigrant or migrant groups. Expectations were that succeeding generations of mainland Puerto Ricans would have achieved upward mobility. One generation later, the essential fact of poverty remains little changed. Indeed, the economic situation of the mainland Puerto Ricans has worsened over the last decade.

The United States has never before had a large migration of citizens from offshore, distinct in culture and language and also facing the problem of color prejudice. After 30 years of significant migration, contrary to conventional wisdom that once Puerto Ricans learned the language the second generation would move into the mainstream of

American society, the future of this distinct community in the United States is still to be determined.

NOTES

1. 1960 U.S. Census, *Puerto Ricans in the United States*, Table A, p. viii; and 1970 U.S. Census, *Persons of Spanish Ancestry in the United States*, Table I, p. 1.

2. Rita Maldonado, "Determinants of Puerto Rico-United States Migration, 1947 to 1973," (Manuscript, 1975), p. 143.

3. Rafael Torregresa, National Director, Migration Division, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, at hearing of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in New York City, Nov. 10, 1975.

4. Based on a conservative estimate, their income tax payments would range from $200 to $300 million.

5. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *A Socioeconomic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers*, p. 81.

6. Puerto Rican Congress of New Jersey, *Socio-Economic Profile of New Jersey Puerto Ricans* (1972), p. 2.

7. Connecticut Advisory Committee (SAC) to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *El Boricua: the Puerto Rican Community in Bridgeport and New Haven* (January 1973), p. v, 2 (hereafter cited as Connecticut SAC Report).

8. Massachusetts Advisory Committee (SAC) to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Issues of Concern to Puerto Ricans in Boston and Springfield* (February 1972), p. 25 (hereafter cited as Massachusetts SAC Report).

9. Kal Wagenheim, *A Survey of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. Mainland in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1973), Table 64, p. 120.

10. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, *Puerto Ricans in the United States*, Table 9, p. 80; *Puerto Ricans in the United States*, 1960 Census, Table 5.

11. New England Regional Council, *Overview of the Problems Encountered by New England's Spanish-Speaking Population* (July 7, 1970), p. 1 (hereafter cited as *Overview of the Problems Encountered*).

12. Majid and Emilie Al-Khazraji, *Worcester's Spanish-Speaking Residents: Dimensions in Social Adjustment* (Worcester: Community Data Center, College of the Holy Cross, 1960) (hereafter cited as *Worcester's Spanish-Speaking Residents*).

13. Massachusetts SAC Report, p. 24.

14. Community Renewal Team of Greater Hartford, *Proposal BOLT*, prepared by CEP Planning Services (January 1970).

15. *Worcester's Spanish-Speaking Residents*, p. 24.

16. Malcolm R. Lovell, Jr., "Progress Report—The Quest for Equity," *Manpower Magazine*, September 1972, p. 4.

17. *Overview of the Problems Encountered*, p. 13.

18. National Commission for Manpower Policy, *Proceedings of a Conference on Employment Problems of Low Income Groups*, Special Report No. 5 (February 1976), p. 3 (hereafter cited as *Problems of Low Income Groups*).

19. Clara Rodriguez, *The Ethnic Queue in The United States: the Case of the Puerto Ricans* (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington Unviersity, June 1973).

20. Valle Consultants, *What Holds Sami Back?: A Study of Service Delivery in a Puerto Rican Community* (New York, 1973), p. 14.

21. U.S. Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President* (March 1973), pp. 102-103.

22. New York Advisory Committee (SAC) to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The Puerto Rican and Public Employment in New York State* (April 1973), p. 12.

23. Massachusetts SAC Report, p. 3.

24. *The Chicago Reporter*, September 1974, p. 1.

25. New Jersey Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Transcript of Open Meeting*, N.J., July 28, 1971.

26. José Erazo, Director of Special Programs, Office of the Mayor, interview in New York City, September 19, 1974.

27. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *The Employment Status of Spanish Surnamed Americans in the New York SMSA*, Research Report No. 42, June 1974, p. 2.

28. James Haughton, "The Role of the Board of Education in Perpetuating Racism in Building Trades and Vice-Versa," in *Schools Against Children*, ed. by Annette Rubenstein (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 159.

29. U.S. Department of Labor, *Subemployment in the Slums of New York* (March 14, 1967), p. 15.

30. Stanley H. Ruttenbert, *Manpower Challenge of the 1970s: Institutions and Social Change* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 12-13.

31. Statement of Ewald B. Nyquist, President, University of the State of New York and Commissioner of Education, in transcript *Hearing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights Held in New York*, N.Y., Feb. 14-15, 1972, p. 19 (hereafter cited as *New York Hearing*).

32. Tom Corso, Human Resources Director, Office of the Mayor, Bridgeport, Connecticut, telephone interview, June 5, 1974.

33. Edward Gonzales, Puerto Rican Manpower and Leadership Training Center, Cornell University, interview in New York City, Sept. 12, 1974.

34. César Rivera, Urban Progress Center, interview in Chicago, Sept. 17, 1974.

35. Herbert Bienstock, Regional Director, Bureau of Labor Statistics, New York, in *Employment Problems of Puerto Ricans*, pp. 37, 61.

36. Cuiros Interview.

37. Massachusetts SAC Report, pp. 88-89.

38. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: A Reassessment (January 1973), p. 45.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

40. Manuel Diaz, Jr., New York Urban Coalition, in *Federal Employment Problems of the Spanish Speaking*, Hearing Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., Mar. 8-10, 1972, p. 129.

41. Connecticut State Department of Community Affairs, *Report of the Governor's Council on Spanish-Speaking Opportunities* (Hartford, 1973).

42. Ismael Betancourt in *Puerto Ricans Confront Problems of the Complex Urban Society*, Community Conference Proceedings, New York City, April 15-16, 1967, p. 460.

43. Testimony of Antonio Candido Martinez in *New York Hearing*, p. 43.

44. Testimony of Braulio Montalvo, Psychologist, Philadelphia Child Guidance Clinic, in Pennsylvania SAC, *Transcript of Open Meeting*, pp. 415-16.

45. 20 U.S.C. 880(b)-1(4)(A)(Supp. IV 1974).

46. Hernan LaFontaine, "Bilingual Education for Puerto Ricans: Si o no?" in *Introduction to Bilingual Education*, Bilingual-Bicultural Educational Series, ed. Luis Ortega (New York: Anaya Las Americas, 1975) (unpaged).

47. National Education Association and American Association of School Administrators, Educational Policies Commission, *Education and the Disadvantaged American*, p. 19.

48. Connecticut SAC Report, p. 19.

49. New Jersey Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Transcript of Open Meeting*, Camden, N.J., July 12, 1971, p. 125.

50. Mike Fucili, Counselor, Temple Opportunity Program, Temple University, interview in Philadelphia, Dec. 3, 1974.

51. 414U.S.563, 566 (1974).

52. Consent Decree at 2, *Aspira v. Board of Education*, 72 Civ. 4002 (Aug. 29, 1974).

53. Statement of Louis Nuñez, ASPIRA Of America, in Senate Hearings on *Equal Education Opportunity for Puerto Rican Children* (November 1970), p. 3796.

54. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education recommended that 29 to 41 new community colleges and 19 to 26 comprehensive colleges be established in the major cities of the eight States with largest Puerto Rican population: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Connecticut, California, and Florida. See *New Students and New Places: Policies for the Future Growth and Development of American Higher Education* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp. 142-44.

55. Isidro Lucas, Chicago Regional Office, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, interview, Nov. 19, 1974.

56. Candido de Leon, President, Hostos Community College, interview in New York City, Nov. 22, 1974.

57. James Blout, Geography Department, telephone interview, Nov. 20, 1974.

58. Jerry Lieberman, Department of Behavioral Science, Essex County Community College, interview in Newark, New Jersey, Nov. 26, 1974 (hereafter cited as Lieberman Interview).

59. Maximo Torres, Proyecto Pa'lante Director, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, interview, Nov. 19, 1974 (hereafter cited as Torres Interview).

60. Carmen Puigdollers, Puerto Rican Studies Department, Lehman College, New York City, interview, Jan. 13, 1974.

61. Samuel Betances, Political Science Department, Northeastern Illinois University, interview in Chicago, Nov. 19, 1974.

62. Lieberman Interview.

63. Russell Daniel, former director, Student Resource Center, Temple University, interview in Philadelphia, Dec. 3, 1974.

64. Maria Blake, Department of Community Education, Newark-Rutgers University, interview, Nov. 26, 1974.

65. Elaine Girod, Office of Admissions, Temple University, interview, Dec. 3, 1974.

66. Torres Interview.

67. Maria Calanes, Spanish Department, Temple University, interview, Dec. 6, 1974.

The San Juan Shuttle: Puerto Ricans on Contract*

Tom Seidl
Janet Shenk
Adrian DeWind

Puerto Rico is second only to Mexico as a source of cheap imported labor for U.S. growers; and on the East Coast it is unrivaled. Unlike Mexicans, however, Puerto Ricans need not worry about quotas or deportations. For Puerto Ricans are "citizens" of the country that has relegated their own to the status of a colony. In the eyes of the U.S. Department of Labor and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), they are considered "domestic workers." The Puerto Rican Employment Service is an affiliate of the U.S. Employment Service, and Puerto Rican workers are referred to as "inter-state migrants," not "illegals."

Many thousands of Puerto Rican migrants (estimates vary between 60,000 and 200,000) work in U.S. agriculture each year. Some come independently in search of work, while others are recruited on the island by private agencies, crew leaders or growers. Such recruitment is illegal under Puerto Rican law, however, unless a written contract is first negotiated between the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor and U.S. growers.

This contract program was instituted by the Commonwealth Government in the late 1940s, to govern the recruitment and employ-

---

*This article first appeared in the November-December 1977 issue of *NACLA Report on the Americas* published by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). It is reprinted here with the permission of NACLA.

ment of workers in mainland agriculture. Over the past 27 years, more than 350,000 Puerto Rican contract workers have been employed in the harvests of 22 states: peaches in South Carolina, apples in Vermont, shade tobacco in Connecticut, vegetables in New Jersey and so on.[1]

The Puerto Rican program is similar in many respects to the West Indian contract system. It offers many of the same advantages that accrue to growers under any system of contract labor: pre-selection of the work force, virtual immunity from unionization and, above all, a contract negotiated not by the workers themselves but by parties with their own particular interests to uphold.

The number of West Indian contract workers in the United States has remained steady since 1960 and growers are demanding the program's expansion if Carter's immigration bills become law. In contrast, the Puerto Rican program entered a phase of steady decline in the 1970s that shows no signs of reversing itself. In its peak years (1967-69), the Puerto Rican program brought more than 21,000 workers to the mainland each year. In the early 1970s a yearly average of less than 12,000 workers arrived. Since 1975, the number has barely stayed above 5,000 (See Table).

For many growers, the advantages of the Puerto Rican program are outweighed by its disadvantages in relation to other sources. Like West Indians, contract workers from Puerto Rico constitute an assured supply of cheap labor, "delivered" on a specific date and "shipped out" when they are no longer needed. But the fact remains that the Puerto Rican program affords the growers less control over the work force than its West Indian counterpart. The intimidation tactics used by growers to fight wage demands and unionization, and to squeeze productivity gains from West Indian workers, are less effective. The difference is not racial or national, as racist stereotyping by growers and the media would have us believe. Rather, the difference stems from the politico-legal status of West Indians, as deportable when troublesome, and of Puerto Ricans, as colonized "citizens."

Unlike Jamaican cane-cutters, for example, Puerto Rican workers can break the contract without facing deportation. (They do take a severe financial loss, however, by forfeiting reimbursement of transportation costs and other so-called "bonuses.") Not only can they stay on the mainland, but they can "legally" attempt to find jobs in industry or services, or apply for welfare, food stamps and the like.

Growers chorus their complaints about the Puerto Rican contract program: high turnover, low productivity, frequent lawsuits and unsuccessful but ominous attempts at unionization. They maintain that the terms of the contract are "onerous" and increasingly costly. And they are unanimous in their acclaim of West Indians as "docile and diligent."

But we have seen that current legislation puts limits on the growers' ability to obtain foreign contract labor. One New Jersey grower, an employer of Puerto Rican contract labor for over 20 years, said he would give his right eye for Jamaicans, but the bureaucracy would not let him have any. Growers that have traditionally relied upon contract workers from Puerto Rico are hoping that the legislation will change. Some have turned to other sources of labor in the interim—high school students, housewives and day-haulers. Others have switched to crops that can be mechanically harvested. And still others are making the most out of the Puerto Rican program—bargaining with the Commonwealth Government to erode the benefits that workers are entitled to under the contract.

Growers that employ contract workers from the West Indies are fighting to keep that work force, and avoid hiring thousands of unemployed domestic workers and especially the thousands of Puerto Rican workers that the Commonwealth Government is prepared to send on a moment's notice.

Bargaining from Weakness

Once a year, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor sits down with U.S. growers to negotiate the terms of a standardized "Agricultural Agreement between Employers and Puerto Rican Agricultural Worker." Like their West Indian neighbors, Puerto Rican workers have no say whatsoever in negotiating the terms of their own employment.

The underlying assumption of this process is that workers' interests are adequately represented by the Commonwealth Government. Indeed, Commonwealth officials view the program as roughly equivalent to the functions of a labor union, and as filling a vacuum left by the lack of unionization in the fields. But how able a negotiator can the Puerto Rican government afford to be?

One of the major problems facing the Government of Puerto Rico today, and one of the major threats to the island's political balance, is a soaring rate of unemployment. Nearly 46% of the island's labor force is either completely inactive (34%) or underutilized (12%).[2] The problem is not a new one. It has plagued government planners since the early 1940s and consistently outpaced their efforts to create more jobs by stimulating foreign investment.

Fomento, the government's program for rapid industrialization, created thousands of jobs in the 1940's and 1950's by offering generous tax incentives to industry and by promoting the island's abundant supply of cheap labor. But thousands of jobs disappreared as well, in the traditional craft industries and especially in agriculture. As farm land was taken over by industry and its accompanying needs, agricultural employment in Puerto Rico plummetted from 200,000 in 1940 to 17,000 in 1977.[3]

In the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment has continued to rise. Labor-intensive industries have abandoned the island in search of still cheaper labor in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, et. al. Capital entering the island's economy today gravitates toward highly capital-intensive sectors such as petrochemicals and chemicals employing relatively few workers.

According to the Planning Board of Puerto Rico, 103,500 new jobs were created between 1941 and 1971, but over twice that number were lost during the same interval.[4] The government's failure to create enough jobs has meant greater emphasis on efforts to reduce the demand for employment by reducing the growth rate of the working class. Unemployment, an inherent feature of capitalist development, is masked in Puerto Rico as a simple problem of overpopulation by the ideologues of colonial rule.

The fruits of the government's efforts to reduce demand for jobs in the short and long term can be summed up by two statistics: (1) one-third of all Puerto Rican women of child-bearing age have been sterilized;[5] and (2) one-third of the Puerto Rican population has emigrated to the United States.[6]

Emigration has clearly been the short-term savior of political stability on the island. A 1973 "Report to the Governor of Puerto Rico" concluded that "during the three decades (1941-71)—in which the greatest push was made to create new jobs, emigration to the United States has had a far greater impact on unemployment." More

PUERTO RICAN CONTRACT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
BY STATE, 1960-1977*

	TOTAL	NJ	NY	Penn.	Del.	Md.	Conn.	Mass.	NH	RI	Mich.	Ohio	SC	other
1960	12,986	6,852	1,003	914	1,122	194	2,207	480	82	—	16	7	—	109
1961	13,765	6,749	1,698	913	1,294	254	2,089	567	89	11	—	6	—	95
1962	13,562	8,347	1,502	693	298	186	1,885	452	88	5	12	—	—	58
1963	13,116	8,022	1,475	416	368	106	1,832	409	51	20	383	—	—	34
1964	14,628	9,201	1,677	107	346	177	2,042	460	43	16	333	—	—	226
1965	17,385	10,095	1,577	138	314	30	3,245	423	38	16	613	—	—	906
1966	19,537	9,812	2,301	219	366	50	5,618	447	33	28	498	158	—	7
1967	21,648	9,388	3,471	140	1,677	6	5,684	450	41	36	51	333	—	369
1968		••••••••••••••••••••NOT AVAILABLE••••••••••••••••••••												
1969	21,862	9,463	2,188	655	1,832	311	6,113	486	54	105	121	299	192	43
1970	18,884	8,770	1,735	512	1,786	114	4,928	487	23	95	46	171	180	37
1971	14,119	6,836	1,237	151	1,543	68	3,669	397	20	61	16	—	94	27
1972	11,900	5,158	957	99	1,691	79	3,351	284	19	81	—	—	129	52
1973	14,641	6,255	1,375	134	1,634	114	4,337	289	27	92	—	—	304	80
1974	12,760	5,112	1,156	134	1,543	51	4,111	162	14	93	—	—	311	73
1975	5,639	3,393	743	112	1,077	—	—	108	81	63	—	—	52	5
1976	5,251	2,208	908	118	1,242	1	—	190	7	30	—	—	280	101
1977	4,191	2,020	773	113	896	15	—	51	36	—	—	—	258	29

Source: Migration Division, Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Cumulative Weekly Reports of Arrivals.*

emphatically, the Report states that "Emigration of the unemployed. . .has constituted the escape valve that has prevented unemployment from reaching catastrophic proportions."[7]

How does all this affect the bargaining position of the Puerto Rican government vis-a-vis U.S. growers? A government that is dependent upon emigration as an escape valve for social tensions can hardly afford to alienate the prospective employers of Puerto Rican migrants. Growers are keenly aware of this contradiction and exploit it skillfully. They can threaten to switch sources or threaten to mechanize if the Commonwealth attempts to drive a hard bargain.

The government's bargaining strength has been further eroded in the 1970s as economic recession in the United States has increased the unemployment rate among Puerto Ricans residing on the mainland. Many have returned to the island rather than be unemployed in a foreign and often hostile environment. Net emigration from Puerto Rico averaged 44,000 per year in the 1950s, and 15,000 per year in the 1960s.[8] Net *immigration* characterizes the 1970s. An average of 37,000 per year returned to Puerto Rico between 1972 and 1976.[9]

On Paper and in Practice

"Our contract is in the vanguard of rights and benefits offered to farmworkers."[10] This is the opinion of officials at Puerto Rico's Migration Division in New York, responsible for administering the contract program on the mainland. If one compares the contract to the protections afforded to U.S. farmworkers by state and federal regulations, their statement is depressingly accurate. However, many of the contract's most positive provisions are systematically violated by growers. And the Puerto Rican Government, guided by its overriding need to keep the migrant stream flowing, has made only token efforts to enforce them.

The contract program is governed by Puerto Rican Law No. 87, passed by the legislature in 1962, to regulate the recruitment and contracting of domestic and farm laborers whose services are to be used outside the boundaries of Puerto Rico. It grants the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor the authority to establish minimum requirements that must be met by all employers.

For example, all contracts must stipulate wage rates, hours, discharge procedures, housing standards, transportation arrangements and food costs. They must all contain a guarantee of income for the worker, insurance coverage, record-keeping provisions and guarantees against discrimination and against reprisal for exercising the right to form, join or assist a labor organization.[11]

The content of these provisions changes from year to year, and varies according to region and crop. Here, let us examine the contract that governs the employment of Puerto Rican contract workers in New Jersey.[12] The major employer in that state is the Glassboro Service Association (GSA), representing more than 200 growers and accounting for 50% of all workers referred to the mainland. Workers recruited by Glassboro are taken to its central labor camp, originally built as a detention camp in World War II. From there, they are distributed to individual growers.

Wages:

In the 1977 contract negotiated with the Glassboro Service Association, wages were set at $2.55 an hour, only five cents above the *minimum* wage for farmworkers set by the state of New Jersey. However, most workers are paid piece rates that they have no voice in setting. The contract stipulates that piece rates must yield at least the equivalent of the hourly rate, or the difference must be paid by the grower at the end of each pay period. Workers say this difference is never even calculated, much less paid.

Unlike current contracts negotiated by the United Farm Workers, the Puerto Rican contract contains no provisions for sick pay or overtime pay. It simply states that workers may be required to work 8-hour days and 6-day weeks, and may "consent" to work for longer.

Guaranteed Income:

One of the contract's more positive provisions is one of its least respected. A guaranteed income clause stipulates that the employer must guarantee the worker 160 hours of work in each successive four-week period, or a sum not less than $400.00 (i.e., the hourly rate x 160). According to Michael Berger, of the Farm Workers Rights Project in New Jersey, payment of the difference between guaranteed earnings and actual earnings presupposes an accurate system of record-keeping, with itemized infomation on hours worked, pieces picked per day, etc. But according to a recent court suit against the Glassboro Service Association, such records—which are required by the Puerto Rican contract—have not been kept, much less made available to workers. "The Glassboro Service Association has no system or procedure designed for calculating and paying any wages pursuant to the guarantee."[13]

Insurance:
The contract provides for workers' compensation insurance at no cost to the worker and for non-occupational disability insurance paid for by workers' and growers' contributions to the Puerto Rican Agricultural Workers Insurance Fund. Until only last year, however, growers sat on the board of trustees of the Insurance Fund *and* owned the hospitals that submitted claims to this fund! When a suit was filed charging conflict of interest, the growers were finally removed from the board.[14]

A constant complaint among workers is the poor medical care they receive from doctors on the growers' payroll. At the Glassboro infirmary, owned and operated by the Glassboro Service Association, it is always in the growers' interest to get the worker back to the fields as soon as possible, irrespective of the ailment.

Complaint Procedure:
Until 1975, the Puerto Rican contract did not contain a complaint procedure, and the one that currently exists has been described by legal experts as "futile and illusory."[15] According to the contract, the regional office of the Puerto Rican Migration Division must make a record of all complaints, notify the employer and "investigate the complaint as quickly as possible." According to lawyers at Puerto Rican Migrant Legal Services, however, hundreds of complaints are never even recorded. And the investigations that are carried out bear little resemblance to an objective determination of the facts. Officials of the Migration Division simply send a complaint form to the employer—presumably the *target* of such an investigation—and ask the employer to verify the complaint. In most New Jersey cases, for example, the "verifier" is Mr. Joseph Garofalo, General Manager of the Glassboro Service Association. Officials of the Puerto Rican Labor Department admitted in court testimony that this is the procedure followed in most investigations:

> Mr. Falcon admitted on cross-examination that Mr. Garofalo completes the section of the complaint form titled "finding of fact"....There is no hearing conducted by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. There is no testimony taken.

> The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not even contact the worker to contravene the findings of Mr. Garofalo. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico merely relies on the facts as stated by the Glassboro Service Association to decide the complaint.[16]

A worker dissatisfied with those findings may request that his case be reviewed. But the binding decision of a Bureau of Conciliation and Arbitration, composed of government-appointed members, with no worker representation, culminates a cumbersome complaint procedure that relies predominantly on the *employer's* finding of fact.

Other examples of the contract's weaknesses, and violations of its strengths, abound. The workers we spoke with at the Glassboro labor camp in New Jersey complained about the medical care, food, housing, arbitrary firings and wages. They complained of being shifted by the GSA from one grower to another, like traded cattle. Theoretically, these workers do not have far to travel to register their complaints. They need only go to the office of the Commonwealth representative—conveniently located *inside* the Glassboro Service Association headquarters at the camp.

But workers have grown impatient with what they describe as an indifferent attitude toward their problems, long bureaucratic tangles and negative results. Some workers have also been the victims of grower retaliation against "troublemakers." So instead, one worker wrote down his complaint on a small piece of paper, folded it many times until it resembled a matchbook, and furtively passed it to the lawyer that accompanied us to the camp.

A Hands-Off Policy

Commonwealth officials in New York told us that most complaints are the result of "misunderstandings" that are quickly settled at the camps. But the volume of law suits brought against growers by the workers themselves, with the assistance of various agencies of the Rural Legal Services Corporation, sharply contradicts this assertion. Over 90 suits have been filed since 1973, and in some cases the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor has been named as co-defendant alongside the growers. The Commonwealth itself never brought a single grower to court in 27 years.[17] And since 1973, it has filed several suits against growers who refuse to hire Puerto Rican workers, but only a handful against employers who consistently violate the terms of the contract.

Puerto Rican policy has been dictated by the desire to avoid confrontations with the growers. In 1973, for example, the national director of the Migration Division, Marco Rigau, was fired by the Secretary of Labor after only ten weeks in office. Rigau claims he was fired for his efforts to actively enforce the contract, by court action if necessary, while the Secretary wanted things handled "adminstratively." "If court actions were initiated," the Secretary argued, "farmers would hire other workers without the contract protections developed by the Puerto Rican Government."[18] This brand of Catch-22 logic has effectively precluded any real enforcement of the contract.

The Puerto Rican Labor Department keeps a low profile in the labor campus and fields. In 1973, only 15 representatives were responsible for assuring compliance with the contract in 14 states and on hundreds of farms.[19] According to one expert on migrant legal affairs, the Puerto Rican Labor Department acts only on complaints and never as the result of its own investigative initiatives.[20]

The net result of this approach, according to lawyers at Puerto Rican Migrant Legal Services, is that the contract program has been used as "a mechanism to avoid unionization and as a guarantee of a steady supply of cheap labor." Growers have enjoyed "virtual immunity" from any effective contract enforcement activities, contract violations have become the rule, rather than the exception, and Puerto Rican workers have been "quietly kept under control."[21]

Court actions filed by the workers themselves since 1973, without the cooperation of the Commonwealth Government, have begun to cost the growers money. In 1974, for example, a worker brought suit against the Garden State Service Cooperative Association for violation of contract provisions concerning housing. José Sánchez Murillo had been living in barracks with faulty heating, a leaky roof, broken window panes, and rats. The court found such conditions "inadequate and infra-human," and awarded the plaintiff $3000 in damages.[22] A class action suit filed against the Glassboro Service Association, and still pending in the courts, charges that Puerto Rican contract workers were underpaid more than $1 million in wages between 1970 and 1975.[23]

The growers' loss of "immunity" from contract enforcement has been cited as one of the major factors behind the recent decline in demand for Puerto Rican contract workers. But growers have been mounting their own counter-offensive as well. Blacklisting is just one of the retaliatory tactics being used against workers who dare to file complaints.

Glassboro recruiters are said to have carried a big black book with them to Puerto Rico this year. The book listed the names of all the contract workers from previous years, with codes next to each name. Workers with exemplary work records and many years of experience were denied employment if their names carried the code U.L.A.—unauthorized legal action. This "selective" recruitment took place in the offices of the Puerto Rican Department of Labor, where officials refused to intervene when workers protested against these tactics. These blacklisted workers have now filed suit against Glassboro *and* against the Puerto Rican Department of Labor.[24]

Growers have also mounted an offensive against those who lend these workers legal assistance. In written testimony to Congressional subcommittee hearings in 1977, growers accused the Rural Legal Services corporation of using "harassment tactics" against them. The testimony specifically recommended that Congress investigate the activities of the Puerto Rican Legal Services and withhold all budget increases for 1978.[25]

Court action has been a major pillar of workers' efforts to improve their conditions by curbing violations of the existing contract. Yet it is clearly recognized that substantial improvements in the working and living conditions of these migrants can only come about when they themselves control both the negotiation of contracts and their enforcement.

Organizing in the East

Seasonal workers are among the most difficult to organize. and when these workers are migrants from over a thousand miles away, scattered on hundreds of farms, the problems multiply. Moreover, as the faces change from one year to the next, the slow task of educating and organizing must begin anew each season. Add to this the growers' unalterable opposition to unionization and the more covert opposition of the Puerto Rican government. Despite these obstacles, organizing inroads have been made among Puerto Rican contract workers on the East Coast. The modest success of these efforts in the past few years, however, has been one of the major factors behind the contract program's decline.

In the early 1970s, the Connecticut Valley seemed to present the most favorable conditions for organizing. Shade toabacco is grown under white cloth tenting to shield the plants from the sun. Temperature under the nets, where workers spend most of their day, may reach 120°F, compounded by the high humidity. The process has little potential for mechanization. Each plant requires human attention up to 15 times between Spring and Fall, or 930.6 million separate hand operations.[26]

Furthermore, contract workers in the Connecticut Valley were less dispersed than in other areas. Large labor camps, such as Camp Windsor, the largest labor camp in New England housing 800 workers, corresponded to the concentrated pattern of land ownership and production in the Valley. Family farming had long ago been replaced by corporate agriculture, dominated by such giants as Culbro Corporation (formerly General Cigar Company) and Consolidated Cigar, a subsidiary of the multi-billion dollar conglomerate, Gulf and Western. Culbro and Consolidated together account for half of all cigar sales in the United States.[27]

Tobacco growers began importing contract workers from Puerto Rico in 1952, to supplement the West Indian work force they had been using since the 1940s. In 1964, under pressure from the U.S. Department of Labor, they stopped using West Indians and for the next decade relied on Puerto Ricans for 90% of their adult labor force. The Shade Tobacco Growers Association, established in 1941, kept a full-time recruiting staff in Puerto Rico and spent about half a million dollars each summer flying four to six thousand workers from Puerto Rico to the fields.[28]

(It is interesting to note that the tobacco leaves grown in the Connecticut Valley, using cheap labor imported from Puerto Rico, are later exported to Puerto Rico for the manufacturing stage of production. Hence, these corporations take advantage of the island's adundant supply of cheap labor at *both* ends of the production process.)

By relying on Puerto Rican contract workers, and on high school students during the busy summer months, tobacco growers thought they were well protected from unionization. But in August 1973, the situation began to change. One hundred Puerto Rican migrants gathered outside the Windsor labor camp and officially created the Association of Agricultural Workers (ATA).

ATA functioned on the island and on the mainland. Organizers in Puerto Rico were stationed at local employment service offices, to tell potential migrants about conditions in the camps and fields, and to urge those who migrated to join the union. On the mainland, ATA concentrated its organizing efforts in the Connecticut Valley and New Jersey. Before the 1973 harvest season ended, over 1,500 migrants in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Jersey had become members.[29]

Growers immediately began a counter-offensive. They tried to break up ATA meetings in the camps or divert workers by providing free liquor, free trips to baseball games and the like. They also instituted token reforms to pacify the workers. According to former ATA organizer, Juan Vera, conditions in the camps began to improve as soon as ATA began to organize. Representatives from the Shade Tobacco Growers Association met with Department of Labor officials in Puerto Rico to devise a strategy that would obstruct the growth of ATA and similar organizations. One brainchild of that meeting was the establishment of an Advisory Committee, composed of 32 workers, to channel ideas and suggestions regarding the contract to the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor. ATA immediately repudiated the Committee as a cosmetic gesture that perpetuated the workers' absolute exclusion from any role in negotiating the terms of their own employment.

By 1974 over 4,000 workers, mostly employed by Shade, had signed union cards.[30] ATA demanded to be recognized as the legitimate bargaining agent for the workers. Its demands included a grievance procedure, job security, time and half for over 40 hours, and a $2.50 hourly wage. When these demands were rejected, ATA threatened to call a major strike.

Here, the story ends abruptly. For within a few months, the contract program that had lasted 23 years in the Connecticut Valley was discontinued. Growers refused to sign the 1975 contract. With an unemployment rate of 9.7% in Connecticut at the time, growers decided to abondon a labor force gaining in militancy and test the local supply. The offered $2.28 an hour for adults and $1.80 for teenagers, and got plenty of takers. A fleet of 500 buses brought workers to the fields each day from nearby cities. And the growers could breathe a sigh of relief, for if anything is more difficult than organizing migrant labor, it is organizing *day-haul* labor.

But let us not be confused by the term "local" labor. Although the contract program ended in Connecticut in 1975, Puerto Rico did not cease to be the growers' most important source of cheap labor. Growers now resort to illegal private recruitment in Puerto Rico while relying for the majority of their work force on the Puerto Rican population of the mainland.

Between 1960 and 1970, the Puerto Rican population of the Hartford area more than tripled, so that in 1975, when 4,100 "local" workers were employed to replace Puerto Rican contract workers, half of these were Puerto Rican residents of the Valley. Many had prior tobacco field experience, and, not surprisingly, many were former contract workers.[31] Hence, it is only a new detachment of Puerto Rico's reserve army of labor that fits the growers' present strategy to avoid unionization and keep wages low. In anticipation of possible problems in the future, however, some growers are already pressing for a return to the good old days when West Indian workers toiled their fields.

ATA in New Jersey

ATA's organizing in New Jersey provoked a somewhat different response among growers. Contract workers are still a major factor in New Jersey agriculture, but their numbers have declined sharply over the last five years, and day-haul workers are now being brought in from high-unemployment areas such as Philadelphia and Camden. More importantly, mechanization is beginning to change the face of agriculture in the state. Many farmers have changed from vegetable and fruit crops to soy and grain, precisely because they require very little hand labor. And even some vegetable crops, such as tomatoes for canning, have been almost entirely mechanized.

In 1976, a much debilitated ATA decided to merge with the United States Farm Workers which planned to open an office in Vineland, New Jersey, at the start of the 1977 growing season. These plans have now been delayed until at least the summer of 1979, with UFW concentrating its efforts on preserving its gains on the West Coast.

According to Angel Domingez, former ATA organizer in New Jersey, there are presently no organizing efforts under way in the state.

New Markets

The threat of unionization is only one factor among many behind the steady decline in the number of contract workers from Puerto Rico each year. Costly court suits and other attempts to actually enforce the Puerto Rican contract have lessened the program's appeal. It is becoming increasingly clear to growers that Puerto Rican workers are unwilling to tolerate existing conditions. In 1974, for example, it was estimated that seven out of every ten migrants quit before their contracts ended.[35]

Meanwhile the Commonwealth Government has tried to open up new markets for the export of Puerto Rican labor. Migration Division officials are currently negotiating with sugar growers in Florida, and expect to sign contracts for approximately 200 workers by the next harvest season. By no mere coincidence, Florida growers are increasingly concerned about organizing drives in their state, and the recent contracts signed by the United Farm Workers representing citrus workers employed by Coca-Cola.

The most intense battle for markets being waged by the Commonwealth concerns employment in the East Coast apple harvests, extending from Maine down to West Virginia. At stake are several thousand jobs for Puerto Rican migrants, currently filled by contract workers from the West Indies.

NOTES

1. Puerto Rican Department of Labor, Migration Division (New York City).
2. Labor Force Statistics Division, Department of Labor and Human Resources, Puerto Rico, *Employment and Unemployment in Puerto Rico*, vols. 77-8 (1977).
3. *Ibid.*
4. "Informe del Subomité del grupo de trabajo del gobernador," Area I, *Oportunidades de empleo, educación y adiestramiento* (mimeographed, November 1973), p. 2.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
6. Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, *Taller de Migración* (New York: CUNY, 1975), p. 165.
7. *Oportunidades de empleo*, pp. 2-4.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

9. "Movimiento de pasajeros para años fiscales 1940-1976" (Sección de Balanza de Pagos, Junta de Planificación, E.L.A., 1976).

10. NACLA interview with Manuel Rodríguez Escalera, Director, Agricultural Program, Migration Division, Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, August 1977.

11. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor, Office of the Secretary, *Regulations to Administrative Act No. 87 of June 22, 1962* (March 8, 1974).

12. *1977 Agricultural Agreement Between the Glassboro Service Association and Puerto Rican Agricultural Workers.*

13. Oscar Cintrón Pérez, *et. al.* vs. Glassboro Service Association *et. al.*, Docket No. C-3251-75, Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Cumberland County, *Summation of Evidence*, p. 17.

14. NACLA interview with Mr. David Noriega, Director of Puerto Rico Migrant Legal Services, September 1977.

15. *Summation of Evidence*, p. 69.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

17. Felipe Rivera, "The Puerto Rican Farmworker," *Taller de Migración* (New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, CUNY, 1975).

18. *New York Times*, July 11, 1973.

19. "The Puerto Rican Farmworker," p. 10.

20. NACLA interview wih Michael S. Berger, Farmworkers Rights Project, Civil Liberties Education and Action Fund of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, September 1977.

21. Statement of Puerto Rico Migrant Legal Services, Inc. to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, House Committee on the Judiciary (1977), p. 2.

22. *José Sánchez Surillo* vs. *Garden State Service cooperative Association, Inc.*, Civil No. CS74-111, Superior Court of Puerto Rico, July 19, 1977.

23. *Summation of Evidence.*

24. *Irizarry, Mendez, Surillo et. al.* vs. *Hon. Carlos Quirós, Secretary of Labor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Garden State Services Cooperative Association, Glassboro Service Association, Rubén Natal and Diego Ortiz*, Civil No. 77-752, U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, May 12, 1977.

25. Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, *Written Testimony of Arthur West*, President of the Garden State Service Cooperative Association, February 25, 1977.

26. *New York Times*, August 24, 1975.

27. "At the Crossroads: Agriculture and Agricultural Labor in the Connecticut River Valley," prepared jointly by the Greenfield Popular Union (PO Box 251, Turner Falls, MA) and the Waterbury Popular Union.

28. *New York Times*, August 24, 1975.

29. James Nash, *Migrant Farmworkers in Massachusetts* (Boston: Strategy and Action Commission, Massachusetts Council of Churches, March 1974), p. 65.

30. NACLA interview with Juan Vera, former ATA organizer in Connecticut, September 1977.

31. Nicholas Carbone, *et al.*, *The Influence of a Regional Economy on Hartford's Population* (City Institute, January 1977), p. 9.

Voices of Anger and Protest*

Puerto Rican Obituary
by Pedro Pietri

They worked
They were always on time
They were never late
They never spoke back
When they were insulted
They worked
They never went on strike
Without permission
They never took days off
That were on the calendar
They worked
Ten days a week
And were only paid for five
They worked
They worked
They worked
And they died
They died broke
They died owing
They died never knowing
What the front entrance
Of the first national bank
looks like

Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Manuel
All died yesterday today
And will die tomorrow
Passing their bill collectors
On to the next of kin
All died

---

* The poem by Pedro Pietri and the essays by Iris Morales and Felipe Luciano are from *Palante!* by Michael Abramson and the Young Lords Party. Copyright (c) 1971 by Michael Abramson and the Young Lords Party. The poem and essays are used here with the permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Waiting for the Garden
of Eden
To open up again
Under a new management
All died
Dreaming about america
Waking them up in the middle
of the night
Screaming: Mira! Mira!
Your name is on the winning
lottery ticket
For one hundred thousand
dollars
All died
Hating the grocery stores
That sold them make-believe
steak
And bullet-proof rice and
beans
All died waiting dreaming
and hating
Dead Puerto Ricans
Who never knew they were
Puerto Ricans
Who never took a coffee break
From the ten commandments
To **KILL KILL KILL**
The landlords of their cracked
skulls
And communicate with their
Latin Souls

Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Manuel
From the nervous breakdown
streets
Where the mice live like
millionaires
And the people do not live
at all
Are dead and were never alive

Juan
Died waiting for his number
to hit
Miguel
Died waiting for the welfare
check
To come and go and come
again
Milagros
Died waiting for her ten
children
To grow up and work
So she could quit working
Olga
Died waiting for a five
dollar raise
Manuel
Died waiting for his
supervisor to drop dead
So that he could get a
promotion

Is a long ride
From Spanish Harlem
To long island cemetery
Where they were buried
First the train
And then the bus
And the cold cuts for lunch
And the flowers
That will be stolen
When visiting hours are over
Is very expensive

Is very expensive
But they understand
Their parents understood
Is a long non-profit ride
From Spanish Harlem
To long island cemetery
Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Manuel
All died yesterday today
And will die again tomorrow
Dreaming
Dreaming about Queens
Clean cut lily white
neighborhood
Puerto Ricanless scene
Thirty thousand dollar home
The first spics on the block
Proud to belong to a
community
Of gringos who want them
lynched
Proud to be a long distance
away
From the sacred phrase:
Qué Pasa?

These dreams
These empty dreams
From the make believe
bedrooms
Their parents left them
Are the after effects
Of television programs
About the ideal
white american family
With Black maids
And Latin janitors
Who are well trained
To make everyone
And their bill collectors
Laugh at them
And the people they represent

Juan
Died dreaming about a new
car
Miguel
Died dreaming about new
anti-poverty programs
Milagros
Died dreaming about a trip to
Puerto Rico
Olga
Died dreaming about real
jewelry
Manuel
Died dreaming about the irish
sweepstakes

They all died
Like a hero sandwich dies
In the garment district
At twelve o'clock in the
afternoon
Social security numbers to
ashes
Union dues to dust
They knew
They were born to weep
And keep the morticians
employed
As long as the pledge
Allegiance
To the flag that wants them
destroyed

They saw their names listed
In the telephone directory of
destruction
They were trained to turn
The other cheek by
newspapers
That misspelled who
mispronounced
And misunderstood their
names
And celebrated when death
came
And stole their final laundry
ticket

They were born dead
And they died dead

Is time
To visit Sister Lopez again
The number one healer
And fortune card dealer
In Spanish Harlem
She can communicate
With your late relatives
For a reasonable fee
Good news is guaranteed

Rise Table Rise Table
Death is not dumb and disable
Those who love you want to
know
The correct number to play
Let them know this right
away
Rise Table Rise Table
Death is not dumb and disable
Now that your problems are
over
And the world is off your
shoulders
Help those who you left
behind
Find financial peace of mind
Rise Table Rise Table
Death is not dumb and disable
If the right number we hit
All our problems will split
And we will visit your graves
On every legal holiday
Those who love you want to
know
The correct number to play
Let them know this right
away
We know your spirit is able
Death is not dumb and disable
RISE TABLE RISE TABLE

Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Manuel
All died yesterday today
And will die again tomorrow
Hating fighting and stealing
Broken windows from each
other
Practicing a religion without
a roof
The old testament
The new testament
According to the gospel
Of the internal revenue
The judge and jury and
executioner
Protector and eternal bill
collector

Secondhand shit for sale
Learn how to say Cómo Está
Usted
And you will make a fortune

They are dead
They are dead
And will not return from the
dead
Until they stop neglecting
The art of their dialogue
For broken english lessons
To impress the mister bosses
Who keep them employed
As dishwashers porters
messenger boys
Factory workers maids stock
clerks
Shipping clerks assistant
mailroom
Assistant, assistant, assistant,
assistant
To the assistant, assistant
dishwasher
And automatic smiling
doorman
For the lowest wages of the
ages
And rages when you demand
a raise
Because it's against the
company policy
To promote **SPICS SPICS
SPICS**

Juan
Died hating Miguel because
Miguel's
Used car was in better
condition
Than his used car
Miguel
Died hating Milagros because
Milagros
Had a color television set
And he could not afford one
yet
Milagros
Died hating Olga because
Olga
Made five dollars more on the
same job

Olga
Died hating Manuel because
Manuel
Had hit the numbers more
times
Than she had hit the numbers
Manuel
Died hating all of them
Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Because they all spoke broken
english
More fluently than he did

And now they are together
In the main lobby of the void
Addicted to silence
Under the grass of oblivion
Off limits to the wind
Confined to worm supremacy
In long island cemetery
This is the groovy hereafter
The protestant collection box
Was talking so loud and proud
about

Here lies Juan

Here lies Miguel
Here lies Milagros
Here lies Olga
Here lies Manuel
Who died yesterday today
And will die again tomorrow
Always broke
Always owing
Never knowing
That they are beautiful
people
Never knowing
The geography of their
complexion

PUERTO RICO IS A BEAUTIFUL
PLACE
PUERTORRIQUEÑOS ARE A
BEAUTIFUL RACE

If only they
Had turned off the television
And tuned into their own
imaginations
If only they
Had used the white
supremacy bibles
For toilet paper purpose
And made their Latin Souls
The only religion of their race
If only they
Had returned to the
definition of the sun
After the first mental
snowstorm
On the summer of their senses
If only they
Had kept their eyes open
At the funeral of their fellow
employees
Who came to this country to
make a fortune
And were buried without
underwears

Juan
Miguel
Milagros
Olga
Manuel
Will right now be doing their
own thing
Where beautiful people sing
And dance and work together
Where the wind is a stranger
To miserable weather
conditions
Where you do not need a
dictionary
to communicate with your
hermanos y hermanas
Aquí se habla español all the
time
Aquí you salute your flag
first
Aquí there are no dial soap
commercials
Aquí everybody smells good
Aquí TV dinners do not have
a future
Aquí wigs are not necessary
Aquí we admire desire
And never get tired of each
other
Aquí qué pasa Power is
what's happening
Aquí to be called negrito y
negrita
Means to be called **LOVE**

"I became the one that translated . . . the go-between."

by Iris Morales

My family can not be called typical, because it excludes a lot of things that other people experience. But there are a lot of threads in the family structure which are typical of all Puerto Rican families. My family just happens to be a very straight type of Puerto Rican working-class family. We weren't affected by drugs. We weren't affected by daughters going out and getting pregnant. Instead, we were affected by daughters going out and doing organizing, becoming political.

Both my mother and father came to New York in 1947. They met here at a dance, got married, and in 1948 I was born. In Puerto Rico my father was a cane cutter. He was the oldest son of about nine children, so when things got rough, he came over here to make some money to be able to send back to the family. My mother was the oldest of nine children also (an older sister had been killed by a lover). After her parents died she became the one who took care of all the other children, so she never knew any kind of childhood. My father worked in a hotel when he first came here, as a dishwasher. Then I guess he graduated to elevator operator—and he's been there ever since. My mother at first didn't work, she just devoted herself to having a family and taking care of the house—the traditional role of women. But, financial things got kind of tight and she was forced to go out and get a job, and that's when problems between them started, because my father, in very strong Latin tradition, felt that was threatening—that a woman should go out and work and have her own money and gain her own independence.

My mother didn't speak any English—she still doesn't—so I became the one that translated. It meant that she was ashamed to go to school because she couldn't speak English and talk to the teachers, and she didn't look as good as the other Americans, the other mothers. It meant that she always had to play a behind-the-scenes role, and she could never assert herself in dealing with any kind of institution.

I was the one that was the go-between. This happens to a lot of older children in Puerto Rican families—they become the link between the Puerto Rican culture and the American culture and the Puerto Rican way of life and the American institutions. They become, in a sense, the ones that come up against oppression the most. For example, when the landlord comes to the house to pick up the rent, it's the oldest one who speaks English who has to translate for the mother. When they go down to the unemployment office, it's the oldest one who goes as a translator, or when they go to the hospital. . . . So the oldest child usually comes in contact with these institutions, and feels, you know, the way that Puerto Rican people are treated.

We first lived on 124th Street, but it was torn down to build a project. So after that we lived on 106th Street, and they're still living there. The apartment has about five little rooms, and I always had to share a room with my younger sister because we always had to have boarders to help pay the rent, although at that time the rent wasn't very high.

My mother worked in the factories and my father worked two jobs in the hotel. He would leave the house about five-thirty in the morning, and he wouldn't come home till four or five. I don't really know what wages he was making because that's one thing that was kept from us. You know, this is something that happens in Puerto Rican families, where the parents have all the authority and the children don't question. There's even a saying in Spanish to the effect that children should speak only when spoken to.

The mother's just one step above the children—she doesn't question anything that the father does—and that's the way it was in my family. If I ever wanted any money, my mother would tell me to go to my father and ask for it. If I ever wanted to go anywhere, I would have to ask my father. If I ever wanted to have anyone over to the house, I would have to ask my father. And my father was not very close to us—he was very distant. He was maintaining his role as an authority figure, and an authority figure doesn't get involved with children or with the wife.

And then, of course, you also have the thing, *machismo*, which is very strong, so that the man feels he has to go out with other women. My father always did that—there was always another woman—and all I remember is my mother sitting and crying. So I developed very negative attitudes toward Puerto Rican men.

My mother's not that old, she's in her middle forties, but she looks like she's in her fifties or sixties—completely destroyed, constantly sick. They say she has a nervous condition. Actually, it's just a reaction to oppression. She's worked in a factory for twenty-three years.

There was one thing that was always very big in the family, that there were no brothers, that my father didn't have any sons. He himself was the oldest son of the oldest son of the oldest son. I was supposed to be a son but I wasn't, and then there were no other sons to carry on the family name. That really got to my pops, so I guess that's one of the reasons he started running around, trying to develop a son somewhere else.

My father can be sick or whatever, but he's never missed a day of work—not even a day—because you've got to support, you've gotta do it. It's a strong thing, you know: "In Puerto Rico I worked and got my money, and here I'm working and getting my money. But I can't make ends meet. I can't pay the rent, my wife went out to work. . . ." He's completely crushed. His whole conception of manhood, which is fucked up anyway, is destroyed.

One time he was dealing in running numbers so that he could supplement, but he got caught, so he stopped that. What happened was that he just kind of gave up trying to deal with things and tried to pretend that everything was okay by developing something else on the outside. He would have nice clothes that he would buy for himself and for his other woman, and in that way pretend that things were okay. Or he goes to Puerto Rico and gives out money to relatives, like he's rich.

In the beginning I remember they used to talk a lot about going back to Puerto Rico. When I was four we went, and then after six years we went again. My mother would always tell me how, although it was hard for her there, it was much nicer—she didn't have to deal with the cold and people who spoke English and people who were in the factories. That at least she would be among her own. My father was coming from a more mercenary kind of thing where he wanted to go back and show that he had made good here, and buy a house and maybe some land and stuff like that. But as we got a little older we started seeing that it was kind of a fantasy, so that now my mother just talks about going back to visit, because she knows she doesn't have any hope of going back there to live. She doesn't have any hope of ever leaving that apartment—and she's been wanting to move for the last ten years. She filed an application with the projects because, you know, when you live in a tenement, the projects are always better. They're cleaner, they don't have rats and roaches, or it doesn't appear that they do. So that's what she aspires to now.

When I went to school I was placed in a class where I was the only Puerto Rican. That helped me a lot in one sense, and it fucked me up in another. The way that it helped me was that I began to see contradictions. Like, we lived on the West Side, a liberal white community, and all the white kids would go home one way, and I would go home another. All the white kids dressed a certain way, too. Like, the girls' skirts didn't get wrinkled, and mine did. They talked about going away to camp, and I would talk about going to *El Barrio* for the summer. I got to see these contradictions very young, but as a result I became timid and felt inferior. I became very ashamed of my family, because they weren't what it was to be American.

You know, we lived in a typical kind of ghetto apartment—no hot water. Sometimes we would go for days without taking a bath, and I would see myself next to the other kids and feel that I was dirty, because I was not white. Or, you know, there'd be rats, and I'd stay up sometimes hoping that the rats wouldn't get into the baby's crib. I'd keep the light on all night and take turns watching with my other sister. My sister and I slept in one room that was divided by a curtain into two. The baby slept on the other side of the curtain, and my sister and I slept in the same bed. It'd get so ridiculous, you'd fight over blankets, you'd fight over . . . I mean, everything is always very antagonistic in that kind of setting. You don't have any privacy, so that if you feel upset or you want to cry, you can't slam the door to your room and go upstairs—you just lock yourself in the bathroom. You could even hear the neighbors next door, there were always people out on the street. . . . I remember when I got into a really big school thing, the guys in the summertime would be playing the congas and it'd get really noisy out on the block, and I'd get pissed at them because I couldn't do my schoolwork, you know.

I started blaming my parents for not giving me anything better. I started hating them—feeling that it was their fault and that they were stupid and that if they'd really worked hard they could have gotten something better, rather than realizing that they were just being victimized and that there was no place for them to go, there was nothing for them to do.

In our family it has always been us two older sisters who have played the pioneer roles. You go to school, coming from a very strict, patriarchal type of family, and you have a conception of things that you can do and things that you can't, and these conceptions start to be broken down. For example, you find that other kids stay over at each other's houses, which is something that you would never be allowed to do as a female. And I wasn't allowed to go to the library until I was in junior high school, when the teachers forced me to go, 'cause my mother and father, coming from a rural thing, didn't know what that was all about.

I was supposed to always come home right from school. I could never visit anyone and no one could visit me—you didn't have strangers in the house because of the fear of strangers, the feelings of inferiority. And I developed these feelings too. I wouldn't have people over to my house—especially the kids that I went to school with, the white kids—because I felt that my house didn't live up to their standards. So I was in a kind of limbo situation. I hung out with the kids on the block, but I went to school with other kids who didn't really consider me part of them because they considered me part of the Puerto Ricans, whom they didn't exactly like.

When I was in seventh grade, I was very friendly with this girl named Susie whom I'd known since kindergarten. She knew that her parents didn't like Puerto Ricans, but she was gonna show them that I was okay—so she took me to her house for lunch. I went and I was very uncomfortable, because I didn't know all this table etiquette and shit. At home we usually ate on the bed or on the floor or in front of the TV or wherever we could eat, 'cause the kitchen wasn't big enough to hold the whole family. I had tried to dress right and speak correctly and not let my accent show, and I thought everything went okay. But that afternoon at school, her father came in and told me that he had a pair of gloves lying on the kitchen table when I was there and when I left they weren't there anymore, and did I know where they were. So I got very indignant and said, "Yeah, that's all we Puerto Ricans do is steal." I just told him off. I refused, I refused to degrade myself and deny that I had taken them—I just said, "Fuck it." You know, you wanna think that, I can't change your ways. Eventually the gloves were found and he wrote me a letter apologizing for this, but I just couldn't accept it.

When I was in eighth grade I got involved in a thing with the kids from the neighborhood where we stole a hundred dollars. I got caught. The truant officer—his name was Big John—caught me counting the money out on the street, 'cause I was *stupid*. They took me to my father's job, and he was humiliated because I had put him through such shame, and they took me to my mother's job and she cried. We came home and my father gave the hundred dollars to the truant officer, plus fifty dollars so that he wouldn't take me in and give me a JD card. And after that I wasn't in with that group of kids. When I went back to them, they said, "Where's the money?" And I said, "Well, you know, I don't have it 'cause my father gave it as a bribe." And they said, "Oh, man, you fucked up, and you're full of shit!" I said, "Fuck it, man. You know, it was either me getting a record or giving the money." But they didn't understand.

My sister—the one two years younger than me—would go to school, but she wasn't part of it either, and she never got into being with people on the block. She was quieter and more timid.

Since the two of us older kids had not turned out so hot because we had gone to public school—which my mother thought accounted for it—she put my other sister into a Catholic school so she could turn out better. The Catholic school had a lot of Irish kids, and the nuns were coming from a thing very oriented toward *them* and not at all toward Puerto Ricans—so that my sister wouldn't even admit that she was Puerto Rican. Finally she turned into a whole street thing. She just decided that she was gonna deal with the people on the block and fuck everything else. She didn't deal with school at all, although she's very bright. She became very rebellious.

And the youngest one—well, you know, all of us got scared because the public school didn't work, my mother said, and the Catholic school didn't work, so we found a way of putting her in private school. *She's* fucked up because she knows she doesn't belong there. She gets into fights with the kids all the time. They organize gangs and they fight each other, and there's a lot of racism going on.

All of us, you see, went through different kinds of things, and yet there's that common thing where we didn't fit for some reason or another, because we were labeled from the beginning, we were made tokens. You know, when you're a kid and being oppressed, you don't understand that it's a whole system, capitalism. All you see is that your pops comes home, when he comes home, and that there ain't enough bread there for the family, or that your mother works at a factory and why can't she work someplace else, why doesn't she learn how to speak English. Like, I used to get on my mother about that all the time. As a matter of fact, the teachers in school used to tell me, "Make her speak English, so that you can speak bettter English."

The rest of the family—aunts, uncles, cousins, and everybody else—considered us kind of odd because we wanted to go on, get more education, and we were kind of rebellious. I started doing organizing when I was young, I started out with the people in my building, trying to organize them into a tenants' group. I was about fifteen, and they thought I was crazy, 'cause what kind of woman goes around knocking on doors and telling people all this kind of stuff? They just saw that I didn't have any respect, 'cause that's a big thing in Puerto Rican families to have respect—and especially in my age group, you have to have respect for your family, and you have to learn how to cook and take care of children, because that's what your role is going to be. When I or my other sister would go out, my mother would say, "Well, you think you're a man—you think you're a man." I got a beating one time for coming home at three-thirty, because I was always supposed to be home at three. I used to stand on the corner and talk to the guys and girls from school, and when I came home one time at three-thirty, for the third or fourth time in a row, I got a really bad beating. For weeks I couldn't walk well. And that's how you teach respect—very physically. You know, very authoritarian.

The Catholic Church was another thing too. What happens is you have to go through all the rituals—baptism, communion, confirmation—even if your family is not into a deeply religious bag. There's that whole thing about having to confess your sins—*everything* is a sin in the Catholic Church—you get that on top of the strictness and the patriarchy. And since the Catholic Church is kind of elitist, that whole cultural thing of inferiority is reinforced. The Catholic Church says you have to dress well to come into the House of God, that boys and girls can't mingle together. The Church also reinforces that authoritarian thing with the father and with the mother, and the kind of controls they have over you, 'cause, you know, God is looking out. It's just taken for granted that there is God and there is the Church, and that you have to respect it—and that goes hand in hand with the whole respect that you must have for elders, the whole respect you must have for your parents, the whole respect for your teachers, the whole respect for authority.

You know, sometimes I sit and I wonder how all my development came, politically. And I think it's happened in the last five years, when I decided to leave home. And that was, like, a big scandal in the family. But it was worth it. It was worth all the hassle and everything, because now I can see what is happening, and being in the Party, I can share this with more people.

You know, there used to be only four choices for the Puerto Rican woman—housewife, prostitute, or drug addict, and then, when the society needed more labor for its sweatshops, she would become a worker.

Now there's a new choice open to her that threatens the existence of the family and the state itself: The Revolution.

"America should never have taught us to read, she should never have given us eyes to see."

by Felipe Luciano

The first ten years of my life were spent in the projects. Long, long, vertical buildings, shit-encrusted walls—there were no rats and roaches, but it was its own prison. It's always reminded me of a mental institution—people closed in, not allowed to expand at all. I grew up there like most of the other Puerto Rican Black brothers and sisters in *El Barrio*.

When I went to public school, I was a bright student, very bright, but I was always a behavior problem—that's what the teachers told me. I rebelled against everything. There was something that I was always looking for as a child. I always knew that I had to do something, as romantic and as weird as this may sound. What that thing was, I didn't really know. I had images and dreams of becoming a doctor, becoming a social worker. Of course before any of those very legitimate dreams, I wanted to be a cowboy on a horse, riding through the plains in my big sombrero. I read *Cowboy Sam* and *Curious George* and Dr. Seuss—very, very entranced. My world was expanded because I was able to read a lot at a very early age.

We were very, very poor. My mother was separated from my father when she was three months pregnant with my sister. They had been married for about three years, and had had one baby right after the other. We went through the welfare scene—the welfare syndrome as I call it—always waiting for that check, anticipating that check, heart beating, mouth dry, arguing with each other. My brother, sister and myself used to fight each other for scraps of food on the table. When that welfare check was supposed to come, we used to run downstairs, open that mailbox. You played a game with yourself—you turned the key very slowly and peeked in the box very slowly, and if that welfare check wasn't there, there were two reactions you used to have. Like when we wanted to be cruel, when we wanted to get back at my mother for a beating she'd given us, we used to go and tell her the check had come and then we'd tell her it hadn't. Otherwise we'd come up with morose-looking faces and say "The check didn't come." I remember those days, I remember almost begging for food.

You resign yourself to poverty—my mother did this. Your face is rubbed in shit so much that you begin to accept that shit as a reality.

You've never seen anything else. Like the only thing we knew was that block. You never went out of that block. I didn't know there was a Museum of Modern Art. I didn't know that there were people who were living much, much better. I didn't know about racism. I mean we were just on that block—and that block was our home, it was all we knew.

The images of that poverty. . . . My stomach rumbling. My mother beating me when I knew it was because of my father—you know, they just had an argument where he almost hit her. The welfare investigator cursing out my mother because what she wants is spring clothing for her children and he's telling her how she just can't have it—when I read in the magazines that people—you know, other people—had spring clothes. Why couldn't we have clothes for Easter? And he's telling her, like, in a sense, "Fuck you." And I remember images of my saying, "When I grow up I'm gonna kill every welfare investigator I see, every one of them—you know, strangle them."

There's nothing extraordinary you know in my childhood—maybe just that I learned very early how to become accepted, how to rise above and beyond, as they say. Even at that point we knew that to the extent that we became white—we would advance in school. To the extent that we spoke properly—we would get Satisfactory or Excellent on our report cards. To the extent that we conformed—we were accepted. And since I read well, and I spoke well, I rose in terms of classes. And I remember the teachers always saying, when I hit a teacher or would throw a chair through a window, or would lead a group of cats through a riot in the cafeteria—a near-riot in the fourth or fifth grade—the teachers grabbed me by the side, grabbed me by my ear, you know. Wrenching my ear and saying, "You know you have so much potential. Why do you act like that? I mean look at your marks—you have so much potential. . . ." That thing went through all my school life—those words were uttered time and time again: "You have so much potential." Of course, what they considered potential was certainly not what I later became.

And my mother was very frustrated also. She couldn't get a job, she wanted to get off welfare. I never looked upon my mother as a woman; she was always my mother. I never looked upon her as a Black Puerto Rican woman who was oppressed—she was just Mommy. She's fat, she is a *bear*, you know, and I remember snuggling between her neck and . . . peace, you know it's peace, 'cause nobody can hurt you when you're with Mommy, 'cause Mommy's the big protector. Not Daddy, but Mommy—Daddy wasn't ever there. And she too wanted to get out, but she didn't know how. You know, she always wanted me to do something, since I was the first born. I was getting into a lot of trouble. But she had these images of me becoming something.

Finally we moved to California to get away from New York and because my mother wanted to go back to my grandmother. California was such an enlightening experience because I saw all these people—Japanese, Chinese, white people—they lived together without the kind of separation that you see in New York. And it was sunny all the time, like there was no snow, you know—just eighty-five-degree weather all the motherfuckin' time. I got *black;* I got black as the sun, man, and I got fat and healthy. I entered the fourth grade and got good grades in school. We had fields—this was in Wilmington, California, before they industrialized—we had fields that we used to run through. After school that's all we'd be doing. I got into track because I always wanted to do that, but I didn't have the chance to do it in New York. I had a lot of happiness, a lot of fun there because the environment was completely different. There were trees, there were horses, which I had never seen. They had a corral, a stable just a block away from the house. Just to see a horse, just to touch him was like another kind of world for me.

But it wasn't to last long. We stayed there only four months. My father was supposed to send us money in a legal separation. But he didn't send it. He got very bitter when my mother took us away, it seems. And though he hadn't done a motherfucking thing for us—remember that when I say that, I'm just remembering the bitterness of my younger years, because I really don't hate him—at that point, he felt my mother had slighted him by taking the kids away. Without the money from him we couldn't survive because my grandmother couldn't take the burden. So we had to go back. And we had to ask the welfare in Wilmington for the money. I remember the very degrading experience of my mother having to go there and be insulted three, four times during that week.

We only had enough money to pay our train fare; we had no money for food. So my grandmother, in a little handkerchief, tied up all of the coins she had. Of course, it didn't last us beyond Union Station in L.A. But we left, and I'll never forget, man, we were starving, you know, literally starving on that train coming back. Big, plush train and no food. We would look at people—you learn how to look at a person to let him know that you're hungry—and they'd give us a little tidbit, but it wasn't much. And I was very concerned for my mother, because throughout the whole trip she held her head in her hands. And it was traumatic, it was horrible, having to see my mother go through shit like that. I felt so responsible for her that I felt like a little man, since I was the oldest. And I was always to my mother lover, confidant, trustee, everything rolled into one.

On that train, hungry as we were, the only thing that saved us were some Black brothers working in the kitchen, and they saw us and we would walk in, we sat down and had some water in front of us. My mother with those little pennies bought some pastries and some coffee and tea because she couldn't afford any more. And the cats knew we were starving, I don't know how they knew, but they just started bringing things to us—burnt blueberry pie, I'll never forget it was burnt, but it was all they could afford, and they gave it to us. And that's how we survived—by them giving us little things. I don't know where they are, man, but all power to them wherever they are. I mean they saved us, I don't know how we would have gotten through that trip without them, 'cause I would've started robbin' or something.

Anyway, we got to New York and we ended up living right back on 112th Street, but in a different project. And for three years we lived there. I went to another school, and again, the same shit. I was, as my mother says, fucking up. I was still into my thing.

At that stage I was living a double life. On the one hand I was going with my mother to church. I grew up in the Puerto Rican Pentecostal Church, which is a scene unto itself—I mean it's a different world. The Holy Spirit, speaking tongues, body contortions, jumping on the floor, vomiting out demons, people entering trances—*vahilias,* as we call them in Spanish—which are just seances almost, that are held overnight . . . all those things I was very involved in. Man, I was a *fervent* church-goer. Even with all the streetfighting I was getting into. That's not unusual. We find in our community—the Puerto Rican community—that things are compatible. For instance, people have Catholic saints and at the same time they'll have a Voodoo doll, you know, or a piece of bread above the door so that the evil spirits can eat that and leave in peace.

So I made the church and the fighting compatible, you know. I would always just shut up about the fighting. I would never tell her. After church or before church she would talk about people beating up each other and be condemning them for it. I might be coming in from a fight myself, but I'd be coming in goodie-goodie and go to church with her, right. And so I just led that kind of a double life.

In school, the same kind of thing happened. I happened to *love* to read.

In fact I just raped books. I used to go to the library, get ten at a time, and just shut myself in my room, because that was my way of escape. Like getting into another world—with horses and trees and flowers, and fighting and adventures—going up on a mountain, and doing all those things that, you know, white folks do.

There were only a very few people that you could talk to about it. I mean, we still hadn't gotten to the point where we were that close to each other. But I had one or two friends—Big Ben, Richard as we called him, and June Bug, right, and we used to sit down and say, "Man, you know, Mount Everest is the highest mountain. I wish we could climb that one, man." We used to talk about riding horses, we used to talk about, oh, so many things.

But at the same time, I was of the street. I had to prove to my friends that I was just as bad as they were. I was always into fighting and scullies—Crack-top as we called it—using spinning tops to crack another guy's top. . . . That's really a ghetto game. Whoever couldn't spin his top had to put his in the middle, and all of us would take turns trying to crack his top—and yet each one cost fifteen cents, and for us that was a lot of money, right. Hot Peas and Butter, that's another game we played. Whoever is It takes a belt, and screams "Hot Peas and Butter," and goes around and whips the *hell* out of whoever he catches. Very violent games on *each other*. . . . We laugh about it now, but it was very rough, as you begin to think about it, how we murdered each other every day. I was vicious when it came to fighting, simply because I didn't want to be considered a schoolboy, you know.

When I was in eighth grade, I had a teacher—I'll never forget her—Mrs. Shapiro—she introduced us to Shakespeare. Here we were in eight-two, which is, of course, a step below eight-one, and they had told her she'd never be able to have us accept Shakespeare—but we loved it, you know. I was Puck in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. We read *Twelfth Night*. We did *Romeo and Juliet*, which I thought was corn shit, and all kinds of things—but we began to enjoy Shakespeare.

And again I had to lead that double life. I enjoyed the fighting, you know. I enjoyed it—it was a release for all of us from whatever we were running from. We had our gang, we had our identity, we had our own community. We didn't realize it then—that the oppressor had taken away our community. What America has done is cause groups to fight each other to keep them from seeing the *real* cause of oppression. We didn't understand that then, man, we just understood that as far as we were concerned, you know, we wanted to be together. And we were very close to one another, and we used to goose each other—of course, had you called us homosexuals then, we would have just had a *fit,* but it was. . . . I mean, it's a natural stage for young cats to go through. And that was another factor involved in it. . . .

Oppression binds you together, sometimes in a negative manner, because you have nothing else to look at. You bind yourselves in locales, and one locale will fight against another. All of the energy that we had against the oppressor was perpetrated on our own people. . . . If I just begin to add up the number of brothers and sisters who had lye thrown in their faces—'cause we used to mix red lye in Pepsi-Cola and throw it in a cat's face—the number of brothers who are now crippled, the number of brothers who are *dead* because of those gang fights, it would number into the thousands.

There are very, very few survivors. Big Ben is a dope fiend, Charlie is a dope fiend. . . . June Big is a very frustrated man—he was brilliant, brilliant as a child, brilliant mind, so was Big Ben, by the way. June Bug ended up as a hospital orderly, and that's what he's doing now. Peachhead is on drugs. Leon, his brother, was shot in the streets and died. The others have died in Viet Nam, or are out on drugs now. One, Angelo, is in Harvard—no, he went to MIT—but he's now working for anti-poverty and lost to the world.

And for me I saw no future. College was to me like a dream, I could never get there. I think that's one of the things—that fear—that led me into, you know, like, vicious, man, vicious fighting. Not knowing what to do with your life, even though you've been taught the American Dream. America has sown her own seeds of destruction, because she's made oppressed people eat that dream up hook, line and sinker and when they found it shattered, they decided that the only way to begin to build that dream for themselves—interpret it for all oppressed people—is to shatter it, shatter the reality that is ugly, and begin to build a new one. America should never have taught us how to read, she should never have given us eyes to see.

Beyond Survival: Por que Sequiremos Siendo Puertorriqueños*

Frank Bonilla

One of the burdens of the wealthy is that they must from time to time take stock of their possessions. Thus, when a people become the simple possession of another, one of the experiences the colonized must face is to periodically see themselves and all that is theirs coldly assessed by various agents of the overlord. In Puerto Rico this process began very soon after the arrival of the first U.S. occupying force. In March of 1899 Acting Secretary of War, G.D. Meiklejohn, called on Department commanders in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to report ''upon the existing state of the inhabitants and the national resources of the islands.'' A sizeable outline of required information was provided which was to be transmitted ''together with general observations as to opportunities for investment.'' [1] Reporting from Arecibo to Brigadier General George W. Davis, the military governor of Puerto Rico, a certain Captain Macomb wrote in that year:

> But the people—and I discuss the poor, working class—are, upon the whole, a gentle, patient, uncomplaining lot, living in ignorance and penury, generally polite,

---

*This essay was originally delivered as a lecture by Professor Bonilla at a lecture series sponsored by the Institute of Puerto Rican Studies of Brooklyn College in the spring of 1971. The lectures delivered during the series are available in a pamphlet published by the Institute, *A New Look at the Puerto Ricans and Their Society*. The essay is reprinted here with the permission of the author and the Institute of Puerto Rican Studies of Brooklyn College.

> and willing to work in a plodding, undemonstrative way. Their very gentleness has permitted the unjust scale of wages they receive to become the custom. [2]

The captain dutifully went on to note that "In the United States general education and the newspapers and labor unions forever prevent such abuse." In the nearby district of Aguadilla a fellow officer, Captain Dentler, found things much the same.

> The people seem willing to work, even at starvation wages, and they seem to be docile and grateful for anything done for them. They are emotional, apt to make idols of some one of their number, and to be led about by him only to pull him to pieces later on. [3]

Across the island in Ponce, Lt. Blunt had apparently come upon slightly more stubborn human material.

> The natives are lazy and dirty, but are very sharp and cunning, and the introduction of American ideas disturbs them little, they being indifferent to the advantages offered. [4]

However, Blunt's premonitions about the unresponsiveness of the natives to the virtues of things American were not widely shared. The more affirmative view stated forthrightly by the aforementioned Capt. Dentler was that, "When American ideas are once inculcated into the people, they will never let go of them and will benefit from them." [5]

What are we to make of the fact that 70 years of increasingly elaborate social science research on Puerto Rico and its mainland offshoots have added practically nothing to the imagery of the Puerto Rican current among our U.S. overseers that could not readily be inferred or extrapolated from the 1900 impressions of the Dentlers and the Blunts? Are Puerto Ricans as a people so transparent, uniform and unchanging that our essential qualities could have been captured so quickly, once and for all, by the untrained eye of the first American occupation force? The obvious answer to this question in my view is that neither Lt. Blunt's appraisals nor much of the subsequent formal research have a great deal to do with the questions to which Puerto Ricans really require answers. These depictions are, on the contrary, successive salvos in a mind-warping exchange that has disfigured and scarred mentalities among both rulers and ruled. This fragmentary and distorted self-knowledge constitutes a crippling heritage from which, I believe, none of us has so far achieved more than partial deliverance.

Puerto Rican Inferiority

The case for Puerto Rican inferiority has many strands and all have been subsequently embellished since the turn of the century. Many of these recurrent themes would seem on the surface to have little to do with politics. Yet the way in which such issues are posed, the rationales that are appealed to in explaining alleged shortcomings, and the paths pointed to as solutions have enormous political consequences. All invidious stereotyping, however hackneyed and timeworn, has political content and overtones.[6] We do not need to dwell very long here on the more obvious forms of social rejection implicit in such crude forms of labelling. Are Puerto Ricans by nature and choice noisy, foul-mouthed, garish in dress, truculent and oversexed? These may be taken as good reasons to avoid Puerto Ricans as neighbors and workmates and to remove one's own from schools frequented by Puerto Rican children. But such images have an adverse political effect chiefly when Puerto Ricans themselves begin to believe they have something to gain by fleeing from their own kind. The more corrosive features of the legend are thus those that destroy the bases of solidarity among a people, that undermine their political confidence, that systematically throw into question their capacity for self-government, and that arbitrarily close off to them desired futures. The essential components of the carefully cultivated myth of Puerto Rican political inferiority have been handed down practically unchanged since their appearance in their most ingenuous form in the War Department report that has been cited.[7] The Puerto Rican, we have been told in countless ways since then, is by disposition docile and submissive. His political impulses and capabilities are primitive (as measured against a falsely idealized mainland standard). He is dependent on outside (U.S.) leadership and models to break the hold of poverty and injustice on his society.

This net of constraining and defeating ideas encumbers our vision and action wherever we find ourselves. Whether on the island or in New York, breaking out of this confining encirclement is a first step toward that space in which we may take a liberating breath. Oppression lies wherever these ideas reign; our freedom is to be found wherever they can be exposed as a mere rationale for denying a people full manhood. What then stands between ourselves and freedom? Chiefly the difference between recognizing the repressive content in ideas and fully understanding what gives them power over us and lends strength to those who wield them against us. More specifically we have before us the unfinished work of sorting out that part of our oppression that is subjective and that which rests on more material factors and therefore requires more than a cleansing of minds in order to be overcome.

The pervasiveness of the notion of Puerto Rican passivity and submissiveness is not to be denied. ". . . there is hardly any area of Puerto Rican society," we have been told by René Marqués, "in which just a light scratching will not reveal docility as a constant and determinant feature."[8] Marqués certainly demonstrates that the theme is a recurrent one in Puerto Rican literature and that Puerto Ricans have generated a rich and graphic vocabulary to express their consciousness of being a subjected people. His essay is at once a scathing, pained and painful exposé of the colonized mentality and the devices by which the oppressed seek to live with the humiliation of long felt powerlessness. This fact lends added weight to his argument. His is an authoritative and literarily informed view from the inside. Therefore, it not only collects and echoes but sets off reverberations of its own. Marqués's thesis has to be taken seriously not only with respect to the psychological and literary ground that he defines for himself but with respect to the many political inferences that he makes along the way.

The official rhetoric has come to celebrate Puerto Ricans as a democratic, tolerant, and peace-loving people. In days when we were more honest and more candid with each other, affirms Marqués, we acknowledged that these terms mean fatalistic, resigned, supine ("ñangotado," i.e., content to remain on our haunches as regards matters of the spirit). The commonwealth is a perfect political expression of this mentality. A Puerto Rican solution is one in which what looks inevitable is transformed into a national project. Our political violence, he affirms, is not revolutionary or revealing of heightened political consciousness but a heroism of despair. The nationalist movement is the maximum expression of a deeply ingrained suicidal impulse (the island, in fact, has a very high suicide rate). The statehood option reflects an equivalent impulse to extinction on a cultural plane. The rebel, middle class writer and intellectual is celebrated but absorbed; he relieves tensions but changes no one. In this bleak panorama Marqués provides a single ray of hope: his suggestion that the Puerto Rican in New York, as he loses the stain of his tropical origins ("la mancha del plátano") may eventually throw off the impulse to self-effacement and obliteration.

What Marqués chronicles with considerably more effect and detail than the sketch just given reveals is the psychological damage and cultural mayhem worked on Puerto Ricans by centuries of exploitation. He exposes the violence of colonialism but falls short in the apparent presumption that the colonized will indefinitely turn the destructive forces thus generated against themselves. The dialectic of impotence and stubborn resistance, however covert and diffuse, is perceived as a grinding friction shredding individuals and social ties but is denied any prospect of political resolution. We are, perhaps, developing a dangerous virtuosity in documenting the prostration, insecurity, ambivalences, and ideological bafflement within our ranks and assigning too little value to the contrary signs that point to a remarkable capacity for survival in a context of prolonged and radical ambiguity. Few people have been forced to move about the world for so long under such false (externally imposed), discordant and provisional (incompletely realized) identities. What can Puerto Ricans anywhere, most of us still passing through this mind-rending experience, ask or expect of each other?

This is a permanent, underlying question in most of what I want to review here. It is, of course, a question that never arises in the observations of the Dentlers, Blunts and their successors with more scientific pretensions. They are not searching passionately for meaningful commitments and viable paths to the advancement of Puerto Rican goals. They are content to document what they perceive as political bankruptcy, the fantasied superiority and invincibility of mainland political designs and the need, therefore, of extending U.S. tutelage indefinitely, however it may be mediated. Yet what kind of political bonds, commitments, and thrust can in fact be maintained in such adverse contexts? When individual lives on a massive scale are blasted by the impossibility of living up to the most private commitments to loved persons, where is the work of social reconnection to begin? If it is within a man's reach only momentarily and with great sacrifice to create and mount an idealized situation of abundance or conviviality for his family or friends, does he need a psychologist to tell him he is giving in to impulses or an anthropologist to inform him he is caught in a fiesta complex? When stability can be found in a galling accommodation to a low-keyed, routined existence, will some not lash out rebelliously against something they know needs to be destroyed? When the enemy is elusive and a fantastic price is paid for striking out against him, will not bizarre modes of copping out be invented or more accessible victims be found to be immolated in his place?[9] This of course will only certify a proneness to erratic behavior and more serious mental disturbances. Then, of course, intellectuals will reproach the mass for being politically inert and unresponsive to political ideals. They will credit to the exemplary action of a few leaders the survival of the independence ideal and the stubborn resilence of a culture surviving against tremendous odds.[10] By contrast the politics of personalism, of social work, of the poverty warriors, and the bootstrap will be seen to flourish. On the island and in mainland ghettoes the practical politicians, who understand how to manipulate "bread & butter" issues, will announce that they have saved their people from a corrosive nationalism and taught them to place economic solutions and speedy assimilation before vague political aspirations or the survival of cherished lifeways. With this they round out and hammer home the legend of Puerto Rico's conformity and purchased submission to an externally defined second-rate status.[11] While the subculture of prostitution and sexual exploitation flourishing in the island backwaters of dependent capitalism and New York slums is minutely recorded as a prototype of what is Puerto Rican, political leaders speak of Operation Serenity. While Puerto Rican young men are conscripted to brutalize others and give their lives in the undeclared wars of another nation, island statisticians tally the value to the economy of the remitted earnings and the social benefits that accrue on the island as the price of this military service. No wonder then that the legend comes back to mock us as in the words of an acute observer, the historian Richard Morse.

> Within this longer perspective, Puerto Rican political formulations take on a hollow ring. They seem designed for a people which is 'shopping' for status . . . No one would deny that voluntary political change should obey, among other things, broad economic considerations. But it is surprising that a people which prides itself on a Hispanic 'soul' should translate them into dollars and cents reckoning carried to the last decimal point.[12]

Such a remark may be offensive and characteristically omits any details concerning the nature of the market in which a nation is brought to trade its pride and integrity for survival. Still it captures a fragment of truth of which we are all painfully conscious. On another plane altogether is the main conclusion of a more recent and professedly "sympathetic" study of student politics at the University of Puerto Rico.

> Contemporary Puerto Rican students, the children of their fathers, have disproved a maxim that has characterized nationalist movements in many areas of the world.

> Puerto Ricans, including their fathers, have shown that man *can* live by bread alone. (italics in the original).[13]

Se le ovlidó notar a este joven científico que el pan con que se imagina le han llenado las bocas a los puertorriqueños ha sido poco, duro, y muy bien cobrado.

The Politics of Migration

Migration itself is thus transformed into a suspect act. Does it represent a massive capitulation, a sellout, escape, or suicide? Is there really no alternative open to Puerto Ricans, whether here or on the island, except full Americanization, a slow extinction and absorption into the underclass of decaying cities? Under what conditions can Puerto Ricans not merely survive but grow affirmatively as a culturally integrated and distinctive collectivity in the mainland context? If we are trying to throw off one set of destructive lies or partial truths, we gain nothing by simply improvising a more congenial set of premises about ourselves or our future prospects. Let it be clear that we are talking about an unprecedented job of psychological and cultural reconstitution and construction that must rest on a very special political and economic infra-structure. If we are unable to imagine outcomes that would satisfy our aspirations, how can we know when we are making or losing ground?

Between 1960 and 1970 the Puerto Rican population in New York shot to over a million. Over that decade the numbers of New York-born Puerto Ricans grew by 150 per cent while those born on the island and living in the States grew by only nineteen per cent.[14] This population overall is extremely young, averaging about 21 years in 1960. The eventual predominance of the mainland born is a significant fact, for the way in which they relate to their putative Americanness will prove decisive in terms of the community's future. As one of the older members of this so-called second generation, I feel a special responsibility to make explicit some of the political implications of choices that lie before us. There are certain core realities that we need to face up to and that we ourselves often conspire to mask or dissemble.

In the first place we are a captured people and remain captives. Formal rights of citizenship and apparent freedom of movement within the country's borders notwithstanding, we remain in a situation that is alien and not of our making. Our parents could not give us any citizenship other than that which, in a watered down form, was imposed on them.

Secondly, the amalgam of U.S. and island cultures and its mainland transplants has, from the Puerto Rican side, never been seen as a simple fusion. Puerto Ricans are not culturally Americans, and we must have the courage to speak up and affirm that we do not wish to be Americans if we are honestly committed to building on our Puerto Rican roots. Even the most ardent proponents of statehood or other forms of political association with the United States have been at pains to make clear that the island intended to remain true to its Hispanic and Antillean traditions. This fact has not passed unnoticed though it has elicited primarily sardonic comment.

> From the Puerto Rican point of view, this eventual society is perhaps not best described as 'bi-cultural.' For indeed, it is the Hispanic tradition that will supply the 'culture' while the United States will merely supply methods, technics, organizational charts, money for pump priming, and a market of 180 million people.[15]

As frequently occurs in such appraisals, the terms here become subtly inverted. Puerto Rico is depicted as ready to exploit the U.S. market while being neurotically standoffish about U.S. culture or unrealistic about the consequences of accepting certain technologies. The economic facts, of course, are exactly the reverse. The tiny island is one of the United States' largest and most lucrative export markets. Puerto Rican exports to the mainland market of 180 million are almost entirely the output of U.S. producers taking advantage of cheap labor and other benefits of the offshore, commonwealth location. As regards the cultural argument, the Puerto Rican position has simply never been, as is insinuated, that U.S. technology could be appropriated without an impact on social organization or lifeways though defenses have in fact been inadequate.

I think we have to recognize in this long-standing rejection of a quick transfer of identity a profoundly political act that is decidedly life affirming and nonsuicidal. Within the most recent flow of migrants, a current that now seems to move directly from rural island settings to eastern seaboard cities, this awareness and search for a viable design for survival remains very much alive. Recent research in Boston reports that the most characteristic group accepts neither isolation nor assimilation.[16] This search for a space within which Puerto Ricans may live and grow in full freedom has been a constant in the fifty years or more that we have been a visible presence in U.S. cities. It is the counterpoint to the rejection in U.S. culture of all groups that are racially distinct or racially suspect. Speaking of Blacks, American Indians, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans, Eduardo Seda has written:

> These groups have failed to adapt to the American melting pot because they are differentiated on the basis of racial criteria and in assimilating into the dominant American culture, these groups internalize the stigma and the self hatred ingrained in that culture against the people of color. In order to avoid the stigma inherent in the internalization of American culture these groups must maintain their own cultural identity as a separate entity in a pluralistic social scheme.[17]

Over the last decade, as the nature of the U.S. role abroad has been incontestably exposed at home, to become fully American has come to mean as well accepting the stigma and mission of the oppressor of others seeking liberation. To shrink from embracing this identity is hardly to be seen as an act of mere malcontents or cranks, neurotically attached to a failing culture.

The history of the Puerto Rican migration has yet to be written. The 1910 census registered some 1,500 Puerto Ricans born in the continental United States. This number had risen to 53,000 by 1930 and 70,000 by 1940. By 1950 the quarter million mark was close, and two decades later we number more than a million, nearly a third of all those with identifiable Puerto Rican parentage under U.S. jurisdiction. Because this movement has been chronicled chiefly by demographers and migration specialists, most of what we know has to do with a few characteristics of this population and small changes in these that signal gains in or obstacles to "assimilation."[18] By the late 1960's small "advances" could be documented for second generation Puerto Ricans as against their island born neighbors: They were not only more youthful but had more years of schooling, higher status jobs, larger incomes, married early and more often outside their group, and had fewer children. A newly noted trend was the shift in migration away from New York City which was said to augur a "diaspora" in which the second generation would spread throughout the nation. The growth of ethnic defense organizations and the penetration by some Puerto Ricans into the higher levels of the local party structure and municipal bureaucracy is also hailed as a sign of accelerating assimilation. The fact that, vis-a-vis other victimized groups, Puerto Ricans remain significantly at a disadvantage on every count (housing, education, income, jobs, health), is rarely mentioned in such accounts. Other groups have paid a similar price of admission for their place in the city and nation. After all, too, Puerto Ricans arrived inopportunely and with some grave handicaps (i.e., ambiguous Spanish-African antecedents, stubborn attachment to a foreign language, a strange variant of Catholicism, what looked like an irregularly bestowed citizenship, and brazenly stated doubts about the wish to be American).

I want to use the rest of my time here to argue further that this kind of celebration of Puerto Rican assimilation or integration is premature and in error. These gains in education skills, earning power and geographic mobility do not signal a simple siphoning off of tensions and a shearing off of individuals into some imaginary American mainstream. Placed against the backdrop of other events and trends here and on the island, they have to be seen as potentially providing a wholly new level of awareness and leadership arising from the depths of a community still imprisoned in poverty and continuously renewed by newcomers entering at the most exploited level. These small successes are also to be seen against the backdrop of the proportions of this youthful generation who are hostages of the society in other settings—who are in schools that teach nothing, without jobs or in dead end jobs, fighting a war in which none believe, crammed into the nation's cell blocks. All of these settings—the streets, the high schools and colleges, the prison—have become radicalizing contexts intensifying awareness, sharpening political skills, stimulating reflection and analysis, generating new commitment.

The present system operates so destructively and arbitrarily that talented and thoughtful youth may wind up as readily behind prison walls as in the college classroom. I want to read briefly from a couple of letters from men in Soledad prison in California. I find these letters remarkable because Puerto Ricans in that prison are few and most have been separated from their community for many years since early adolescence.

> I know that it seems as if people are not able to hold together very long. But we who can get together must stay together and struggle that much harder for the freedom, justice and equality which we as oppressed people have never seen. As everyone who recognizes the struggle for what it really is knows, it's time to unite.

> I want to help our people . . . I've been doing a lot of thinking about forming a Puerto Rican Awareness Group . . . Our people, Black, Brown, Red, Yellow people (brothers) are in need of unity. I understand that there's always a new idea and new minds that get together for our cause. I sure would love to contribute my ideas and my brotherhood and love to the brothers who are trying very hard to bring in a better life for our people.

As the inmates are the first to say "not every brother inside the joint is a soldier." Nevertheless, the prisons like the schools and other institutions that up till very recently had served largely to shake and obliterate individuality and Puerto Rican identity, have somehow been in part turned around. Puerto Rican men in prison are defining for *themselves* the condition for their reconnection to society and doing so in terms of a politically informed concern for their own. The prisons have become a front of concern and action as vital to our community as housing, jobs, or schools.

From this perspective the fact that in the city university system alone there are today more than eight thousand Puerto Rican students will prove significant chiefly to the extent that the colleges and universities are also turned into contexts of liberating work. That liberating work involves not only casting off the blinders of a colonializing education which explains only our inferiority and impotence but developing counter values that thwart cooptation and elitism. Four fifths of employed Puerto Ricans are blue collar workers.[19] We will gain nothing by penetrating the university unless those who enter are an advance party with working lifelines to the street, the community, the prison, the island and every other setting in which things important to mainland Puerto Ricans as a collectivity are occurring.

This may seem like a heavy burden to place on young people going into a new and complex milieu that is unprepared for them and reluctant to accept new definitions of its functions. University administrators are quick to respond to such formulations with charges that we are seeking to polarize, politicize, subvert, and fragment institutions and academic traditions. "What will majors in Puerto Rican studies find to do?" they ask, while cheerfully passing out undergraduate degrees in 18th century French drama and medieval history. This is, of course, a defensive screen, for they would like us to be seen as irresponsible radicals, hustlers, and interlopers ready to box our young into a meaningless academic dead end just to have a base in a corner of the academy. In point of fact our needs are fairly modest though impossible to realize within the framework of the universities as now constituted. We are, after all, not preparing our youth to administer an empire, manage global wars, travel to the moon, or control restive minorities. We do need to undo the work of a deforming education, to vitalize and take command of our own process of cultural construction, and to understand the economic and political requirements for our survival as a community.

One additional statistic concerning the New York Puerto Rican population requires comment. In the 1960 census 96 per cent of that population was classified as white. Who is kidding whom? What is the extent of Puerto Rican complicity in this numerical charade? Are Puerto Rican social standards of race really so relaxed that all but a few qualify as white? Are we simply refusing to play the racial numbers game according to mainland rules? I want to repeat here a few remarks I have made often before. We live in a society that knows only black and white. Puerto Rican complacency and equivocation with respect to race and even our more genuine accommodations of racial differences have little place here. As we have discovered, here one is black, white, or a non-something. Still Puerto Ricans—white or black—have little comprehension of the deep racial animosities that divide mainland Americans. Many are understandably reluctant to become part of a fight that is to them ugly and meaningless. But we cannot continue to pretend to be an island of civility and racial harmony untouched by the storm of racial conflict that surrounds us. Again we must acknowledge that our culture—like all others dominated by Europeans—has taught us to experience blackness as misfortune. Our escapism and lack of realism with respect to race issues is as much grounded in such fears and self-doubts as in any affirmative principles of equality. If the Puerto Rican approach to race is really more humane, we have to prove it here. And the only convincing proof of moral strength in this connection is to stand up as proudly for what is black in us as individuals and for what is black in our community as we do for our Puerto-Ricanness.

Beyond Survival

According to all going theories of history, culture, and collective psychology, Puerto Ricans do not exist or are bound to disappear. We are said to have no real institutions, distinctive culture, or secure identity. Whatever fragments of such unifying ideals and sentiments we may have scraped together in the past are only a weak shield against the overwhelming onslaught of the dominant culture with its power to penetrate and engulf the alien. I believe we have to acknowledge the silence, surface submission, and non-militancy that has marked much of our past. But we need also to see beyond that to the tenacity and capacity for survival contained in the resolute avoidance of a capitulation on the cultural front. This is part of the mystery to be unraveled and turned now to surer political purpose. The option to struggle for full sovereignty in the island and power over our own mainland communities remains very much alive. Part of the success of the colonizer lies in having pitted Puerto Ricans against Puerto Ricans in part of that contention. But this only accentuates the ultimate contradictions and heightens our awareness of what threatens; the powerful have nothing to give us except death and now the prospect of fratricide.

But what content are we to give abstract ideas such as pluralism and power in the complex and conflict-ridden context of U.S. cities? What kind of culture can be built on such shallow economic and political under-pinnings? In the past we have mainly been offered theories and designs pointing to easily won, bright futures. The bootstrap image is a case in point; a prodigious feat defying natural laws but implying a soothing economy of effort. We have before us the first Puerto Rican generation an important part of which sees herioc struggle as its destiny. They correctly insist on keeping attention riveted on the everyday reality of the deprivation endured by Puerto Ricans. But we do need some future vision of a state of the world satisfactory to us. This does not mean a quest for grand theories or scientific truths, but a systematic probing for poltically significant truths. If we choose life, we have to understand what is life-giving and what deals death. If we choose to go beyond survival as a community, then our creativity must be fed by a collective vision that reaches out to Puerto Ricans everywhere. When people ask in what way Puerto Ricans differ from earlier immigrants, we must be ready with the true answer which is that we are a displaced offshoot of a people and a land that have yet to be liberated and whose freedom is our own.

NOTES

1. *Puerto Rico,* embracing the Report of Brig. Gen. Geo. W. Davis, Military Governor, U.S. War Dept., Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, 1899, p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 44.

3. Ibid., p. 45.

4. Ibid., p. 47.

5. Ibid., p. 45.

6. Among the scores of reviews of Oscar Lewis' *La Vida* (Random House, 1968) only that by Barrington Moore, Jr. *(New York Review of Books,* June 15, 1967) deals in a serious way

with the political implications of the culture of poverty thesis as it applies to Puerto Rico, even though Moore was among the few to disclaim any special knowledge of the Puerto Rican case.

7. Americans were not the first to attribute docility to Puerto Ricans. Similar observations had been made by Spaniards and Puerto Ricans before the U.S. invasion.

8. René Marqués. "El Puertorriqueño Dócil", *Revista de Ciencias Sociales,* Vol. VII, Nos. 1-2, 1963, p. 78.

9. The initiated will recognize in these remarks some of the 70 interrelated traits of the culture of poverty (Oscar Lewis, *A Study of Slum Culture,* New York: Random House, 1968.)

10. An otherwise highly useful and compact overview of nationalist thought and action in Puerto Rico has been called to task on this score. See Manuel Maldonado Denis, *Puerto Rico,* Siglo Veintiuno, 1969, and his "The Puerto Ricans: Protest or Submission," in the *Annals,* March 1969. The critique appears in *La Escalera,* Vol. IV, No. 1, June, 1970 (Gervasio Garcia, "Apuntes Sobre Una Interpretación de la Realidad Puertorriqueña").

11. On the progressive deflation of the commonwealth idea and its architects see Luis Nieves Falcón, "El Futuro Ideológico del Partido Popular Democrático," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales,* Vol. IX, No. 3, September 1965.

12. Richard M. Morse, "The Deceptive Transformation of Puerto Rico," paper delivered at a Conference on the Social Sciences in Historical Study, University of Michigan, May, 1959.

13. Arthur Liebman, *The Politics of Puerto Rican University Students,* University of Texas Press, 1970, p. 150.

14. *Puerto Ricans in New York State,* 1960-69, New York State Division of Human Rights, No. date.

15. Richard Morse, "The Deceptive Transformation," p. 30.

16. Manuel Teruel, *Puerto Ricans in Transition, Social Relations,* Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 1969.

17. Eduardo Seda Bonilla, "Ethnic Studies, Cultural Pluralism and Power," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, University of Colorado, April, 1970, p. 1.

18. See especially "The Puerto Rican Experience on the U.S. Mainland," a special issue of the International Migration Review, Vol. II, Spring, 1968.

19. New York State Division of Human Rights, *Puerto Ricans,* p. 19.

Selected Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL, GENERAL, AND INTERPRETIVE WORKS

Works in Spanish

Babín, María Teresa. *Panorama de la cultura puertorriqueña.* New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1958.

Blanco, Tomás. *Prontuario histórico de Puerto Rico.* San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1946.

Fernández Méndez, Eugenio. *Desarrollo histório de la sociedad puertorriqueña.* San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1959.

Maldonado-Denis, Manuel. *Puerto Rico: Una interpretación historico-social.* México: Siglo XXI, 1973.

Manrique Cabrera, Francisco. *Historia de la literatura puertorriqueña.* New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1956.

Nieves Falcón, Luis. *Diagnóstico de Puerto Rico.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1972.

Pagán, Bolívar. *Historia de los partidos politicos puertorriqueños.* San Juan: Libreria Campos, 1959.

Pedreira, Antonio. *Isularismo.* Madrid: Tipografía Artística, 1934.

Seda Bonilla, Eduardo. *Requiem para una cultura.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1970.

Silén, Juan Angel. *Hacia una visión positiva del puertorriqueño.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1970.

Zenón Cruz, Isabelo. *Narciso descubre su trasero.* Humacao: Editorial Furidi, 1975.

Works in English

Babín María Teresa, ed. *Borínquen: An Anthology of Puerto Rican Literature.* New York: Random House, 1974.

______. *The Puerto Rican's Spirit: Their History, Life, and Culture.* New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1971.

Cordasco, Francesco and Buchioni, Eugene, eds. *The Puerto Rican Experience: A Sociological Sourcebook.* Totowa, New Jersey: Towman and Littlefield, 1973.

Dessick, Jesse, ed. *Doctoral Research on Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans.* New York: New York University Press, 1967.

Fernández Méndez, Eugenio, ed. *Portrait of a Society: Readings on Puerto Rican Sociology.* Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1972.

______. *The Sources of Puerto Rican Culture History: A Critical Appraisal.* San Juan: Ediciones El Cemi, 1967.

Figueroa, Loida. *History of Puerto Rico.* New York: Anaya Book Co., 1972.

Lewis, Gordon K. *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963.

López, Adalberto and Petras, James, ed. *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society.* Cambridge. Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1974.

Maldonado-Denis, Manuel. *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation.* New York: Random House, 1972.

Osuna, Juan José. *A History of Education in Puerto Rico.* 2nd ed. Río Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1949.

Silén, Juan Angel. *We, the Puerto Rican People. A Story Oppression of and Resistance.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

Steiner, Stan. *The Islands: The World of the Puerto Ricans.* New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

U. S. Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico. *Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office, 1966.

Vivó, Paquita, ed. *The Puerto Ricans: An Annotated bibliography.* New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1973.

Wagenheim, Kal. *Puerto Rico: A Profile.* 2nd. ed. New York: Praeger, 1975.

______. ed., with Olga Jiménez de Wagenheim. *The Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History.* New York: Praeger, 1973.

Wells, Henry. *The Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of Changing Values and Institutions.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

PUERTO RICO TO 1898

Works in Spanish

Abad y Lasierra, Fray Iñigo. *Historia geográfica, civil y natural de la Isla de San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico* [1788]. Río Piedras; Editorial Universitaria, 1959.

Alonso, Manuel. *El Gíbaro. Cuadro de costumbres de la isla de Puerto Rico* [1849]. San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1967.

Atiles, Francisco del Valle. *El campesino puertorriqueño. Sus condiciones físicas, intelectuales y morales.* San Juan, 1887.

Brau, Salvador. *La colonización de Puerto Rico.* San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1966.

———. *Las clases journaleras de Puerto Rico.* San Juan, 1882.

Cifre de Loubriel,Estela, *La inmigración a Puerto Rico durante el siglo XIX.* San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1964.

Córdoba, Pedro Tomás de. *Memorias geográficas, históricas, económicas y estadísticas de la isla de Puerto Rico.* San Juan: Oficina del Gobierno, 1831-1883.

Cruz Monclova, Lidio. *Historia de Puerto Rico en el siglo XIX,* 3 vols. Rio Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1957-1964.

Díaz Soler, Luis M. *Historia de la esclavitud negra en Puerto Rico (1493-1890)* 3rd. ed. San Juan: Editorial Universitaria, 1969.

Fernández Méndez, Eugenio, ed. *Crónicas de Puerto Rico.* Vol. 1. San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1957.

Figueroa, Loida. *Breve historia de Puerto Rico (Desde sus comienzos hasta 1898).* 2 Vols. Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1969.

Gauthier Dapena, José. *Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal puertorriqueño en el siglo XIX.* San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1963.

Gómez Acevedo, Labor. *Organización y reglamentación del trabajo en el Puerto Rico del siglo XIX.* San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1970.

López-Baralt, Mercedes. *El mito Taíno.* Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1976.

Morales Carrión, Arturo. *Historia del pueblo de Puerto Rico desde sus orígenes hasta el siglo XVIII.* San Juan: Departamento de Instrucción Pública, 1968.

Pedreria, Antonio. *El año terrible del 87.* San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1964.

Rosario Natal, Carmelo. *Puerto Rico y la crisis de la guerra hispano-americana.* Hato Rey: Ramallo Brothers, 1975.

Suárez Díaz, Ada. *El Doctor Ramón Emeterio Betances, su vida y su obra.* San Juan: Ateneo Puertorriqueño, 1968.

Tapia y Rivera, A. *Mis memorias o Puerto Rico como lo encontré y como lo dejé.* San Juan, 1946.

Works in English

Alegria, Ricardo. *Discovery, Conquest and Colonization of Puerto Rico: 1493-1599.* San

Juan: Colección de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 1971.

Fewkes, Jesse Walter. *The Aborigines of Porto Rico and Neighboring Islands* [1903-04]. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970.

Flinter, George. *An Account of the Present State of the Island of Puerto Rico.* London, 1834.

Morales Carrión, Arturo. *Puerto Rico and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean.* Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico Press, 1952.

Turnbull, David. *Travels in the West. Cuba; with Notices of Porto Rico and the Slave Trade* [1840]. New York: Negro University Press, 1969.

PUERTO RICO SINCE 1898

Works in Spanish

Carreras, Juan. *Santiago Iglesias Pantín.* San Juan: Editorial Club de la Prensa, 1967.

Iglesias de Pagán, Igualdad. *Ed obrerismo en Puerto Rico (1896-1905).* Palencia de Castilla: Ediciones Ponce de León, 1973.

Maldonado-Denis, Manuel. *Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos: Emigración y colonialismo.* México: Siglo XXI, 1976.

Mathews, Thomas G. *La Política puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato.* San Juan: Editorial del Departamento de Instrucción Pública, 1967.

Ojeda, Felix. *Vito Marcantonio y Puerto Rico: Por los trabajadores y la nación.* Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1978.

Quintero Rivera, Angel G. *Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico.* Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1978.

———. *El liderato local de los partidos y el estudio de la política puertorriqueña.* Río Piedras: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1970.

———, ed. *Lucha obrera en Puerto Rico. Antología de grandes documentos en la historia obrera Puertorriqueña.* Río Piedras: CEREP, 1971.

Ramírez, Rafael, Levine, Barry, and Buitrago Ortíz, Carlos, eds. *Problemas de desigualdad social en Puerto Rico.* Río Piedras: Libreria Internacional, 1972.

Seda, Eduardo. *Los Derechos civiles en la cultura puertorriqueña.* Río Piedras: Editorial Universitaria, 1963.

Torres, Benjamin, ed. *Pedro Albizu Campos. Obras escogidas.* San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975.

Villar Roces, Mario. *Puerto Rico y su reforma agraria.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1968.

Works in English

Anderson, Robert W. *Party Politics in Puerto Rico.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

Berbusse, Edward *The United States in Puerto Rico: 1898-1900.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Bhana, Surendra. *The United States and the Development of the Puerto Rican Status Question, 1936-1968.* Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1975.

Bourne, Dorothy and James, *Thirty Years of Change in Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Ten Selected Rural Areas.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

Clark, Truman. *Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933.* Pittsburgh: Press, 1975.

Clark, Victor S., *el. al. Porto Rico and its Problems.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1930.

Diffie, Bailey and Justine. *Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge.* New York: The Vanguard Press, 1931.

Dinwiddie, William. *Porto Rico. Its Conditions and Possibilities.* New York, 1899.

Epstein, Erwin H., ed. *Politics and Education in Puerto Rico: A Documentary History of the Language Issue.* Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1970.

Flores, Juan. *The Insular Vision: Pedreira's Interpretation of Puerto Rican Culture.* New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, CUNY, 1978.

Goodsell, Charles T. *Administration of a Revolution: Executive Reform in Puerto Rico Under Governor Tugwell, 1941-1946.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.

The History Task Force, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños. *Labor Migration under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Howard University. *Symposium on Puerto Rico in the Year 2000.* Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1968.

Lewis, Gordon K. *Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Mathews, Thomas G. *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960.

Mintz, Sidney, *Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rico Life History.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

Negrón de Montilla, Aida. *Americanization in Puerto Rico and the Public School System, 1900-1930.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1971.

Quintero Rivera, Angel G., ed. *Workers' Struggle in Puerto Rico: A Documentary History.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.

Seda, Eduardo. *Social Change and Personality in a Puerto Rican Agrarian Reform Community.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

Steward, Julian, *et. al. The People of Puerto Rico.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956.

Tumin, Melvin and Feldman, Arnold. *Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico.* 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.

PUERTO RICANS IN THE UNITED STATES

Works in Spanish

Greven, Leonardo. *Cuentos de Nueva York. El padre que no se fué y otros cuentos.* New York, 1978.

Iglesias, César Andreu, ed. *Memorias de Bernardo Vega (una contribución a la historia de la comunidad puertorriqueña en Nueva York).* Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1977.

Maldonado-Denis, Manuel. *Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos: Emigración y colonialismo.* México: siglo XXI, 1976.

Nieves Falcón, Luis, *Los emigrantes puertorriqueños.* Río Piedras: Editorial Edil, 1975.

Soto, Pedro Juan. *Ardiente suelo, fría estación.* México, 1961.

———. *Spiks.* Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1970.

Works in English

Abramson, Michael, ed. *Palante: Young Lords Party.* New York: McGraw Hill, 1971.

Algarin, Miguel and Piñero, Miguel, eds. *Nuyorican Poetry: An Anthology of Words and Feelings.* New York: Morrow, 1975.

Barretto, Lefty. *Nobody's Hero: A Puerto Rican Story.* New York: New American Library, 1977.

Campos, Ricardo and Flores, Juan. *National Culture and Migration: Perspectives from the Puerto Rican Working Class.* New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, CUNY, 1978.

Chenault, Lawrence. *The Perto Rican Migrant in New York City.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.

Colón Jesús. *A Puerto Rican in New York and other Sketches.* New York: Arno Press, 1975.

Cooper, Paulette, ed. *Growing up Puerto Rican.* New York: New American Library, 1972.

Cordasco, Francesco, ed. *Puerto Ricans on the United States Mainland: A Bibliography of Reports, Texts, Critical Studies and Related Materials.* Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972.

Documents of the Puerto Rican Migration, 1879-1901. New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, CUNY, 1977.

Fitzpatrick, Joseph P. *Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971.

Handlin Oscar. *The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.

The History Task Force, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños. *Labor Migration Under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Hernández Álvarez, José. *Return Migration to Puerto Rico.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Jennings, James. *Puerto Rican Politics in New York City.* Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977.

Language Policy Task Force. *Language Policy and the Puerto Rican Community.* New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, CUNY, 1977.

López, Alfredo. *The Puerto Rican Paper: Notes on the Re-emergence of a Nation.* New York: Boobs-Merrill, 1973.

Mapp, Edward, ed. *Puerto Rican Perspectives.* Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1974.

Mills, C. Wright. *The Puerto Rican Journey.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

Morh, Nicholasa. *In Nueva York.* New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1979.

Padilla, Elena, *Up From Puerto Rico.* New York; columbia University Press, 1958.

Pietri, Pedro. *Puerto Rican Obituary.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Sexton, Patricia Cayo. *Spanish Harlem: Anatomy of Poverty.* New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Soto, Pedro Juan. *Hot Land, Cold Season.* New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1973.

——— *Spiks.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973.

Thomas, Piri. *Down These Mean Streets.* New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967.

——— *Savior, Savior, Hold my Hand.* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1972.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future.* Washington, D.C., 1976.

Wagenheim, Kal. *A Survey of Puerto Ricans on the U.S. Mainland in the1970s.* New York: Praeger, 1973.

Wakefield, Dan. *Island in the City: The World of Spanish Harlem.* New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.

Brief Chronology of Puerto Rican History

c. 12-10,000 B.C.:	Emergence of tribal communities of hunters and gatherers in northern South America.
c. 4-6,000 B.C.:	Tribal groups of hunters and marine food gatherers migrate from northern South America to the Lesser Antilles.
c. 300 B.C.:	Arawak-speaking groups from northern South America begin to migrate to the Lesser Antilles where they introduce slash-and-burn agriculture and pottery making.
c. 300 B.C.-800A.D.:	Spread of Arawak-speaking groups throughout the Lesser Antilles, Puerto Rico, and the other of the Greater Antilles; improving agricultural techniques and an expanding argicultural surplus; growing complexity among the societies of the Lesser and Greater Antilles.
c. 800-1493:	Evolution of Taino culture and society in Puerto Rico and the other of the Greater Antilles; growing agricultural productivity and social; complexity; expanding population concentrations; migration of Carib groups from northern South America to the Lesser Antilles.

1493: Christopher Columbus discovers the island of Boriquén for Europe on November 19. He names it San Juan Bautista. (Later the island becomes known as Puerto Rico.)

1503: The Crown of Castille authorizes the shipping of black slaves to the New World.

1508: Juan Ponce de León begins the Spanish occupation of Boriquén and founds the settlement of Caparra.

1509: The Spaniards begin the evacuation of Caparra to the site where the city of San Juan stands today. Arrival of the first slaves in Puerto Rico.

1511: Under the leadership of Agüeybana II, the Taino inhabitants of Boriquén launch their first rebellion against the Spaniards. Agüeybana is killed and the rebellion is crushed. Many Tainos flee the island to neighboring islands.

1512: Alonso Manso, first bishop of Puerto Rico, arrives on the island. He returns to Spain in 1515.

1521: Ponce de León is wounded by local Indians while exploring the Florida Peninsula. He dies in Havana soon thereafter.

1530: Gold production in Puerto Rico declines rapidly. Many Spaniards leave the island to seek their fortunes elsewhere in the continent. Governor Manuel de Lando takes steps to stop the exodus. To replace a rapidly declining Indian labor force, more black slaves are introduced.

1531: Governor Lando describes Puerto Rico as "the key to the Indies."

1533: A watchtower to protect the port of San Juan is erected. The construction of *La Fortaleza* begins.

1539: The construction of El Morro fortress is authorized.

1565: Last Taino rebellion against the Spaniards.

1576: *La Fortaleza* becomes the official residence of the governors of Puerto Rico.

1582: Governor of Puerto Rico informs the king of Spain that only a few hundred Indians are left on the island.

1586: To cover the cost of administering and defending the island, the Mexican *situado* (subsidy) is introduced. It was not abolished until 1811.

1595: Francis Drake attacks San Juan in November, but is rebuffed.

1598: George Clifford, Count of Cumberland, attacks San Juan and holds on to it for 82 days (from June through November).

1603: Royal efforts are undertaken to cut down on the production of ginger.

1608: The Boquerón Fort, the bridge on the San Antonio channel and the Cañuelo Fort are built.

1625: A Dutch expedition, commanded by Boduin Hendrikson, attacks and takes San Juan. After occupying the city for almost two months, the Dutch burned most of it, then sailed away.

1635: The construction of a massive wall around San Juan is begun.

1647: Diego de Torres Vargas writes his *Descripción de la Isla y Ciudad de Puerto Rico.*

1700: Charles II of Spain dies after willing Spain and its empire to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV of France. Soon thereafter the War of the Spanish Succession begins. It lasts until 1713.

1702: English attack near Arecibo is rebuffed.

1703: A Dutch invading force is repulsed near Guadianilla.

1714: The town of San Mateo de Cangrejos is founded.

1717: The town of Río Piedras is founded.

1723: The town of Guaynabo is founded.

1726: Coffee trees are introduced from the French Antilles.

1732: The town of Manatí is founded.

1735: The town of Guayama is founded.

1739: The town of Utuado is founded. Beginning of War of Jenkins' Ear between England and Spain.

1740: The town of Coamo is founded.

1745: The town of Toa Baja is founded.

1751: The town of Toa Alta is founded. José Campeche, well-known island painter, is born.

1752: The settlement of Ponce, on the south coast, officially becomes a town.

1753: Governor Felipe Ramírez de Estenos expels the English from the island of Vieques.

1756: The Real Compañia de Barcelona is created to carry on commerce with Puerto Rico and Hispaniola.

1757: Governor Ramírez de Estenos presents a plan for agrarian reform in the island. Juan Alejo Arizmendi is born in San Juan.

1760: The Town of Farjardo is founded.

1763: The town of Mayagüez, on the west coast, is founded.

1764: A new mail system is inaugurated between Spain and Cuba, and San Juan is an intermediate stop.

1765: Marshall Alejandro O'Reilly arrives in Puerto Rico. Census of the island's population: 44,833 persons of whom 5,037 are black slaves.

1771: The town of Cabo Rojo is founded.

1771: The town of Bayamón is founded.

1772: Founding of the towns of Pepino and Cayey.

1775: Founding of the towns of Caguas and Aguadilla. Ramońn Power y Giralt is born. Population of Puerto Rico is 70,250, including 6,467 black slaves.

1778: Arecibo, Coamo and Aguada attain official status as towns.

1782: The wall surrounding the main area of San Juan is completed.

1787: Exportation of tobacco to Holland is authorized. The Royal Mercantile Factory is established for the exporting of tobacco.

1793: The towns of Yabucoa and Humacao are founded.

1797: English attack Puerto Rico but are forced to withdraw. The towns of Juncos and Luquillo are founded. Spain authorizes commerce between Puerto Rico and neutral powers.

1803: Juan Alejo Arizmendi is appointed bishop of San Juan.

1807: The first printing press is brought to Puerto Rico. The island's first publication, *La Gaceta Oficial,* is printed. French troops begin to move into Spain.

1808: The Spanish people begin their war against the French armies of occupation. Soon thereafter a Junta Central is established to coordinate the anti-French war effort. The Junta calls for a meeting of the traditional Spanish Cortes (parliament) in the city of Cádiz.

1809: The Spanish American colonies are invited to elect deputies to the Cortes. The Puerto Rican creole elite chooses Ramón Power y Giralt to represent them.

1810: Wars of independence get underway in the Spanish American mainland.

1812: The Cortes of Cádiz enacts a constitution that gives the colonies some representation.

1814: Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, abolishes the Constitution of 1812 after the French armies have been forced out of Spain.

1815: Ferdinand VII grants Puerto Rico the *Cédula de Gracias*.

1820: Liberal revolt in Spain forces Ferdinand to reinstate Constitution of 1812. Puerto Rico is once again given the right to elect representatives to the Spanish Cortes. Public lighting is installed in San Juan.

1822: Román Baldorioty de Castro is born. Slaves revolt in Bayamón and Toa Baja.

1823: The liberal regime in Spain is overthrown. Ferdinand VII once again abolished the Constitution of 1812.

1825: José Julián Acosta is born.

1826: At a congress of representatives from several of the newly-created Spanish American republics, Simón Bolívar advocates the creation of an army to liberate Puerto Rico and Cuba. The United States opposes the plan. The town of Comerío is founded. Alejandro Tapia y Rivera is born.

1827: Ramón Emeterio Betances is born in Cabo Rojo.

1829: The town of Lares is founded. Julio L. Vizcarrondo and Segundo Ruiz Belvis are born.

1830: Simón Bolívar dies. The towns of Aibonito and Ceiba are founded.

1832: The Theological Seminary is officially opened in San Juan. Audiencia of Puerto Rico is created.

1837: Governor Miguel López Baños issues a decree known as *Bando de Policía y Buen Gobierno.*

1838: Andrés Vizcarrondo, Buenaventura Quiñones, Juan Quiñones and others plan an uprising to proclaim Puerto Rican independence. They are arrested when Governor López de Baños learns of the plan. Buenaventura Quiñones is discovered hanged in a cell in El Morro.

1839: Eugenio María de Hostos is born in Mayagüez.

1842: Salvador Brau is born.

1843: The *Aguinaldo Puertorriqueño* is published in San Juan.

1844: The *Album Puertorriqueño* is published in Barcelona.

1845: Spain finally gives in to British pressures and puts an end to the slave trade in Puerto Rico.

1848: Slave rebellions in Ponce and Vega Baja in Puerto Rico and in the neighboring island of Martinique lead Governor Juan Prim to issue the notorious *Bando Negro.*

1849: Governor Juan de la Pezuela introduces the system of passbooks (*libretas reglamentarias*). In Barcelona, Manuel A. Alonso's *El Gíbaro* is published.

1850: José Gautier Benítez and Cayetano Coll y Toste are born.

1854: Daniel de Rivera publishes his poem *Agüeybana el Bravo.* He is arrested by Governor Fernando Norzagaray. The School of Agriculture, Navigation, and Commerce is created. Román Baldorioty de Castro and José Julián Acosta, who had gone to Spain to study, return to Puerto Rico.

1855: Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón is born.

1857: Juan Morel Campos is born. So is José Celso Barbosa.

1859: Luis Muñoz Rivera is born.

1860: Ramón E. Betances is exiled from the island because of his pro-independence activities.

1862: Betances is once again exiled from Puerto Rico by the colonial authorities.

1863: Julio L. Vizcarrondo established in Madrid the Spanish Abolitionist Society.

1865: Cuban and Puerto Rican separatists establish a pro-independence Republican Society in New York City.

1866: José de Diego is born.

1867: Betances proclaims "The Ten Commandments of Free Men" in St. Thomas.

1868: On September 23, pro-independence groups take over the town of Lares and proclaim the creation of the Republic of Puerto Rico.

1869: The promulgation of a new constitution in Spain gives Puerto Rico the right to elect deputies to the Spanish Cortes. The notoriou *Guardia Civil* is introduced to Puerto Rico.

1870: The Liberal Reformist Party and the Conservative Party are founded.

1873: Slavery is abolished in Puerto Rico.

1874: The Spanish Federal Republic, which had been established in

1873, is overthrown by the Spanish military and the monarchy restored.

1878: New electoral law limits the size of the electorate in Puerto Rico to 2,000 persons (out of an adult male population of 374,640). Luis Lloréns Torres is born.

1879: The town of Culebra is founded on the island of the same name.

1880: A tramway from San Juan to Río Piedras is inaugurated.

1881: The Assimilist Party is founded.

1886: The *carretera militar* connecting San Juan to Ponce is completed.

1887: The Puerto Rican Autonomist Party is founded. Governor Romualdo Palacios launches reign of terror against the autonomists and reformists in general. Among those arrested and thrown into the dungeons of El Morro is Román Baldorioty de Castro.

1889: Baldorioty de Castro dies in Ponce.

1891: Pedro Albizu Campos is born in Ponce.

1892: The Cuban Revolutionary Party is founded in New York City by José Martí. A Puerto Rican Section of the party is organized.

1895: Cuban revolutionaries launch war of independence.

1897: Luis Muñoz Rivera, the most important autonomist leader on the island, betrays to the Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico a pro-independence plot in Yauco. Soon thereafter he travels to Spain to ask for autonomy for Puerto Rico. The regime of Sagasta in Spain grants Puerto Rico an Autonomous Charter.

1898: The United States goes to war against Spain. Spanish troops in Cuba are defeated. U.S. troops occupy the Philippines. In July, U.S. troops occupy Puerto Rico. In September, Spain and the United States sign the Treaty of Paris by virtue of which Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. A U.S. general is named by Washington to govern the island. Luis Muñoz Marín is born.

1899: San Ciriaco hurricane devastates the island. General John Eaton is appointed Superintendent of Public Instruction. All newspapers published in Puerto Rico are placed under the direct control of the U.S. military government. The Puerto Rican Republican Party is founded.

1900: The Foraker Act sets up civil government. Charles H. Allen becomes the first civilian governor under U.S. colonial rule. The first Labor Congress is held.

1903: The University of Puerto Rico is established.

1904: The Unionist Party, led by Luis Muñoz Rivera, is founded.

1910: Under the leadership of Santiago Iglesias Pantín, la *Federación Libre de Trabajadores* is founded.

1911: The College of Agricultural and Engineering is established in Mayagüez.

1912: Matienzo Cintrón founds the Puerto Rican Independence Party.

1913: The Unionist Party eliminates statehood from its program. Matienzo Cintrón dies.

1915: The Puerto Rican Socialist Party (led by Santiago Iglesias) is founded.

1916: Luis Muñoz Rivera dies.

1917: The United States enters World War I. In March, the Jones Act is passed. The new act imposes U.S. citizenship on Puerto Ricans and makes them subject to the draft laws of the metropolis.

1918: The U.S. Supreme Court declares Puerto Rico an "unincorporated" territory belonging to but not forming part of the United States. José de Diego dies.

1921: Celso Barbosa dies.

1922: The Unionist Party eliminates independence as a goal from the party's platform. Antonio Barceló, leader of the Unionist Party, suggests the concept of the *Estado Libre Asociado*. Pro-independence Unionists leave the party, and under the leadership of José Coll y Cuchi found the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.

1923: First radio station is established in Puerto Rico.

1924: Santiago Iglesias leads the Socialist Party (the party of the workers) into a pro-statehood alliance (the *Coalición*) with the Republican Party (the party of the rich).

1928: San Felipe hurricane hits the island.

1929: The Depression hits Puerto Rico. By 1930, 36% of the employable on the island were unemployed.

1930: Pedro Albizu Campos is elected president of the Nationalist Party.

1931: Luis Muñoz Marín returns to Puerto Rico after living for many years in the U.S.

1932: The Coalition of pro-statehood Republicans, sectors of the Unionist Party and sectors of the Socialist Party led by Santiago Iglesias win the insular elections. Santiago Iglesias is elected Resident Commissioner to Washington. San Ciprián hurricane devastates the island.

1933: Cane workers at the South Porto Rico Sugar Company go on strike. They are joined in early 1934 by workers of the Fajardo Sugar Company and Central Aguirre Associates.

1934: Antonio S. Pedreira publishes his *Insularismo*.

1935: Nationalist militants are killed by police at the University of Puerto Rico.

1936: The chief of the insular police, Colonel Francis Riggs, is killed by two young Nationalists. Albizu Campos and several other Nationalists are arrested and tried for sedition. Albizu Campos is sentenced to the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. Senator Tydings introduces the bill named after him that offers Puerto Rico its independence.

1937: At the commencement of a parade of the Nationalist Party in Ponce, the police opens fire and many Nationalists are killed. Thus the name "The Ponce Massacre."

1938: Luis Muñoz Marín and others leave the Liberal Party (formerly the Unionist Party) and found the Popular Democratic Party. Workers strike for 42 days on the water front in the Toa Baja-Dorado-Bayamón area. Antonio Barceló dies. Nationalists open fire on Governor Blanton Winship.

1939: Santiago Iglesias dies.

1940: The Popular Democratic Party of Luis Muñoz Marín wins a surprising and impressive electoral victory. Muñoz Marín becomes president of the insular sentate.

1941: Rexford Guy Tugwell is named the last North American governor of Puerto Rico.

1944: The Popular Democratic Party wins the election with 383,000 votes, compared to 208,000 of the combined opposition.

1946: President Truman names Jesús T. Piñero governor of Puerto Rico (the first Puerto Rican to occupy the post). The *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueñno* (PIP) is founded in Bayamón.

1947: The insular legislative adopts the Industrial Incentives Act; Operation Bootstrap goes into effect. The goal is to attract foreign capital to the island. Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico after a 10-year prison term. President Truman signs the Crawford-Butler Act, permitting Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor.

1948: Students at the University of Puerto Rico go on strike. The Popular Democratic Party wins the election, with 392,000 votes against 346,000. Luis Muñoz Marín becomes the first elected governor in the history of Puerto Rico. The Catholic University in Ponce is founded.

1950: In July President Truman signs Public Law 600 permitting Puerto Rico to draft its own constitution within a colonial framework. In October a Nationalist revolt explodes in several parts of the island. Nationalists attack *La Fortaleza* in San Juan. On the mainland Nationalists try to kill Truman. In Puerto Rico the National Guard is mobilized to crush the revolt. Albizu Campos is arrested and once again sent to jail.

1951: A plebescite approves Law 600 by 75 per cent of the votes cast. Soon thereafter 92 delegates (the majority *populares*) are elected to a Constituent Convention to draw up the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or Associated Free State.

1952: On March 3, with 375,000 to 83,000 votes the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is approved.

1954: On March 1 four Nationalists open fire in the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen.

1955: The Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña is established.

1956: The Popular Democratic Party wins 62 per cent of the total vote. The Statehood Republican Party doubles its 1952 total with 172,000 votes; the PIP drops to 85,000. The *Federacion Universitaria Pro-Independencia* (FUPI) is established.

1959: The U.S. Congress rejects the Fernos-Murray Bill, which aimed to amplify Puerto Rico's autonomy. The *Movimiento Pro-Independencia* (MPI) is founded.

1960: The Popular Democratic Party wins the elections with 58 per cent of the total votes cast. The FUPI launches a campaign against compulsory ROTC at the University of Puerto Rico.

1962: Muñoz Marín and President Kennedy exchange letters and arrange for the creation of a joint U.S.-Puerto Rico Status Commission to conduct studies on the status of the island.

1963: Cuba requests the inclusion of the Puerto Rican case in the agenda of the Committee of Twenty-Four (decoloniztion matters) of the United Nations.

1964: Muñoz Marín retires from the governorship. His handpicked successor, Roberto Sánchez Vilella, becomes the Popular Democratic Party candidate and easily wins the election.

1965: Pedro Albizu Campos dies.

1967: In a referendum on political status, the Commonwealth concept receives a majority of the votes, against statehood and independence.

1968: A rift in the Popular Democratic Party causes Sánchez Vilella to leave the party. He forms his own People's Party. Luis Negrón López is the Popular Democratic candidate. Luis A. Ferré and the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (the heir of the old Republican Party) win by a narrow margin, interrupting 28 years of Popular Democratic Party rule.

1969: Senate minority leader Justo Méndez of the New Progressive Party tells the press that the Commonwealth is to be a "transitory" vehicle to statehood, reasoning that the 1968 election nullified the 1967 referendum.

1970: Governor Ferré and President Nixon agree on the formation of an *ad hoc* committee to discuss Ferré's request that Puerto Ricans be allowed to participate in presidential elections. Muñoz Marín retires from the Senate.

1971: The MPI changes its name to Puerto Rican Socialist Party and adopts Marxism-Leninism as its ideology.

1972: Rafael Hernández Colón of the Popular Democratic Party is elected governor of Puerto Rico. The Popular Democratic Party received 100,000 more votes than the New Progressive Party of Ferré.

1973: Waves of workers' strikes hit the island. The National Guard is mobilized to run certain enterprises paralyzed by these strikes. At an assembly of students at the University of Puerto Rico, the majority vote to strike for changes at the university. The university is forced to close.

1975: As a result of demonstrations by local residents and other Puerto Ricans, the U.S. Navy departs from the offshore island of Culebra which it had used as a ship-to-shore gunnery target since 1899. The inflation rate reaches an annual level of close to 30%. It is estimated that between 20% and 40% of the labor force is unemployed.

1976: U.S. President Gerald Ford issues declaration supporting statehood for Puerto Rico. Carlos Romero Barceló, head of the PNP, unseats Governor Colón of the PPD. The PNP received about 48% of the votes cast, in contrast to about 45% for the PPD. The PNP establishes control of both houses of the Legislature. Demonstrations against the U.S. Navy are organized in the offshore island of Vieques.

1977: Carlos Romero Barceló is sworn in as governor of Puerto Rico. Waves of strikes manifest a growing militancy among Puerto Rican workers and opposition against growing repressive measures by the Barceló government. Union leaders representing 60,000 workers from the Trade Union Committee Against Repression.

1978: Governor Barceló declares that if the PNP is returned to power in 1980 he will press for statehood in a plesbicite in 1981. Luis Mũoz Marín comes out of political retirement to speak out against the pro-Statehood position of Barceló. The U.N. Committee on Decolonization labels Puerto Rico a colony of the U.S. and calls for self-determination for the island. The resolution states that such self-determination can be exercised properly only after the U.S. transfers power over Puerto Rico to the Puerto Rican people. Two proindependence Puerto Rican activists (Carlos Soto and Arnaldo Rosado) are murdered by police at Cerro Maravilla.

1979: The rate of inflation and unemployment continues to rise. The people of Vieques step up their campaign to get the U.S. Navy to stop using the island for shelling and bombing practice and for the storage of bombs and other explosives. René Marqués dies.

The Puerto Ricans, their history, cultur
972.95 PUE 46989
CORRY PUBLIC LIBRARY

THE
their histo

edited by Adalberto López

This fine collection of articles by authors from a variety of disciplines offers many views of Puerto Rico. Within the volume the historical perspective reaches all the way back to the tribal societies living on **Boriquen**, which was the indigenous name of Puerto Rico. After a discussion of the colonization process by the Spaniards there follows a description of the three centuries during which Puerto Rico was a colony. This period proved to be an evolutionary one, for the nineteenth century saw the birth of the Puerto Rican nations.

From its foundation of historical narrative the book branches into two sections. These deal with two main groups of Puerto Ricans in this century: the first, those people who remained in Puerto Rico, and the second, Puerto Ricans living in or employed on the mainland.

The book makes major contributions to information on the culture and sociology of the Puerto Rican people. With essays treating such varied topics as the position of women, class development, contemporary literature, the seeds of migration, and voices of protest amid widespread poverty and exploitation, it provides a comprehensive compilation.

The questions raised in the book are revealing and provocative; the answers offered do not pretend to be ultimate solutions. This is a text intended to stimulate discussion and further reading in areas of particular interest. It is not to be missed by students and scholars, and will be of great use to the general readers as well.

Adalberto López is Associate Professor of History, Director of Latin American and Caribbean Area Studies Program, and Coordinator of Overseas Academic Programs at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He is author of **The Revolt of the Comuneros, 1721-1735: A Study of the Colonial History of Paraguay**, and coeditor of **Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society**, both published by Schenkman.

SCHEN
C

ISBN: 0-87073-845-
ISBN: 0-87073-844-

ER DESIGN:
A ARRAND

JAN 2 0 2002
DEC
7/23/04
DISCARDED from the
Corry Public Library